

The Journal of

SOCIAL ISSUES

JANUARY, 1968


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VALUES, ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS IN
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

INVITED DISTINGUISHED ADDRESS: 1967
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: 1967
MILTON ROKEACH
KURT LEWIN MEMORIAL ADDRESS: 1967
MUZAFER SHERIF

NATHAN CAPLAN
WILLIAM ECKHARDT
MARCIA GUTTENTAG
RALPH SEGALMAN
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THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES

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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues is a group of over two thousand psychologists and allied social scientists who share a concern with research on the psychological aspects of important social issues. SPSSI is governed by Kurt Lewin's dictum that "there is nothing so practical as a good theory". In various ways, the Society seeks to bring theory and practice into focus on human problems of the group, the community, and the nation as well as the increasingly important ones that have no national boundaries. This Journal has as its goal the communication of scientific findings and interpretations in a non-technical manner but without the sacrifice of professional standards.

The Journal typically publishes a whole number on a single theme or topic. Proposals for new thematically integrated issues should be sent to the General Editor. In addition, the Journal welcomes manuscripts for possible inclusion in an occasional issue devoted to separate articles of general interest to its readers, but with no necessary relationship to each other. Single manuscripts should be sent to the Singles Editor.

JOSHUA A. FISHMAN, *General Editor, JSI*, Ferkauf Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Yeshiva University, 55 Fifth Ave., N. Y., N. Y. 10003

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Society Address: Caroline Weichlein, SPSSI Executive Secretary, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Subscriptions to the Journal, applications for membership in the Society, changes in mailing address, and requests for information should be sent to Mrs. Weichlein.

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
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

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Issue Editor: Abraham J. Tannenbaum

Invited Distinguished Address: 1967

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in the Civil Rights Movement*, Martin Luther King, Jr.

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Editorial Notes

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES WILL ACCEPT "SINGLES"

The JSI Editorial Board plans to depart somewhat from the current policy of organizing each number of the Journal of Social Issues around an integrating theme or topic. In the future, some *JSI* issues will consist of "singles", i.e., of separate articles that bear no necessary relationship to each other. The single-theme-per-issue policy will still predominate since it provides for comprehensive coverage of the vital social concerns addressed by the Journal. However, there are matters of broad public concern to which social scientists have contributed relatively little theory or research—certainly not enough to fill an entire *JSI* number. The Editorial Board feels that if the topic is important enough, and a single paper written on it is compelling enough, some future *JSI* issues ought to be designed to accommodate such "singles".

SSPSI members and their friends and colleagues in the social sciences are therefore invited to submit manuscripts for review and possible inclusion in forthcoming "singles" issues. The editors suggest the following guidelines for preparing "singles".

(a) In keeping with the *JSI* tradition, a "single" should deal with a broadly conceived critical issue. The titles of past *JSI* numbers suggest that the *Journal* has always addressed itself to topics that have breadth and scope rather than those that are conceptually circumscribed, even if their implications are vast. "Singles" submitted for consideration by the *JSI* Editorial Board ought to follow that spirit.

(b) As in the case of *JSI* numbers planned around one topic, a "single" article should be a contribution growing out of the professional work of the social scientist and should therefore, reflect theory or research in his field. It should not be simply a personal essay that would be more suitable for a journal on public affairs.

There is no way of determining as yet how frequently a "singles" issue of *JSI* appear. Wherever possible, a paper that is acceptable to the editors will be published along with other papers on the same topic in order to preserve the current format of topical issues. The "singles" format will appear only when there is not enough social scientific material that can be assembled on the topic to fill an entire Journal number.

Please address all contributions to Dr. J. Diedrick Snoek, Singles Editor *JSI*, Department of Psychology, Clark Science Center, Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts 01060.

COMMENTS AND REJOINDERS

Readers wishing to discuss or comment upon any of the articles in this or subsequent issues of *JSI* may submit their reactions or criticisms to Dr. Joshua A. Fishman, General Editor, *JSI*, Yeshiva University, 55 Fifth Ave., N.Y., N.Y. 10003. Criticisms or observations of general interest will be published in a *Comments and Rejoinders* section of *JSI*.

The JSI Editorial Board Announces a New Feature

For some time, the Editorial Board of this *Journal* has been discussing the state of its audience: social scientists and others who have an active interest in research on significant social issues.

We believe that those who care about such problems now form a relatively dispersed group, loosely affiliated through such organizations as SPSSI and its equivalents in the fields of sociology, anthropology and behavioral science. Such dispersion is natural enough in a complex culture, but has a crucial disadvantage: the person who thinks of himself as a "social scientist with a conscience", who takes social relevance as an important criterion

for choice-making in the social-scientific enterprise, may often feel that he does not have a well-defined reference group membership. Similarly, the thoughtful person in a field of social practice who is committed to systematic application of scientific knowledge in his area of professional endeavor may feel isolated and unsupported.

In short, we have come to believe that some reference-group building is in order. The researcher who cares about the social fate of the knowledge he produces, and the practitioner who believes that crucial social problems deserve more than hand-to-mouth treatment need to have more sense that they are not alone, more feeling that their concerns are shared, rather than being misguided, deviant or autistic.

SPSSI has, of course, devoted itself to the building of such a reference group for years. Yet in important respects the pages of this *Journal*, devoted as they are to specific problem domains from issue to issue, have not done as much as they might have to build a "community of interest". Those uninterested in a specific topic or problem may easily bypass that particular issue of the *Journal*. Our format has given no space for the occasional essay, the "rejoinder to the rejoinder", the impudent question about a pressing social problem that no one seems interested in from a scientific point of view, the posing of dilemmas, the illuminating news item, the speculative commentary. Yet such activities are the essence of any informed extended community.

Accordingly, the Board has inaugurated a new department of the *Journal*, devoted, so to speak, to the reduction of anomie and the increase of reference-group salience among those who care about the intersection of the social sciences with social problems. It will appear in each issue, beginning in the next issue.

The Co-Editors of this section will be David Krech and Nevitt Sanford; the Board is delighted to welcome them in what we see as an important—and enjoyable—enterprise. Below, they discuss their hopes and intentions.

The Editorial Board

Martin Deutsch

Irwin Katz

Bernard Kutner

Matthew B. Miles

Harold Proshansky

Milton Schwobel

J. Diedrick Snock

Abraham Tannenbaum

Joshua Fishman, General Editor

From David Krech and Nevitt Sanford . . .

The Board's statement of our overall assignment says pretty much all that needs to be said. It remains for us only to add a few "general specifics" indicating what matters will have priority and how we propose to deal with them. And then, with the next issue of the *Journal*, we will be off and running.

When we received the Board's invitation, and before we acknowledged that we were willing and perhaps even able to take on the job, both of us discussed the possibilities and problems involved at some length (two luncheons, several extended telephone conversations, and one fortuitously met sidewalk conference). We discovered—not to our very great surprise—that we shared several worries, forebodings, hopes and goals about SPSSI, society, our country, social psychology (and social psychologists) and the *Journal of Social Issues*.

We believe that in our universities today a searching for knowledge about man and society is expanding at an accelerating rate; and yet we are confronted with social problems of such depth as to make any reasonable man, who is acquainted both with the results of this searching and with the scope of the problems, to despair of finding solutions.

We believe—and we believe that all good SPSSI members also believe—that something can and must be done about this state of affairs. We believe that more effective means can be found for applying the bits and pieces of knowledge we already have. But what is of even greater urgency, we believe that social scientists can do a better job of producing knowledge that *can* be applied, knowledge that *is* relevant to the problems that confront us. This may require (and we say this *sotto voce* at the moment—we may boom it out later) a re-examination of the strategy, tactics, aspirations and image-building of social psychology as a "science": and as a "technology".

Just a few comments about this credo:

We think we can document the point that now, in contrast with the early days of SPSSI, relatively few psychologists in areas other than social (e.g., animal, experimental, physiological, learning theory) are joining the Society. What does this mean? Does it mean that, among psychologists, only those who are professional social psychologists have social concerns? Does it mean that most psychologists want to segregate their roles as scientists and as citizens? Does it mean that psychologists (like so many other academes these days) feel that they have nothing to contribute on the social front—even on matters of the greatest social and national import—but must leave it to the "experts"? Does it mean that

most psychologists (including some social psychologists) are not at all certain that social psychology *has* anything of value to contribute to the solution of our current social despairs? If all of these—or any one of these—are commonly held beliefs, then much has changed among our brethren and we have lost the mood of the founders of the SPSSI. For they believed that in circumstances that are dire, psychologists *must* act, even if *all* the facts are not yet in, and that we dare not limit ourselves to problems on which we already have expert knowledge.

It distresses us much that the successors and younger colleagues of non-social psychologists like Tolman, Schneirla, Halstead, Gibson, *et al.*, are no longer joining and working in SPSSI. However, we have an even greater concern. We have a more-than-vague feeling that even the social psychologists who *are* card-carrying and dues-paying members of SPSSI are not pulling their weight in SPSSI work. We believe that we can document the point that in recent years a majority of the contributors to the *Journal of Social Issues* have been non-psychologists. We applaud the *Journal's* editors' devotion to multidisciplinary work, but at the same time we cannot rid ourselves of the suspicion that this editorial devotion reflects the fact that far too few psychologists—social or of other persuasions—are doing work that is relevant to the great social issues of the day.

To understand the decreasing interest of psychologists in social issues, their decreasing inclination to use SPSSI as a vehicle for the expression of their interests, or the apparent shortage of social psychologists willing and able to work on major social problems, it will be necessary to examine many things. We will want to examine, for instance, whether any significant changes have occurred in the ways in which research is organized, supported and rewarded, or, more bluntly, the ways in which social psychologists, now define themselves, advance their careers and improve their status.

It may be that we shall have to ask again, and rethink again, such cosmic questions as: What would be the best working relation between science and society, between research and action or practice, between the university and social policy? Can university-based social scientists, while acting as scientists and as university men (rather than as individuals), advocate and seek to implement policies that flow from their inquiries? It often seems that social scientists can do so and are even often encouraged to do so by their universities, but only so long as these policies are in keeping with the conventional wisdom and broad governmental policies. When this is the case, social scientists are perceived as objective and neutral and socially-helpful, and all of this is put down on

the plus side of the ledger (under the rubric "public service") and stands them in good stead when promotion committees are convened. But let the area of their concern be "controversial", and they embarrass their colleagues, generate anxiety in the university establishment, and threaten the image of themselves as scientists. Must somebody else be the advocates on "controversial" issues? Who? Who will lobby for "the people", or for unpopular and politically weak groups such as non-conforming students or low-income alcoholics? Perhaps SPSSI ought to define itself more sharply as a lobby for the "lobby-less"? And perhaps we ought to think of agencies other than the university which can focus on the integration of research, policy-making and policy-implementation?

And as the two of us mulled over these oft-mulled-over matters, it occurred to us that we might look anew at the training of social psychologists. Some graduate schools, no doubt, have so accented scientific purity and theory and method that their social psychology Ph.D.s. have never looked a social psychological problem directly in its awesome and often ugly face. (From time to time in this Department you will find questionable metaphors. One of us is addicted to them, and the other, suspecting that he, too, has his failings, will abide these metaphors against the day when *his* stylistic tics will assert themselves.) We discussed the notion (with some enthusiasm) of recommending that the graduate student in social psychology, *before* being granted his degree, be required to spend a year as an interne in some agency or institution that is engaged in social action. We proposed such agencies as labor unions (especially the new and struggling farm labor unions), draft resistance groups, civil rights groups, population control groups, Dean of students offices, political campaign offices, etc.

These concerns, off-the-cuff analyses, questions, hinted solutions and quick insights should be enough to demonstrate that we intend to vent our biases in these columns. It should, however, provide some reassurance to our colleagues to remind them that as psychologists the two of us have not been cast from the same mold. It is to be expected (indeed, we look forward to it) that we will sometimes disagree. And when we do so, we will make this disagreement known to the readers of this Department. But, more importantly, we expect that our readers will make known their disagreements with us. While, of course, we cannot promise to print all of the letters or contributions we hope to receive, we can promise this: We intend to set aside a major part of the space allotted to this column for contributions from our readers. If enough people write in, we will also make a determined effort to

describe the general climate and trend of opinions expressed. We solicit your notes, letters, full-length articles. We promise to listen, to report what we hear and to talk back.

David Krech
Nevitt Sanford

Issue Editor's Note on the death of Martin Luther King, Jr.

This edition of the *Journal of Social Issues* was about to go to press with the publication of Dr. Martin Luther King's distinguished paper, "The Role of the Behavioral Scientist in the Civil Rights Movement", when the news was flashed that he had been martyred by an assassin's bullet. Since then, a shocked and grieved world has anxiously set about assessing the aftermath of the tragedy. People everywhere want to know whether the infamous April 4 in Memphis has moved Dr. King's countrymen closer to — or farther from — the social ideals for which he made the ultimate sacrifice. His legions of followers will surely endeavor to immortalize his life's work for Civil Rights so that history may bring meaning to his martyrdom. His legacy of inspired utterances will be scrutinized as never before in the hope that their message might reflect a newly evolving conscience of a nation. The paper published in this issue is part of that legacy. It poses a vital challenge to social scientists, and in so doing, it embodies the spirit of a man who lived a short life but whose transcending idealism will challenge the intellect and imagination of America for all time.

A. J. T.

The Role of the Behavioral Scientist in the Civil Rights Movement* **

Martin Luther King, Jr.

It is always a very rich and rewarding experience when I can take a brief break from the day-to-day demands of our struggle for freedom and human dignity and discuss the issues involved in that struggle with concerned friends of good will all over the nation. It is particularly a great privilege to discuss these issues with members of the academic community, who are constantly writing about and dealing with the problems that we face and who have the tremendous responsibility of moulding the minds of young men and women all over our country.

*Invited Distinguished Address given at the 75th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, September 1, 1967, Washington, D.C. Dr. King was President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Atlanta, Georgia. Copyright 1967 by Martin Luther King, Jr. Reprinted by permission of Joan Davis.

**This issue of the Journal of Social Issues was already in galley proof when the shocking and numbing news of Martin Luther King's assassination was released. The lesson of his life and the lesson of his death should additionally spur social scientists to the deeper involvement in the civil rights movement called for by Dr. King in his doubly poignant address.

Joshua A. Fishman, General Editor

The Civil Rights Movement Needs the Help of Social Scientists

In the preface to their book, *Applied Sociology* (1965), S. M. Miller and Alvin Gouldner state: "It is the historic mission of the social sciences to enable mankind to take possession of society". It follows that for Negroes who substantially are excluded from society this science is needed even more desperately than for any other group in the population.

For social scientists, the opportunity to serve in a life-giving purpose is a humanist challenge of rare distinction. Negroes too are eager for a rendezvous with truth and discovery. We are aware that social scientists, unlike some of their colleagues in the physical sciences, have been spared the grim feelings of guilt that attended the invention of nuclear weapons of destruction. Social scientists, in the main, are fortunate to be able to extirpate evil, not to invent it.

If the Negro needs social sciences for direction and for self-understanding, the white society is in even more urgent need. White America needs to understand that it is poisoned to its soul by racism and the understanding needs to be carefully documented and consequently more difficult to reject. The present crisis arises because although it is historically imperative that our society take the next step to equality, we find ourselves psychologically and socially imprisoned. All too many white Americans are horrified not with conditions of Negro life but with the product of these conditions — the Negro himself.

White America is seeking to keep the walls of segregation substantially intact while the evolution of society and the Negro's desperation is causing them to crumble. The white majority, unprepared and unwilling to accept radical structural change, is resisting and producing chaos while complaining that if there were no chaos orderly change would come.

Negroes want the social scientist to address the white community and "tell it like it is". White America has an appalling lack of knowledge concerning the reality of Negro life. One reason some advances were made in the South during the past decade was the discovery by northern whites of the brutal facts of southern segregated life. It was the Negro who educated the nation by dramatizing the evils through nonviolent protest. The social scientist played little or no role in disclosing truth. The Negro action movement with raw courage did it virtually alone. When the majority of the country could not live with the extremes of brutality they witnessed, political remedies were enacted and customs were altered.

These partial advances were, however, limited principally to the South and progress did not automatically spread throughout the nation. There was also little depth to the changes. White America stopped murder, but that is not the same thing as ordaining brotherhood; nor is the ending of lynch rule the same thing as inaugurating justice.

After some years of Negro-white unity and partial successes, white America shifted gears and went into reverse. Negroes, alive with hope and enthusiasm, ran into sharply stiffened white resistance at all levels and bitter tensions broke out in sporadic episodes of violence. New lines of hostility were drawn and the era of good feeling disappeared.

The decade of 1955 to 1965, with its constructive elements, misled us. Everyone, activists and social scientists, underestimated the amount of violence and rage Negroes were suppressing and the amount of bigotry the white majority was disguising.

Science should have been employed more fully to warn us that the Negro, after 350 years of handicaps, mired in an intricate network of contemporary barriers, could not be ushered into equality by tentative and superficial changes.

Mass nonviolent protests, a social invention of Negroes, were effective in Montgomery, Birmingham and Selma in forcing national legislation which served to change Negro life sufficiently to curb explosions. But when changes were confined to the South alone, the North, in the absence of change, began to seethe.

The freedom movement did not adapt its tactics to the different and unique northern urban conditions. It failed to see that nonviolent marches in the South were forms of rebellion. When Negroes took over the streets and shops, southern society shook to its roots. Negroes could contain their rage when they found the means to force relatively radical changes in their environment.

In the North, on the other hand, street demonstrations were not even a mild expression of militancy. The turmoil of cities absorbs demonstrations as merely transitory drama which is ordinary in city life. Without a more effective tactic for upsetting the status quo, the power structure could maintain its intransigence and hostility. Into the vacuum of inaction, violence and riots flowed and a new period opened.

Urban Riots . . .

Urban riots must now be recognized as durable social phenomena. They may be deplored, but they are there and should be understood. Urban riots are a special form of violence. They

are not insurrections. The rioters are not seeking to seize territory or to attain control of institutions. They are mainly intended to shock the white community. They are a distorted form of social protest. The looting which is their principal feature serves many functions. It enables the most enraged and deprived Negro to take hold of consumer goods with the ease the white man does by using his purse. Often the Negro does not even want what he takes; he wants the experience of taking. But most of all, alienated from society and knowing that this society cherishes property above people, he is shocking it by abusing property rights. There are thus elements of emotional catharsis in the violent act. This may explain why most cities in which riots have occurred have not had a repetition, even though the causative conditions remain. It is also noteworthy that the amount of physical harm done to white people other than police is infinitesimal and in Detroit whites and Negroes looted in unity.

A profound judgment of today's riots was expressed by Victor Hugo a century ago. He said, "If a soul is left in darkness, sins will be committed. The guilty one is not he who commits the sin, but he who causes the darkness".

The policy makers of the white society have caused the darkness; they create discrimination; they structured slums; and they perpetuate unemployment, ignorance and poverty. It is incontestable and deplorable that Negroes have committed crimes; but they are derivative crimes. They are born of the greater crimes of the white society. When we ask Negroes to abide by the law, let us also demand that the white man abide by law in the ghettos. Day-in and day-out he violates welfare laws to deprive the poor of their meager allotments; he flagrantly violates building codes and regulations; his police make a mockery of law; and he violates laws on equal employment and education and the provisions for civic services. The slums are the handiwork of a vicious system of the white society; Negroes live in them but do not make them any more than a prisoner makes a prison. Let us say boldly that if the total violations of law by the white man in the slums over the years were calculated and compared with the law-breaking of a few days of riots, the hardened criminal would be the white man. These are often difficult things to say but I have come to see more and more that it is necessary to utter the truth in order to deal with the great problems that we face in our society.

Vietnam War . . .

There is another cause of riots that is too important to merely mention casually — the war in Vietnam. Here again, we are deal-

with a controversial issue. But I am convinced that the war in Vietnam has played havoc with our domestic destinies. The bombs that fall in Vietnam explode at home. It does not take much to see what great damage this war has done to the image of our nation. It has left our country politically and morally isolated in the world, where our only friends happen to be puppet nations like Taiwan, Thailand and South Korea. The major allies in the world that have been with us in war and peace are not with us in this war. As a result we find ourselves socially and politically isolated.

The war in Vietnam has torn up the Geneva Accord. It has seriously impaired the United Nations. It has exacerbated the hatreds between continents, and worse still, between races. It has frustrated our development at home by telling our underprivileged citizens that we place insatiable military demands above their most critical needs. It has greatly contributed to the forces of reaction in America, and strengthened the military-industrial complex, against which even President Eisenhower solemnly warned us. It has practically destroyed Vietnam, and left thousands of American and Vietnamese youth maimed and mutilated. And it has exposed the whole world to the risk of nuclear warfare.

As I looked at what this war was doing to our nation, and to the domestic situation and to the Civil Rights movement, I found it necessary to speak vigorously out against it. My speaking out against the war has not gone without criticisms. There are those who tell me that I should stick with civil rights, and stay in my place. I can only respond that I have fought too hard and long to end segregated public accommodations to segregate my own moral concerns. It is my deep conviction that justice is indivisible, that injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. For those who tell me I am hurting the Civil Rights movement, and ask, "Don't you think that in order to be respected, and in order to regain support, you must stop talking against the war". I can only say that I am not a consensus leader. I do not seek to determine what is right and wrong by taking a Gallop Poll to determine majority opinion. And it is again my deep conviction that ultimately a genuine leader is not a searcher for consensus, but a molder of consensus. On some positions cowardice asks the question, "Is it safe"? Expediency asks the question, "Is it politic"? Vanity asks the question, "Is it popular"? But conscience must ask the question, "Is it right"? And there comes a time when one must take a stand that is neither safe, nor politic, nor popular.

But one must take it because it is right. And that is where I find myself today.

Moreover, I am convinced, even if war continues, that a genuine massive act of concern will do more to quell riots than the most massive deployment of troops.

Unemployment . . .

The unemployment of Negro youth ranges up to 40 per cent in some slums. The riots are almost entirely youth events — the age range of participants is from 13 to 25. What hypocrisy it is to talk of saving the new generation — to make it the generation of hope — while consigning it to unemployment and provoking it to violent alternatives.

When our nation was bankrupt in the 30's we created an agency to provide jobs to all at their existing level of skill. In our overwhelming affluence today what excuse is there for not setting up a national agency for full employment immediately?

The other program which would give reality to hope and opportunity would be the demolition of the slums to be replaced by decent housing built by residents of the ghettos.

These programs are not only eminently sound and vitally needed, but they have the support of an overwhelming majority of the nation — white and Negro. The Harris Poll on August 21, 1967, disclosed that an astounding 69 per cent of the country support a works program to provide employment to all and an equally astonishing 65 per cent approve a program to tear down the slums.

There is a program and there is heavy majority support for it. Yet, the administration and Congress tinker with trivial proposals to limit costs in an extravagant gamble with disaster.

The President has lamented that he cannot persuade Congress. He can, if the will is there, go to the people, mobilize the people's support and thereby substantially increase his power to persuade Congress. Our most urgent task is to find the tactics that will move the government no matter how determined it is to resist.

Civil Disobedience . . .

I believe we will have to find the militant middle between riots on the one hand and weak and timid supplication for justice on the other hand. That middle ground, I believe, is civil disobedience. It can be aggressive but nonviolent; it can dislocate but not destroy. The specific planning will take some study and

analysis to avoid mistakes of the past when it was employed on too small a scale and sustained too briefly.

Civil disobedience can restore Negro-white unity. There have been some very important sane white voices even during the most desperate moments of the riots. One reason is that the urban crisis intersects the Negro crisis in the city. Many white decision makers may care little about saving Negroes, but they must care about saving their cities. The vast majority of production is created in cities; most white Americans live in them. The suburbs to which they flee cannot exist detached from cities. Hence powerful white elements have goals that merge with ours.

The Role for the Social Scientist

Now there are many roles for social scientists in meeting these problems. Kenneth Clark has said that Negroes are moved by a suicide instinct in riots and Negroes know there is a tragic truth in this observation. Social scientists should also disclose the suicide instinct that governs the administration and Congress in their total failure to respond constructively.

What other areas are there for social scientists to assist the civil rights movement? There are many, but I would like to suggest three because they have an urgent quality.

Social science may be able to search out some answers to the problem of Negro leadership. E. Franklin Frazier, in his profound work, *Black Bourgeoisie*, laid painfully bare the tendency of the upwardly mobile Negro to separate from his community, divorce himself from responsibility to it, while failing to gain acceptance into the white community. There has been significant improvements from the days Frazier researched, but anyone knowledgeable about Negro life knows its middle class is not yet bearing its weight. Every riot has carried strong overtone of hostility of lower class Negroes toward the affluent Negro and vice versa. No contemporary study of scientific depth has totally studied this problem. Social science should be able to suggest mechanisms to create a wholesome black unity and a sense of peoplehood while the process of integration proceeds.

As one example of this gap in research, there are no studies, to my knowledge, to explain adequately the absence of Negro trade union leadership. Eighty-five per cent of Negroes are working people. Some 2,000,000 are in trade unions but in 50 years we have produced only one national leader—A. Philip Randolph.

Discrimination explains a great deal, but not everything. The picture is so dark even a few rays of light may signal a useful direction.

Political Action . . .

The second area for scientific examination is political action. In the past two decades Negroes have expended more effort in quest of the franchise than they have in all other campaigns combined. Demonstrations, sit-ins and marches, though more spectacular, are dwarfed by the enormous number of man-hours expended to register millions, particularly in the South. Negro organizations from extreme militant to conservative persuasion, Negro leaders who would not even talk to each other, all have been agreed on the key importance of voting. Stokely Carmichael said black power means the vote and Roy Wilkins, while saying black power means black death, also energetically sought the power of the ballot.

A recent major work by social scientists Matthew and Prothro concludes that "The concrete benefits to be derived from the franchise — under conditions that prevail in the South — have often been exaggerated", . . . that voting is not the key that will unlock the door to racial equality because "the concrete measurable payoffs from Negro voting in the South will not be revolutionary" (1966).

James A. Wilson supports this view, arguing, "Because of the structure of American politics as well as the nature of the Negro community, Negro politics will accomplish only limited objectives" (1965).

If their conclusion can be supported, then the major effort Negroes have invested in the past twenty years has been in the wrong direction and the major pillar of their hope is a pillar of sand. My own instinct is that these views are essentially erroneous, but they must be seriously examined.

The need for a penetrating massive scientific study of this subject cannot be overstated. Lipsit in 1957 asserted that a limitation in focus in political sociology has resulted in a failure of much contemporary research to consider a number of significant theoretical questions. The time is short for social science to illuminate this critically important area. If the main thrust of Negro effort has been, and remains, substantially irrelevant, we may be facing an agonizing crisis of tactical theory.

The third area for study concerns psychological and ideological changes in Negroes. It is fashionable now to be pessimistic. Undeniably, the freedom movement has encountered setbacks. Yet I still believe there are significant aspects of progress.

Negroes today are experiencing an inner transformation that is liberating them from ideological dependence on the white

majority. What has penetrated substantially all strata of Negro life is the revolutionary idea that the philosophy and morals of the dominant white society are not holy or sacred but in all too many respects are degenerate and profane.

Negroes have been oppressed for centuries not merely by bonds of economic and political servitude. The worst aspect of their oppression was their inability to question and defy the fundamental precepts of the larger society. Negroes have been loath in the past to hurl any fundamental challenges because they were coerced and conditioned into thinking within the context of the dominant white ideology. This is changing and new radical trends are appearing in Negro thought. I use radical in its broad sense to refer to reaching into roots.

Ten years of struggle have sensitized and opened the Negro's eyes to reaching. For the first time in their history, Negroes have become aware of the deeper causes for the crudity and cruelty that governed white society's responses to their needs. They discovered that their plight was not a consequence of superficial prejudice but was systemic.

The slashing blows of backlash and frontlash have hurt the Negro, but they have also awakened him and revealed the nature of the oppressor. To lose illusions is to gain truth. Negroes have grown wiser and more mature and they are hearing more clearly those who are raising fundamental questions about our society whether the critics be Negro or white. When this process of awareness and independence crystallizes, every rebuke, every evasion, become hammer blows on the wedge that splits the Negro from the larger society.

Social science is needed to explain where this development is going to take us. Are we moving away, not from integration, but from the society which made it a problem in the first place? How deep and at what rate of speed is this process occurring? These are some vital questions to be answered if we are to have a clear sense of our direction.

We know we haven't found the answers to all forms of social change. We know, however, that we did find some answers. We have achieved and we are confident. We also know we are confronted now with far greater complexities and we have not yet discovered all the theory we need.

And may I say together, we must solve the problems right here in America. As I have said time and time again, Negroes still have faith in America. Black people still have faith in a dream that we will all live together as brothers in this country of plenty one day.

But I was distressed when I read in the *New York Times* of August 31, 1967 that a sociologist from Michigan State University, the outgoing president of the American Sociological Society, stated in San Francisco that Negroes should be given a chance to find an all Negro community in South America: "that the valleys of the Andes Mountains would be an ideal place for American Negroes to build a second Israel". He further declared that "The United States Government should negotiate for a remote but fertile land in Ecuador, Peru or Bolivia for this relocation". I feel that it is rather absurd and appalling that a leading social scientist today would suggest to black people, that after all these years of suffering an exploitation as well as investment in the American dream, that we should turn around and run at this point in history. I say that we will not run! Professor Loomis even compared the relocation task of the Negro to the relocation task of the Jews in Israel. The Jews were made exiles. They did not choose to abandon Europe, they were driven out. Furthermore, Israel has a deep tradition, and Biblical roots for Jews. The Wailing Wall is a good example of these roots. They also had significant financial aid from the United States for the relocation and rebuilding effort. What tradition does the Andes, especially the valley of the Andes mountains, have for Negroes?

And I assert at this time that once again we must reaffirm our belief in building a democratic society, in which blacks and whites can live together as brothers, where we will all come to see that integration is not a problem, but an opportunity to participate in the beauty of diversity.

The problem is deep. It is gigantic in extent, and chaotic in detail. And I do not believe that it will be solved until there is a kind of cosmic discontent enlarging in the bosoms of people of good will all over this nation.

There are certain technical words in every academic discipline which soon become stereotypes and even clichés. Every academic discipline has its technical nomenclature. You who are in the field of psychology have given us a great word. It is the word maladjusted. This word is probably used more than any other word in psychology. It is a good word; certainly it is good that in dealing with what the word implies you are declaring that destructive maladjustment should be destroyed. You are saying that all must seek the well-adjusted life in order to avoid neurotic and schizophrenic personalities.

But on the other hand, I am sure that we will recognize that there are some things in our society, some things in our world, to which we should never be adjusted. There are some things con-

cerning which we must always be maladjusted if we are to be people of good will. We must never adjust ourselves to racial discrimination and racial segregation. We must never adjust ourselves to religious bigotry. We must never adjust ourselves to economic conditions that take necessities from the many to give luxuries to the few. We must never adjust ourselves to the madness of militarism, and the self-defeating effects of physical violence.

In a day when Sputniks, Explorers and Geminies are dashing through outer space, when guided ballistic missiles are carving highways of death through the stratosphere, no nation can finally win a war. It is no longer a choice between violence and nonviolence, it is either nonviolence or nonexistence. As President Kennedy declared, "Mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to mankind". And so the alternative to disarmament, the alternative to a suspension in the development and use of nuclear weapons, the alternative to strengthening the United Nations and eventually disarming the whole world, may well be a civilization plunged into the abyss of annihilation. Our earthly habitat will be transformed into an inferno that even Dante could not envision.

Creative Maladjustment . . .

Thus, it may well be that our world is in dire need of a new organization, The International Association for the Advancement of Creative Maladjustment. Men and women should be as maladjusted as the prophet Amos, who in the midst of the injustices of his day, could cry out in words that echo across the centuries, "Let justice roll down like waters and righteousness like a mighty stream"; or as maladjusted as Abraham Lincoln, who in the midst of his vacillations finally came to see that this nation could not survive half slave and half free; or as maladjusted as Thomas Jefferson, who in the midst of an age amazingly adjusted to slavery, could scratch across the pages of history, words lifted to cosmic proportions, "We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal. That they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights. And that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness". And though such creative maladjustment, we may be able to emerge from the bleak and desolate midnight of man's inhumanity to man, into the bright and glittering daybreak of freedom and justice.

I have not lost hope. I must confess that these have been very difficult days for me personally. And these have been difficult days for every civil rights leader, for every lover of justice and peace.

They have been days of frustration — days when we could not quite see where we were going, and when we often felt that our works were in vain, days when we were tempted to end up in the valley of despair. But in spite of this, I still have faith in the future, and my politics will continue to be a politic of hope. Our goal is freedom. And I somehow still believe that in spite of the so-called white backlash, we are going to get there, because however untrue it is to its destiny, the goal of America is freedom.

Abused and scorned though we may be, our destiny as a people is tied up with the destiny of America. Before the Pilgrim fathers landed at Plymouth, we were here. Before Jefferson scratched across the pages of history the great words that I just quoted, we were here. Before the beautiful words of the "Star Spangled Banner" were written, we were here. For more than two centuries, our forebears laboured here without wages. They made Cotton King. They built the home of their masters in the midst of the most humiliating and oppressive conditions.

And yet out of a bottomless vitality, they continued to grow and develop. If the inexpressable cruelties of slavery could not stop us, the opposition that we now face will surely fail. We shall win our freedom because both the sacred heritage of our nation, and the eternal will of the almighty God, are embodied in our echoing demands.

And so I can still sing, although many have stopped singing it, "We shall overcome". We shall overcome because the arch of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice. We shall overcome because Carlyle is right, "No lie can live forever". We shall overcome because William Cullen Bryant is right, "Truth crushed to earth will rise again". We shall overcome because James Russell Lowell is right, "Truth forever on the scaffold, wrong forever on the throne, yet that scaffold sways a future". And so with this faith, we will be able to hew out of the mountain of despair a stone of hope. We will be able to transform the jangling discords of our nation into a beautiful symphony of brotherhood. This will be a great day. This will not be the day of the white man, it will not be the day of the black man, it will be the day of man as man.

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A Theory of Organization and Change Within Value-Attitude Systems¹

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My purpose this afternoon is to present a first report of an ongoing research program broadly concerned with the relations existing among values, attitudes and behavior. In the first part of this paper, I will consider the functional and structural role which attitudes, values and value systems play within a person's total system of belief (Rokeach, 1960), some conditions which might lead to enduring change in values, and some consequences which might be expected to follow from such change. In the second part of this paper, I will briefly describe our approach to the measurement of values and value systems, and I will report some results relevant to several facets of the theoretical formulations discussed in the first part of this paper.

Unlike other cognitive approaches in contemporary social psychology which focus attention on attitude organization and change, we are focussing our attention primarily on value organization and change. This shift of focus from attitude to value

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evolves from certain second thoughts that I would like to share with you about the central position which the attitude concept has held in social psychology.

It is now exactly half a century since Thomas and Znaniecki (1918) first proposed that the study of social attitudes should be the central problem of social psychology. In the intervening years the attitude concept has indeed occupied a dominant place in theory and research, and it has been assigned prominent space in the textbooks and handbooks of social psychology. "The concept of attitudes", Allport has written in one of these handbooks, "is probably the most distinctive and indispensable concept in contemporary American psychology. No other term appears more frequently in the experimental and theoretical literature" (1935, 798).

Now, half a century later, the time is perhaps ripe to re-open the question as to whether the attitude concept should continue to occupy the central position it has enjoyed for so long. In raising this question, I do not mean to suggest that it is no longer important nor that it is any the less important now than it has been in the past, but only to ask whether there is now, and indeed whether there always has been, an even more deserving candidate for this central position.

The Value Concept . . .

Several considerations lead me to place the value concept in nomination ahead of the attitude concept. First, value is clearly a more dynamic concept than attitude having a strong motivational component as well as cognitive, affective and behavioral components. Second, while attitude and value are both widely assumed to be determinants of social behavior, value is a determinant of attitude as well as of behavior. Third, if we further assume that a person possesses considerably fewer values than attitudes, then the value concept provides us with a more economical analytic tool for describing and explaining similarities and differences between persons, groups, nations and cultures.

Consider, finally, the relative ubiquitousness of the value and attitude concepts across disciplines. While attitudes seem to be a specialized concern mainly of psychology and sociology, values have long been a center of theoretical attention across many disciplines—in philosophy, education, political science, economics, anthropology and theology, as well as in psychology and sociology. All these disciplines seem to share a common concern with the antecedents and consequents of value organization and value

change. Around such a shared concern we may more realistically anticipate genuine interdisciplinary collaboration.

It might seem somewhat paradoxical, in view of the more central theoretical status generally accorded the value concept, that we should have witnessed over the years a more rapid theoretical advance in the study of attitude rather than value. One reason for this, I suspect, was the more rapid development of methods for measuring attitudes, due to the efforts of such men as Bogardus, Thurstone, Likert and Guttman. A second reason, perhaps, was the existence of a better consensus on the meaning of attitude than value. A third possible reason is that attitudes were believed to be more amenable to experimental manipulation than values. In any event, the ready availability of quantitative methods for measuring attitudes made it only a matter of time before experimentally-minded social psychologists would seek to determine whether the attitude variable could be fruitfully fitted into the classical pretest-treatment-posttest paradigm. And upon finding that attitudes were indeed susceptible to experimental influence, a demand was created for theories of attitude organization and change to explain the results rather than for theories of value organization and change.

I would like to draw special attention to one consequence of the fact that it was the attitude rather than the value variable which thus came into the experimentalist's focus. Bypassing the problem of values and their relation to attitudes, we settled perhaps a bit too hastily for studies that I will call problems of persuasion to the neglect of what I will call problems of education and re-education. We emphasized, for example, the persuasive effects of group pressure, prestige, order of communication, role playing and forced compliance on attitudes. But we neglected the more difficult study of, say, the more enduring effects of socialization, educational innovation, psychotherapy and cultural change on values.

It was, therefore, our hope that in shifting from a concern with attitudes to a concern with values we would be dealing with a concept which is more central, more dynamic, more economical, a concept which would invite a more enthusiastic interdisciplinary collaboration and which would broaden the range of the social psychologist's traditional concern to include problems of education and re-education as well as problems of persuasion.

Definitions of Attitudes, Values and Value Systems

The discussion thus far has proceeded on the assumption that the conceptual boundaries between an attitude and a value, and

between a value and a value system, are clear and widely understood. This assumption is surely unwarranted. Since I plan to employ these concepts in distinctively different ways, I am obliged to first define them and to try to spell out the main distinctions I see among them.

An attitude is an organization of several beliefs focussed on a specific object (physical or social, concrete or abstract) or situation, predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner.² Some of these beliefs about an object or situation concern matters of fact and others concern matters of evaluation. An attitude is thus a package of beliefs consisting of interconnected assertions to the effect that certain things about a specific object or situation are true or false and other things about it are desirable or undesirable.

Instrumental and Terminal Values

Values, on the other hand, have to do with modes of conduct and end-states of existence. To say that a person "has a value" is to say that he has an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally and socially preferable to alternative modes of conduct or end-states of existence. Once a value is internalized it becomes, consciously or unconsciously, a standard or criterion for guiding action, for developing and maintaining attitudes toward relevant objects and situations, for justifying one's own and others' actions and attitudes, for morally judging self and others and for comparing oneself with others. Finally, a value is a standard employed to influence the values, attitudes and actions of at least some others, for example, our children's.

This definition of value is highly compatible with those advanced by Clyde Kluckhohn (1951), Brewster Smith (1963) and Robin Williams (1968). So defined, values differ from attitudes in several important respects. While an attitude represents several beliefs focussed on a specific object or situation, a value is a single belief which transcendentally guides actions and judgments across specific objects and situations and beyond immediate goals to more ultimate end-states of existence. Moreover, a value, unlike an attitude, is an imperative to action, not only a belief about the preferable but also a preference for the preferable (Lovejoy, 1950). Finally, a value, unlike an attitude, is a standard or yardstick to guide actions, attitudes, comparisons, evaluations and justifications of self and others.

²For a fuller discussion of the nature of attitudes see Rokeach (1968).

The distinction between preferable modes of conduct and preferable end-states of existence is a more or less familiar one in the philosophical literature on values: it is a distinction between values representing means and ends, between instrumental and terminal values (Lovejoy, 1950; Hilliard, 1950). An instrumental value is therefore defined as a single belief which always takes the following form: "I believe that such-and-such a mode of conduct (e.g., honesty, courage) is personally and socially preferable in all situations with respect to all objects". A terminal value takes a comparable form: "I believe that such-and-such an end-state of existence (e.g., salvation, a world at peace) is personally and socially worth striving for". Only those words or phrases that can be meaningfully inserted into the first sentence are instrumental values, and only those words or phrases than can be meaningfully inserted into the second sentence are terminal values.

Consider next the concept of value system. Many writers have observed that values are organized into hierarchical structures and substructures. Operationally speaking, the concept of value system or hierarchy suggests a rank-ordering of values along a continuum of importance. And given the distinction which I have just drawn between instrumental and terminal values, two separate value systems may be posited—instrumental and terminal—each with a rank-ordered structure of its own, each, no doubt, functionally and cognitively connected with the other, and both systems connected with many attitudes toward specific objects and situations.

It is often the case that a person is confronted with a situation in which he cannot behave in a manner congruent with all of his values. The situation may activate two or more values in conflict with one another. For example, a person may have to choose between behaving compassionately or behaving competently, but not both, between behaving truthfully or patriotically, but not both. Similarly, in a given situation a person may have to choose between such terminal values as self-fulfillment and prestige, between salvation and a comfortable life. A person's value system may thus be said to represent a learned organization of rules for making choices and for resolving conflicts—between two or more desirable modes of behavior or between two or more terminal states to strive for.

Given a reasonably sizeable number of values to be arranged in a hierarchy, a large number of variations are theoretically possible. But it is extremely unlikely that all such value patterns will actually be found. Many social factors can be expected to

restrict sharply the number of obtained variations. Similarities of culture, social system, caste and class, sex, occupation, education, religious up-bringing and political orientation are some of the major variables which are likely to shape in more or less similar ways the value systems of large numbers of people. We may thus expect that while personality factors will give rise to variations in individual value systems, cultural, institutional and social factors will nevertheless restrict such variations to a reasonably small number of dimensions.

Mental Organization of Value-Attitude Systems

The conceptual distinctions I have drawn between attitudes and values, between instrumental and terminal values and between values and value systems suggest that there are different numbers of attitudes, instrumental values and terminal values within a person's total system of beliefs. The distinctions suggest that a grown person possesses thousands and perhaps tens of thousands of attitudes toward specific objects and situations, but only several dozens of instrumental values and perhaps only a few handfuls of terminal values. Such a difference in numbers immediately points to the presence of a hierarchically connected system of attitudes and values. Let us suppose that the thousands of attitudes within a person's total belief system are all in the service of and cognitively connected with perhaps a few dozen instrumental values, and that the instrumental values are, in their turn, functionally and cognitively connected with an even fewer number of terminal values.³ We can further suppose that this value-attitude system is more or less internally consistent and will determine behavior, and that a change in any part of the system will affect other connected parts and that it will lead to behavioral change.

It is now possible to discern the outlines of at least four separate subsystems within the value-attitude system just described, and we may concern ourselves with problems of measurement,

³Woodruff and DiVesta (1948) were perhaps the first to clearly formulate the idea that attitudes are functionally and cognitively connected with values. The kinds of values which these authors and others (Smith, 1949; Peak, 1955; Rosenberg, 1956; and Carlson, 1956) apparently had in mind were terminal values. Scott (1959, 1965), on the other hand apparently had instrumental values in mind. The present formulation attempts to go beyond these formulations to propose an operational distinction between terminal and instrumental values, to propose that there are many attitudes, fewer instrumental values, and even fewer terminal values and to propose that attitudes, instrumental and terminal values are all functionally interrelated.

organization and change within any one of these subsystems considered separately. First, several beliefs may be organized together to form a single attitude focussed on a specific objection or situation. Second, two or more attitudes may be organized together to form a larger attitudinal system, say, a religious or political system. Third and fourth, two or more values may be organized together to form an instrumental or a terminal value system.⁴

This description of a person's value-attitude system is incomplete, however, unless we also represent within it at least three additional kinds of cognitions or beliefs that are continually fed into the value-attitude system, in order to provide it with the raw materials for growth and change. Coordinated with the four subsystems just mentioned there are, fifth, the cognitions a person may have about his own behavior (or commitments to behavior), sixth, the cognitions he may have about the attitudes, values, motives and behavior of significant others, and, seventh, the cognitions he may have about the behavior of physical objects. All such cognitions may be experienced by a person as being consistent or inconsistent to varying degrees with one another or with one or more of the attitudes or values within his value-attitude system.

Change In Value-Attitude Systems

We not only seek to describe the manner in which value-attitude systems may be organized but also how they may change. In common with other balance formulations the present theory also postulates a motivation for consistency, but consistency is defined, primarily, as consistency with self-esteem (Deutsch, Krauss and Rosenau, 1962; Malewski, 1962; Frentzel, 1965) and, secondarily, as consistency with logic or reality. While a person

⁴As already indicated, the major portion of our combined research efforts have been directed primarily toward measuring and gaining a better understanding of organization and change in the first and second subsystems of the more inclusive value-attitude system — single and multiple attitude organizations. But what seems to have received considerably less systematic attention thus far are problems of measurement, organization and change which are directly focussed on the third and fourth subsystems as such — the instrumental and terminal value systems — and problems of organization and change in the more inclusive value-attitude system containing all four subsystems. Nevertheless, a number of studies have moved significantly to one degree or another in this direction. In addition to the studies already cited the following are especially relevant: the study of terminal value patterns by Hunt (1935), Smith's work on value as a determinant of attitude (1949), White's approach to value analysis (1951), Morris' formulation of 13 Ways (1956) and Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's cross-cultural study of value orientations (1961).

will typically strive for both kinds of consistency, consistency with self-esteem is probably a more compelling consideration than consistency with logic or reality.

But we seek to go beyond contemporary consistency theories to articulate systematically all the combinations of elements or subsystems of elements that can conceivably be brought into an inconsistent relation with one another. In our efforts to formulate a theory of organization and change within value-attitude systems we are groping toward a theory of dissonance-induction as well as a theory of dissonance-reduction. We ask: How many different types of inconsistent relations might a person experience naturally, or might he be induced to so experience? Are there theoretical grounds for supposing that certain types of inconsistent relations are more likely to be psychologically upsetting than other types? Will certain types of inconsistent relations lead to larger and more enduring change than other types? And are certain types of inconsistent relation likely to have more far-reaching consequences for cognition and behavior than other types?

Let us posit that a person strives for consistency within and between each and every one of the seven subsystems that I have just represented within the value-attitude system. If we label these subsystems A to G we can then produce a matrix, shown in Table 1, of all the possible relations which a person might experience or might be induced to experience as inconsistent.

The matrix suggests at least 28 relations which may be experienced as cognitively inconsistent. The diagonals represent seven such possibilities *within* each of the subsystems: AA repre-

TABLE I
MATRIX OF INCONSISTENT RELATIONS
POSSIBLE WITHIN THE VALUE-ATTITUDE SYSTEM

Cognitive Organization of	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
A. Attitude	X ¹	x	x	x ⁴	x ⁴	x	
B. Attitude system		X ⁵	x	x	x ⁶	x	
C. Instrumental value system			X	x	x	x	
D. Terminal value system				X	x	x	
E. Cognitions about own behavior					X	x	x
F. Cognitions about significant others' attitudes, values, motives, or behavior						X	x
G. Cognitions about behavior of non-social objects							X x

¹ McGuire (1960)

² Abelson and Rosenberg (1958)

³ Festinger (1957)

⁴ Sherif (1965); Hovland, Janis and Kelley (1953, 1957); Janis, *et al.*, 1959; McGuire (1964)



⁵ Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955)

⁶ Heider (1958) and Newcomb (1961)

sents an inconsistent relation between two or more beliefs within a single attitude organization; BB represents an inconsistent relation between two or more attitudes within an attitude system; CC represents an inconsistent relation between two or more instrumental values within the instrumental value system; and so on. The remaining 21 relations shown in Table 1 represent possible experiences of inconsistency *between* subsystems. Type CD, for example, represents an inconsistent relation between a terminal and instrumental value, as when a person discovers that he places a high value on salvation but a low value on forgiveness; Type AC represents an inconsistent relation between an instrumental value and an attitude, as when a person discovers that he places a high value on tenderness but favors escalating the Vietnam war.

If we now scrutinize contemporary theories of balance and attitude change through the lattice-work of this matrix we may compare them with one another for comprehensiveness of formulation or extent of overlap. Osgood, for example, who is concerned with incongruities between two attitudes linked together by an assertion, is apparently dealing with inconsistencies of Type BB; Festinger, who is typically concerned with inconsistencies between an attitude and a cognition about behavior, is apparently dealing with inconsistencies of Type AE. I have tried to locate within the matrix the specific types of inconsistencies which various balance and attitude change theorists have been mainly concerned with, and you may wish to inspect these more closely at your own leisure. My analysis suggests that each of these theoretical approaches is studying a different part of the elephant, concentrating on different kinds of inconsistent relations, as represented within different cells of the matrix. It also suggests that a majority of all the possible experiences of consistency and inconsistency, especially those implicating the more central parts of the value-attitude system, still remain for the most part unexplored.

The intriguing question now before us is which of the 28 types of inconsistency are likely to lead to the greatest pay-off in magnitude and enduringness of change, in effects on other parts of the system and in effects on behavior. A look at the matrix suggests that the greatest pay-off should come about by bringing into an inconsistent relation the most central elements of the system, those conceived to have the most direct functional and structural connections with the rest of the system. Attention is thus drawn especially to Type DD in the matrix — an inconsistent relation between two or more terminal values — and close behind,



to other types combining D with A, B, C, E, F, or G. Since these terminal values are the most centrally located structures, having many connections with other parts of the system, we would expect inconsistencies which implicate such values to be emotionally upsetting and the effects of such inconsistency to dissipate slowly, to be long-remembered, to endure over time, to lead to systematic changes in the rest of the value system, to lead to systematic changes in connected attitudes and, finally, to culminate in behavior change.

I would next like to propose three main methods for inducing a state of inconsistency between any two of the elements shown in Table 1. The first two are well-known, and the third is perhaps new. First, a person may be induced to engage in behavior which is inconsistent with his attitudes or values. Second, a person may be exposed to new information from a credible source which is inconsistent with information already represented within his value-attitude system. A third way, which to the best of my knowledge has not been employed thus far, and which I hope will open the door to an experimental study of problems of education and re-education, is to expose the person to information about states of inconsistency already existing within his own value-attitude system. What I am proposing here is somewhat analogous to the effects which may be generated by showing a person undergoing a medical examination his X-ray revealing previously unsuspected and unwelcome medical information. It may be assumed that in every person's value-attitude system there already exist inherent contradictions of which he is unaware for one reason or another — compartmentalization due to ego-defense, conformity, intellectual limitations or an uncritical internalization of the contradictory values and attitudes of his reference groups. In other words, feelings of inconsistency may be induced not only by creating it but also by exposing to self-awareness inconsistencies already existing within the system below the threshold of awareness.⁵ I will return to this issue shortly.

⁵Stotland, Katz and Patcher (1959) have reported some incidental evidence that subjects whose attitude was at variance with their values were more likely to change their attitude in order to bring it into a consistent relation with their values. The functional approach of Katz and his co-workers is, however, somewhat different from the approach discussed here. First, the theoretical approach of these investigators, like that of others, is primarily focussed on the problem of attitude change and not on value change. Second, they have approached the problems of attitude change by attempting to give their subjects insight into the psychodynamics of their attitudes. In contrast, the present approach skirts the problem of underlying psychodynamics and instead merely attempts to give the subjects insight into whether certain relations within their systems are or are not consistent.

Some Research Findings

I would now like to describe some findings from our current research program that bear on the theory just presented. Our first problem was to find a way to measure value systems, and our approach to this problem was extremely simple. Initially, we collected a dozen instrumental values (e.g., broadminded, clean, forgiving, responsible), another dozen terminal values (e.g., a comfortable life, equality, freedom, salvation), alphabetized each set of values, and simply asked our subjects to rank-order them in order of importance. In a matter of a few minutes we were thus able to obtain data on the relative importance our subjects attached to 24 values — 12 instrumental and 12 terminal.

I do not have time here to go into the details of how we initially selected these values, how we improved upon them in successive versions or to discuss the results we obtained along the way. I hope it will suffice to say here that the rank-orderings of instrumental and terminal values seem to be reasonably stable over time: Form A, our initial form composed of 12 instrumental and terminal values, had test-retest reliabilities in the .60's after a seven week period; Form D, our fourth and final version composed of 18 instrumental and terminal values, had test-retest reliabilities in the .70's after 7 weeks. In the course of developing these scales we managed to obtain data on the similarities and differences in instrumental and terminal values of many groups—college, high school and grade school students, various occupational groups, and various religious and political groups. We also obtained data on the factorial dimensions along which instrumental and terminal values are organized, both separately and together, on the relation between instrumental and terminal values, between values and attitudes and between values and behavior.

Especially relevant to the validity of our approach to the theory and measurement of value systems are the results we obtained on the relation between values and behavior, and between values and attitudes. In this connection, let me cite some statistically significant findings concerning religious and political values. We find that the rank-ordering of one terminal value alone—*salvation*—highly predicts church attendance. College students who go to church "once a week or more" rank *salvation* first on the average among 12 terminal values. But other groups—those who attend church "once a month", "once a year", or "never"—typically rank *salvation* last among 12 terminal values.

Table 2 shows significant relationships between two distinc-

tively political terminal values—*equality* and *freedom*—and attitude toward civil rights demonstrations. Those who report they are “sympathetic, and have participated” in civil rights demonstrations rank *freedom* first on the average and *equality* third among 12 terminal values; those who are “sympathetic, but have not participated” rank *freedom* first and *equality* sixth; and those who are “unsympathetic” rank *freedom* second and *equality* eleventh.

TABLE 2
COMPOSITE RANK-ORDER FOR FREEDOM AND EQUALITY
AND ATTITUDE TOWARD CIVIL RIGHTS DEMONSTRATIONS*

	Yes, and have participated N = 10	Yes, but have not participated N = 320	No, not sympathetic N = 114	P ^b
Freedom	1	1	2	.01
Equality	3	6	11	.001

*All cell entries are based on the rank-ordering of median scores obtained for 12 terminal values. All references in the remainder of this paper to “composite rank order” are similarly defined.

^bObtained by Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance.

A second kind of data we are collecting has a purely descriptive purpose, to determine the extent to which fundamental similarities and differences among various groupings can be meaningfully and economically described solely in value terms. Some of these descriptive data are predictable in advance on the basis of various considerations, thus providing us with additional validity data. For example, *salvation* was found to rank first among 12 terminal values by Lutheran ministers, by students attending a Calvinist college and by Catholic and Lutheran students attending a mid-western university. But *salvation* is typically ranked last by Jewish students and by those expressing no religious preference.

Our descriptive data, however, also provide us with many surprises which cannot be altogether predicted in advance. Consider, for example, some contrasting patterns of findings on *freedom* and *equality* shown in Table 3.

Fifty policemen from a medium-sized midwestern city rank *freedom* first on the average and *equality* last, showing a value pattern even more extreme than that of college students who are unsympathetic with civil rights demonstrations. Unemployed whites applying for work at a state employment office show a similar pattern, though not as extreme as that of policemen. Unemployed Negroes applying for work show a reverse value pattern—*freedom* is ranked tenth, and *equality* is ranked first. Finally, Calvinist students show yet another pattern: both *freedom* and

equality are ranked relatively low in their hierarchy of terminal values.

TABLE 3
COMPOSITE RANK-ORDER
FOR FREEDOM AND EQUALITY FOR FOUR SAMPLES

	50 Policemen	141 Unemployed Whites	28 Unemployed Negroes	75 Calvinist Students
Freedom	1	3	10	8
Equality	12	9	1	9

All these data on *freedom* and *equality*, as well as other considerations which I do not have time to discuss here, seem to point to the presence of a simple, nonetheless comprehensive two-dimensional model for describing major variations among various political orientations. Picture, if you will, the four points of a compass. I will represent at the north pole those groups that place a high value on both *freedom* and *equality*, such as the liberal democrats, socialists and humanists; at the south pole, I will represent those groups that place a low value on both *freedom* and *equality*, such as the fascists, Nazis and KKK; to the east, on the right, I will represent those groups that place a high value on *freedom* and a low value on *equality*, such as the John Birch Society, conservative Republicans and followers of Ayn Rand; finally, to the west, on the left, I will represent those groups that place a low value on *freedom* and a high value on *equality*, such as the Stalinist or Mao type Communism.

Data supporting this model have recently been obtained in a study carried out in collaboration with James Morrison. We selected 25,000-word samples from political writings representing the four poles, and counted the number of times various terminal and instrumental values were explicitly mentioned. Samples were taken from socialist writers like Norman Thomas and Erich Fromm, Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, Goldwater's *Conscience of a Conservative* and Lenin's *Collected Works*. Table 4 shows the results obtained for the two terminal values, *freedom* and *equality*.⁶

The socialists mention *freedom* favorably 66 times and they mention *equality* favorably 62 times. For the socialists, *freedom* turned out to rank first and *equality* second in relative frequency among 17 terminal values. Employing these same 17 terminal values, analysis of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* revealed that *freedom* was

⁶A fuller report on all the values — instrumental and terminal — will be presented in a separate report.

TABLE 4
FREQUENCY OF MENTION AND RANK-ORDER OF FREEDOM AND EQUALITY
IN WRITINGS BY SOCIALISTS, HITLER, GOLDWATER AND LENIN

	Socialists		Hitler		Goldwater		Lenin	
	Freq.*	Rank	Freq.	Rank	Freq.	Rank	Freq.	Rank
Freedom	+66	1	-48	16	+85	1	-47	17
Equality	+62	2	-71	17	-10	16	+88	1

*Number of favorable mentions minus number of unfavorable mentions

ranked 16th and *equality* 17th. In Goldwater's hierarchy of values, *freedom* ranked first and *equality* 16th; and in Lenin's the results were the other way around, *freedom* ranking 17th and *equality* first. All in all, these data seem to fit the two-dimensional model almost perfectly.

While I do not have time here to elaborate further on this model or to consider its implications, I do want to raise the question of possible inconsistencies within a person's value-attitude system which might involve *freedom* and *equality*. One of the advantages we gain in asking our subjects to rank-order a set of positive values for importance is that the subject, having little or no awareness of the psychological significance of his responses, has little or no reason to disguise them. In this sense, our value scales function like projective tests. All the values we employ, considered in isolation, are socially desirable ones in our culture and, in the final analysis, the subject has only his own value system to guide him in rank-ordering them. Thus, a subject who ranks *freedom* first and *equality* last, (or who ranks, say *salvation* first and a *comfortable life* second) is not apt to be aware of the possibility that he may be revealing something about himself that others might interpret as anti-democratic or logically inconsistent, or, even, as hypocritical. But some of our subjects, upon having their attention drawn to the fact that they ranked *freedom* and *equality* in a highly discrepant manner or that they ranked both *freedom* and *equality* relatively low seemed embarrassed by their ratings. I would suggest that embarrassment is one overt behavioral manifestation of cognitive imbalance.

This discussion of possible inconsistencies lurking below the threshold of awareness brings me back to the matrix of dissonant relations previously discussed and presented in Table 1. I have already suggested that a felt state of inconsistency in relation between two values or between a value and an attitude or between one's values and a reference group's values should lead to persistent dissonance effects, which, to alleviate, would require change to make them more consistent with one another. I would now like

to report briefly on the results of an experiment designed to test these expectations.

Three groups of subjects, Control Group A and Experimental Groups B and C, first filled out an attitude questionnaire concerning equal rights for the Negro, equal rights for other groups, and American policy in Vietnam. A week later all three groups rank-ordered the 12 terminal values shown in Table 5. Experimental Group B was then presented with information in the form of "Table 1" showing the composite rank orders actually obtained by 444 Michigan State University students for these same 12 values. To arouse feelings of inconsistency between two terminal values the experimenter drew attention to "one of the most interesting findings shown in Table 1" namely, that the students, on the average, ranked *freedom* 1 and *equality* 6. "This suggests", the experimenter continued, "that Michigan State students in general are more interested in their own freedom than they are in freedom for other people". The subjects were then invited to compare their own rankings with those shown in "Table 1".

The procedure with the subjects in Experimental Group C was identical with that for Group B except for the fact that they were shown "Table 2" in addition to "Table 1". The purpose of "Table 2" was to induce an additional dissonant relation between a value and an attitude. "Table 2" showed the relationship between civil rights attitude and average rankings of *freedom* and *equality* (the same results shown herein in Table 2). The experimenter discussed these results in some detail and then concluded: "This raises the question as to whether those who are against civil rights are really saying that they care a great deal about *their own* freedom but are indifferent to other people's freedom. Those who are *for* civil rights are perhaps really saying they not only want freedom for themselves, but for other people too". The subjects were then invited to compare the results shown in "Table 2" with their own previously-recorded responses to the same civil rights question and with their own previously-recorded rankings on *freedom* and *equality*.

Posttests on values and attitudes were administered three weeks later and three to five months later — to the two experimental groups as well as to the control group, which had received no information. The overall results are shown in Table 5.

Control Group A showed small and generally non-significant changes in values three weeks later and three months later. Note that there was a significant change in *freedom* three months later, but that it is in a negative direction. But Experimental Group B shows significantly positive increases in *equality* and in *freedom*.

TABLE 5
MEAN CHANGES IN RANK-ORDER OF 12 TERMINAL VALUES FOR
CONTROL AND EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS 3 WEEKS AND 3 MONTHS LATER

	3 wks	47	Group A	Group B	Group C
			N =		
	3 mos	32	135	178	120
A comfortable life	3 wks	.17	—.48*	—.34	
	3 mos	.09	—.57	—.61*	
A meaningful life	3 wks	—.23	—.39	—.29	
	3 mos	.25	—.44	—.20	
A world at peace	3 wks	.34	.61*	.18	
	3 mos	.19	.62*	.30	
Equality	3 wks	.79	1.47***	1.72***	
	3 mos	.44	1.47***	1.68***	
Freedom	3 wks	—.47	.78**	.70***	
	3 mos	—1.19**	.48	.46*	
Maturity	3 wks	—.04	—.10	—.13	
	3 mos	1.16	—.10	—.17	
National security	3 wks	.36	.41	.55**	
	3 mos	.31	.65	.54*	
Respect for others	3 wks	.11	.16	—.11	
	3 mos	.75	—.03	.33	
Respect from others	3 wks	.13	—.09	—.11	
	3 mos	.03	—.52	.14	
Salvation	3 wks	.15	—.21	—.48**	
	3 mos	.09	—.27	—.53*	
True friendship	3 wks	—.83*	—1.06***	—1.05***	
	3 mos	—.72	—.52*	—1.12***	
Wisdom	3 wks	—.55	—.99***	—.61**	
	3 mos	—.28	—.72*	—.90**	

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001, t test for correlated measures.

three weeks later. Three to five months later we still find sizable increases in *equality*, which is significant, and in *freedom*, which is not significant. For Experimental Group C we observe significant positive changes on both *equality* and *freedom* — three weeks later as well as three to five months later.

Along with these experimentally-induced increases in the importance of *equality* and *freedom* we also observe systematic changes in the rest of the value system. Other social values — *a world at peace* and *national security* — consistently increase in importance, while personal values — *a comfortable life*, *a meaningful life*, *maturity*, *salvation*, *true friendship* and *wisdom* — consistently decrease in importance. Many of these changes are statistically significant, and the value changes are evident not only three weeks later but also three to five months later. And the mag-

nitude of the systematic changes observed is on the whole greater for Experimental Group C than for Experimental Group B.

Experimental Groups B and C not only showed enduring changes in values but also in attitudes. We observed enduring changes in attitude toward the two most salient issues in contemporary American life — equal rights and Vietnam. Table 6 shows the nature of the attitude and value changes obtained in

TABLE 6
MEAN CHANGES IN VALUES AND ATTITUDES IN FOUR GROUP C SUBGROUPS

		Ranks equality high and is procivil rights	Ranks equality low and is procivil rights	N =
	3 wks	.55	.14	70
	3 mos	.40	.8	49
A comfortable life	3 wks	.58	-.07	-1.10**
	3 mos	.13	.50	-1.41**
A meaningful life	3 wks	-.25	-.50	-.17
	3 mos	.28	-.50	-.47
A world at peace	3 wks	.44	1.79	-.27
	3 mos	.18	1.75	.16
Equality	3 wks	.36	.00	3.16***
	3 mos	-.23	-1.13	3.71***
Freedom	3 wks	.82**	.29	.80*
	3 mos	.60	-.50	.39
Maturity	3 wks	-.05	.57	.06
	3 mos	-.48	.63	.02
National security	3 wks	.44	.86	.53
	3 mos	.20	.50	.73
Respect for others	3 wks	-.38	.71*	-.17
	3 mos	.45	.75	.29
Respect from others	3 wks	-.13	.00	-.73*
	3 mos	.68	-.13	-.37
Salvation	3 wks	-.67*	-.14	-.57*
	3 mos	-.65	.25	-.80
True friendship	3 wks	-.58	-.157*	-1.30***
	3 mos	-.33	-.125	-1.43*
Wisdom	3 wks	-.69	-.193	.03
	3 mos	-.100*	-.88	-.86
Equal rights for Negroes	3 wks	-.47	4.57*	.09
	3 mos	.80	9.25**	1.80
Equal rights for others	3 wks	-.11	-.43	.20
	3 mos	.23	2.88	4.33**
Viet Nam	3 wks	-.109	.36	.60
	3 mos	-.83	.75	1.63*

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001, t test for correlated measures.

four Group C subgroups. The first column shows the results for those subjects who had initially ranked *equality* high and, consistent with this value, were procivil rights in attitude. This subgroup showed no changes in attitudes — either three weeks or three months later — and they showed virtually no enduring changes in values. The second column shows the results for those subjects who although initially high on *equality* were nevertheless anticivil rights in attitude. Three months later their values remained unchanged, but notice what had happened to their attitude toward equal rights for the Negro. Three weeks after the experiment their attitude toward equal rights for the Negro increased significantly by a mean of 4.57 in the liberal direction; and three to five months later the mean increase had grown to 9.25. The other two attitudes — equal rights for others and Vietnam — did not change for this group.

The third column shows the results obtained for those subjects whose initial attitude was also inconsistent with their value for *equality*. They had ranked *equality* low but had nevertheless expressed sympathy for civil rights demonstrations. Three weeks and three months after the experimental session they showed sizeable and highly significant increases in *equality*, thereby bringing *equality* into alignment with their procivil rights attitude, and they also showed significant decreases in two personal values, *a comfortable life* and *true friendship*. And this group, already pro-Negro in attitude, became significantly more favorable in their attitude toward equal rights for others and significantly more dove-like in their attitude toward the American presence in Vietnam. These attitude changes were not evident three weeks after the experimental session, but they were clearly evident three months afterward — a "sleeper" effect.

Consider, finally, the fourth column which shows the results for those subjects who consistently ranked *equality* low and were anticivil rights. Three months later these subjects valued *equality* significantly more and *true friendship* significantly less. But we found no changes in attitudes for this group.

All these results are reasonably consistent with the now widely accepted proposition that a necessary condition for change is a state of cognitive inconsistency. We have independently measured this state of inconsistency by asking our subjects at the end of the experimental session to tell us whether they felt "satisfied" or "dissatisfied" with what they had found out about the way they had ranked the several values. We found that variations in these intervening states of satisfaction-dissatisfaction were significantly related to variations in discrepancy between values, objec-

tively determined. In turn, these intervening states of dissonance, assessed at the end of the experimental session, significantly predicted the changes in values which were observed three weeks and three months after the experimental treatment.

In Conclusion . . .

As I conclude this paper I become acutely aware of at least a few questions which should be raised about the methods and findings reported here. Do the various value terms have the same meaning for different subjects? What ethical precautions are especially necessary in research on value change? Are the systematic and the sleeper effects value and attitude changes reported here genuine changes or are they artifacts of the experimental situation? Can we expect behavioral changes to follow from such value and attitude changes? Is it just as consistent for a person to move *freedom* down to *equality*, as to move *equality* up to *freedom*? Under what conditions will values change to become more consistent with attitudes, and will attitudes change to become more consistent with values? Can each of the different kinds of inconsistent relations represented in the matrix be experimentally isolated and their relative effects tested? What are the implications of our formulations and findings for education, therapy and for other areas of human concern which necessarily engage people's values?

For lack of time I must defer considerations of these questions and deal with them in a fuller report on a later occasion. Instead, I would like to return to the main theme stated in the opening to this paper, namely, that there are grounds for arguing in favor of a shift of focus away from theories of attitude organization and change toward more comprehensive theories of value organization and change. The empirical findings I have reported in the latter part of this paper now embolden me to advocate even more strongly the desirability for such a recentering within the discipline of social psychology.

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The Kurt Lewin Memorial Award Presentation
by
The Society for the Psychological Study
of Social Issues
to
Muzafer Sherif

Comments by

The Chairman of the Award Committee . . .

In this age of *rangatahi*, it is tremendously important that the model of Muzafer Sherif be vitally presented. His current work is highly significant for modern research and theory and application. The fact that it is firmly rooted in the principles enunciated, and researches undertaken, decades ago and that the earlier work was based on still earlier work by others as well as himself, must not be lost sight of. The fact that he represents a broad multi-disciplinary approach to significant problems without yielding one iota of his identification with social psychology must also be appreciated. That he successfully combines experimental method in the laboratory and in field settings to the advancement of both theory and social understanding reflects his unique genius, but that he does so should stimulate us all to make similar attempts. That an eminent historical figure is also a contemporary leader and pace-setter in these times of rapidly changing technologies is

truly noteworthy, and that we are here privileged to share his *mana* should be a source of pride and inspiration to us all. The spirit of Kurt Lewin must be feeling good about this award; and we, grateful that we have institutionalized a role structure that permits us, in the guise of giving honor, to solicit a presence which enhances us.

Eugene Hartley

Comments by

A former Student of the Awardee . . .

Muzafer Sherif, through his "frame of reference" approach provided social psychology with a point of view that led to the integration of culturological and psychological factors. Man's psychological activity become meaningful he taught us, when we consider the social facts, the norms, the values, the organizational framework, that man contends with — the factors which formed the effective stimulus configuration. Rejecting the view that experience and behavior could only be understood relative to a given culture, Muzafer Sherif asserted that social psychology (like psychology as a whole) could formulate lawful relations concerning *how* man functioned in social relations, though, admittedly the content of his cognitions depended upon the stimulus configuration — the social stimulus situation.

In one stroke, Muzafer Sherif made the social sciences relevant to psychology, and through his emphasis that man creates societal products, he made psychology relevant to the social sciences. Refusing to divorce social psychology from experimental psychology, refusing to accept the compartmentalization of man into his psychological, economic, anthropological, etc. aspects. Muzafer Sherif stressed in theory and in research how knowledge was obtained on each level of analysis. Through this inquiry into the nature of the abstractions offered by each of the separate sciences, he showed that the psychological laboratory could be used to verify sociological level generalizations, and he argued, believing in the unity of the sciences and of man, that when the findings on one level of generality (or in one science) did not fit with findings on another level of abstraction (another science), that one or both sciences needed to re-examine research findings.

In numerous works he has taught us to abstract from cultures the world over, and from individual experiences in particular settings, hypotheses that would have that timeless character, that

level of generality or invariance which is the hallmark of genuine science. Thus, in his first book, *The Psychology of Social Norms*, published in 1936, Muzafer Sherif isolated the conditions leading individuals to reciprocally influence one another in the production of social norms — those standards which regulate individuals' cognition and behavior. He then went on to verify his hypotheses in the remarkable and classic autokinetic experiment. In that same volume he elaborated a program of research which showed that the critical components of social situations could be abstracted and simulated in the laboratory for the purpose of verifying psychological hypotheses, accounting for the social behavior of man, his culture and his organization into groups. Recasting earlier experiments on social facilitation, Muzafer Sherif turned the interactionist point of view into a research reality.

Bertram Koslin

*Presentation of the Award by
The President of SPSSI*

It is my privilege this afternoon to present for the Committee the Lewin Memorial Award of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. The goals and aspirations of SPSSI are importantly shaped by the life and contributions of Kurt Lewin. As one means of perpetuating Lewin's memory and honoring significant achievement in areas related to Lewin's work, the Society is pleased each year to present its Kurt Lewin Memorial Award. This year it is the Society's distinct pleasure to present this Award to an outstanding Social Psychologist whose contributions are known throughout the psychological world.


Muzafer Sherif is now a Professor at Pennsylvania State University where he and his wife, Dr. Carolyn Sherif, have been since 1965. His work now covers numerous articles and sixteen books — the significance of which is attested to by the fact that virtually all of us gathered to honor and hear him have read and been influenced by many of these volumes. Professor Sherif's classic studies have included his Master's dissertation at Harvard on prestige suggestion effects in the judgment of literary passages and his Doctoral dissertation at Columbia on social influence and the autokinetic effect. He has taught and conducted research at the University of Ankara in his native Turkey, Princeton, Yale — and for sixteen years at the University of Oklahoma.


SPSSI proudly presents to you, Muzafer Sherif, this scroll,
inscribed as follows:

Kurt Lewin Memorial Award
granted by the Society for the
Psychological Study of Social Issues
to
Muzafer Sherif
1967

for furthering in his work, as did
Kurt Lewin, the Development and integration
of psychological research and social action.

Tom Pettigrew
President, SPSSI





If The Social Scientist Is To Be More Than A Mere Technician....

Muzafer Sherif
Pennsylvania State University

There are special reasons that I welcome participation in this, the nineteenth memorial session arranged by the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues to honor the work of Kurt Lewin. This Society's concern that research be devoted to important social issues is particularly congenial to my enduring research interests, as it is to so many other social psychologists. In fact, I joined this Society almost ten years before joining the APA.

Another reason is the memorial occasion itself. In the 1930's I was searching the experimental literature and cross-cultural studies with the aim of formulating a basis for the adequate frame of reference for man's behavior. I was fortunate to encounter the experimental work of Kurt Lewin and other Gestalt psychologists. My intellectual debt was acknowledged in a little volume published in 1936, *The Psychology of Social Norms*, where I started by taking stock of social psychology at the time, expressing dismay at the fragmentary and piecemeal state of things and at its lack of perspective. Lewin's work appeared at that time like a fresh breeze, as I noted in the following words: "Already we have great beginnings toward a more effective approach to our problem in the works of Kurt Lewin and Jean Piaget and their students. Lewin and his followers have made a lasting contribution to social psychology by introducing such concepts as 'aspiration level' and

'ego-level' . . . In Piaget's work we have the best fruits of the developmental approach . . ." (p. 24).

Now I turn to my topic, "If the Social Scientist Is To Be More Than a Mere Technician . . .". In recent years, increasing numbers of researchers within social science itself have pointed to the need for new breakthroughs in social science. In addition, men in public life have begun to acknowledge the urgent need for directions, even prescriptions from social science for more effective handling of pressing social ills, conflicts between group and group, poverty, riots and crises that urgently demand solutions.

These stirrings within social science and the urgent appeals from men in public life force but one conclusion: At least some social scientists have to be more than mere technicians if they are to chart for us the daring orientations needed for new breakthroughs.

I believe that the potentiality of a scientific approach to the analysis of human relations, with applications based on it, has not yet had its due turn in court. Other modes of handling human problems have brought human relations to their present state, such as they are — fraught with tension, conflict, distrust, crises and the specter of a war that can destroy everything cherished in culture as well as the hope of human survival itself. The politician's cunning sophistication in *Realpolitik*, with patchy power arrangements and precarious public relations, has proved over and over to breed short-range adjustments that flare into new crises and new, long-range problems. The stark realism of the military generals in various countries breeds more killing and destruction on a vaster scope. The good will and idealism of the humanist and the religious leader have fallen far short of actualization (not infrequently to their own disillusionment) because the good will and idealism were not based on realistic analysis of underlying causes, and not implemented through long-range action programs coordinate with such a valid analysis.

Some of the Temptations . . .

During the last few decades, an ever-increasing number of social scientists have been called by government agencies, private business and foundations for consultation and research evaluation of their programs. Research funds and positions have increased tremendously in recent years, as exemplified by an increase in U. S. federal funds to social science research from 73 million dollars in 1960 to 380 million in 1967 (Committee on Government Operations, 1967). This increase is not altogether an unmixed

blessing. The centripetal pull of the facilities thus provided could not help diverting some outstanding researchers from establishing their own course with more limited resources. As a consequence, the more immediate issues that gain the limelight for administrators are apt to receive priority over problems of lasting significance and future import. Not infrequently, the research problems, the major orientations and the framework within which research programs will be cast are already circumscribed by the supporting agency. And these are not necessarily the problems, orientations and frameworks which are conducive to building valid principles that stand the test of time. A researcher—whether he be social psychologist, political scientist or sociologist — who uses the skills and techniques of his trade within the bounds of programs already laid down with specific objectives can only contribute as a technician.

Of course, the fraction of support earmarked for basic research by various agencies, governmental and private, without restrictions on the kind of problems to be studied or the immediate application value of findings does not fall within this evaluation. One can only wish for the increase of such support that goes with no strings attached.

The marketplace, the government agency and the action program are not the only places to find our technicians. There is an understandable, if not justifiable tendency for each social science discipline to develop its respectable outlook, its genteel modes of approach and its acceptable research instrumentalities, and then to freeze into orthodoxy. I will not take the time to give specific cases of such orthodoxies with their circumscribed grooves. They are the domains of people in the in-crowd who communicate with one another in the currently fashionable lingo, as if the universe were confined within the grooves of their particular orthodoxy. The only genuine issues within these grooves become issues of technical refinement here and there, to the neglect of persistent issues that have bearing on actualities.

In this early and formative stage of social science, the huge tasks that confront us are more than technical ones. We have not yet established bearings that permit us to move to the future on solid grounds. Yet, the antidote for our present state does not seem to lie in the application of ready-made models borrowed through analogy from more established disciplines, like physics and mathematics. It is indeed tempting, and perhaps the most elementary mode of attacking new problems, to try a ready-made model that has proved useful in other domains in the attempt to give pattern and form to the unwieldly and complex events of social life.

Of course, formal models are goals to be attained in the ma-

ture state of a discipline. But when models are transferred to social science simply because they are formal and aesthetic, without sufficient concern for their isomorphism with the actualities of social relations, their predictive value is bound to be negligible. They too become a technician's sport. We would do well to recall the forceful statement by the sociologist, Emile Durkheim (1915), that the patterns of social realities are not simply an extension of physical and biological patterns and cannot be extrapolated directly from them. Thus, no matter how useful analogical thinking may be in exploration, science created by analogy alone becomes a technical enterprise. No matter how elegant the model, it forces us into a selectivity in choosing problems, in defining variables — at times to the point that the crucial variables are simply chopped off. The point was eloquently stated by Robert Oppenheimer in his invited address to psychologists at the APA convention in San Francisco in 1955.

. . . between science of very different character, the direct formal analogies in their structure are not too likely to be helpful. Certainly what the pseudo-Newtonians did with sociology was a laughing affair; and similar things have been done with mechanical notions of how psychological phenomena are to be explained. I know that when physicists enter biology their first ideas of how things work are indescribably naive and mechanical; they are how things would work if the physicists were making them work, but not how they work in life. I know that when I hear the word 'field' used in physics and in psychology, I have a nervousness that I cannot entirely account for. I think that, especially when we compare subjects in which ideas of coding, of the transfer of information, or ideas of purpose, are inherent and natural with subjects in which these are not inherent and natural, that formal analogies have to be taken with very great caution (Oppenheimer, 1956, 133-134.).

The volume of social science research mounts daily. Social psychology, political science, anthropology and sociology fill their several professional journals and spawn new ones to handle the overflow on specialized topics. Yet there is a growing concern as to what all this thriving enterprise and busy comings-and-goings add up to. The concern is shown by social scientists themselves, by supporting agencies, both governmental and private, and by action programs urgently calling for help. This concern and the stock-taking it provokes are well represented in the four volumes entitled *The Use of Social Research in Federal Domestic Programs* prepared by the staff of the Research and Technical Sub-committee of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of Representatives (1967).

Necessity of An Interdisciplinary Approach

Why these concerns, particularly at a time when the pace of research and publication accelerates? It is ironic that only a tiny fraction of the output stands the test of time to be incorporated into the fabric of social science that stretches toward the future. Only a small fraction bears on significant problems of enduring actualities, hence only a fraction has relevance in the shaping of policies and action programs.

No amount of soul-searching within any single discipline — be it psychology, sociology, political science or anthropology — will remedy the situation. Significant research in social science with relevance for persistent major problems has to go beyond the bounds and established grooves of any single social science discipline. No social science discipline can be self-contained. This conclusion was one of the themes in Roger Barker's Kurt Lewin Memorial Address in 1963 (Barker, 1964).

Social psychology, as a meeting ground of individual and socio-cultural variables, is in a unique position to help in the integration of social sciences. By the same token, it is the most vulnerable to provincialism and insularity the moment that it buries itself within the confines of a single academic discipline (whether psychology or sociology) or attempts to develop by feeding exclusively on its own corpus. Within its own confines it cannot select the significant problems for study that persist throughout social science, nor can it incorporate the major variables pertinent to the problems. All by itself, social psychology cannot even develop single handedly the methodology for studying many of the variables that it *must* include. Social psychology that has the pretense of developing valid theory with relevance to actualities and policy decisions has no choice but to be *interdisciplinary* (Sherif, 1967).

This is neither the time nor the place to examine all of the issues that the word "interdisciplinary" raises for social science or educational practice. For the moment, let me make myself clear by taking one case — the history of psychology, which from its beginnings was interdisciplinary. Psychology, especially experimental psychology, always borrowed from physics, chemistry, anatomy and physiology. Borrowing from the *physical* sciences has always been considered proper; it was the thing for psychologists to do. Now, I am saying that for the same reasons and in the same spirit, social psychology must borrow from the other social sciences if it is to be more than a tooling ground for technicians, busily wielding their trade in trivia.

The social psychologist *has* to borrow findings from other social sciences about the sociocultural environment, with its social,

economic and political organization, its values, and its tools. Other social sciences study these aspects of the sociocultural environment at their meaningful, patterned *level*. These meaningful patterns constitute *social stimulus situations* for the individual. The social psychologist cannot reduce these meaningful patterns to isolated single stimuli or improvise their nature without running the risk of ethnocentric distortions. Therefore, he has no choice but to borrow the needed information from other social sciences. What must be borrowed from social science is *at least* as essential as what the psychologist has always been eager to borrow from the natural sciences about the nature of physical stimulus energies.

Some have expressed apprehension that an interdisciplinary approach would result in social psychology spreading itself too thin. On the contrary, the needed interchange with other social sciences will contribute to social psychology in establishing its bearings and providing the needed perspective. It can only result in broadening and strengthening the methodological base. This promise of interdisciplinary integration was expressed well by Stanley Milgram in a chapter prepared for a forthcoming volume on problems of interdisciplinary relations in the social sciences (Sherif and Sherif, 1968):

"When a social scientist frees himself from the narrow grooves of his academic discipline, a new range of intellectual problems is made accessible to him, and new paths of inquiry opened. I have seen this time and again among colleagues and graduate students, and am beginning to believe that just as cross-pressure in voting, free the individual from following the traditional choices of his social group, intellectual cross-pressure generated by an interdisciplinary outlook liberate a person's thinking from the limiting assumptions of his own professional group, and stimulate fresh vision".

Concentration of Research on Long-Range, Persistent Problems

We are not the first to be troubled with vexing problems of intergroup relations involving issues of prejudice, segregation and exploitation. We are not the first ones to be caught in flare-ups between groups like strikes, riots or war. We are not the first to live in a time of rapid social change, hence to witness the rise of social movements expressing defiance against the status quo by minorities within nations who have been targets of discrimination or by erstwhile colonial populations in their search toward a new identity and nationhood.

We are not the first to be confronted with problems of leadership-follower-ship, morale, loyalty-disloyalty, conformity and deviation, delinquency, marginality and other reference group issues — all of which stem from the general fact that man carries out the important business of living within some form of organizational pattern.

Nor is the present generation of psychologists the first that has engaged in studying the difficult problems of categorization of neutral and value-charged stimulus objects, that has engaged in studying problems of self consistency when the person confronts situations that jar or enhance it, or that has engaged in studying his reactions to communications that support or violate his cher-ished commitments and stands.

Such problems of import in man's relation to man, especially in times of rapid social change so characteristic of our time, have been *persistent* problems. Men in public life as well as the several social science disciplines have invested great energy and time for generations to their study and their solution. Instead of cutting ourselves off from what is accumulated in the literature as a result of their efforts, it is to our own advantage to extract from it and utilize, as a foundation on which to build, that which stands the test of time and that which recurs over and over. Sifting their accumulated experience also saves us from wasting our own time and energies in pursuing lines that others have already discovered to be dead ends. The craze for novelty in the academic market-place blinds us to the advantages of such stock-taking, longitudinally and across the disciplines.

The study of *persistent* and recurrent problems of the kind just mentioned, namely, personal identity and consistency, inter-group relations, social movements of defiant peoples searching new identity, and other forms of social change — cannot be a one-shot venture. These problems require sustained, continuing and long-range concentration. If we keep at them, concentrating on persistent problems rather than hopping on the band wagon when there are rewards for studying them, then we will not be surprised when their specific manifestations flare upon the public scene as crises of major proportions. And if this long-range and persistent concentration is applied to such long-range and persistent problems, we will not be caught unprepared in theoretical orientation and in methodological resources when the time is opportune to contribute to policy decisions about these problems. Therefore, it is gratifying that this Society has shown more and more concern in recent years with organizing itself towards dealing with long-

range and persistent problems, with the sustained and enduring concentration they require (e.g. SPSSI Newsletter, 1966).

A Persistent Problem Area Illustrated: Intergroup Relations

The rest of this paper will be devoted to one of these persistent and recurrent problems, namely the over-riding problem of inter-group relations. Already, a coherent picture is emerging in our understanding of intergroup relations, although it is by no means complete. This coherent picture owes its outlines to cumulative efforts in sociology, political science, history, anthropology as well as social psychology. It provides the essentials for a theory of intergroup conflict and cooperation that does have a bearing on actualities, hence has important implications for policy decisions.

One reason why action programs intended to reduce inter-group hatreds have been ineffective, on the whole, is that a realistic diagnosis of the sufficient and necessary conditions for inter-group conflict has been lacking. In other words, action programs, on the whole, have not been based on a valid theory of intergroup conflict. Diagnosis and analysis of etiology should be the first step, and not an afterthought, in formulating policy and action. Certainly, this is not a new idea. The dictum that good practice is associated with good theory and that valid theory is the practical basis for effective action has been stated in one form or another for at least a hundred years.

Theories positing an instinct of aggression have not fared well. The long-range research program by J. P. Scott and his associates (1958, 62) came to clear-cut generalizations about such theories. Basing his generalizations on careful experimentation, rather than anecdote or unrepresentative cases, Scott concluded:

The important fact is that the chain of causation in every case eventually traces back to the outside. There is no physiological evidence of any spontaneous stimulation for fighting arising within the body. This means that there is no need for fighting, either aggressive or defensive, apart from what happens in the external environment. . . . This is quite a different situation from the physiology of eating, where the internal processes of metabolism lead to definite physiological changes which eventually produce hunger and stimulation to eat, without any change in the external environment.

Explanations of intergroup conflict or harmony, war or peace between human groupings through analogy with individual events have been off the mark, whether these events were personal motive, individually endured frustration or interpersonal quarrels.

The psychiatrist J. D. Frank (1964, 41) aptly made this point in discussing war and peace:

... It becomes increasingly clear that individual psychopathology cannot cast much light on the question of war . . . war is a group activity. Individuals fight but do not wage war. This is reserved for organized groups.

Frank further noted that "mentally healthy national leaders are as fully capable of leading a nation to war as mentally unbalanced ones".

We may now define the proper domain of intergroup relations. Every instance of friendship or hostility, love or hate is *not* necessarily a case of intergroup relations. The domain of intergroup relations includes only those states of friendship or hatred, harmony or conflict that stem from membership in groups, whether the events occur while individuals interact as members of their respective groups or during collective encounters between groups.

Having delineated the domain of intergroup relations, I shall now state the essentials of a theory of group conflict (Sherif and Sherif, 1953; Sherif, 1966):

... The limiting condition in shaping attitude and behavior, images and action of one group vis à vis another is the nature of functional relations between the groups. The sufficient condition for the rise of hostile attitudes and deeds toward another group is simply that the goals pursued by the parties involved are mutually incompatible. Given these conditions, communication and other transactions between the groups does invariably lead to hostile and vindictive attitudes, unfavorable images or stereotypes, casting blame on one another for the state of affairs and eventually to overt conflict and fighting. Power is pitted against power; the alternatives that each group can consider are progressively reduced to the choice between deterrence and actual violence. Each group mobilizes its resources with all the meticulous planning and "preparedness" measures to be executed by the more able, intelligent and skilled within its fold.

... It follows that the cause of intergroup conflict does not reside primarily within the particular organizational form and the cultural values of any given group (although of course these may become highly relevant when groups are closely interdependent). Ironically, the zeal with which members of one group pursue intergroup hostility is proportional to the degree of solidarity and cooperativeness within the in-group, and these tend to increase during intergroup conflict. Thus democracy within the bounds defined as "we" does not necessarily imply democracy in relations with outsiders, if those outsiders are defined as enemies or competitors.

... The rise of intergroup conflict has unmistakable consequences for relations and values within each group. The enduring

consequence of intergroup conflict is toward recasting the organization and the values that prevail within each group to strengthen its role in the conflict. Leaders arise who are adept in conflict. Old values are enlisted in the cause, including traditional values of peace and freedom for individual members.

. . . The sufficient condition for the rise of intergroup hostility provides the basis for diagnosis and for seeking effective measures for reducing intergroup hostility. If hostile attitudes and deeds are the outcome of confrontations among groups pursuing mutually incompatible and mutually exclusive claims, it follows that reduction of hostility must depend on interaction between groups to achieve goals that are compellingly desired by all parties to the conflict and that require their cooperation. In short, one necessary and sufficient condition for the reduction of intergroup hatred is interaction towards *superordinate goals*. This provides the *motivational base* for making effective the usual methods like conference of leaders, dissemination of information and exchange of persons.

Goals superordinate to the private interests of each group, but highly desired by all parties do promote cooperation between groups and do eventually breed friendly and fraternal attitudes. We have shown this experimentally, and there are historical and contemporary cases confirming this generalization (Sherif *et al.*, 1961; Sherif, 1966). While other measures for reducing conflict do have a place in resolving disputes, their effectiveness is markedly limited unless there is a motivational base provided by a series of superordinate goals in which the groups are genuinely interdependent for their attainment. Thus negotiations by leaders and representatives, communication and exchange of persons, dissemination of information, and so on prove disappointing unless the conditions of interdependence created by superordinate goals have already been established. And let me repeat that superordinate goals are not technical matters. They are goals urgently desired and compelling to all groups involved and not tactics, manipulative devices or persuasive techniques that can be used by one group to impose its will on others.

Social Movements Conducive to More Inclusive Self Identity

The conceptualization presented here in its bare essentials placed the domain of intergroup conflict and cooperation within the context of group functioning vis a vis other groups. Therefore, a closer look is needed at the formation of human groups and, in particular, the process wherein loyalty to small local units is enlarged toward a more inclusive self identity.

Groups do form whenever individuals with common interest, common gripes or common aspirations interact. In the course of their interaction over time, individuals develop bonds with each other in a pattern of reciprocities (that is, roles and statuses) and live within the set of evaluative categories, or norms, developed to regulate their transactions, at least in matters that concern their common lot. Such matters ordinarily include important relations with other groups.

Groups are not closed systems that survive indefinitely without change. Especially the technological developments of the modern world have made groups increasingly interdependent in many spheres of life, including their livelihood, safety and security. The trend toward increasing dependence of group on group has fostered ever-enlarging social units, encompassing erstwhile autonomous and separate groups. Each of these larger systems, in turn, develops a superordinate organizational pattern, superordinate normative regulators and associated sanctions for their implementation.

Needless to say, the trend toward increased interdependence of groups and the emergence of larger units are not short-term propositions, occurring over night. Nor do the new and larger units come into existence without opposition, resistance and last ditch fights from vested interests in the component units. Groups do have interests of their own, customs and values that their members are willing, even eager to defend. The cake of custom is not broken easily. It may crumble, but it has its staunch defenders.

Initially, the trends toward more inclusive patterns of human relationships and more comprehensive values start as *social movements*. Every social movement has initially a protest or defiance aspect. It generates also a vision for *change* expressed in a platform or program to remedy the causes of protest or defiance. Frequently, they are initiated by small numbers of individuals whom the establishment at the time may consider starry-eyed visionaries, irrational radicals, crackpots and the like. But if the torchbearers are men with insight into the widespread concerns and aspirations of people, and not merely self-seeking adventurers, the bill of gripes, declarations of defiance and protest, which are among the first activities of every social movement, find resonance among large numbers of geographically separated individuals and groups. On the constructive side, the social movement proclaims its positive goals, legislative or organizational reforms or innovations that these goals seek and other instrumentalities for implementing them.

Combining the elements of conflict and the positive aims, a

social movement can be defined as a pattern of attempts—through pronouncements, literature, rallies and direct action — to establish or to maintain a definite scheme of human relations and values, prompted by states of common unrest, discontent and common aspirations of a large number of individuals.

Independence movements toward nationhood, like those of the United States in 1770's and more recently on the Asian and African continents, are among the examples of social movements that actualized the self identity built through their social movements into larger and more inclusive organizational patterns, with instrumentalities for implementing their slogans of self-determination.

There are many incipient and well organized social movements in the world today seeking the formation of more inclusive units. We will gain greater insight into the workings of many forms of collective flare-ups (for example riots), if we view them as part and parcel of a social movement of long duration, rather than as discrete and particular failings on the part of this or that administration, this or that policy or city, during the heat of summer. The particular events associated at the moment with such flare-ups are, in fact, only triggers for which other triggers could easily substitute. Flare-ups in American cities are not unique events of the long hot summers of the 1960's. The Detroit race riots, not of 1967 but way back in 1943 in which whites were the ones who initiated violence, were triggered by a relatively minor incident on a bridge at Belle Island, Detroit. But, as Lee and Humphrey (1944) noted in their study, the riots might easily have been triggered at any of a number of other places in that city, simmering with tension.

With all of their variations, each social movement that proclaims its protests and defiance of the status quo also builds a *self picture*, gaining momentum in time so that it cannot be handled or subdued merely with improvised financial hand-outs or similar ameliorative measures that indeed might have been effective in an earlier formative period of the movement. And, every social movement of large proportions has a range or latitude for its militancy, from moderate to extreme. The leaders who occupy positions within this range are those who prove by example and action that they can live up to the particular set of expectations widely shared by rank and file at the time (Killian and Grigg, 1964). This range of alternatives for leadership tends to narrow down as the movement encounters resistance or oppression. Martin Luther King characterized the phenomena well in his 1963 letter from Birmingham jail, where he expressed regret that moderate white religious leaders labeled him as an extremist. On the contrary, he wrote:

"... I stand in the middle of two opposing forces in the Negro community. One is a force of complacency... The other force is one of bitterness and hatred and comes perilously close to advocating violence" (King, 1964, 72-73). King correctly predicted that dismissal of his moderation would lead millions toward a more militant position.

Therefore, the formula that groups or social movements are created by leaders should be completed with the corollary that leaders are also creations of the less articulate rank and file. It follows that the alternatives for policy and action that are open to leaders of social movements, and nations for that matter, do not include all possible alternatives to be found in a formal logical model. Leaders are bound to move and lead within a range of alternatives that the rank and file expect or can tolerate. Those master technicians who tinker endlessly with models of deterrence in international affairs have usually overlooked the significant constraints of internal leadership and decision making. In brief, the long-range and fruitful line of research in this problem area will develop methods to assess alternative strategies that are either acceptable to or expected by the membership of a group, as the basis for analyzing decisions of policy makers and their consequences. Meanwhile, many social movements should be grateful that they did not have the services of a deterrence technician. On the basis of the deterrence model, the decision of the American colonies to risk war for independence from the King would have seemed sheer madness.

Modern Dilemma in Human Identification: Provincial or More Inclusive Loyalties

For many years the over-riding concern for peoples everywhere has been the futile waste in life and human resources caused by wars. World-wide suffering and destruction in the past gave rise to various world organizations, including the United Nations, to cope with the recurrence of open conflicts. Yet the nations of the world are not ready to renounce war as an instrument of national policy. Those who earnestly propose outlawing war and delegating authority for resolving disputes between nations to a world body, are still considered to be members of an insignificant social movement composed of starry-eyed visionaries.

Yet, there are certain irreversible trends and conditions that support the growth of the movement to abolish war as an instrument of national policy, to delegate authority for settling disputes

between nations exclusively to a world-wide authority. The trend is toward ever-increasing dependence of nation upon nation in many spheres of life—a trend created by the impact of developing technology in communication, transportation, production and commerce. The principal condition that provides impetus for such a movement is the recent and astronomical increase in what Brock Chisholm called, in plain English "our killing power". Brock Chisholm credits the increase in "killing power" with an unprecedented effect, namely with transforming the scope of the social units responsible for individual survival from national to world-wide proportions. I quote from Chisholm (1966, 55):

. . . our killing power has become such that . . . the survival unit quite suddenly . . . is no longer the nation but has become the human race itself, and for this we have no precedent, no previous experience and no education for dealing with any such situation. It was quite unknown on earth until just now.

It is important to note, however, that the trend toward enlarged "survival units" has been underway for some decades and has already resulted in the creation of a good many organizations, numbering no less than one hundred, for the international regulation of a variety of specific activities, starting with a Universal Postal Union in 1875.

In a recent United Nations publication, thirteen experts in international law (Thirteen Experts, 1963) from countries as varied as the United States, Switzerland, the Soviet Union, India and France, examined the trend toward organizations whose rules cut across national boundaries. One of these experts introduced the operation of such organizations through his own experience, in the following words:

The invitation to deliver this lecture reached me by letter in Buenos Aires thanks to arrangements made by the Universal Postal Union. I cabled my acceptance through facilities operated in accordance with the International Telecommunication Union. I later crossed three continents by air services made possible by the rules and facilities of the International Civil Aviation Organization and the World Meteorological Organization. I was exempt from quarantine because I held a certificate of vaccination issued by the World Health Organization. Seven international organizations had some part in my being here (1963, 6).

The thoughtful examination by these thirteen experts of the trends toward international organization reveals common threads which social psychologists might well heed.

First, in every case, the move toward cooperative efforts grew from common interdependent problems — for example in commu-

nication or weather prediction or health — which the separate nations could not handle independently.

Second, the cooperative efforts did eventually lead to agreements on rules that are binding for all nations in the specific activity involved and in international organizations to implement them. In other words, the nations are bound to rules and organizations superordinate to those prevailing within the bounds of the individual member nations.

Third, the evolution of the common yardsticks or norms applicable to all countries frequently required changes in habitual practices *within* nations, in the particular sphere of common concern. In other words, with respect to those practices, nations were required and did change their concepts of their sovereignty, namely that portion of this sovereignty involving practices that conflicted with the newly evolved international union.

The serious impediments retarding the evolution of superordinate binding rules for resolving international disputes exclusively by international bodies lie in the claims and objectives of nations which they enshrine within the confines of their own sovereignty, despite the conflict of these claims and objectives with the trend toward the increasing interdependence of people everywhere. As a result, many peoples in various countries of the world today are caught in dilemmas between their growing identification with more inclusive values encompassing humanity, on the one hand, and the more provincial and local identifications of their own particular groups, be it their tribe, state or nation, on the other hand.

Not infrequently, the demands of provincial identifications and loyalties are at odds with more universal and inclusive values. There are forces of resistance attempting to block the trend toward increasing interdependence between groups by intensifying such provincial loyalties. Many examples come to mind. We learn from C. Legum's volume on *Pan Africanism* (1962) and United Nations reports on Apartheid (1963) that while the new nationalisms in Africa move toward broadening the narrow and local insulations of tribalism, the colonial powers still foster insulation of these very same peoples within their more restrictive tribal loyalties. Those who are familiar with *The Closed Society* by the historian James W. Silver (1964) must be impressed by his vivid account of the constricting effects of making "states rights" supreme. The closed society produced the closed mind, which Milton Rokeach (1960) has analyzed extensively in other localities as well.

The Trend Is Toward Loyalty to Human Bonds

Still, there is an unmistakable and irreversible trend toward loyalty to human bonds more inclusively than the tribe, state or nation. It was not enough for the leaders who participated in the Nazi barbarism to declare at the Nuremberg trials that they were simply carrying out the orders of their superiors. Many people have pondered the implications of these events, and many persons in various countries today are caught in a dilemma as to when the demands of more provincial identifications conflict with the more inclusive loyalties to humanity, doubtless with tremendous psychological wear and tear to these persons. Surely such dilemmas raise psychological questions worthy of serious research of long-range scope, for the dilemmas will not disappear so long as the trend toward interdependence continues. These research questions include the following: When is a person justified in refusing to carry out orders from the superior authority on the grounds of his attachment to humanity? Can definite criteria over and above legal technicalities be specified for such refusals? Otherwise, we cannot single out cases where such refusals reflect genuine identification with and devotion to humanity and those that reflect simply subjective whims of the individual in question. What are the social and psychological issues in the establishment of such criteria? Of course, research concerned with such problems will necessarily involve social, political and legal aspects as well as social-psychological questions.

There are still other facets to the dilemmas of loyalty between provincial and more inclusively human bonds. There is an assumption of some standing that loyalty to primary groups — such as tribe or family — is the prerequisite for loyalty to larger, more comprehensive values and human ties. Certainly, larger loyalties can include those to the primary groups whose values are compatible. Thus, when they are compatible, identification with and loyalty to every broadening and more inclusive human bonds need not be conducive to the arousal of an attitude of "self-hatred" for the person's more provincial primary group or affiliation.

But when the primary group promotes incompatible values, does it follow that identification with the provincial group (tribe, family, clan) will promote devotion to wider human values? The issue is raised here as a research problem on integration or conflict of human loyalties that deserves serious concentration under conditions of a changing world. From what we know about the categorization process, it is a reasonable hypothesis that the more constricted scope of identification is likely to result in total

rejection of more comprehensive, more universal human bonds, perhaps proportional to the person's love and attachment to his primary group.

Creative Alternative to the Law of the Jungle

Perhaps more serious, but not unrelated to the dilemma between provincial identification and widening human bonds, is the gap between the proclamations and deeds of nations in regard to resolving their disputes. As eloquently proclaimed in the United Nations Charter, almost every nation today states its abhorrence of the scourge of war and its dedication to peace. In principle, that is in abstract principle, most nations have proclaimed the necessity of a world body to settle their disputes.

On the ruins of the first World War, the victors founded the League of Nations. But, as the U.N. Secretary General U Thant (1964) summarized its ill-fated existence, its doom was forecast in its birth as adjunct to a war settlement by the victors. We learn from an account of The Evolution of the United Nations that the Charter of the United Nations was framed before the realization that nuclear weapons made familiar concepts of war obsolete and before the realities of power relations among nations would change (Bunting and Lee, 1964, 50). From the same sources, we learn that nations soon proceeded to form regional pacts, nearly all of which "were a straight vote of no confidence in the Security Council" (1964, 61).

Thus, despite proclamations of devotion to a principle of settling their differences through a world body, nations are still most sensitive to their sovereign right to take the matter of waging war into their own hands. They bristle over their sovereignty in settling disputes in their own way.

The gap between proclamation and deed is a cause of great concern to those who fully realize that modern "killing power" made obsolete the conception of survival only as tribe, clan or nation. The survival unit, as Chisholm declared, has become the human race. Distances and oceans are no longer dependable shields. The formula that the survival unit is the whole human race becomes more than a metaphor when General MacArthur (who is considered by many people in the United States as the personification of military grandeur) publicly asserted that "War has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. . . . If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. . . . Science has clearly outmoded it as a feasible alternative" (MacArthur, 1955, 37).

Alarmed by the bleak picture of a stone age that inevitably lies ahead if the law of the jungle continues, men of sufficient vision beyond provincial blinders have been offering various devices to get out of the predicament. Thus men of such vision and good will in various countries offered blueprints for world federation. Experts on international law, government and economics proposed programs for a viable and effective world organization for settling international disputes and decreasing the appalling gaps in income, living, health and educational standards that divide peoples into "have" and "have nots", with all of the attendant consequences.

Clark and Sohn's Plan . . .

One of the most elaborately thought out plans for an effective world body to function as the arbiter in international disputes is that proposed by Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn (1966). Their influential book, *World Peace Through World Law*, is now available in many languages and in a short time has gone through three revisions. In the 1966 revision, two alternative plans are proposed. One plan is an article by article revision of the present U.N. Charter. The second is a detailed proposal for a new world body, in which supreme authority is vested in a representative body which the authors refer to as the General Conference and an Executive Council replaces the present Security Council, but functions under the directives of the General Conference. The main features of this detailed proposal specify that the organization is open to *all* nations ratifying the plan. No nation can be barred or expelled from the body. In fact the authors insist that the effectiveness of the new world body depends on its unanimous or near unanimous ratification by all nations. It includes a Disarmament Authority and a Peace Force. Representation is proportional to the population of constituent nations. Representatives would initially be selected by national legislatures or comparable bodies in each country, with the aim of their election eventually by popular vote within each country. The purpose of these latter proposals is at least to reduce the possibility of the representatives being mere agents of the governments that happen to be in power at the time (*cf.* Sevareid, 1965, *The Final Troubled Hours of Adlai Stevenson*).

Recently the historian Waskow (1967) proposed private initiative to establish training schools for developing personnel to man an eventual transnational peace-keeping force, with emphasis on the need for their developing unequivocal loyalties to peace beyond their own national loyalties. The psychologist

Charles Osgood (1962) has proposed a variety of measures to reverse the spiral of the arms race in a series of steps designed for Graduated Reciprocal in Tension-reduction (GRIT).

The effectiveness of all such blueprints and measures is predicated on the assumption that nations, and especially great powers, are so motivationally committed to the settlement of disputes through a world body that they would relegate this most sensitive and central sphere of their sovereignty to it. How fortunate for humanity if such a strong universal motivational base existed.

The great obstacles is not lack of resourcefulness in social design or in technical matters, but the insufficiency and contradictions in the more inclusive identification and loyalty that might provide the base of support for a world-wide arbiter of international disputes.

Nations do not as yet conceive themselves as interdependent parts of the survival unit composed of the human race. Despite the mounting evidence of peoples' interdependence for their safety, security and future progress, the nations have not embraced the superordinate goal of human survival, in the attainment of which their own well-being and survival lies.

A viable world body directed toward the superordinate goal of human survival, which will safeguard cultures built through centuries and insure their future development, cannot be patterned in the image of "my way of life" or "your way of life". It requires superordinate organization, superordinate value orientations in which more provincial identifications and loyalties are not at odds with more comprehensive loyalties, at least as these pertain to the sphere of mutual safety. It requires instruments and sanctions coordinate with the superordinate organizations and values.

Where is such an organization to come from? It is probably safe to conclude that no government today could commit itself to such a scheme, mindful of the consequences at home — accusations of selling out, of being traitors, and of exposing their people to danger. It is only the people who can provide the broad base for their official spokesmen to take such bold steps. And this broad base does not come out of thin air. It has to develop and be nourished first as social movements in various countries. As we noted in our brief analysis of social movements, public leaders are as much creations of popular movements as they are the initiators of new policies and actions.


It is not within the ken of one social psychologist or the scope of one paper in this APA Convention to chart the course

of a long-range social movement or to write prescriptions for research that will yield indicators useful for policy or action programs. But one prerequisite for the effectiveness of any blueprints or programs is the arousal of a broad motivational base which will sensitize peoples that they are in a common predicament. If social psychologists, along with their fellow social scientists, participate in spelling out the terms of this common predicament, they will have a unique opportunity of contributing to the creative alternative toward the superordinate goal of human survival and cultural enrichment, instead of serving as mere technicians.

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Treatment Intervention and Reciprocal Interaction Effects¹

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The last several years have witnessed an accumulation of reports on the effectiveness of efforts to change behavior in ways that are intended to be therapeutic for the persons receiving the treatment. These findings reveal a disquieting lack of fit when anticipated changes are viewed in relation to outcomes measured by standard behavioral research procedures. Reviews by Brayfield (1963), Colby (1964), Eysenck (1966), Bergin (1966) and Truax and Carkhuff (1966) conclude that therapeutic counseling does not measurably increase average positive adjustment changes over and above what one ordinarily finds among untreated controls. In fact, most attempts to influence or modify the behavior of others, whether they be deep psychotherapy (Eysenck, 1952; Levitt, 1956; Whitehorn and Betz, 1954; Barron and Leary, 1954), less intensive corrective techniques (Krasner and Ullmann, 1966), social intervention (Powers and Witmer, 1951; Miller, 1959; Meyer, Borgatta and Jones, 1965; Caplan, 1965) or resocialization procedures (Brim and Wheeler, 1966) produce only very limited change effects when individuals are considered in the aggregate. And, in some instances, even contrary behavior may

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result (Cohen, 1962; Truax and Carkhuff, 1964; Bergin, 1966). As Bauer has aptly expressed it, man is "an obstinate audience" (1965).

The research design most frequently used in investigating the effects of treatment or change techniques in general has been the comparison of changes in behavior shown by experimental and control subjects measured at two points in time. Major attention has been given to the measurement of outcome either in terms of absolute change or the evaluation of the relative efficacy among different treatment procedures. Such a research approach is particularly appropriate for determining the efficacy of a specific type of treatment. Whether this research method is adequate for identifying the variables that either contribute to or impair the efficacy of the specific method of treatment remains an open question.

Thus far research has revealed little about the *processes* of behavior change and the causes of final effects. In consequence, it is difficult to determine which events lead to what outcomes. If a treatment fails to change individual behavior, how and why does it fail? What are the impediments? Should an entire approach be jettisoned in the face of repeated negative outcomes or would a few adjustments in the method of treatment make the difference between success and failure? Finally, while non-experimental influences may be equally as therapeutic as experimental influences, what influences are most critical or instrumental in producing a certain result irrespective of their origin? In short, while research focused on outcome has merit, longitudinal study of the treatment process itself is required to provide the information necessary to improve present methods or to indicate new and more promising orientations.

The present study is less concerned with outcome effects as such than it is with the process of behavioral change and with factors that regulate the course of such change through time among subjects involved in a treatment intervention project. Specifically, the major point of interest is the change in behavior of youth who are exposed to a program of counseling and pragmatic help designed to improve their personal and social adjustment; how they change over time; the relationship of behavior changes to program input; and how client and treatment agent behavior are affected by the very interaction system they create.

As a Background . . .

The study to be described here is a sequel to an earlier investigation. By way of setting the stage for material to follow,

it will be necessary to review briefly some of the previous findings. Results from an investigation into the nature and variety of factors associated with the effectiveness of street gang work (Caplan, *et al.*, 1967) raised a number of questions about the character of the dependent variable, i.e., changes in adjustment due to program exposure. The subjects were inner-city boys, most of whom were members of what are generally considered delinquent gangs. The action program was The Chicago Youth Development Project, a large-scale neighborhood-based effort designed to curtail anti-social tendencies and to promote pro-social behavior primarily through the intervention street gang workers. Such workers reach youth outside the confines of traditional in-building facilities and attempt to resocialize and assist them in innumerable ways through face-to-face contacts. For a more detailed account of the target population, program operations and the action arena, see Mattick and Caplan (1964). For those interested, a description of the practice and special concerns of street gang workers can be found in Spergel's *Street Gang Work* (1966).

The treatment model that emerged from the results of the previous study implied a monotonic and additive effect following expected lines. Adjustment tended to improve over time in relation to the amount of program input; the more the help and the better the relationship, the more likely and the greater the success. Yet, there were certain curious and unexplained features to the data.

The first question raised by these data concerned the presence of weak statistical associations between a set of operational variables and changes in adjustment. A number of worker-boy interaction variables presumed to be at the core of the treatment process showed only low to moderate correlations with the dependent variable ("contact adjustment progress"). Either we had failed to consider some key ingredients in the change process or the series of adjustment changes was discontinuous and possibly nonlinear as well, making the use of a zero order correlations statistic (Kendall's tau_b) inappropriate.

The second question concerned a disproportionate imbalance in the distribution of subjects along the latter stages of the adjustment scale, resulting in a relatively few final "success" cases but many "near success" cases. Only 4% (24) out of 598 subjects were classified at the "success" stage; yet 32% (191) were classified in the immediate preceding stage, resulting in a near-success pile-up of subjects along the adjustment scale.

At least two explanations seem possible. Either the mea-

sures had been made too soon for program efforts to register their full summation-effect or there was some obstacle at the latter stages of the treatment program which foreclosed the possibility of final success for the majority of the subjects.

It can be seen from these introductory remarks that the first of these two explanations ties into the second and that closer examination of the dependent variable dimension is prerequisite to understanding the issues involving each. Although both explanations will be given attention here, the present study was designed to examine the latter — namely, given a necessary time lapse for program effects to accrue, would the proportion of success cases increase accordingly and, if not, what are the obstacles causing a pile-up at the "near-success" stages?

Unfortunately, from an inferential point of view, a serious limitation of the prior study resulted from reliance upon "frozen history" data; the data had been gathered at a single point in time from subjects with differences in amount of program exposure. While such data provided a valuable point-in-time profile of project accomplishments, the absence of repeated measures on the same individuals through time made it impossible to test the two explanations stated above. In particular, there was no way to ferret out the serial pattern of adjustment stage changes over time from the statistical morass and, in the absence of such information, it was impossible to know what ongoing adjustment trends remained submerged in the data.

In contrast to the earlier study, the data to be presented here were gathered longitudinally within the ongoing context of the action program so that process or trend analysis would be possible. The main departure from the earlier study is this procedural modification allowing for repeated measures for the same individuals at successive points through time.

Method

Subjects

One hundred and nine boys being counseled by one of three experienced street gang workers were subjects for the present study. The mean age of the subjects upon being included in the study was 15.8 years, with a range from 13 to 18 years; thirty-five per cent (38) were either drop-outs or push-outs from school and 45 per cent (41) had official delinquency records. Roughly two-thirds (64) of the subjects were white, the remainder being Negro. All subjects resided in the traditionally highly delinquent and economically disadvantaged inner-city areas of Chicago.

Only subjects classified at the "treatment" or individual problem solving level of program involvement were included in this study. Subjects were included upon being rated at Stage 5 on the adjustment progress scale to be described shortly. This decision to study subject behavior only at the more intensive program involvement levels permitted greater concentration of our attention upon events associated with the pre-success pile up.

Measurement Scales

Dependent variable: Adjustment classifications representing different degrees of behavior change were based on a refined version of an empirically derived, eight-stage Program Adjustment Scale developed for the earlier investigation. In brief, the first four adjustment stage classifications of the Program Adjustment Scale are concerned with relatively "low-level" program involvement and adaptation on part of the subject. They pertain to subject receptivity to (a) development of worker-boy acquaintanceship; (b) social and recreational level group work; (c) group counseling; and, (d) the earlier phases of dyadic counseling. The chief interest in the present study focused on the later adjustment stages. Those stages involving a greater degree of personal adaptation and commitment to final program objectives. In terms of behavioral criteria used for evaluating change, they are:

Stage 5. *Receptivity to personal counseling.* The boy enters willingly into a one-to-one counseling relationship with the worker. He meets the worker privately a minimum of twice a week to discuss personal problems. He no longer views the worker as only a group sponsor, but as a personal confidant as well; the acquaintanceship becomes "tight".

Stage 6. *Meaningful relationship.* The boy demonstrates overt agreement with the worker's opinions concerning issues of personal and social adjustment. The boy "opens up" or "unplugs" when discussing private feelings with the worker. Conjointly, they make plans to initiate activities designed to have life-shaping effects upon the boy's future. In social work parlance, the boy is considered "reached".

Stage 7. *Commitment and preparation for change.* Although there is a many-sidedness to action objectives, at Stage 7 a focusing down and more or less coherent striving around a particular change behavior objective becomes evident here. The boy commits himself verbally to the adoption of the new behaviors required to meet the objective and does not deter the worker from instituting a variety of preparatory arrangements and pragmatic intervention steps to facilitate the behavior change. He appears

ready for a conscientious effort to modify his behavior along lines which are often at variance with past or established behavior.

Stage 8. *Transfer and Autonomy.* The "success" stage. Whereas all prior program adjustment stages pertain to operational or instrumental goals, this stage represents the final goal. The behavior change is made manifest and survives in a post-program or "real life" situations. The boy "stands on his own feet" and indicates by independent actions that he has successfully incorporated behavior changes planned during the earlier stages of the worker-boy relationship. Examples would be a boy who accepts and remains with a job after a past history of unwillingness to accept the discipline required for successful job holding or a drop out who returns to and remains in school. Specific "success" objective depends, of course, upon the individual subject and his idiosyncratic behavior. Each "success" objective is in accord with the nature of the problem presented by the subject.

To test the reliability of rater judgments using these classification categories, 200 boys comparable to but not included among the subjects in the present investigation were rated independently by the author and one research assistant. These adjustment stage ratings were based upon field observations of worker-subject interaction and often, but not always, informal interviews with the subjects. The inter-rater adjustment stage correlation was .87 (Pearsonian); equivalence measures, i.e., percentage of inter-rater agreement for each stage ranged from 91% (Stage 6) to 85% (Stage 7).

In the study to be described, ratings were conducted similarly by the same two raters. Rating disagreements were resolved by discussion and re-evaluation. It should be emphasized that the ratings were *not* made by the street workers. This scale, however, and the one to follow, were empirically derived earlier from actual worker reports.

Independent variable: The instrument used to measure variations of treatment input was labeled the Blood, Sweat and Tears (BST) Scale. As with the dependent variable scale, BST rating criteria were based on operational referents in manifest behavior. A brief description of the six point BST scale in terms of criterion behavior examples follows.

Description of Effort by Street Worker

Level of Input

1. Minimal worker input. Routine recreational and social services are provided the subject. The worker may give some

attention to individual problem-solving for the subject, but only in a group setting.

2. In addition to group work, low-level individual counseling or minor personal favors are provided occasionally.

3. Individual counseling is provided routinely three or more times a week in addition to worker-sponsored group activity.

4. The worker begins to provide individual services in addition to counseling; he offers a helping hand in a miscellany of *individual* services, e.g., lends money, provides transportation, talks to key adults such as teachers, police or potential employers on behalf of the subject. He connects the subject to resources which might otherwise be inaccessible.

5. Day to day worker-boy interaction. The worker helps the boy over and beyond what would be required routinely. He tries hard to stimulate change and explores the possibility of providing the subject greater access to potential resources in order to create the proper conditions for the desired behavior change. Normally at any one time a worker can handle no more than five to seven boys at this BST input level without excess strain upon himself and the proportion of program resources made allotted to him.

6. The supreme effort. The worker's concern for the boy's welfare and adjustment reaches the most personal sphere of his own life. The worker resorts to an all-out effort to modify and influence the subject's behavior regardless of the difficulties encountered. The worker spends part of his free time in effort to help the boy, often bringing him into his own home for periods of a few days, weeks or even longer. Without belaboring the obvious, from the viewpoint of the program the worker and his resources are largely pre-empted for a single subject. Normally, at any one point in time, a worker can handle only one or two boys at this intensive work level and, even then, only for relatively short periods.

The BST Scale ratings were based on routine discussions with workers and subjects; nonparticipant observation of worker-boy interaction; and analysis of the workers' Daily Activity Reports (see Mattick and Caplan, 1964), a routine reporting procedure designed specifically for the purpose of accounting for each worker's activities. A pilot reliability check on 200 subjects for the BST scale showed an inter-rater reliability coefficient of .81 (Pearsonian) between the author and a research assistant. Equivalence measures ranged from 74% (BST level 2) to 93% (BST level 4). The BST measures reported in the study were based on the ratings of these same raters.

General procedure: Subjects were included in the study after

being classified initially at Stage 5; that is, none of the subjects had been classified previously at Stage 5 or at an Adjustment Scale stage higher than Stage 5. Each of the 109 subjects had moved up to Stage 5 from a numerically lower adjustment stage. Thus, at the onset of the study, Stage 5 classification represented the highest adjustment stage classification attained for each subject up to that point in time.

Originally, 120 boys were included in the study; however, contact was lost with eleven subjects prior to the termination of the study. Four of these subjects moved away, one was killed while attempting a robbery, and six simply disappeared. Data for these subjects were removed before analysis; hence, $N = 109$.

The period of study for each subject extended over a one-year period beginning with the initial Stage 5 classification. After having achieved Stage 5 classification, weekly adjustment and BST scale evaluations were begun for each subject by the two raters. These ratings were made sequentially once a week for fifty-two consecutive weeks.

The three street gang workers studied were among nine workers hired after screening one hundred and twenty applications. They were experienced in their work, and were regarded highly for their skills by their supervisors and by others engaged in the same or similar work. While the three workers under study had some general notion of the measurement scales, having been involved in the process leading to their eventual form, they viewed the interviews as routine and as being one part of a larger ongoing effort to collect data on events in the Chicago Youth Development Project. The researchers and their activities were known and were matter-of-factly accepted by the workers and many of the subjects; both workers and researchers were routinely involved in a variety of action-research studies over a five-year period.

A major problem in the investigation stemmed from the fact that the study was conducted in a field setting where social reality did not necessarily coincide with nor could be bent to suit ideal research requirements; there simply is no way to control the stream of everyday events and non-experimental influences for the purpose of conducting such an investigation. Also, because the researchers had no control over action arrangements, there could be no predetermined or fixed ratio scheduling of program input. Some subjects, particularly at a time of crisis, received concentrated attention for a short time span. Others received a relatively even buildup in input over the twelve months of data collections. This absence of a synchronically con-

trolled treatment schedule precluded what otherwise would have been some interesting possibilities for auto-correlational or multiple time series analysis of the data.

Results and Discussion

Near-success pile-up: The first consideration was to determine if the present data showed a near-success pile-up similar to that noted in the earlier study. Figure 1 shows the final ad-




FIGURE 1

Per cent of subjects at various adjustment stage positions one year after Stage 5 classification.

justment classification frequencies for the 109 subjects. One year after having reached Stage 5, 6% (8) of the subjects are at Stage

8, the "success" stage, while, by contrast, 34% (37) are at Stage 7 and 39% (40) at Stage 6. Cursory inspection of the frequency distributions for these three latter adjustment stages clearly indicate a situation similar to that obtained earlier; a near-success pile-up is evident from this "time-bound" picture of the present adjustment classification data. However, as will be shown shortly, the comparative statistics presented in Figure 1 invites a serious over-simplification. They connote a condition of stability in a set of data which is, in fact, nonstationary; harbored in these data are directional change functions whose properties remain to be specified.

Adjustment Stage Changes and Their Sequential Patterning

Having now set the stage for the use of longitudinal data, the remaining discussion will be devoted to the analysis of sequential arrangement of adjustment stage changes and their relation to the near-success pile-up. The most immediate issue to be addressed is whether the number of Stage 8 "success" cases is disproportionately small because the investigation terminated too soon for the additive change model to produce its final summation effects. Allowing for variation because of errors in measurement and extraneous influences, the possibility is that the adjustment classifications for each subject at any one point in time portray each subject at his highest classification attained to date. The implication here is that each individual represented in the aggregate data at each adjustment stage in Figure 1 is characterized by a similar or identical past record of adjustment changes and that each holds similar transition probabilities for future stage changes. This possibility can be studied by examining the sequential arrangement of adjustment changes for each subject through time.

Figure 2 shows the serial order of subsequent adjustment stage changes beginning with the initial Stage 5 classification. Disregarding time and BST measures for the moment and considering only sequential arrangement, 89% (97) of the one hundred and nine initial Stage 5 subjects moved to a numerically higher stage while only 6% (6) remained at Stage 5 throughout the fifty-two weeks of the study without further change; and a numerically lower or pre-treatment (\leq Stage 4) classification followed Stage 5 classification for the remaining 6% (6) of the subjects. Of the ninety-seven subjects who made a numerically positive stage change, eighty-six were reclassified to the next high-

ADJUSTMENT SCALE CLASSIFICATION CHANGES




FIGURE 2

Per cent of subjects showing change behavior at each adjustment stage during the initial set of reclassification movements. The lines represent the direction of change and are roughly proportional in length to the number of subjects involved. The dash lines were used at Stage 8 because of the small N.

est adjustment stage, Stage 6, while eleven subjects advanced directly to Stage 7 by skipping Stage 6.

Subsequent adjustment stage movements for the 86 Stage 6 subjects shown in Figure 2 are as follows: 63% (54) were next classified at a numerically positive adjustment stage (all went to Stage 7); 31% (27) remained at the Stage 6 classification until termination of the one-year postStage 5 study interval; and 6% (5) were next classified at a preStage 6 level. Although, in contrast to the Stage 5 events, a proportionately higher number of Stage 6 subjects remained fixed at this adjustment level, the predominant tendency to advance numerically and in serial order is again evident.

Of the initial one hundred and nine subjects included in the study of Stage 5, sixty-seven reached Stage 7; eleven skipped to Stage 7 from Stage 5; fifty-four moved directly to Stage 7 from

Stage 6; and two subjects who had made a numerically descending adjustment change at Stage 6 later returned to Stage 6 and then moved on to Stage 7. Of these sixty-seven Stage 7 subjects, 15% (10) next moved to Stage 8; 28% (19) remained at Stage 7 without further change; and 57% (38) were next classified at some numerically lower adjustment stage. In contrast with Stages 5 and 6, the predominant postStage 7 directional movement tendency is *negative*.

An important finding seems evident at this point: The small proportion of Stage 8 "success" cases is not due to an arrestment of a positive change pattern; postStage 7 adjustment classification changes do occur, but most are *not* in the anticipated direction. Adjustment stage reclassification changes are fairly regular and positive in directional movement trend throughout the series of instrumental goal stages (Stages 5-7) but the trend changes to a predominantly negative direction after that point. Before discussing the implications of these results it will be instructive to proceed further by following out the full chain of subsequent adjustment stage reclassifications for the thirty-eight backsliders.

First order backsliders: Of the thirty-eight subjects who evidenced negative program adjustment change (backsliding) after initial Stage 7 classification, 76% (29) were next classified at Stage 6, 18% (7) at Stage 5, and 5% (2) dropped back to a group work involvement. Assigning a Stage ≤ 4 classification and a value of 4 for all cases that drop below Stage 5, the mean adjustment stage change from Stage 7 for these first order backsliders was -1.30.

Second order backsliders: After having reached Stage 7 and then having dropped back to a numerically lower adjustment stage level, thirty-three of the thirty-eight first order backsliders eventually regained Stage 7 classification during the rebound phase of the backsliding loop. Of these subjects, two progressed to Stage 8, two remained at Stage 7 without further change for the remainder of the one year period for study, and twenty-nine dropped back to numerically lower adjustment stages. Of these twenty-nine second order backsliders, 59% (17) were next classified at Stage 6, 24% (7) at Stage 5, and 17% (5) at Stage 4, for a mean adjustment scale change of -1.76 stages.

Third order backsliders: Twenty-four of the second order backsliders were reclassified at Stage 7 for the third time during the one year postStage 5 period of study. Of these, none advanced to Stage 8. Nine subjects remained at Stage 7 for the duration of the study period, and fifteen evidenced Stage 7 backsliding for the third time by reclassification to a numerically lower ad-

justment stage. Twenty-seven per cent (4) of these third order backsliders were next classified at Stage 6, 33% (5) at Stage 5, and 40% (6) at Stage 4 upon leaving Stage 7. The mean adjustment stage change for the third order backsliders is -2.13.

Figure 3 represents visually the series of postStage 7 reclassifi-




FIGURE 3

Phase diagram of major adjustment stage reclassification trends for the three successive backsliding orders moving in a clockwise direction.

fication patterns for each of the three backsliding orders described above. The numbers over the two solid lines between the last three stages indicate the number of subjects that reached Stages 6-8 during the initial series of reclassification changes. The numbers in parens below Stage 7 identify each backslide group by its iteration order: First order backsliders tend to be reclassified at Stage 6; second order backsliders are usually reclassified at Stage 5 or 6; and third order backsliders are most often reclassified at Stages 5 or ≤ 4 . The Rebound Phase trend lines indicate that backsliders tend to return to Stage 7 via Stage 6, although occasional "skips" from Stage ≤ 4 , to Stage 6 occur.

Backsliding and Aggregate Response Frequencies

The uncovering of a series of successive postStage 7 backsliding loops throws light on the unresolved issues discussed earlier. The presence of these loops strengthens the "stumbling block" or success obstacle hypothesis and also helps to explain the presence of weak correlation between program adjustment change and those variables presumed to be critical or instrumental in producing such change.

In connection with this latter issue, the foregoing discussion on backsliding is immediately relevant. Backsliding activity makes possible the simultaneous appearance of subjects at any one adjustment stage classification who represent various backslide iteration orders. However, a meaningful set of zero order correlations between adjustment changes and variables associated with such change would require that subjects at each adjustment classification stage be characterized by identical processes of change. It can now be seen that the static representation in Figure 1 and, undoubtedly, the data mentioned from the earlier study as well, include subjects from different backsliding orders at the adjustment classification stages with each group of backsliders probably holding a different set of independent variable relationships to a common dependent variable measure. Thus, by statistically treating a multi-state condition as multiple responses, obtained results will have been so confounded as to be almost meaningless.

Under such circumstances, aggregate response frequencies would probably most often tend to decrease the values used to make statistical inferences. For concreteness, a variable used in the earlier study, "length of time known", i.e., how long the subject has been known to the worker, provides an obvious illustration. During the initial ascent through the adjustment stages it could be presumed safely that "time known" and adjustment classification would be positively correlated: Those at Stage 6 are likely to have been known to the worker longer than those at Stage 5, but not for as long as those at Stage 7. However, if we examined the Stage 5 subjects at any one point in time, subjects representing different backsliding orders are likely to be found. Thus, whatever differences may be represented a correlation between "time known" and program progress would be largely attenuated because of the presence of mixed orders of backsliders at each program adjustment stage. The validity of any set of intercorrelations among variables associated with the change process described here would depend upon: (a) the extent to which the interrelationships vary with successive orders of

backsliding, and (b) the numbers of subjects representing each backsliding order at each adjustment stage.

One point remains to be made regarding the additive or simple "summation effect" hypothesis before introducing additional data. While the data in Figure 2 alone are sufficient to discredit the possibility of a *linear* summation treatment model, these findings do not constitute an unambiguous disconfirmation of the possibility that continued work would lead to success. Conceivably, even after more backsliding, the majority of subjects might spin off to Stage 8. Insofar as these data can show, however, continued work over time does not appear to be positively related to the probability of future Stage 8 classification; in fact, Stage 8 classification after the initial progress through the adjustment stages, became increasingly *less* likely with each successive iteration of the backsliding orders. Six of the eight subjects shown at Stage 8 in Figure 1 proceeded to that stage directly from Stage 7 without backsliding, two second order backsliders spun off to Stage 8 and remained there, but no third order backslider reached Stage 8. The two second order backslide subjects who achieved Stage 8 classification were the least time-tested among the success cases. One was classified at Stage 8 less than a month before termination of the study interval; the other was so classified five weeks before the end of the study interval. Thus, while continued work with backsliders may have served a variety of important social and personal purposes, and may have even produced positive changes which will remain submerged and undetected until later life, the present data suggest that continued effort with backsliders did not serve to advance immediate program objectives.

Adjustment Changes and Program Input

So far the data have been treated in terms of their most obvious features with little or no attention given to the relationship of adjustment classification changes to other variables. The remaining sections of this paper will be devoted to the findings on synchronic features of the adjustment trends and program input (BST) in relation to reclassification changes. For the purpose of simplicity the analysis considers comparisons of the two dichotomous movement cases (positive vs. negative movers).

Initial classification changes: Figure 4 gives the following: (a) the BST level at time of adjustment stage reclassification during the initial series of adjustment scale changes, i.e., those subjects whose movements are illustrated in Figure 2; and (b) the elapsed time between adjustment stage reclassifications. The p levels refer to Mann-Whitney U test (Siegel, 1956) comparisons

NEGATIVE MOVERS		STAGE	POSITIVE MOVERS	
		5		
N	(6)	(6)	(97)	P
X BST	2.10		2.66	>.05
X Months	2.05		2.03	>.05

NEGATIVE MOVERS		STAGE	POSITIVE MOVERS	
		6		
N	(5)	(7)	(54)	P
X BST	1.60		3.08	<.05
X Months	5.21		4.80	>.05

NEGATIVE MOVERS		STAGE	POSITIVE MOVERS	
	First Order Backsliders	7		
N	(38)	(19)	(10)	P
X BST	3.48		3.40	>.05
X Months	3.16		5.31	<.05

FIGURE 4

Means for input level (BST) and time interval between adjustment classification changes. The BST level is based on measures immediately prior to stage reclassification. Means are presented for comparison purposes only; p levels are based on the Mann-Whitney U test and are two-tailed probability levels.

of positive and negative change groups. All statistical tests are two-tailed.

The data in Figure 4 are not particularly striking in their own right, but provide an interesting contrast for the complementary data on backsliding to follow. At Stage 5 there is a sizeable but statistically nonsignificant difference between mean BST levels. The mean BST level was 2.10 for those making a negative change versus 2.66 for those making a positive change, ($z = 1.07, p > .05$). The length of time between Stage 5 classification and the first subsequent classification change is not even suggestive of a significant difference for the two opposite "mover" groups.

At Stage 6 the tendency to advance on the adjustment scale with increased BST is even more distinct. The mean BST level immediately prior to adjustment stage reclassification for the negative change group is 1.60, and 3.08 for the positive mover group. This difference in BST level for the two change groups is statistically significant ($z = 2.37, p. < .05$). The corresponding time interval between adjustment classification changes for the negative and positive mover groups is 5.21 mos. and 4.80 mos.; as before, this difference does not approach significance. The Stage 6 data suggest that boys with comparatively low BST input maintain a "tight" relationship with the worker for about five months and then show a negative adjustment change; conversely, increased BST at this adjustment stage has the effect of (a) reducing the time between stage classification changes, and (b) increasing the likelihood of a positive adjustment change.


Positive change in program adjustment appears to be largely a function of program input for Stages 5 and 6. At Stage 7, however, reclassification time and program input data presents a different pattern. For the first time in the sequence of adjustment changes, increased input is *not* associated with a directionally positive adjustment scale reclassification. The BST level is slightly higher for the *negative* change group (first order backsliders) than for the positive change group (3.48 vs. 3.40). While the direction of the difference is opposite to that noted for the two prior adjustment stages, the size of the difference is too small for statistical significance. Secondly, Stage 7 reclassification time is significantly *less* for the negative than for the positive change group (3.16 mos. vs. 5.31 mos.; $z = 2.40, p < .05$). While input does not appear to make a difference in determining the direction of classification change, the first order backsliders take less time to reverse the heretofore positive trend in adjustment stage progress than is required by the "success" cases to progress to

Stage 8. For the first time in the sequence of adjustment changes, increased input at Stage 7 is *not* associated with a directionally positive adjustment reclassification change.


Backsliding and the regulation of input: Figure 4 data show the program input and chronological data from the initial set of adjustment stage reclassifications leading up to the first order of backsliding. Data in Figure 5 presents the input and mean

Backsliding Order

1
(N=38)



2
(N=29)



3
(N=15)




FIGURE 5

Mean program input levels (BST) and subsequent negative adjustment scale changes for each of the three backslide orders.

negative classification change distance for each of the three backsliding orders. In essence, Figure 5 picks up where Figure 4 leaves off by following out the remaining series of adjustment changes for the backsliders. It differs from Figure 4 in that the time interval data are omitted.

Following out the Figure 5 data, it can be seen that the mean BST level required to advance the first order backsliders from Stage 6 to Stage 7 was 3.07 (practically identical to the mean figure of 3.08 shown in Figure 4 for all subjects reaching Stage 7, i.e., backsliders in addition to those who terminated at Stage 7 or proceeded on to Stage 8). Also, the input level associated with the initial Stage 6 to Stage 7 classification was not different for subjects, irrespective of the postStage 7 outcome. As already pointed out in Figure 4, the mean BST level of 3.48 for the backslider group is not significantly different when compared with that for other nonbacksliding subjects at the same adjustment point. Finally, it should be noted that the mean adjustment stage change for the first order backsliders is -1.30, resulting in a mean adjustment scale reclassification position of 5.70 immediately following the postStage 7 reclassifications.

Continuing with data in Figure 5, the twenty-nine second order backsliders show a mean Stage 6 BST level of 3.02; apparently no additional input was required to return subjects to Stage 7 for the second time. There is, however, a conspicuous and statistically significant difference between the first and second order backsliders with respect to Stage 7 BST levels (3.41 vs. 4.97) determined by the Sign test ($z = 2.66$; $p < .05$) (Siegel, 1956). (Note: the Sign test was based on a comparison of the first and second order data for the 29 of the 38 first order backsliders who later became second order backsliders. Because of this, the first order Stage 7 BST level of 3.41 reported for those in the Sign test analysis is somewhat, but insignificantly, different from the BST mean of 3.48 given in Figure 5 for all 38 original postStage 7 subjects, some of whom did not become second order backsliders. The same explanation will account for the slight discrepancies between the Figure 5 figures and those reported for other Sign test comparisons.)

This 1.49 increase in BST level is not only notable because it represents a reliable difference, but because it is a sizable difference. At this crucial near-success juncture in program adjustment progress, the worker increases program input rather sharply at the same point where he had previously experienced a setback. Despite this increased effort, however, backsliding not only recurs, but the Sign test comparison shows that the mean change of -1.76 adjustment stages is significantly greater than that evidenced previously by the same subjects as first order backsliders ($z = 2.81$; $p < .05$). Thus, increasing the dosage only leads to the paradoxical occurrence of even a greater degree of

setback. Now to the third order backslider data and the worker and subject reactions that follow.

No significant increase in BST level is required to return the subjects to Stage 7 the third time. Figure 5 shows the third order Stage 6 BST level of 3.19 higher, but not significantly more so than the comparable BST level of 3.02 for the second order backsliders. However the mean Stage 7 BST level for the third order backsliders is significantly higher than that for the second order backsliders when at the comparable adjustment stage position. The third order Stage 7 BST level is 5.60 while the comparable second order backslide data for these subjects is 4.84 ($z = 2.40$; $p < .05$).

The respective postStage 7 adjustment stage classification change and third order backslider subjects are -1.78 and -2.13. The difference, showing a greater degree of negative change for the third order backsliders, approaches significance ($z = 1.73$; $p < .08$). It should be pointed out, however, that the degree of negative change shown for the third order backslider group represents a considerably more conservative measure of change than is evident elsewhere in these data. In computing the mean adjustment scale changes all ≤ 4 Stage adjustment stage classifications, were given a value of 4. At least four, roughly a quarter of the third order backsliders, justified a *less than* Stage 4 adjustment classification. The negative change difference between these backslide orders would have been significant beyond the .05 level had these subjects been given a value of 3.

With little need for qualification, a temporary scaffolding of the sequence of backsliding events at Stage 7, shows: client negative change followed by increased input by the treatment agent followed by increased negative change by the client followed by even greater increased input by the treatment agent followed by even greater negative change by the client and so on, with striking regularity.

Explanatory Variables and Their Implications

The major finding may be put concisely: over time, individual subjects repeatedly demonstrate a tendency to *nearly* succeed in adopting final change behaviors advocated by the treatment program. Subjects can be "reached" and demonstrate considerable in-program behavior changes; but, despite considerable preparation for and expectation of post-program transfer of these changes, individual subjects repeatedly fail when faced with the test of real experience. It now remains to consider briefly some

possible explanations to account for these results along lines which are suggested but are not testable by means of the available data.

Program-Related Variables

Goal incongruity and transfer: The possibility that there is something inherent in the nature of program operations that delimits their range of success seems evident from the following: (a) the sharp reversal in the direction of adjustment changes occurring between instrumental and final goals during the initial series of adjustment scale changes, and (b) the reiteration of this near-miss tendency in the series of asymptotic backslicing approaches toward the final goal. The transfer point between instrumental success to real life situations marks the furthest pivotal point along the adjustment scale for each of the three backslicing loops, suggesting that instrumental changes proceed independently of or are basically incompatible with the final objectives they are designed to produce. There is no particular problem in moving the subjects through instrumental goal stages; the real complications ensue only when the same means are applied for the purpose of passing from operational to final objectives. At this crucial point, the means shown to be functional to instrumental progress become dysfunctional. Increased treatment input at the threshold of success does not push the subject over to the other side; its principal consequence is to cancel out prior instrumental gains in direct proportion to the magnitude of the increase.

These data show clearly that the "unreached" can be reached through intervention and meaningful relationships can be established with "hard core" youth generally considered recalcitrant and unresponsive to efforts. These same data suggest, however, that while reaching the unreached may have merit in its own right, being reached appears to be noncontingent or, at best, only peripherally related as an operational requisite for producing other changes in behavior. In fact, because of the services and favors proffered, there may be considerably more advantages in being "reached" repeatedly than in being changed. Most typically, instrumental changes initiated in the program setting have little or no survival value when the subject is no longer in the "power field" of the worker.

Individual-Related Variables

Worker behavior: In the research on influence, therapeutic treatment change, and the like, considerable attention is given

to the personality of the person who is the object of the change effort. He is viewed as a "reactor" and the person attempting to induce change as the "actor". It is perfectly clear, however, from the data that when continued interaction between influencer and influencee is possible, then the needs of both participants co-determine the results. Any long-term program of intervention must concern itself with practitioner as well as client behavior if it is to be effective.

What impresses one most about worker behavior is the strict adherence to a more-of-the-same philosophy under circumstances where program input and the accomplishment of final program objectives varied inversely; and, by contrast, the worker's rather conservative regulation of program while experiencing success in reaching instrumental goals. With respect to the allocation of resources, it bears emphasizing that pre-success failure had the effect of increasing future input commitment to those very subjects holding the least potential for behavior change. The pre-emptory input requirements for third order backsliders must have limited the worker's freedom to establish new relationships and thereby reduced his potential usefulness to the treatment program. Certainly, knowledge of the incremental assumptions held by the worker in applying and regulating the treatment variable would seem important for understanding outcome results and for making safer evaluations of the program accomplishments. The distribution of the treatment variable as preconceived by the action planners may turn out to be quite different from that spelled out by the staff personnel faced with the delicate task of carrying the program to the target population.

It would be difficult to estimate the extent to which such persistence and inflexibility on the part of the worker may be peculiar to action agents associated with such catch-as-catch-can programs, but it would seem that these outreach efforts might lend themselves to this kind of behavior. Under these conditions, the client does not pay the practitioner's salary and, because the action program uses the open community as an arena for its activities, clients may find it difficult to defend themselves from or to avoid the intrusion of the worker into their lives. Not particularly interested in changing their behavior, subjects may decide to go along with the program operations but not its desired ends. Because the client population and the practitioner may be operating under different reference frames, the distribution of program resources may fall largely under the control of treatment agents captured by the emotional challenge of reforming a client population more interested in gaining from the means employed

by the program to attain certain ends than in the actual achievement of those ends.

Another way of interpreting these results is that, by repeatedly "trying harder" to enforce an ends-means matching after each near-success failure, the worker is rationalizing his failure by showing that he is really working hard and that failure by the boy is not the worker's fault. For whatever reasons, if a goal displacement (i.e., means become ends) takes place on the part of the worker or boy or both, then it is possible that the very steps taken to deal with the problem behavior may not eliminate, but institutionalize it.

Subject Behavior

The subjects seemed to have a special affinity for accepting help and a special disaffinity for "success" in terms of those behaviors which the program ideally wished to produce. Their behavior arouses the suspicion that they possess the potential capability for demonstrating the desired behavior changes were they inclined to do so. Workers, employers, school personnel and other key individuals connected with the change effort repeatedly distinguished the subjects as being more "unwilling" than "unable" to demonstrate the various criterion behaviors used to denote final "success". The implication is that the subjects failed by choice; their behavior, although not identical, seems similar in many ways to the behavior of the Borstal boy described in *The Loneliness of the Long-Distance Runner* by Sillitoe (1959).

It may be true that the subjects were either unaccustomed or disinclined to success, but it must be kept in mind that the forces fatal to success may have more to do with incompatible ideologies than with an over-determined response to deeply embedded personality dynamics.

The values of holding a job, avoiding delinquent peers and continuing school until graduation and the like may not be shared by the subject. Moreover, the subjects may be cognitively correct. There may be good reason for the unwillingness to adapt to the external demands required for program success. It may well be true that some jobs are *not* worth getting up for in the morning; that delinquency may have more to do with biases inherent in police activity and distributive justice than with the peculiar tendencies of those who are apprehended; and, perhaps formal education is only a time consuming irrelevancy in their lives. In any case, whether the major factor be in the value structure or in deeper features of the personality, it seems clear that, even if "reached", remotivation remains a major hurdle to overcome in reorienting the activities of urban youth.

Interaction Effects

Any provisional hypotheses to explain these results must take into account the close linkage between the fate of the action program and the orderly and interconnected arrangement of mutually dependent client-practitioner interactions from which the backsliding loops and their component complex of subroutines are derived. The basis for process behavior is essentially interactions through time and, once these activities are set in motion, they are destined to define a reflexive interaction system which has consequence for carrying out program operations and for reaching final achievement aims. What remains to be addressed is the possible extent to which the continual worker-boy interaction necessary for program implementation may also determine its final outcome—consciously or unconsciously, consensually or unilaterally.

One way of looking at the interaction system is in terms of its boundary setting function—that it serves to circumscribe the very limits of participant actions. The asymptotic approaches of the backsliding loops to the final goal stage certainly suggest the possibility of boundary maintenance similar to the "positive dependence" cycles described by Herbst (1962, 145). In his study of coal mining, Herbst, using a Lewinian model, shows that in order to survive as a group, miners appropriately induced changes in their output behavior or operation at an achievement level which minimally met the requirements of management. The manner in which counteractions by subjects at the threshold of success delineate one boundary while successively increasing their prospect for more attention by moving the boundary back at the other end of one loop suggests the possibility of manipulation and testing of input limits.

The data also suggest yet another possibility of viewing the continued effects of interaction that invites attention—the possibility that reaction to the immediate effects of one's behavior upon the other produces its own stimulus and gives rise to the conditions that support and practices that sustain continual interaction quite apart from its intended purpose. In other words, a reflexive and self-reinforcing *folie à deux* in which both participants, caught up in behavior patterns they cannot control, regulate and are regulated by the effects of their actions upon the other; each being creature and creator of a self-perpetuating drama built upon an interweaving of reciprocal interaction effects. The net effect of this interaction of exacerbating tendencies is to produce a relationship which is more accommodative than

functional and which, from the point of view of the action program, presents a problem analogous to the philosophical-logical paradox of a system attempting to deal with itself.

Whatever may be the ceremonial meaning behind the interactional Laocoon revealed in the data, it clearly shows the worker to be as persistently non-adjustive and as committed to a particular behavior set as the boy whom he hopes to change. Their reactions seem to have a great deal in common; it is unfortunate that their commitments are in part antithetical.

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The Values of Fascism

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On the basis of his analysis of the values expressed in the public speeches of Hitler and Roosevelt, White (1949) developed seven indices of war propaganda or conflict-mindedness. Eckhardt (1965) validated four of these seven indices and developed another index of war propaganda (the "war/peace" ratio) on the basis of White's original data. These five indices were validated across 15 subjects, including Hitler and Mussolini, representing Fascism; Marx, Stalin, and Khrushchev, representing Communism; Roosevelt and Kennedy, representing Liberalism; and Churchill and Hoover, representing Conservatism (Eckhardt, 1965). It was found that these political subjects were significantly higher on these five indices than non-political subjects were. It was also found that Fascism was significantly higher on these five indices than the other political ideologies were.

The purpose of the present study was to determine whether these results in relation to Fascism would be further confirmed or denied when tested by analyses of two more Fascist leaders: Goebbels and Rockwell. It was also the purpose of this study to arrive at an operational definition of Fascism based on the values expressed by Mussolini, Hitler, Goebbels and Rockwell.

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Methods and Subjects

The method of *Value-Analysis* (White, 1951), which had been used in the previous studies, was applied to every 20th page of *The Goebbels Diaries* (Lochner, 1948)², an entire interview with George Lincoln Rockwell (Haley, 1966), and an entire essay on Fascism (Mussolini, 1922). White (1949) analyzed every second speech (or excerpt) in *My New Order* (Hitler, 1941), the results of which have been included in the present study.

Value-analysis is a form of content-analysis. "Value", the unit of analysis, was defined as "any goal or standard of judgment which in a given culture is ordinarily referred to as if it were self-evidently desirable" (White, 1951, 13). The values used in this study followed the definitions provided by White (1951, 44-55). Each value explicitly stated in the material, or clearly implied by it, was counted as one point, the assumption being that the relative frequency of reference to a value would constitute a measure of its importance to the speaker or the writer.

For further details on the nature, use, reliability and validity of value-analysis, consult White (1949, 1951). My own reliability with ten other analysts was .84 on the average, ranging from .64 to .95, all significant at the .01 level of confidence. Four test-retest reliability coefficients, over a six-month interval, averaged .79, ranging from .69 to .87, all significant at .01. The average reliability within seven subjects was .76, ranging from .69 to .83, all significant at .01. The reliability of group averages was checked by correlating the values of six groups with those of the individuals comprising those groups. With an average of ten individuals per group, the average reliability of the six groups was .73, ranging from .62 to .83, all significant at the .01 level.

Definitions of the Indices of War Propaganda

The indices of war propaganda or conflict-mindedness, originally developed by White (1949) and further validated by Eckhardt (1965), were: denunciation, strength, justified aggression, "war/peace" values and lack of concern for the welfare of others.

Denunciation was that per cent of total values where the

²Goebbels' diaries were analyzed by Jerome Rochlin, D.O., who was a senior student at the College of Osteopathic Medicine & Surgery, Des Moines, at the time of this study.

subject accused others of, and condemned them for, not wanting or respecting certain values, including the denunciation of aggression and dominance listed under the moral category in Table 1.

Strength was that per cent of total values which included the values of freedom, achievement, recognition, dominance, aggression, military strength, patriotism, determination, national sovereignty, obedience and denunciation of democracy, all listed under the strength category in Table 1.

Justified aggression was defined as aggression valued as a means of defending oneself or other values.

The "war/peace" ratio consisted of "war" (values whose frequency was significantly higher in Hitler's value-distribution compared with that of Roosevelt) divided by "peace" (values whose frequency was significantly higher in Roosevelt's value-distribution compared with that of Hitler). "War" values were indicated by a "W" and "peace" values by a "P" in Table 1.

Concern for the welfare of others was defined as that per cent of total values comprising the values of 15 public assistance cases, including economic welfare, work, emotional security, achievement, recognition, determination, friendship, democracy and knowledge.

Results

Table 1 shows the relative frequency of values expressed by Mussolini, Hitler, Goebbels and Rockwell. The value-distributions of Mussolini, Hitler and Goebbels were not significantly correlated with each other at the .05 level of confidence, but Rockwell's distribution was positively correlated with that of the other three subjects .49 on the average, significant at the .01 level. The distribution of all four subjects was positively correlated with the average distribution (in the fifth column of Table 1) .68 on the average, significant at the .01 level, suggesting that this average distribution represented the values of these four Fascist leaders fairly well. In spite of these overall similarities, a chi-square test of the differences between the frequencies (the results of which have been indicated by plus and minus signs in the first four columns of Table 1) showed that over half of the relative frequencies in each of these columns differed significantly from the average frequencies in the fifth column. Two sources of this variance would presumably be (a) the difference in the historical times and circumstances in which these men expressed themselves: Mussolini in Italy in 1922,

TABLE I
THE VALUES OF FASCISM

Values	Mussolini (N = 189)	Hitler (N = 4077)	Goebbels (N = 813)	Rockwell (N = 469)	Average (N = 5548)
Strength category					
Freedom	1.1	3.4+	0.6	0.0—	1.3—
(W) Achievement	0.0—	2.6—	4.1—	16.6+	5.8+
(W) Recognition	0.0—	2.0—	10.0+	4.5	4.1
Dominance	27.0+	1.6—	2.5—	6.6—	9.4+
(W) Aggression	12.7+	3.9—	9.6	14.5+	10.2+
(W) Military strength	1.1—	7.5+	5.0	3.7	4.3
(W) Patriotism	11.6	9.7—	13.9	15.1+	12.6+
Determination	9.0	4.0—	13.2+	8.7	8.7+
(W) Sovereignty	0.0—	0.8	1.2+	0.0—	0.5—
Obedience	4.2+	2.2	0.0—	2.8	2.3
Democracy (bad)	9.5+	0.3—	0.0—	0.0—	2.5
	76.2	38.0	60.1	72.5	61.7
Economic category					
(P) Economic welfare	2.1—	4.3	7.8+	1.1—	3.8
(W) Ownership	0.0—	5.7+	0.0—	0.0—	1.4—
(P) Work	0.0	1.2+	0.0	0.0	0.3—
	2.1	11.2	7.8	1.1	5.5
Moral category					
(P) Morality	2.6+	1.0	0.0—	1.1	1.2—
(W) Truth	0.5—	6.0+	3.0	5.8+	4.1
(W) Justice	0.0—	3.5+	1.8	0.0—	1.3—
Religion	12.2+	0.7—	2.3—	3.2—	4.6+
(P) Democracy	0.0	1.6+	0.0	0.0	0.4—
(W) Aggression (bad)	0.5—	12.8+	0.6—	7.4+	5.3+
(W) Dominance (bad)	0.0—	4.4+	0.9	1.1	1.6—
(P) Friendship	0.0—	1.9	3.6+	0.0—	1.4—
(W) Tolerance	2.1	3.9+	1.1	0.0—	1.8—
Generosity	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.2	0.3—
Carefulness	0.0	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.4—
	18.4	36.8	13.9	19.4	22.4
Miscellaneous category					
(P) Peace	1.1—	4.4+	4.2+	2.0	2.9
(P) Knowledge	0.5—	1.2	3.9+	1.5	1.8—
(W) Practicality	1.6	2.9+	0.9	0.0—	1.4—
Security	0.0—	1.5	6.8+	0.4—	2.2
Culture	0.0—	1.0	2.0+	1.9+	1.2—
(P) Value-in-general	0.0	0.2	0.6	0.6	0.4—
	3.2	11.2	18.4	6.4	9.9

Note.—Plus and minus signs in the first four columns indicate significant differences from the average, according to the chi-square test. The total chi-square for these four columns was 2683, significant at the .01 level, with 90 degrees of freedom. Plus and minus signs in the fifth column indicate significant differences from the mean of this column. The figures for Hitler were obtained from White (1949, 162). All of the figures in the body of this table are percentages of the total number of values indicated in parentheses at the top of each column.

Hitler in Germany from 1935 to 1939, Goebbels in Germany from 1942 to 1943, and Rockwell in America in 1966; and (b) the difference in the form of expression: Mussolini in an essay, Hitler in public speeches, Goebbels in a diary, and Rockwell in an interview. The correlations obtained in spite of these historical and literary differences should therefore be taken as rather conservative measures of similarity in these cases.

The plus and minus signs in the fifth column of Table 1 indicate significant differences from the mean of this column. The plus signs then indicate the highest values of Fascism (based on these four subjects). These Fascist values, in order of their frequency, were patriotism, aggression, dominance, determination, achievement, denunciation of aggression in others and religion.

Table 2 shows the indices of war propaganda or conflict-mindedness for Mussolini, Hitler, Goebbels and Rockwell, and their average on each index in the fifth column.

TABLE 2
FASCIST INDICES OF WAR PROPAGANDA

Indices	Mussolini	Hitler	Goebbels	Rockwell	Average
Denunciation %	32+	32+	23	43+	33+
Strength %	76+	38	60+	73+	62+
Justified aggression %	1	3	NA	0	1
Non-welfare %	88+	75	51	67	70
War/peace ratio	5+	4+	3	11+	6+
Average <i>T</i> score of all indices	64+	59+	57+	75+	62+

Note.—Plus signs indicate scores higher than one standard deviation from the mean of 15 subjects (Eckhardt, 1965, 350). The figures for Hitler were obtained from White (1949, 165-169).

Mussolini was significantly higher than the average of 15 subjects (Eckhardt, 1965, 350) on four of these indices, as shown by the plus signs in Table 2. Hitler was significantly higher than average on two indices, Goebbels on one, and Rockwell on three of them. All four subjects were significantly higher than average on the average *T* score of all indices, shown at the bottom of this table.

The fifth column in Table 2 shows that the average of these four subjects was significantly higher than the average of 15 subjects (Eckhardt, 1965, 350) on three of the indices and on the average *T* score of all five indices.

Table 3 shows that Fascism was significantly higher than three other political ideologies on three of the indices and on the

average *T* score of all five indices, shown at the bottom of this table.

TABLE 3
WAR PROPAGANDA AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

Indices	Fascism	Conservatism	Liberalism	Communism	Non-Political
Denunciation %	33+	10	14	18	5—
Strength %	62+	45	27	29	25
Justified Aggression %	1	1	1	2	2
Non-welfare %	70	70	64	47	45
War/peace ratio	6+	1	1	1	1
Average <i>T</i> score of all indices	62+	49	48	47	44—

Note.—Plus signs indicate scores higher than one standard deviation from the mean of 15 subjects (Eckhardt, 1965, 350). Conservatism was represented by the speeches and writings of Churchill and Hoover. Liberalism was represented by Kennedy and Roosevelt, data for the latter being obtained from White (1949). Communism was represented by Marx, Stalin and Khrushchev. Non-political subject matter included fifteen public assistance cases, three synoptic gospels, twelve alcoholics, twelve members of Alcoholics Anonymous and six intellectuals whose writings were edited by Crossman (1949).

Illustrations of Fascist Values

Illustrations of Hitler's values may be found in White (1949). Illustrations of Mussolini's and Rockwell's values will be given here.

Mussolini's Values

Table I shows that Mussolini's most frequently expressed values were dominance, aggression, religion, patriotism, denunciation of democracy and determination.

Mussolini defined Fascism primarily in terms of denouncing democracy, internationalism, liberalism, pacifism and socialism, as illustrated by the following statements:

Fascism combats the whole complex system of democratic ideology, and repudiates it. . . . Fascism denies that the majority . . . can direct human society . . . and it affirms the immutable, beneficial and fruitful inequality of mankind (Chandler, 1949, 210).

A doctrine which is founded upon (the) harmful postulate of peace is hostile to Fascism. And thus hostile to the spirit of Fascism . . . are all the international leagues and societies which . . . can be scattered to the winds when once strong national feeling is aroused by any motive — sentimental, ideal or practical (Ibid, 208-209).

Liberalism always signifies individualism. . . . The individual in

the Fascist State . . . is deprived of all useless and possibly harmful freedom (Ibid, 211-212).

Fascism . . . believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace. It thus repudiates the doctrine of pacifism. . . . War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it. . . . This anti-pacifist spirit is carried by Fascism even into the life of the individual; the proud motto of the *Squadrista*, 'I don't give a damn' . . . is an act of philosophy . . . it is the education to combat (Ibid, 208-209).

Fascism repudiates the conception of 'economic' happiness, to be realized by Socialism. . . . Fascism denies the validity of the equation, well-being = happiness (Ibid, 209-210).

Mussolini believed that "heroic and holy" motives were far superior to economic motives for the guidance of human behavior: "The State professes no theology, but a morality, and in the Fascist State religion is considered as one of the deepest manifestations of the spirit of man, thus it is not only respected but defended and protected" (Ibid, 213).

In statements such as these Mussolini defined Fascism as authoritarian, nationalist, conservative, militarist, capitalist and religiously orthodox. This definition would be generally consistent with the higher values of Fascism in the fifth column of Table I.

Rockwell's Values

Table I shows that Rockwell's most frequently expressed values were achievement (white supremacy), patriotism (including racial purity), aggression, determination (courage), denunciation of aggression in others (under the moral category), dominance (authoritarianism) and truth.

The value of white supremacy was illustrated by statements such as the following:

The nigger race is inherently inferior to the white race intellectually. . . . The fact is that the average nigger is not as intelligent as the average white man. . . . And the blacker they are the dumber they are (Haley, 1966, 76). This is what I'm fighting for — not Aryanism, but White Christian solidarity. . . . There's going to be a battle of Armageddon, and it's going to be not between communism and democracy, but between the colored millions of the world and small but elite corps of white men (Ibid, 80).

The value of patriotism was identified with the value of white supremacy, so that whoever believed in white supremacy was the only true patriot, and whoever did not believe in white supremacy was accused of treason: "Well, there are going to be hundreds of thousands of Jewish traitors to execute, don't forget

... so it seems to me that mass gas chambers are going to be the only solution for the Communist traitor problem in America" (Ibid, 79).

Rockwell was ready to use violently aggressive means to accomplish his patriotic purposes, as already indicated by the previous quotation, and by the following illustrations: "The harder you people (his interviewer was a Negro) push for the (race mixing), the madder white people are going to get" (Ibid, 74). He often used the word "hate" to characterize his various activities: "Hate-nannies" (Ibid, 81). "Hate literature" (Ibid, 81). "Hate monastery" (Ibid, 82). "Hate bus" (Ibid, 156).

There was little question of his high degree of courage and determination to actualize his values: "Being prepared to die is one of the great secrets of living" (Ibid, 154). "I counted on being jailed and hated and hounded. . . . Maturity is to accept the consequences of your own acts" (Ibid, 156).

Rockwell's denunciation of aggression in others was illustrated by statements such as these: "I have received literally thousands of threats against my life" (Ibid, 72). "I know I'm going to go — probably in some violent manner" (Ibid, 154).

His authoritarianism was illustrated by the following statements: "I'd reinstitute the American Constitutional Republic the way it was set up by our authoritarian forefathers — who were, in essence, nothing more than National Socialists just like me. . . . I don't believe in democracy" (Ibid, 82).

The value of truth was largely frustrated by the Jews: "The Jews' own figures convict them as liars!" (Ibid, 78). "The Jews are the world's master liars"! (Ibid, 79).

Table 2 shows that Rockwell's per cent of denunciation, strength per cent, war/peace ratio and average *T* score of all five indices were very high indeed. When his 43% of denunciation was divided among its various objects, 16% was directed against Jews, 14% against Negroes and 13% against others, including his own confederates and allies. These denunciations have already been illustrated in previous paragraphs, but further illustrations are given in the next two paragraphs.

Rockwell identified Communism, Democracy and Judaism with each other as enemies of white supremacy and Christian patriotism: "All this equality garbage was started by a Jew anthropologist . . . this equality garbage is straight Soviet, Lysenkian biology" (Ibid, 76). "They're (Communism and Judaism) practically the same thing. . . . International communism was invented by the Jew Karl Marx and has since been led mostly by Jews — like Trotzky" (Ibid, 79). "My father once told me that his Jewish

friends (Fred Allen, Benny Goodman, Groucho Marx, Walter Winchell) ask him, 'How could you spawn such a viper?' Well, I'm proud that Communist Jews think me a viper" (*Ibid*, 156).

Some of Rockwell's ideas about the Jews seemed to be clearly delusional in content: Jews were said to run all the big civil rights organizations, to have engineered the Negro riots in Watts, Harlem and Rochester, to have falsified the figures on the number of Jews exterminated by Hitler, and to have passed off the photographs of dead Germans as dead Jews (*Ibid*, 78). American Jewish army officers were accused of building the gas chambers in concentration camps after the war, torturing "innocent Nazis", and falsifying evidence at the Nuremberg trials; hundreds of thousands of American Jews were accused of being Communists (*Ibid*, 79). The Jewish press was accused of "gagging and slandering" Rockwell and his message (*Ibid*, 156).

If these ideas are properly interpreted as delusions of persecution, other ideas seemed to be delusions of grandeur: "I know this is irrational, but I believe that I was placed here for a purpose and I think God has something to do with it: Our country needs a leader" (*Ibid*, 154). "Hitler produced a local 'lab experiment'; he provided me with an ideology in the same way that Marx provided one for Lenin. My task is to turn this ideology into a world movement" (*Ibid*, 80). He "knows" that he will be elected President of the United States in 1972 (*Ibid*, 82).

Discussion

Although Mussolini's, Hitler's and Goebbels' expressed values were not significantly correlated with each other, their values were all significantly correlated with those of Rockwell. The values of all four subjects were significantly correlated with their combined average in the fifth column of Table 1, which may be taken as a general measure of Fascist values as they have been verbally expressed by several leading exponents of Fascism in several different countries of the Western World during the middle half of the 20th century under a variety of historical circumstances.

Patriotism, aggression (militarism), dominance (authoritarianism), determination (courage) and achievement (superiority), the most frequently expressed values, were all "strength" values. This set of values reflected one of the distinguishing marks of Fascist ideology and set it off significantly from other ideologies, as shown in Table 3. In this case, patriotism, far from being the "last refuge of a scoundrel", as Samuel Johnson once asserted,

was the foremost value of Fascism. The Fascist patriot, as described by Rockwell, was the true believer in the myth of superiority in the form of white supremacy. In other words, Fascist nationalism was functionally synonymous with racialism. Aggressive and authoritarian methods were required to maintain the superiority of the few against the encroachments of the majority of inferior (colored) people in the world. The high value placed upon determination showed that the Fascist was determined to actualize (act out) his values, and that he was willing to sacrifice himself and material comforts for what he believed to be higher spiritual values.

The next two highest Fascist values were denunciation of aggression in others and religion, both under the moral category in Table 1. Fascism was no higher than Liberalism in its denunciation of aggression in others, but it was significantly higher than the other political ideologies in religion (Eckhardt, 1965, 355). The Liberal denunciation of aggression in others, as expressed by Roosevelt and Kennedy, was consistent with the significantly low value which they placed upon aggression for themselves (White, 1949, 162; Eckhardt, 1965, 355). But the significantly high Fascist denunciation of aggression in others was contradicted by the significantly high value Fascists placed upon aggression for themselves. In other words, in the Fascist ideology, it was all right for the Fascist superman to be aggressive but it was not all right for his inferior subordinates to be aggressive. Aggression in the superman was "good", but aggression in others was "bad". This contradiction between what the Fascist wanted for himself and what he wanted for others would partly define Fascism as a double standard of values.

Consequently, the Fascist leader or *führer* would be expected to be a "strong" leader, in the sense of placing significantly high emphases upon the "strength" values as illustrated here. The Fascist follower would be expected to submit to such a leader or group of leaders. And the Fascist "enemy" would be anyone dissenting from this superior-inferior hierarchy and "subverting" people toward a belief in the myth of equality. These "enemies" of Fascism might be Communists, Conservatives, Liberals or Jews. They might even be Christians, but the Fascist emphasis upon religion presumably served to attract a good number of Christians to its cause, especially orthodox Christians. Fascism seemed to be able to transform religious orthodoxy into religious idolatry through its provision of a "strong" leader, a superman, who was able to take the place of God in the minds of men by appealing to their messianic expectations. Orthodox Jews, as well

as orthodox Christians, were likely to be caught up in this process of religious idolatry, which seemed to be an essential ingredient in the rise of Fascism to political power (Eckhardt, 1966).

Although Fascism was significantly higher than other ideologies in war propaganda or conflict-mindedness, as shown in Table 3, the average *T* scores at the bottom of Table 2 would suggest that Fascist war propaganda was likely to be considerably higher when Fascism had no political power (as in the cases of Mussolini in 1922 and Rockwell in 1966) than when it had political power (as in the cases of Hitler in 1935-1939 and Goebbels in 1942-1943). These differences would suggest that when war propaganda had achieved its purpose of promoting war it was no longer needed so much. Another possible interpretation would be that political expediency dictated a moderation of extreme views for the sake of votes.

Table 3 shows that Fascism was significantly higher than other political ideologies in per cent of denunciation, strength per cent and war/peace ratio, but not significantly higher in justified aggression and non-welfare per cent, suggesting that these latter two indices had less utility for indicating war propaganda than the former three. Since only Fascism was significantly high on these indices, the present results would also suggest that the terms "war propaganda" and "Fascist propaganda" may be synonymous for most practical and theoretical purposes.

White (1951, 6) believed that the per cent of denunciation was "the best single objective indicator of conflict-mindedness" since it was the "most striking single difference between the content of Hitler's speeches and those of Roosevelt". Eckhardt (1965) confirmed this belief across 15 subjects. The present study of two additional Fascist leaders showed Rockwell to be significantly high in his per cent of denunciation (over two standard deviations from the mean of 15 subjects), but Goebbels' per cent of denunciation was within the normal range although it was high within this range. The latter finding may be a function of the literary form of Goebbels' expression (diaries), which may not have been intended for public consumption as were Mussolini's published essay, Hitler's public speeches and Rockwell's published interview. In any event, the public accusation and condemnation of others for not wanting or respecting certain values would seem to be an effective way of arousing aggression against them, thus constituting effective war propaganda.

Fascist denunciation of others was not limited to the "enemies" of Fascism, but friends were also denounced. This was because the Fascist superman thought that he was better than

anyone else, including other supermen. This was most evident in the interviews conducted with Fascist leaders during the Nuremberg trials (Gilbert, 1947). Thus, denunciation of others would seem to be one way of increasing one's own self-esteem, making oneself feel superior by degrading others to an inferior position and keeping them in their place. Judging by the contents of the *F* scale (Adorno et al., 1950), this degradation of others would seem to be characteristic of Fascist followers as well as Fascist leaders.

Fascism would seem to be the social approval of the displacement of hostility down the social hierarchy. (Conversely, Communism would seem to be the social approval of the displacement of hostility up the social hierarchy).

The per cent of "strength" values has already been discussed in terms of the highest values of Fascism. Having established the inferiority of others by means of denunciation, the "strength" values serve to keep the inferior ones (those who did not believe in the myth of superiority) in their places. "Might" was "right" in the Fascist ideology. In the Fascist struggle for existence, the Darwinian concept of "fittingness" had been narrowed down to "strength", the core concept in the Fascist philosophy of Social Darwinism and in the Nietzschean transvaluation of Judeo-Christian-Democratic values to the values of superman which were beyond good and evil (Nietzsche, 1956). What was right in the Fascist ideology was not the wishes of all, nor even the wishes of many, but strictly the wishes of the superman minority.

The contents of the "war/peace" ratio, as indicated by "W" and "P" in front of the values listed in Table 1, show that "war" values were primarily "strength" values plus denunciation of others in the moral category, and that "peace" values were primarily values concerned with the welfare of others (Eckhardt, 1965, 353). The significantly high "war/peace" ratio of Fascism could then be interpreted as a high "selfish/unselfish" ratio, suggesting that Fascism might be nothing but human selfishness raised to the level of a political ideology through the mediation of religious idolatry!

The present results concerning Fascism (represented by four subjects) generally confirmed the previous results concerning Fascism (represented by two subjects). In addition to being significantly higher than other ideologies in war propaganda, Fascist values were not significantly correlated with the general values of other ideologies, whose values were significantly correlated with each other. More specifically, as previously found (Eckhardt, 1965, 354-356), Fascism was significantly higher than other ideol-

ogies in militarism (aggression) and authoritarianism (dominance), but significantly lower than other ideologies in socialism (economic welfare).

Like war propaganda, Fascist propaganda was characterized by a denial or ignorance of one's own faults, projection of these faults upon an "enemy" (who was largely a product of projection), and a willingness to use any means to actualize one's own values, regardless of the consequences to oneself and regardless of the welfare of others. The denial or ignorance of one's faults was illustrated by Rockwell's delusions of grandeur. The projection of these faults upon an "enemy" was illustrated by his delusions of persecution. The willingness to use any means to gain his ends was made quite explicit by Rockwell, as was his lack of concern for his own welfare and the welfare of others.

This pattern of traits would be consistent with that of the sociopathic personality with denial of his own faults, projection of blame upon others, ruthlessness in getting his own way, and lack of social responsibility, as illustrated by Goering and other Fascist leaders at the Nuremberg trials. Psychological studies of these war criminals at Nuremberg found that Fascist leaders were not psychotic, but generally sociopathic and highly intelligent (Gilbert, 1947). Their sociopathic personalities were divided into three types: paranoid such as Hitler, aggressive such as Goering and schizoid such as Himmler and his concentration camp leaders (Gilbert, 1950, 282-284).

Summary and Conclusions

The values expressed by Goebbels and Rockwell were analyzed and compared with the values of Hitler and Mussolini which had been previously analyzed (White, 1949; Eckhardt, 1965). Mussolini's, Hitler's and Goebbels' value-distributions were not significantly correlated with each other. Rockwell's values were significantly correlated with those of Mussolini, Hitler and Goebbels, and the values of all four were significantly correlated with their average distribution of values. This average distribution was believed to represent Fascist values, as expressed by these four leaders, fairly well.

Their average *T* score on all indices of war propaganda or conflict-mindedness were all significantly higher than the average of 15 subjects, so that all four of these subjects were similar in this respect, and Fascism was significantly higher than three other political ideologies (Communism, Conservatism and Liberalism) in war propaganda.

The values most frequently expressed by these four Fascist leaders were: patriotism (including racial purity), aggression, dominance (authoritarianism at home and imperialism abroad), determination (courage), achievement (superiority), denunciation of aggression in others, and religion.

Fascist values were illustrated by statements from Mussolini and Rockwell. Mussolini defined Fascism primarily in terms of the denunciation of democracy, internationalism, liberalism, pacifism and socialism, all of which were presented as "enemies" of Fascist religion and morality which, by contrast, would value authoritarianism, nationalism, conservatism, militarism and capitalism.

Rockwell, like Hitler before him, found in this ideology an almost perfect solution to his emotional problems developed in relation to his father, his younger brother and his father's Jewish friends, who were presumably seen as influencing his father to love his inferior brother equally as much as himself. It would be speculated that Rockwell generalized his father to the stereotype of the White Christian, his younger brother to the stereotype of the Inferior Negro, and his father's Jewish friends to the stereotype of the Communist Jew. It was Rockwell's mission to save the White Christian from the evil machinations of the Communist Jew, who was guilty of trying to get the White Christian to love the Inferior Negro, which would degrade the White Christian and enable the Communist Jew to rule the world.

Fascism was clearly and explicitly presented by Rockwell as the true belief in the myth of superiority in the form of white supremacy. The true patriot believed in this myth, and whoever did not believe in this myth was a traitor. Communists, Democrats and Jews, with their myth of equality, were clearly guilty of treason, the only solution for which were "mass gas chambers". Rockwell, like Hitler before him, was ready to use most aggressive and authoritarian means to actualize his values.

The most frequently expressed values of Fascism were "strength" values which were wanted for oneself, the superman, but not for others believed to be inferior, suggesting a double standard of values as characteristic of Fascism. "Strength" values operationalized the myth of superiority, white supremacy, Social Darwinism, Nietzsche's transvaluation of Judeo-Christian-Democratic values and "might makes right".

If the "strength" values, as one index of war propaganda or conflict-mindedness, served to keep the inferior ones in their proper places, another index of war propaganda, the per cent of

denunciation, seemed to be especially effective in degrading others to an inferior position in the scale of human values, defining Fascism as the social approval of the displacement of hostility down the social hierarchy. The high frequency of "strength" values among these Fascist leaders suggested delusions of grandeur, and the high per cent of denunciation of others suggested delusions of persecution. The combination of these two delusions, taken together with a lack of concern for the welfare of oneself and others, would define Fascism more as a system of violence than as a system of values. In other words, Fascism would seem to contradict the nature of values, so far as these should contribute to the welfare of oneself and other men. In still other words, so far as Fascism could be defined as human selfishness raised to the level of a political ideology through the mediation of religious idolatry, Fascism would be a self-assertive, self-deceptive, self-defeating and self-destructive ideology. If it could ever gain enough adherents, it could destroy the world in the process of destroying itself. It almost did this once already during this century.

Fascist propaganda, like war propaganda with which it was virtually synonymous, was characterized by denial or ignorance of its own faults, projection of these faults upon an "enemy", and willingness to use any means to actualize its own values. This pattern of traits defined Fascism as a sociopathic personality raised to the level of a sociopathic society, with various proportions of paranoid, aggressive and schizoid features, ruthless in getting its own way in the world, anti-social, anti-self and ultimately anti-life.

The method of value-analysis would seem to provide a fairly detailed and operational definition of Fascism: high frequency of "strength" values, especially patriotism, aggression (militarism) and dominance (authoritarianism); high per cent of denunciation of others, especially Communists, Democrats (Conservatives and Liberals) and Jews, for their belief in the myth of equality and for their opposition to the myth of superiority (white supremacy); lack of concern for their own welfare and that of others (economic welfare, work, justice, democracy, peace and knowledge); religion (in the form of religious idolatry of a human leader); and a double standard of values (denouncing in others what one wants for himself).

Authoritarianism of the right, or displacement of hostility down the social hierarchy, has also been operationalized by the *F* scale (Adorno et al., 1950). The sociopathic personality has been operationalized by the *Pd* scale of the Minnesota Multi-

phasic Personality Inventory (Hathaway and McKinley, 1943). Militarism has been operationalized by a Foreign Policy Questionnaire (Peace Research Group, 1964). Patriotism has been operationalized by the *E* scale (Adorno et al., 1950). Democracy has been operationalized by an Opinionnaire on Democracy (Ledbetter and Lentz, 1949). Religion has been operationalized by a scale of religious orthodoxy (McLean, 1961). Conservatism has been operationalized by a Conservatism-Radicalism Opinionnaire (Lentz, 1935). A battery of scales such as these should be useful in further research on the phenomenon of Fascism.

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The Relationship of Unemployment to Crime and Delinquency

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Countries throughout the world have expressed growing concern with the dilemma of social delinquency. Adult crime has always been a social problem. It is the increase in the rate of juvenile crime in many countries which has aroused increased anxiety. Delinquent and semi-delinquent subcultures are so much a part of our current scene throughout the world that in each country they have acquired a distinct identity.

In 1960, at the United Nations Second Congress on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (1960), areas which reported increases in juvenile delinquency rates included: Africa, the Americas, Australia, Austria, Eastern Germany, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States. Japan, for example, reported a startling yearly climb of 1.2% in the juvenile delinquency rate (Fujiki, 1962) since 1955, with appreciable spurts during 1957 and 1958. Only Belgium, Canada, Italy and Switzerland reported decreases in delinquency. Denmark, despite decreases in adult crime, reported an increase in juvenile crime (United Nations, 1963).

It would appear that rises in juvenile crime go hand in hand with industrialization and economic affluence (Increases in joy-riding and car thefts parallel wide-spread car ownership).

Countries with high rates of economic growth seem to be plagued by high delinquency rates. Countries like Turkey and Iran, with an 80% rural population and a low level of industrialization, also have low rates of delinquency. In India, a country with a generally low delinquency rate, a sudden rise of delinquency in Orissa province coincided with the erection of a new steel plant and a new urban, industrial center in the area.

But even without a close analysis, it is quickly apparent that the simple idea that economic affluence is inevitably tied to juvenile crime cannot be accepted. By world standards, Switzerland, Canada and Belgium are highly industrialized and affluent and yet characterized by decreasing juvenile crime rates.

Advocates of rapid industrialization stress the positive social effects of economic well-being, pointing out that providing employment opportunities gives people the means of escaping from the antisocial consequences of poverty. Employment allows them legitimate means of obtaining goods and status. The proponents of this view point to the high correlations between lower-class and caste status and juvenile crime rates. Merton (1959) and other sociologists (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960) in the United States have held that high delinquency rates among the lower-class in the United States reflect the lack of legitimate means and opportunities to achieve the products of success — i.e. affluence and status — goals which are assumed to be commonly shared by all Americans. These sociologists assume that those who lack the legitimate means for obtaining such goals will turn to anti-social behavior. For the young, crime and delinquent behavior are the only available means of achieving material success. In line with this thinking, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1967 recently passed by the United States Senate, is an effort to provide economic and job opportunities to people from urban slum and poverty stricken areas. Similarly, one of the goals of the Mobilization for Youth project in New York City is the reduction of juvenile crime via economic opportunities provided through vocational training.

There is, however, evidence which contradicts the basic assumptions of this theory. A study of American Automobile Workers (Chinoy, 1955) indicated that they did not share the desires for success and status which supposedly characterized all Americans. Instead, they were more interested in immediate pleasures and in "having a good time". Success and status goals may actually be foreign to parts of working-class culture.

There is a considerable amount of data which appears to substantiate each divergent view. The question is — do high de-

linquency rates result from the limited opportunities, the frustration and despair of poverty, or do they follow in the wake of industrialization, economic well-being and high employment? It is the thesis of this paper that despite a multitude of methodological and definitional problems, it is possible to integrate these divergent views and clarify the relationship of economic cycles to juvenile and adult crime rate.

The Relationship Between Employment and Crime

In order to have a clear look at the relationship between employment and crime, one must discard the idea that a simple cause and effect relationship can be isolated. Numerous research studies with apparently contradictory conclusions have made the assumption of a simple cause and effect relationship in attempting to correlate an economic index, such as employment figures or business activity with overall crime rate. It is necessary to explore the exact nature and operation of the variables intervening between these two conditions. Many demographic characteristics are directly affected by economic fluctuations, yet these effects are not visible in simple correlations. Among these characteristics are population changes occurring in different areas of the country, rural vs. urban shifts, and changes in the homogeneity or heterogeneity of a population.

An analysis of the research evidence requires a jaundiced eye applied to the way in which crime and delinquency statistics are evaluated. The lack of uniformity and comparability of economic indices presents a complex problem in evaluation. Technological changes and differences in the level of industrialization in each country mean that it is of considerable importance which economic index is chosen to be related to the crime rate. Unemployment statistics cannot be indiscriminately compared between countries since rate of employment has a different meaning which is specific to the economic context of each country. In England, for example, crime rate has fluctuated with grain prices only in agricultural countries, while business failures have been the significant statistic in industrial areas.

Initially, rates of adult crime and rates of juvenile crime must be separately examined since considerable evidence suggests that they are not positively correlated. It is the relationship between adult crime rates and economic cycles which has received the closest attention. The earliest studies which related an economic index to crime found direct correlations between grain prices and total number of adult criminal offenses. These early

studies (National Commission, 1931) indicated that larcenies increased with downturns in the business cycle but that an inverse relationship existed for property crimes associated with violence (e.g., burglary, house and shopbreaking). Liquor sales and arrests for alcoholism decreased during business downturns.

In large countries adult crime rates have also shown differences according to regional pattern. A study of serious crimes in the United States during the ten year period, 1937 to 1946 (Porterfield, 1948), indicated that during some of the years when there was no change in national rate there were significant but opposing changes in different geographic areas which cancelled each other out when combined in the national rate. For example, while rates during the war years climbed in industrialized areas, which experienced an influx of new residents, rates went down in areas that lost large segments of their population to the military service. Patterns of criminality also vary by states. Illinois and California, for example, show strong robbery patterns, while Louisiana and North Carolina have a high proportion of arrests for crimes against persons and a low incidence of arrests for auto theft.

When the adult crime rate has been broken down by type of crime, studies in both the United States and Europe show a significant correlation between adult property arrests, i.e. larceny, burglary, robbery and auto theft, and rate of male employment.

Juvenile Crime and Employment

When we turn to the evidence of the relationship between juvenile crime and male unemployment rates, the picture is unclear; studies lead to contradictory conclusions.

One reason for the murkiness in this area lies in the multiple sources of error contained in statistics on juvenile crime. Definitions of what constitutes juvenile crime vary from country to country. In the United States there are many behaviors which are not considered criminal if performed by an adult but which are defined as delinquency if committed by a juvenile. Thus, truancy and running away from home make up a large percentage of the United States' delinquency statistics. Delinquency in girls is often precocious sexual activity or lack of obedience (incorrigibility). In most European countries only the violation of adult laws is considered delinquency. At the 1960 United Nations Conference in London, in order for the United States to compare juvenile delinquency statistics with those of other countries, it

was necessary to eliminate this type of delinquent act — with the result that the United States' juvenile delinquency rate dropped by 50 per cent.

There are other reasons why juvenile crime statistics are not comparable between different countries. There are local biases in arrest patterns and in the manner in which juvenile arrests are reported. In some countries minority group membership makes arrest more likely. There are differing social class pressures which also affect arrest patterns. In small communities with considerable face-to-face contact, arrest patterns differ from those which prevail in the large, impersonal cities.

Moreover, it is difficult to compare juvenile crime statistics even in the same area over time. Climate of opinion in the same area changes greatly, as do the techniques of reporting juvenile crime. In Lille, France, for example, it was reported that after a local judge launched an all-out antidelinquency campaign, the delinquency rate quadrupled (Tunley, 1962). Delinquency rates, therefore, respond to a multitude of social conditions even though the actual amount of crime committed by the young may not change.

Now, with some awareness of the hazards involved in this investigation, let us turn to the studies which have attempted to examine the relationship between juvenile crime and unemployment. There is a world-wide and oft-repeated hunch that juvenile crime decreases during times of unemployment. This hunch has its basis largely in anecdotal evidence from the United States during the 1930's — evidence which suggested that juvenile crime declined during the Depression. This hunch is based on very few studies.

The most important of these studies (Bogen, 1944) used Los Angeles Juvenile Court statistics for the 16 year period from 1925 to 1941 and compared them with a composite index of business activity. The study found a decline in boys' delinquency rates which coincided with a decline in business activity. However, the findings of this study were confounded by a simultaneous rise in the role of social and welfare agencies (such as CCC camps, etc.) which occurred at the same time and played a direct role in the lives of the same adolescent boys. The confounding of a number of social changes which occur simultaneously is a criticism which can be levelled at the few studies done on this topic during the depression.

In a more recent study in the United States (Glaser and Rice, 1959), which reported the typical direct relationship between adult crime and unemployment, a fall in delinquency rate

associated with unemployment was also reported. However, this finding was actually an artifact of the method of statistical analysis which was used. The authors used Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics from their inception in 1932 through 1950. Because of wide fluctuations in the total number of arrests each year, they expressed the total number of arrests for each age group as a percentage of total arrests for all ages. Therefore, with a rise in the adult crime rate during times of unemployment, there appeared to be a corresponding drop in the percentage of juvenile crime simply because when one percentage figure shows a rise, the others must fall.

There have however, been several studies which arrived at some clear-cut answers using a different methodology. These are studies in which demographic and census data provided independent measures for a large number of economic geographic and social variables. Census data was related to crime rates in different census tracts. One study of juvenile crime rate by census tract (Porterfield, 1948) found that mobility of population, with resulting population heterogeneity, was a significant factor in determining the ranks of states in both the amount and type of juvenile crime. This study found an inverse relationship between "economic well-being" and juvenile crime rate. Because economic well-being and urbanization are highly correlated, serious crimes also were not related to urbanization. The use of census data permitted a differentiation between economic indices, factors of race, and indices of population heterogeneity. Race, as a separate factor, was not significant in the United States crime rate. When the twelve Southern states, leading but stable in Negro population, were compared with indices of crime and heterogeneity, the co-efficient of correlation was $-.37$. It was population heterogeneity which predicted the juvenile crime rate. One may conclude from this study that social disorganization, rather than economic well-being or lack of it, was related to the juvenile crime rate.

The Poverty Versus Affluence Question

With the techniques now available it is possible to provide a direct answer to the question of whether poverty or affluence is related to juvenile crime.

The use of independent social and economic data taken from census figures, combined with juvenile crime rate figures by census tracts circumvents the obstacles in a comparison of juvenile crime rates over time or between different countries or

geographic regions. The statistical technique of cluster analysis (Tyron, 1955) further makes it possible to differentiate between the effects of a number of conditions, e.g. poverty, substandard housing, poor education, etc., and population instability, per cent of racial change, etc., which are often to be found together but which may have distinct effects.

The question I am asking was posed in a study of juvenile crime rates in Baltimore (Lander, 1954) in which the aforementioned techniques were used. Lander proposed that delinquency rates were the result of normlessness, or Durkheim's venerable concept of anomie. Although conditions of poverty often occur side by side with neighborhood instability and the resulting lack of norms, the delinquency rate, he proposed, was not related to the economics of an area, but to its moral or anomic character.

To test this hypothesis, multiple social and economic measures derived from the 1940 U. S. Census were compared with delinquency rates from 1939-40. The census data was broken down into two clusters, an economic cluster and an anomic one. Some of the data included in the "economic" cluster were: per cent of substandard housing, per cent of overcrowding, median rental, and number of school years completed. The "anomic" cluster included per cent of population turnover, per cent of homes owner occupied, and per cent of change in the racial composition of a census tract.

The hypothesis was vividly confirmed. The most blighted census tracts, i.e. those with the poorest housing and greatest overcrowding were not the areas with the highest delinquency rates. Further, it was the lack of racial homogeneity, rather than race per se, which was related to delinquency rate. Delinquency increased as the proportion of Negroes in a census tract increased from 0% to 50%, but decreased as their proportion in the population of a census tract went from 50% to 100%. In the completely stabilized Negro areas, areas of 90% to 100% Negro population, the Negro delinquency rate was the same as the corresponding white rate when the influence of other factors was eliminated. The factor analysis indicated that although areas characterized by instability and anomie are frequently the same districts which are also characterized by bad housing, low rentals, and overcrowding; that delinquency was fundamentally related only to the anomie and not to the socio-economic condition of an area. Studies using the same techniques in other regions have corroborated this clear-cut finding (Bordua, 1959).

If Anomie Then High Delinquency

If anomie, i.e. the lack of stable norms in which neighborhood values reinforce family values, is the significant factor in delinquent behavior, then (a) where there is a high degree of population mobility, so that no stable neighborhoods can develop, or, (b) where there is a fast rate of social change, so that norms are drastically different between generations and a situation of normlessness vis a vis parents and children is created, these should all be reflected in high delinquency rates.

Conditions of employment and unemployment play a direct role in population shifts. If we examine conditions of employment throughout the world, we will see that depending on the differential effects on population mobility and social change, employment patterns are related to both rises and declines in the rate of delinquency in different countries. It is possible to predict the direction of the effect by following the consequences of the employment pattern on the stability of the population.

High delinquency rates follow conditions of unemployment, when, for example, job patterns change so that the poor must shift from place to place, often from urban center to urban center, in search of work. The resulting instability and anomie of the poor under these conditions will be reflected in high delinquency rates. One example is the shift in delinquency rates in the United States from high percentages among the foreign-born near the turn of the century to high rates among the native-born during the 1940's. This shift directly followed a shift in the ethnic composition of the marginal, unskilled labor force who were at the mercy of sudden shifts in job pattern. Another is the exceptionally high rate of delinquency among Southern Negro in-migrants in the United States. These in-migrants come north in search of jobs and also become part of the marginal, unskilled labor force. They are the first to be laid off and the last to be hired. Even a small drop in employment rate means they are out of work. This forces them to be chronically marginal and shifting.

When however, rapid industrialization and high employment are accompanied by population shifts as is the case in Germany, France and other countries with a rapidly expanding industrial plant, then once again the conditions for normlessness and anomie are created and a high delinquency rate is the result. In a country such as Japan, where the rate of social change has been revolutionary, in keeping with the pace of rapid industrialization, the difference in norms between older and younger

generations is vast. In its own way this creates the condition of normlessness which is the feeding-ground for delinquency. In South Africa, where the employment pattern results in the constant break-up of families, when men leave the locations for long periods in order to find work, the normlessness and anomie are chronic, as is the exceptionally high rate of delinquency.

On the other hand, in a country like Switzerland where industrialization and high employment have not been accompanied by catastrophic social changes or major population shifts, there is a declining rate of delinquency under conditions of considerable economic affluence.

The price of industrialization and economic affluence is not inevitably a high rate of delinquency. The effects of employment conditions on the rate of social change and particularly on population mobility must be taken into account. Social planning, side-by-side with economic planning could prevent the needless creation of the anomic conditions which result from industrial transformations. The extent to which advance planning can counteract the anomic conditions associated with industrial change, is illustrated in the social planning which is an integral part of the Volta River Project in Ghana (Lambo, 1964). This massive hydro-electric power project with concomitant industrialization, involves the resettlement of 100,000 people and the creation of 52 new towns. In other parts of Africa, newly created industrial towns have been plagued by phenomenally high rates of delinquency. In the Volta Project, however, sociologists, community development experts, and town planners have worked on overall planning from the start. As the result of their work, the new towns have been laid out in such a way that people of the same kinship and social affinity are living together. Instead of large compounds for workers, housing units are broken down and arranged around courts to facilitate the growth of natural neighborhoods. The scale of housing units is small enough to permit maximum stable face-to-face contacts. Although the project is still too new for long term conclusions, there is an encouragingly low rate of delinquency.

In countries with well established industrial plants, such total intervention is not feasible. Nevertheless, a realization that community is as tangible a need as any physical need could become a part of government and industry planning for the utilization of human resources. The social and economic cost of the anomie conditions inadvertently created by industrial change is too great to go unheeded.

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What Every Young Psychologist Should Know

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Most psychologists tend to call themselves scientists, some consider themselves professionals and a good many think they are both. Whatever his aims, every graduate student in psychology realizes that he has to acquire a body of knowledge and of techniques. He may differ with his teachers about what or about how much, he should learn but not about having to learn.¹ While experience in applying of what he has learned may be more important for the applied psychologist than for the academician-scientist, even the latter can benefit from it in such areas as teaching, the utilization of equipment, etc.

The young psychologist soon finds out that having knowledge and experience may be sufficient to make a good or even a great psychologist but that other characteristics are required to be acclaimed a successful one.² What are the prerequisites for such acclaim? Maybe the most important one is to have the "right attitude". This has nothing to do with one's scientific knowledge

¹Cf., Becker, Geer, Hughes and Strauss, 1961, 131 for a discussion of the situation of the medical student.

²What is considered success is a relative matter; the full professor in the "minor league" may be envied by the full professor in the "bushleague" and envy the full professor in the "major league" (Caplow and McGee's (1958) terms).

but concerns "knowing what the score is" and acting accordingly. Currently one of the more important elements is to bring not only credit to the employing organization but also cash. This is sometimes known as "grantsmanship". The importance attached to grants is attested by the lectures, colloquia and brochures devoted to obtaining and renewing them. The more staff or equipment colleges, hospitals or other employing organizations can obtain without paying their own money for it, the better they like it. This has been more true of colleges than of hospitals and clinics but the latter are catching up. With various federal laws appropriating funds for health in general and for mental health in particular, the obtaining of grants will become more rather than less important for mental health institutions.

Grants . . .

In applying for grants it is much better to apply for the support of *programs*, whether research or clinical, than for single studies. While those who like to do the latter sometimes find support, they might do better to postpone such projects until the time their reputation is securely established and epithets such as "non-programmatic" will not hurt them. Those academicians who have difficulties in thinking beyond the next experiment could have real difficulties in getting much financial support and may have to spend their summers teaching, or engage in some other form of gainful employment. They may even have to pay their own way to conventions — unless one has been shown to have a nose of proved hardness, it might also be advisable to submit proposals which include complex ANOVAs, just to indicate that one knows what one is about.

In doing one's work, whether this be of an experimental or clinical nature, a knowledge of current fads³ and fashions⁴ is of great help. Thus, in clinical research, depending upon the particular period, one will encounter large numbers of articles on the Taylor anxiety scale, on response sets, etc. The state of affairs in *J.E.P.* type of research is no different.

Similarly, areas commended to the attention of clinicians are strongly effected by fashion. Some years ago there was great emphasis on geriatrics; while the problem of the aging population has hardly lessened, new areas such as rehabilitation and com-

³One may think of a current fad as a degenerate brother of the *Zeitgeist*.

⁴Cf., Hagstrom's (1965, 177-184) and Dunnette's (1966) discussions of fashion in science.

munity mental health have become more approved watchwords.⁵ Getting support for research or clinical work is easier if one is willing to go along with the current trend. This may be done by actually working in the fashionable area; a shrewder operator will dress up a proposal with the right words but manage to work in the area he really is interested in.

Publication . . .

Once one gets to the point of writing up one's research, theory or opinion for publication, it is important to realize that there are many, many journals. While it is true that some journals have better reputations than others, rejection by a good journal should not thrust one in a fit of depression so deep that one burns the manuscript. If one's work has any merit whatsoever, one of the "lesser" journals may accept it. If the second editor won't take it, maybe the third one will. While the glory attached to publishing in a "lesser" journal may be less than getting it in a "high prestige" one, it usually is more than not publishing at all. Thus, neophytes with sensitive skins might do well to keep a list of relevant journals at hand. Having an alternate outlet ready might help to soften the blow of an initial rejection!

A few words should also be said about the need to emphasize results, action and progress. Preoccupation with countable results is of course a cornerstone of the American scene. The publish-perish situation with its emphasize on (quantity of) publications as a *means* (to gain rank, money, etc.) rather than on its end results has been discussed ad nauseam (e.g., Caplow and McGee, 1958; Sommer, 1959; Merton, 1963; Storer, 1963; Hagstrom, 1965).⁶ — In clinical settings countable results involve numbers of patients treated, tested, discharged, etc. Administrator at State department levels may reproach administrators at hospital levels for not discharging as many patients as some other hospital; in such comparisons the benefit of the patients may only be a secondary concern (Simon, 1965a, 1965b).

Wherever the young psychologist plies his profession, he is well advised to look and act busy. One important reason for this is that if one is busy one may refuse additional work, particularly if it is of an undesired kind. There is also the positive value attached to activity per se — it is not only in the non-psychological

⁵Such areas usually have substantive merit in addition to having "fashion appeal".

⁶The Caplow and McGee volume should be required reading for every student interested in an academic career.

sector of the American scene that frantic activity tends to be looked on with favor. It is often implicit that the doer is accomplishing more than the thinker; it is also implicit that if there is action, something worthwhile is being accomplished by it.

Instituting innovations and favoring progress usually is regarded highly. Great concern with finding new ways of doing one's work seems particularly intense in applied areas. Still it would be unfair to slight such signs of progress on the academic scene as classroom T.V., P.A. systems. These innovations permit classes to get larger and larger⁷ and thus enable teachers to engage in more rewarded activities (research, administration).

Due to the limitations of available clinical theories and techniques, there always has been emphasis on trying out new ones. This emphasis has increased as a result of the report of the Joint Commission (1961) and of the developments subsequent to it. There is great clamor for "innovations", "new programs" and the like, again with emphasis on action and concrete results.⁸ Here, too, there tends to be more concern with the means — demonstrating that one is willing to try something new and different, proving that one is an up-to-date clinician, obtaining a demonstration grant — than with the ends that may be accomplished by them.

Public Relations . . .

Not to be omitted from a discussion of what is good for a young psychologist are public relations requirements. The more (of the right) people one gets to know and gets along with, the better. Buttering up those in power is as advisable in professional settings as it is in any other walk of life; not doing it has had sad consequences for many, whether student or staff (cf., Caplow and McGee, 1958, 228). The intrigues current in academia are well reported on both in prose and fiction (e.g., Caplow and McGee, 1958, 50f on "selling down the river"). Being at odds with one's colleagues may even result in being given a psycho-

⁷This is related to the problem of bigness in higher education. It may be of some interest to note that while it is currently emphasized that bigness in mental hospitals is undesirable and should be avoided, the overall trend in higher education is in the opposite direction. One wonders whether advocates of the inevitability of Big Education should not take a lesson from the Big Mental Hospital. It may be a great deal easier to plan several smaller institutions now than to break apart institutions of monstrous proportions later.

⁸Some of the problems with action projects, particularly with their evaluation, have been discussed by Freeman and Sherwood, 1965.

diagnostic label with serious effects on one's future (cf., Winthrop, 1964). Particular care needs to be taken of the 20 year men: a good many feel that kingly deference is due them. They, on the other hand, often feel that their "busyness" excuses them from extending to others even the most rudimentary forms of courtesy and consideration. Even "old timers" of a few years standing may tend to feel they have a privileged status when it comes to using the institutions property. This is particularly true of library books which they tend to keep for long periods of time and which can be extracted from them only with great feats of diplomacy and then only for brief periods of time! There is also the "young genius" with the razor-sharp mind. He has the utmost contempt for his denser colleagues and does not mind saying so to the students.

"Old university hands" seem to have somewhat higher expectations about the obeisance due them than do clinical bureaucrats. Those new to applied settings do not have to tread quite as softly or prostrate themselves quite as low as the untenured faculty member. Even here, intrigues and palace revolutions are by no means unusual: Big Chiefs may find themselves Little Chiefs almost overnight, those sitting on top of the world one day may be in Siberia only a short time later.

Public relations in clinical settings have other perspectives. One aspect of the community mental health movement has been to expect the clinician to go out into the community and mingle with the crowd.⁹ Only recently has there been recognition that while the community mental health movement has many positive features, it also brings with it many new problems (cf., Dunham, 1965; Freeman, 1965).

Professional Meetings—More Education . . .

No discussion of current practices and foibles would be complete without mentioning admonitions of clinical administrators to their staff to go to professional meetings and to get more education. They strongly encourage their charges to join many professional organizations and to go to professional meetings — the more the merrier. Many of these administrators seem to feel that clinicians do not read. Thus, the only way in which to make sure the clinician keeps up with progress is to see that he goes to professional meetings. Particularly at the smaller of such meetings, there is much talk about the professional situation (read

⁹Some years ago, the word was to get out of the office and on the ward; nurses have been and still are similarly admonished.

definition and duties of clinical psychology and other mental health professions) as well as of other professional matters (new programs and how to advance one's department and oneself through them).

Related to this distrust of the clinician's willingness to read is the continuous urging to obtain further training, on-the-job and otherwise. Refresher courses are considered good but it is even better liked if one learns something new. This exaggerated emphasis on greater educational requirements has been discussed at an earlier occasion (Simon, 1965a).

And How is the Young Psychologist to Live with Himself?

Given such conditions, how is the young psychologist to live with himself and with those under, over and beside him? How is he to maintain his own self-respect and the respect of others? Crucial here is his ability to distinguish between his justified (or realistic) feelings of disappointment about professional conditions and his unjustified ones.

Unjustified feelings of disappointment are the result of his own errors of judgment or lack of knowledge. Psychologists, just like anyone else in a new status, have expectations and beliefs that are unwarranted and incorrect. An example here would be the new Ph.D.'s feeling that now that he has the degree, he has arrived — everyone will defer to him, rewards and promotions shall come to him automatically without further work. The majority will go through a "head shrinking" process, adapt in a reasonable short time and experience minimal distortion of their careers. Others, whose outlook does not change or does so too slowly, may suffer the humiliation of being passed over for rewards, promotions, etc. Many of them wander from institution to institution full of grievances and self-righteousness without being aware of their own lack of judgment.

Justified feelings of disillusionment may be due to unjust actions of fellow professionals or to those of more remote parts of the particular social system. One aspect of the latter would be the effects of rules and laws. Thus, a new staff member might not be eligible to obtain certain benefits, privileges, etc., because of institutional rules, Civil Service laws, etc. Disillusionment may also be due to the direct effects of more remote functionaries and decision makers: auditors, treasurers, deans, commissioners, boards of trustees, etc. Their rulings and pronouncements often play havoc with spirit, self-respect and dignity of any psychologist, young or old.

The major concern of this paper has been with the young psychologist's justified feelings of disillusionment resulting from the actions of fellow professionals: his colleagues, immediate supervisors or subordinates. Included here are actions that are cowardly, irresponsible, rude, inconsiderate, devious, denigrating, punitive, vengeful, etc. (cf., Simon, 1965c). Some of this behavior is ethical but not "nice", some of it of shady ethicality, some of it plainly unethical. Sometimes it involves the use of public authority for personal gain, sometimes the wielding of authority in an overly harsh manner ("unneutralized aggression" cf., Hartmann, 1955). Sometimes, it involves the inefficient or overly timid use of authority (e.g., not helping or not protecting when this would be called for). Sometimes, it involves trying to get ahead by jockeying for position with no concern for the means used.¹⁰

To prevent being hurt by the actions of his fellow professionals, the young psychologist is well advised to keep his eyes and ears open and to monitor the main channels of communication (the gossipers as well as the powers that be).¹¹ If he does not exercise caution and foresight, his own naivete and innocence would be partially to blame for whatever inequity befalls him. It is only in an ideal world that persons, including even the most paternal and fraternal professional ones, do not have their own axes to grind.¹² To offer them too much temptation is not judicious; while the elders should not succumb, the naive young tempter would not be without blame.

To Gain Success . . .

The discussion up to now has centered on what the young psychologist is apt to run up against — what he should be ready to anticipate. What has not been discussed is what the young psychologist should actively do to gain success. What are his choices?

Success involves reaching a goal by such means that there is interference with the achievement of other goals, particularly those that are more important. Success may be defined from the perspective of a social group or from that of an individual. In general terms, in the former reaching some goal results in social

¹⁰Hagstrom, 1965, 86, discusses the occasional lack of ethics in striving to achieve priority of publication. His sample does not include psychologists; there is little reason to assume that the state of affairs is any different with us.

¹¹The somewhat withdrawn loner would thus be at a disadvantage.

¹²Merton (1963) gives examples of how human even the greatest of scientist are.

approval, in the latter, reaching some goal leads to self-approval. Examples of measures of success are money, the preservation of a person's own integrity and recognition by others (acclaim, fame).

If social approval and self-approval involve the same criteria, a person's task is relatively simple. All he has to do is to meet the criteria, whether they involve feats of courage, of earning money, etc.¹³ Thus, the young psychologist who is somewhat of an operator will easily thrive in those professional locations where the watchword is expediency; an idealistic young psychologist will function well in prim and proper environs.

What if there is divergence between criteria? The operator thrown into an idealistic environment may not find it too difficult to act the role of the scrupulous professional. The plight of the idealist in an expedient environment is a much more difficult one.¹⁴ Should he change his goals or should he retain his ideals? If he should choose the latter, he may lose money, status and the respect of certain colleagues and sometimes even those whom he is supposed to serve (students, clients).

His choice will depend upon specific issues, his own characteristics as well as the pressures of the setting. Whatever choice he makes, he should be wary not to place undue blame on the environment. If the idealist remains one in an expedient environment, he should not expect applause — the role of the martyr and of the reformer is usually not full of immediate tangible rewards. Nor should the idealistic psychologist turned expedient blame his environment for his conversion. If he did not want the reward, he would not have changed!

The Older Psychologist . . .

The emphasis here has been on alternatives open to the young psychologist. Little has been said about the situation of his elders. They have their own problems, whether they are upward or downward mobile on the ladder of success (e.g., Caplow and McGee, 1958; Hagstrom, 1965).

Nor did the present paper include an analytic discussion of ethical and other problems of the field of psychology. Many of the problems referred to here are also found in other areas of knowledge and in other countries (e.g., Mills, 1953; Goffman, 1961; Presthus, 1962; Hubbard, 1963; Storer, 1963; Bixenstine, 1964; Boalt, 1965; Hagstrom, 1965). What has to be admitted is

¹³He may not be able to meet the criteria but this is another problem.

¹⁴It is not implied that these are the only types of conflict.

that psychology is no *better* than the rest of society, it has not avoided the influence of the Organization Man (cf., Sommer, 1959). Students and their elders have to face up to the fact that psychology is not quite what it is cracked up to be.

Accepting reality and facing the facts of life is part of personal as well as of professional development. Compromise may have to be made. But "elders" owe it to their own integrity as well as to their students, clients and colleagues, to decide whether their compromises are primarily made for expedient personal reasons or for scientific-professional ones. As far as the young psychologist is concerned, he will have to decide how he wants to adjust to the realities of the psychological market place. The more he is aware of the kind of success he prefers and what the prerequisites for it are, the easier his adjustment will be.

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The Protestant Ethic and Social Welfare

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Much has been written on the Protestant Ethic (Weber, 1930) and the role it has played in the development of the business culture and related institutions. Social Welfare has also been the subject of extensive literature. There has been, however, little discussion of the interrelated dynamics of social welfare activities and the business culture; past, present and future.

The Protestant Ethic needs little delineation among historians, sociologists, economists and theologians. Hughes (1958, 323) describes Weber's Protestant Ethic as "an ethic that endorsed and encouraged the life of rationally oriented business activities". Weber's (1930) thesis was that "man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition, as the ultimate purpose of life". This "earning of money . . . so long as it is done legally (is) the result and expression of virtue and proficiency, (and) is (man's) calling".

To distill the totality of the Protestant Ethic into a brief statement carries with it the danger of over-simplification. To examine the relationship between that Ethos and the Ethos of Social Welfare nevertheless requires such a distillation.

The Protestant Ethic . . .

The Protestant Ethic indicates, Green (1959, 9) states in quoting Luther, that "God accomplishes all things through you (the worker or enterpriser). Through you he milks the cow and

does the most servile works". Green believes that "this conception of the secular life as a God-appointed task necessarily involves the idea that the proper performance of such a secular task is a religious obligation" (1959). Fullerton (1959) digests the Weber "school" conceptualization that work is a means of discipline, a prescription against sexual temptation and religious doubts, the moral as well as the natural end of power, and a purpose for life. Even the wealthy, he notes, are not exempt from work, although they may choose the less sordid occupations. Sombart (1959, 34) believes that the proponents of the Ethic sought to reward industry, "the mother of all profit. Money in itself was just barren dross . . . (They) hated nothing so much as idleness".

Fullerton (1959, 7-13) believes that the establishment of work as a conscious calling and service to God provided a religious rationale for the establishment of profit making, the charging of interest, the pressure upon the employee for work beyond the support of his immediate needs, the obligation not to waste time or money, and, in general, to commit idleness and any other condition which prevents full utilization of one's time and full efficiency to the category of sinfulness. In this view of idleness he is supported by Sombart (1959, 31) who paraphrases the Calvinists in stating the idler is "lower than the beasts". "Reason and order", he says, "in worldly affairs . . . was a cardinal virtue in Christian ethics, according to this conceptualization". Troelitsch (1959, 27) states that "this ethic regards laziness and idleness as the source of all evil, and the result of a failure to impose discipline".

Furthermore, the Protestant Ethic indicated that "for the greater glory of God", one should work and behave as one who has achieved Salvation. Not having achieved that state or not being sure that one has achieved it, one had best emulate the socially and economically elite (who have apparently been "Saved" by reason of God's fruits having been showered upon them) in order to give an external appearance of also have been saved (Weber, 1930).

The Protestant Ethic Man . . .

The profile of an "ideal type" of Protestant Ethic man was one who works hard, is not distracted by activities unrelated to his work, defers for the future all possible rewards for prestige and economic success to be achieved in a later time, conserves his assets and belongings for a time of need for himself and his extended family, saves surplus wealth for the purpose of extending economic enterprise, even at the expense of self-denial in the

present (Weber, 1930). The Protestant Ethic man was a model of honest initiative and aggressiveness in business. Not to be aggressive would be a sign of immorality.

Success, for this model, was recognition by God of one's morality and of membership in the religious elite. Honesty was necessary for the operation of God's World, and the enforcement of honesty was a religious as well as a public duty. To turn a profit was a moral good. To earn a wage honestly was a moral good. To earn only for one's immediate needs and not to seek improvement by more skillful, devoted and longer work hours was an indication of religious immorality. Man is individually responsible for his own acts and only individually could man be saved. Beyond the rules of honesty, courtesy and family obligation, one worked alone for the "Horatio Alger" like success which was the theme of the ambitious, moral young man. One did not borrow, unless one did so in relation to conservative profit goals. To become a debtor might otherwise place on a man the stigma of immorality (Vernon, 1962, 321-2). The stigma of idleness or bankruptcy constituted not only immorality and cause for social ostracism but was backed by the full weight of governmental punishment in the form of vagrancy laws and debtors' prisons.

The high valuation of hard work, honesty and the social pressure for the retention of employment emphasized the subordination of employee (who was not proven to have been saved) to the employer (or the undertaker, as Sombart (1959) labels him) who was apparently blessed by God — otherwise he would not be an employer.

An important revision occurred of the entire thrust of the former Christian ethic under which Sykes has paraphrased "it was harder for a rich man to get into the Kingdom of Heaven than for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle. . . . [was converted because] man found it expedient to reverse that and soon [we said] . . . if you're virtuous you'll be rich, and if you're poor you're no good" (1967, 13).

This view of man, whether employer or employee, was undergirded by the marketplace processes for purchase and sale of goods, tools, services and labor, as described by Toennies in the *Gesellschaft* (1961, 199) "each individual offers his commodity to everyone else, and all are capable of producing the same commodities". In the process, man's Godly "calling" was converted into a "job" according to Fullerton (1959).

Thus, if a man were to be poor, or unable to function in society, having assumedly been endowed by God with a capability

equal to others, his condition is, as quoted by Lourie (1964), a result not of circumstances but of his own "idle, irregular and wicked courses" or "individual improvidence and vice". It was therefore considered at the time when the Protestant Ethic held sway to be "unwise and dangerous to pamper those who fail". This was the basis of the "theory of less eligibility of the 1834 English Reform Laws".

La Piere (1965) also describes this view, still current among some conservatives, of those unable to care for themselves:

Every attempt by government to relieve the individual of responsibility and his own welfare reduces the social spurs to individual accomplishment, and it lessens to some degree the unfulfilled needs and desires of the members of society; indeed, it is the ultimate goal of welfarism to leave no needs and desires unfulfilled. If, for example, an individual is relieved by old-age pensions and other governmental devices from the need to prepare financially for his later years, he will have no incentive to do so; he will need, that is to say, to live from hand to mouth without thought of the future.

Man — a Commodity of the Market Place

Thus, the potential employee in the *Gesellschaft*, (who no longer had the support of the *gemeinschaft* feudal manor structure), found himself a commodity on the market place. His bargaining power depended on the extent of his education and skills, the extent to which those skills were in demand by employers, the extent of his needs, and the fear that non-employment would mean not just hunger and lack of shelter for himself and his family, but also social ostracism, religious condemnation and even imprisonment. What seemed at the surface to be a bargaining process among economic equals was in reality a condition in which one of the parties was often "more equal" than the other. The larger the business of the employer, the greater the economic venture, and the more numerous the seekers after employment, the more likely it was that the employee was a piteous object-commodity rather than an actor in the bargaining process. Muller (1952, 317) describes the theory of such bargaining processes as based on the curious belief "that uncontrolled economic strife will automatically promote the good of all".

The Social Welfare Program

That a social welfare program should have developed at all under the Protestant Ethic is a matter of surprise to some who have examined the history of these times. When a governmental

program did develop, Ferguson notes that severe distinctions were made between the "deserving" and the 'underserving' poor (1963). The former included such categories as the widowed, the orphaned, the ill, the aged (who had been prevented by circumstance to save in earlier years), the physically handicapped, and persons in conditions similarly beyond their past and present control. Those who were poor due to alcoholism, idleness and other personality factors were classed in the same "undeserving category" as those unable to find employment for reasons related to the economy. The "deserving poor" were considered the innocent victims of someone else who had immorally avoided gratification deferment.

The impact of this conceptualization of the poor made social welfare "the agent" of the Protestant Ethic establishment. In fact, the rubric "agent" was utilized for decades as the designation of the social welfare worker.

. . . Social welfare served the establishment by acting as one of its agents in the enforcement of the ethic of the importance of having work, regardless of the current "going price" for labor and other external conditions.

. . . It also served as an ancillary operation to "fill in the cracks" of the economy, or, if one prefers the analogy, as a "first-aid" squad to pick up the more aggravated cases of dead and wounded after each market place encounter conducted according to Protestant Ethic rules.

. . . It served the establishment as well in filling in, from time to time, by helping to a limited extent to keep the labor force viable during the periodic depressions and "lulls" experienced by an uneven economic climate.

. . . By its very existence, it also served to assuage some of the guilt of the economic "undertakers" who had, from time to time, to lay off men, to hire children and women instead of men, to import new labor from other regions to increase competition for jobs, etc.

. . . Finally, social welfare provided, for the rich, a ready activity with which to cure their "existential nausea", as described by Gabor (1966, 13).

In a sense, social welfare programs of that era served as a kind of human "Department of Sanitation" in a Protestant Ethic society where being inefficient and unskilled is immoral and where the immoral can be exploited or discarded with impunity.

The Church and the Welfare Movement

The social welfare movement also served as an answer to those Lutheran and Catholic elements in society who viewed the marriage of religion and business with some suspicion. The removal of the basic responsibility for relief of the poor from the

church to the local governmental body made the encouragement of employment easier and more efficient for the governmental-business establishment. Similarly, the establishment of an official social welfare program in the government, parallel with other governmental services related to vagrancy, debtor control, etc., increased the control of the poor by the establishment and in the process, increased the sense of powerlessness in the available labor force.

The church was "dropped" as the chief relief program for other reasons as well. Tawney (1959, 43) explains that the church was guilty of having "sanctioned the spurious charity of indiscriminate almsgiving: the true Christian must repress mendicancy and insist on the virtues of industry and thrift". Tawney explains, of course, that this attitude of removal of church authority was also, in great part, related to other aspects of the Reformation which included popular rejection of the "encouraged luxury and ostentation" of the Roman Church. The "members of the Reformed Church must be economical and modest", as a Protestant Ethic man should be. The church, however, also tended to make demands on the undertaker class, and to remove one major function of charity from the church to the local "overseer of the poor" tended to limit the scope of such demands. Similarly, the lessened social distance between the individual priest or minister and the poor might well have created support for the poor which was not in consonance with the purposes of the establishment. Thus an elected or politically appointed superintendent of the poor was probably more Protestant Ethic oriented.

The Establishment and the Poor

The relationship between the establishment and the poor in the new world was not any different. Franklin (1943, 216) reports on the scene in the New England colonies:

Reared on a gospel of work and thrift, which offered material rewards to those who labored according to God's will, New Englanders were deeply ingrained with the most thoroughly bourgeois of all religious ideologies. The Colonists advocated and practiced rule by those who prospered through capitalist enterprise, and condemned the poor as slothful, both to eternal damnation after death and subjugation on earth to 'God's elect'. The Congregational Church, successor to the old Puritan Church of Massachusetts, was the center of all community life. Most terrible of all calamities was to feel the disfavor of the congregation. The Puritan faith demanded that each man search both his own soul and the conduct of his neighbor for signs of failure to follow the Calvinist code of sober toil and material advancement.

The clergy, in alliance with the merchants, wielded all-powerful political control.

Franklin (1943, 76) reminds us that "the vast majority of the poorest [people] — unskilled laborers, journeymen, tenants, many small farmers — were still disenfranchised through property qualification".

This condition did not last continually, nor was it maintained throughout the new United States. Wirth (1939, 655) for example, describes developments in the West:

Because the spirit of equality was strong in the West, the new states gave the right to vote of adult male without any restriction based on tax paying or ownership of property, and the older states followed their example. By 1828 the suffrage had been so extended that Jackson was said to be the first President elected by the people. In the East . . . the aristocrat remained entrenched.

The tendency to give the vote, and later, free land, to men without means was not accepted generally without objection. To many, including those in support of Hamiltonian views, the poor were by definition unworthy of equality and autonomy. Franklin (1943), for example, quotes a Massachusetts newspaper editorial expressing the Federalist view: "There can be but two parties in a country — the friends of order and its foes". Franklin states that:

To such a degree were organizations of the poor and criticism of the government held criminal in certain areas — especially in the strongholds of Congregationalism — that frequently the members of the societies [of the unpropertied] were forced to work secretly.

The objection to enfranchisement and autonomy for the poor was not limited to New England. Lourie (1964) describes a viewpoint held by many landed gentry which might be found in one of the Ayn Rand novels of our time. "The advancement of private persons will be the advantage of the public. . . . Each individual should pursue his self-interest with minimal interference".

It should be understood that this interpretation of the immorality of poverty went far beyond the precepts of Calvin. Troeltsch (1959, 22) for example, refers to Calvin's work in developing a home industry for the manufacture of cloth and velvet in Geneva with the aid of a state loan "in order to give work to the poor and unemployed". He also refers to Calvin's efforts in a similar vein in the watch making industry. Calvin thus never denied the necessity for community action to prevent and alleviate poverty which derived from causes beyond the personal choice of idleness as a way of life.

Others, especially in America, took the view point that the "modern system of industry will not work without some unemployed margin, some reserve of labor" (see Hunter, 1966, 16). Thus, to many of the enterprisers in a new and expanding land, the presence of a substantial group of poor, seeking employment and perhaps not finding it too readily, was a social good, especially if this view point were supported by the rationale provided by the Protestant Ethic.

Social Work and the Protestant Ethic Work Goals

Social welfare in the new land naturally developed from springs within the society of the establishment. Lourie (1964) is thus probably correct in his conclusion that:

The assumed values and norms of social work, like those of other social institutions are rooted in those of the society of which it is an instrument. Like other institutions, social work perpetuates earlier identifications in active, modified or vestigial form which emphasize values that oppose the existence of poverty or which support the possibility of rescuing the worthy and the young . . . were in their immediate goals.

The close relationship between the Protestant Ethos and social work goals and methods are emphasized by Lourie (1964):

Social work in its operations and in its personnel is rooted in the middle class . . . include those (values) of achievement and success, activity and work efficiency and practicality and external conformity. In practice, racism toward . . . non-acceptance of (values of compassion and their acceptance of failure to realize achievement, etc.) are also clearly defined. Some of these (practice attitudes) may be ineffective (with problems of poverty) or actually deterrent to endeavor to abolish poverty.

Lourie emphasizes that social welfare in America sought not only succor for the unfortunate, reflecting humanitarian mores, but more importantly, it sought protection for the community. The stress of social work was on deterrence and restrictiveness, and this has persisted in the organizational structure and operational stance of most public and private social service agencies despite the personality valuing ethos publicly announced by the social work profession and perhaps even naively assumed to be the accepted purposes of social work agencies by many social workers.

Charlotte Lowle (1957), one of the leaders in the profession of American social work however, viewed the problem of money as a value over humanity as a value as a prime concern. She stated that "Within our society money has been the symbol of adequacy, even of worth. It wins respect for the individual".

Robert Carr (1963, 745) also viewed the Protestant Ethic as a major problem for social work, although he did not use the specific terminology as such. He stated that:

The traditions of individual initiative and the concept of *An逸者* as a land of opportunity affected public attitudes toward the relief of destitute individuals and families. At first aid to the needy was considered a responsibility of the local community. Individuals requiring help over long periods were regarded as shiftless and beyond rehabilitation.

The idealized goal systems for social work, although far different from those of the Protestant Ethic, are worthy of comparison, if only for the sake of establishment as benchmarks.

Friedlander's (1958) idealized version of the value orientation of social work lists the following:

Conviction of the inherent worth, integrity and dignity of the individual.

Conviction that the individual who is in economic, personal or social need has the right to determine for himself what his needs are and how they should be met. (The right of self-determination)

The firm belief in equal opportunity for all limited only by the individual's innate capacities.

Conviction that man's individual rights to self-respect, dignity, self-determination, and equal opportunities to himself, his family and society.

Youngdahl (1966, 608) also seeks to list the ideals of social work:

Social work more than any other profession, perhaps, bases its whole practice and philosophy on the individual rights of people, the right of self-determination, the right of free association and movement, the right of free expression and freedom of choice. The personal integrity of the individual is fundamental to social work practice, where ever the specialization and wherever the differences in ideology nature may be. If there is one thing on which social work is agreed, it is that the integrity of a human personality must be preserved and that no that has done can be a social worker for helping or providing service to people.

Mary McCormick (1960) also has formulated a set of social work values related to such items as consideration for the personal worth of the clientele served, desire for personal growth and experience for the client group, the categories of values in man, the concept of love as related to the helping process, the encouragement of social functioning within the group and clientele served, the need to seek integration of dominant value systems with the client, and the propagation of the network of rights and legitimization of social action in behalf of both the client who come to social work and those who do not.

In Social Work—A Gap Between the Practice and the Preachings

It must be remembered that there is a sizable gap between the ideals expressed by and within the social work profession and the realities practiced within public and private social work.

A cursory examination of a few of these idealized postures can be revealing in terms of whether social work leans toward the idealized version of the Protestant Ethic patterns. Friedlander's first item that social work holds the conviction of the inherent worth, integrity and dignity of the individual might be considered valid when viewed from the position of the middle class neurotic client of a family agency who is encouraged to return to be helped with his problem. But for every such easily helped client there are hundreds of multi-problem clients and families who are turned away as "too hard to help", "not ready for help", or "not ready to accept our kind of help", or perhaps not even sought out in the ghettos of America's large cities.

Is the innate, inherent worth of these clients less than those of the middle class clients who do and are encouraged to return? Is not the long time, multiproblem beset family, with a culture and communication gap which makes a visit to the psychiatric temple too strange to attempt, not also worthy, and in need of respect and dignity as well? Friedlander's second item relates to the client with a need and indicates the right of the client to make his own choices. This is far from the condition reported by many clients of public welfare agencies who live in fear of being "cut off" unless they accept certain spoken and often unspoken "suggestions" made by their public welfare workers and their master's level supervisors.

This condition of expression of one set of ideals related to humaneness, while according to a set of Protestant Ethic policies related to conservation of funds, punishment of idleness and avoidance of luxuries beyond the bare essential of existence stems from the historical tie between what was the Protestant Ethic middle class volunteer or paid "agent".

On the one hand, some social work volunteers entered the field to seek social reform. These were perhaps children of the well-to-do, already "saved", as proven by their leisure, who sought to help others "save" themselves. Some other social work volunteers were assigned by their employers to community service (Becker, 1963, 257). In the former instance, the effort sought the idealized version; in the latter, a version of social work was often administered where the Protestant Ethic was the agency policy.

In these services, which were far more numerous than the former, the practice prevailed of reminding the poor, subtly or otherwise, of the rules they were breaking. In many instances, where the poor could not bargain for themselves in the job market place, a bargain was made for them by the agent, at a price accepted by the agent, often without prior consultation with the client. Soup kitchens and shelters were, in a number of instances, established by the wealthy often as a covert means of drawing unemployment labor into an area where wage rates threatened to rise. The turn of the century social work pattern may have been helpful to individuals on a "retail" basis but it was, at times, quite intimidating to labor as a group. Much of social work as a method of building human personality was a myth more often honored in the breach than in the performance.¹ The social work profession often served as a double-edged palliate amidst great human misery; on the one hand it pacified those who sought social change, and it provided or retained "rice-Christians" in geographical area to intimidate those who had employment and sought to organize for better wages. That social workers could participate in such self-delusion is perhaps one of the wonders of the early 1900's.

The newly rich, victims of sudden vast wealth were, it is reported by Laski (1948, 33) "troubled by their consciences", but not so much troubled that they did not concurrently provide financing for "retailers" of social work while at the same time hiring Pinkerton guards and industrial spies to prevent union organization from developing among the same people.

The Settlement House and Social Work Ideology

The social settlement house, on the other hand, sought to bring about social change more closely related to the social work ideology. Gillen (1937, 534) for example, describes the ideal social settlement as

. . . a center in which men and women of education, sometimes of wealth and leisure, may meet on terms of neighborly friendliness the less fortunate citizens of their community, where each may learn from the other and through friendship render service to each other, resulting in enlargement of vision, development of personality, and united action for social betterment. It is not a place where rich condescend to the poor, and where the poor receive subserviently the gifts of the rich and educated. It is a place where in the spirit of

¹In matters where the basic Protestant Ethic was not openly challenged, some changes were effected by social work personnel. These included foster care instead of orphanages, cash grants instead of in-kind relief and other ameliorative approaches.

democracy, men and women of all classes, all races, all religions, work together for the common end of personal and social improvement.

The settlement house developed as a program operated and financed by the autonomous volunteer workers with direct contact with the residents of the poor neighborhood. All too often it was unfortunately superceded by paid workers governed by a volunteer board of status persons whose emphasis again operated within the Protestant Ethic. Kahn (1957, 117) reports that "in function and philosophy, the agencies combined the scientific, pragmatic and materialist outlook of the new society with its equally characteristic heritage of puritanism and moral absolutism".

In a sense, the social work program provided satisfactions for many of the persons involved in the service. To the donor or sponsor, it provided a feeling of "one-up-manship" which carried with it a sense of status and power as well as a channel toward acceptance or retention in higher levels of society. To the social worker, it provided an accepted position in society and power without the personal achievement of business success. For the client, it provided an opportunity to surrender responsibility for oneself and one's family. Levy (1963, 416-419) states that "the route to such surrender (of the clients right to self-determination) is often paved with noblesse oblige and ingratiation".

Fingarette (1965, 27) makes a clear distinction between the voluntary client who seeks help and the person who "lives with his problem". The difference, he notes is that the voluntary client is one who experiences unhappiness and finds his unhappiness is "without meaning." Thus the person who experiences unhappiness and does not seek help may be one who accepts that unhappiness as a burden which is fated for him. In other words, the nonclient with problems may be one who accepts his fate as a sinner within the Protestant Ethic, and passively endures whatever is dealt to him.

Lubove (1966, 609-611) indicates that "organized social work emerged . . . to reinforce, not to protest against the imperatives of the work culture. (Private Social Work) attributed poverty in a land of opportunity to character defects . . . (a lack of sufficient) work incentives and disciplines". Lubove makes it clear that private social work viewed its role as "the diffusion of middle class (read Protestant Ethic) behavioral norms . . . thrift, sobriety, ambition, zeal for self-improvement and, not least important, fear of the consequences of dependency . . . the public welfare system has, in large measure, been shaped in the image of private social work".

The Protestant Ethic—Rejected

The unrest which developed in America *outside of the social work profession* was, in the main, a rejection of the Protestant Ethic, or at the least, an attempt to amend it. The Eugene V. Debs labor efforts, the rural and urban cooperative societies, the Grange movement, the Populists, all emphasized that the individual is not necessarily responsible for the poverty which besets him. The conservation movement successfully supported by Theodore Roosevelt made the point that American's trees are a national property. In time, exceptions were made to emphasize that "Business is Business" isn't always the rule to be followed. The widespread commitment to public education and the graduated income tax were all clear exceptions to the Protestant Ethic. The anti-slavery movements radically jolted the Protestant Ethic structure and emphasized the point that humans are not an economic commodity. Collective marketing, a grassroots challenge to the Protestant Ethic, became a natural pattern for farmers. Land grants to colleges and homesteaders, women's suffrage, child labor laws and revolutions in the institutionalized care of the mentally ill all stemmed from nonsocial work movements often led by individual "mavericks". Government, the establishment, and the organized social work structure often fought these social changes which challenged the Protestant Ethic patterns. Those within social work who supported these changes, although now sainted in name, were often vilified and derided by their peers. The movement of hundreds of thousands of immigrants who often brought self-help programs and mutual aid methodologies with them further compromised the Protestant Ethic culture and diluted the social work ethos supported by the establishment.

The depression finally put the lid on the general myth that poverty is a self-chosen way of life. Over one fourth of all Americans were "sinners" under the Protestant Ethic, and this was too many for credibility to sustain. Thus the Protestant Ethic went out of "style" as an American belief (except in terms of Social Agency operation), and the *right* to public assistance arrived. It is true that there are cultural islands throughout America where these rights are unknown to the poor, or where these rights are ignored by the establishment and their employed public welfare workers, but the myth of the Protestant Ethic has been amended in most sectors of society where corporations and labor meet. The Social Security Act and the G.I. Bill are long since part of the Societal landscape.

The Rise of Technicianship

The onset of the depression, and the revision of the public assistance programs left private (nonpublic) social work with the need for a redefinition of its function. During these years, private social work sought refuge in technicianship, primarily revolving about Freudian dynamics.

The pattern of technicianship as a refuge is, in itself, closely related to the Protestant Ethic. The Protestant Ethic system accepts technicianship as long as it is saleable. One is justified, according to the Protestant Ethic, in selling a service as long as the seller believes that he is selling an honest service, and as long as the buyer is willing to pay for the service. The fact that the buyer buys the service (or that someone else buys it for him) is a consensual validation to the seller that it is an honest service. This allows the encouragement of a growing complexity of technicianship, which is not necessarily a mastery of a process as long as someone pays for it. In this category, many "claimed" services have been bought and sold, without objective measures of validity. Thus the mental hygiene ethic and service, which seldom reaches those most in need of the service because of its origins and cultural setting, easily derives from the Protestant Ethic system. As long as someone pays for the service, regardless of the purposes of the payer, the service is considered valid for the Protestant Ethic. Surprisingly such a service, which may not even seek out to reach its claimed target group, will devalue the technicianship of nonpurchased services. Thus the service to the poor by non-technicians is of lesser status in the Protestant Ethic system than a service which is paid for by someone other than the user.

The original assignment for Social Work by the Protestant Ethic establishment was to help get some of the "sinners" out of poverty. Those who were gotten out of poverty were soon replaced by others. Those who were rescued from poverty, all too often, rejected their origins and were, in return looked upon with suspicion by those they had left behind. The perhaps more effective process of leadership development within the poverty group and culture was not even considered, despite its success in the earlier settlement house movement. Instead, as agents of the Protestant Ethic, a continued skimming of the cream of poverty's potential leadership is carried out by methods long since dropped by the general society. The skimmed off products often have no where to go. If they seek employment in the larger society, they soon find that not individualism and ambition are sought but "team-work". Return to the culture of poverty is

impossible. In such an atmosphere of Protestant Ethic social work, the occasional successful client quite often returns to the agency only to replay the game Berne calls "But I was only trying to help you" with his worker (1966).

Part of the paradox of modern social work lies in the lack of tools of measurement of effectiveness of service. Most social workers come from outside of the arena of business where sales are what count. Often the public welfare worker comes into social work after having failed in the arena of business or a profession. This personality type is often "goal-less" on the job, unlike the Protestant Ethic worker who sought to please his boss with production or sales. Thus the public welfare worker, having rejected the profit or materialism goal, and having also rejected the innovative means (or is ignorant of them) seeks out a retreat from new means and goals by finding comfort in the status of the clinical setting or the regulation of public welfare. Freudian dynamics (or more often pseudo-Freudian dynamics) or State Welfare regulations or both become the ritual means he follows. The client who does not fit the available means falls by the wayside. Like the potential drop-out who faces the rigid teacher, the client either shapes up to the specified teaching method and "curriculum" or gets out.

This type of client treatment is not even good Protestant Ethic programming. In the Protestant Ethic, the customer who doesn't come in or who costs the establishment money by staying out, is sought out and served according to his need, as long as profit is made or money is saved.

Thus, in the new panorama which faces the social work profession, its old assignment is cancelled, but it does not yet know it. Its old methods are retained and institutionalized, but they no longer fit the society which pays for the service. Its target clientele ignores or fears it, and instead seeks the freedom from the Protestant Ethic enjoyed presently by most of American society including the social workers.

Many of the poor understand the double standard of social work (Protestant Ethic rules for the client, organization man rules for everyone else).² The surprising aspect is that social workers don't know that the double standard is a double standard, that most of the dysfunction in social work derives from the

²Clients must behave according to the Protestant Ethic; not build up bills, use credit carefully, budget family funds, be prompt for appointments, tell the truth to workers even if the truth is damaging, sexual behavior more virtuous than Caesar's wife, non-conspicuous consumption, non-use of alcohol, careful consumer purchase (non-impulse buying), etc.

double standard, and that only when the problem is recognized and solved will social work enter into the functionality of the twentieth century.

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Biographical Sketches

NATHAN CAPLAN is Program Associate at the Institute for Social Research and Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Michigan. He received his Ph.D. from Western Reserve University and has taught at the University of Illinois (Chicago Circle). He is presently engaged in research on urban violence under sponsorship of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. His major interest is in change producing models—the problems of measuring the change process, the relative efficacy of different models, the constraints that define the limit of treatment achievement, and the moral issues they raise. He has just finished a book which will appear under the title: *Social Intervention and a View of Man*.

WILLIAM ECKHARDT is Research Psychologist at the Canadian Peace Research Institute, Clarkson, Ontario, where his main interest is in the analysis of the relations of war/peace attitudes to other social attitudes and personality variables. He is a graduate of Swarthmore College and the University of Kentucky. He has practiced clinical psychology in mental health clinics, child guidance centers, and city, county and state hospitals in Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky and Iowa. He has also done research on the Rorschach test, mental health and civil rights.

MARCI A GUTTENTAG is an Assistant Professor at Queens College. A Ph.D. in psychology from Adelphi U., she was recently Visiting Fellow in the Department of Sociology at Yale. Her research deals with the interaction of organizational variables and individual characteristics. She is co-author of *Social Structure in Integrated Classrooms and Pre-Integration Characteristics of Negro Children*.

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. was President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate of

1964. He was the Co-pastor of the Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta, Ga. His leadership in the Civil Rights Movement was committed to non-violence and civil disobedience. He received his Ph.D. from Boston University in the field of Systematic Theology, and his books included among others *Stride Toward Freedom*, *Where Do We Go From Here* and *Why We Can't Wait*.

MILTON ROKEACH is Professor of Psychology at Michigan State University. He has been a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences and, previously, a Social Science Research Council postdoctoral fellow. He was president of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues in 1966-67 and prior to this a member of its Council for several years. At the invitation of the Polish Sociological Association he lectured at several Polish universities in 1964, and during the current year he is on a cultural exchange visit to the Polish Academy of Science in Warsaw. He is the author of *The Open and Closed Mind*, *The Three Christs of Ypsilanti* and of the forthcoming *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values*.

RALPH SEGALMAN is an associate professor and assistant director for undergraduate studies of the School of Social Work, the University of Texas at Austin. He has a Doctor of Philosophy degree from the Center for Human Relations and Community Studies of New York University, and a Master's degree of Social Work from the University of Michigan. His publications include studies in concepts of self-acceptance, conflicts of culture between the poor and middle class, and minority group relations and adjustments.

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WALTER B. SIMON is Chief Psychologist and Director of the Out-patient Clinic at Northampton State Hospital, as well as Visiting Lecturer at the University of Massachusetts. He has been a Clinical Psychologist at the Veterans Administration Hospital in Tomah, Wisconsin. His Ph.D. is from Indiana University. He has published articles on the social aspects of clinical practice and in the area of interpersonal judgment.

NATHAN CAPLAN, "Treatment Intervention and Reciprocal Interaction Effects," *Journal of Soc. Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 1, 63-88.

Data on the effort of street club workers to modify the behavior of inner-city youth are examined to determine the nature and consequences of the change process. Repeated measures on the same individuals through time show that changes in behavior did not follow the lines of linear summation effect. Instead, individual subjects were brought repeatedly through a series of instrumental goal achievements only to fail in their progress at the point where in-project changes were to be transferred to the real life situation. At this critical point in the change process, the principal consequence of increased treatment input was to cancel out prior instrumental gains in direct proportion to the magnitude of the increased input. What then followed was a series of mutually dependent client-practitioner interactions which, in the long run, may be more accommodative rather than functional from the standpoint of program objectives.

WILLIAM ECKHARDT, The Values of Fascism. *Journal of Soc. Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 1, 89-104.

The values of Fascism, as expressed in the speeches and writings of Goebbels, Hitler, Mussolini and Rockwell, were analyzed by R. K. White's method of value-analysis and by means of five indices of war propaganda or conflict-mindedness. Fascist propaganda, like war propaganda with which it was virtually synonymous, was characterized by denial or repression of its own faults, projection of these faults upon an "enemy", and willingness to use any means to actualize its own values. This pattern of traits defined Fascism as a sociopathic personality raised to the level of a sociopathic society, with various proportions of paranoid, aggressive and schizoid features, ruthless in getting its own way in the world, antisocial, antiself and ultimately antilife.

MARCIA GUTTENTAG, The Relationship of Unemployment to Crime and Delinquency. *Journal of Soc. Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 1, 105-114

Industrialization, economic affluence, and high delinquency rates often occur together. Yet some countries show rising affluence combined with falling delinquency rates. The use of independent social and economic census tract data correlated with delinquency rates by census tracts has made it possible to study effects of anomie and economic factors. Anomie is related to delinquency. Employment pattern is related both to rises and declines in delinquency, depending on its effect on population mobility and social change. When either high employment or underemployment cause population shifts, fast social change, and normlessness, the groups affected will show high delinquency rates, regardless of class or ethnic background.



MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., The Role of the Behavioral Scientist in the Civil Rights Movement *Journal of Soc Issues*, 1968 XXIV No. 1 1-12


Behavioral scientists have not contributed significantly to the Civil Rights Movement. Negroes want social scientists to address the white community and develop programs designed to eradicate racialism. Three areas of the Civil Rights Movement where assistance from social scientists is urgently needed are the problems of Negro leadership, political action by the Negro and psychological and ideological changes in Negroes. For the last time in history Negroes have become aware of the deeper causes for the cruelty and crudity that governed white society's response to their needs. Social science and social scientists are needed to explain new development in both the white and black community and how such developments will lead to the promotion of a non-racist democratic society or greater racial isolation.

MILTON ROKEACH, A Theory of Organization and Change in Value Attitude Systems *Journal of Soc Issues*, 1968 XXIV No. 1 13-33

This paper is a first report on an ongoing research program broadly concerned with the relations existing among values, attitudes and behavior. In the first part of this paper conceptual distinctions are drawn between attitudes and values between instrumental and terminal values and between values and value systems. In the second part of this paper various kinds of data are presented concerning the reliability of the measurement of instrumental and terminal value systems, the relation between values and attitudes and between values and behavior. Some experimental data are then presented which tentatively suggest that enduring changes in important values and attitudes are possible as a result of inducing certain kinds of incongruent relations within the value attitude system.

SHERIE MUZAFER, If The Social Scientist Is To Be More Than A Merely Technician *Journal of Soc Issues*, 1968 XXIV No. 1 61-61

It is necessary that the work of the social scientist cross disciplines and search its historic past if there is to be an examination of persistent and recurrent social psychological problems which go beyond mere technical help. The example of intergroup relations is used to illustrate one such problem. It is suggested that from what is known about the organization process the more conflicted scope of identification is likely to result in a shift toward the more comprehensive, more universal human bonds, perhaps proportional to the person's love and attachment to his primary group. However, the possibility of and the necessity for every transitory intergroup interaction may lead to some intergroup organizations which might counteract that tendency.



RALPH SEGALMAN, *The Protestant Ethic and Social Welfare*. *Journal of Soc. Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 1, 125-141.

The Protestant Ethic gave hard work, enterprise, honesty and avoidance of wastefulness a religious rationale which was necessary for the development of an industrial economy. The move from church centered charity to government responsibility for welfare was directly related to the "Protestant Ethic" and industrialization. Thus welfare became a type of limited support of the industrial scene. Despite the fact that over the years social welfare has continued to operate in support of the Protestant Ethic, the modern industrial society has developed a new "organization man" ethos. Social workers, as part of general society, have adopted the "organization man" value system for themselves, while expecting "Protestant Ethic" behavior from their clients.

WALTER B. SIMON, *What Every Young Psychologist Should Know*. *Journal of Soc. Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 1, 115-124.

A successful career in psychology requires more than knowledge or experience. Currently crucial is grantsmanship with its special emphasis on programmatic research and statistical sophistication. Of almost equal importance is the need to engage in the "right" kind of research or professional project. To cope with this far from idealistic condition, the young psychologist needs to distinguish between justified and unjustified feelings of disillusionment. The young psychologist is advised to think through whether self-approval or the approval of a social group is most important to him. Many professional decisions result in both types of approval; if they do not, the young psychologist should not be surprised about the negative consequences.



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
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APRIL, 1968

VOL. XXIV • NO. 2

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

John DeLamater, Robert Hefner, Rémi Clignet
and an

International Editorial Committee:

Herbert Kelman and M. Brewster Smith,
Co-Chairmen

spssi

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The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues is a group of over two thousand psychologists and allied social scientists who share a concern with research on the psychological aspects of important social issues. SPSSI is governed by Kurt Lewin's dictum that "there is nothing so practical as a good theory." In various ways, the Society seeks to bring theory and practice into focus on human problems of the group, the community, and the nation as well as the increasingly important ones that have no national boundaries. This Journal has as its goal the communication of scientific findings and interpretations in a non-technical manner but without the sacrifice of professional standards.

The Journal typically publishes a whole number on a single theme or topic. Proposals for new thematically integrated issues should be sent to the General Editor. In addition, the Journal welcomes manuscripts for possible inclusion in an occasional issue devoted to separate articles of general interest to its readers, but with no necessary relationship to each other. Single manuscripts should be sent to the Singles Editor.

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
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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

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with Rogelio Diaz-Guerrero, Joshua A. Fishman, Ulf Himmelstrand,
F. Olu. Okediji, and Douglass Price-Williams.

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Editorial Notes

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES WILL ACCEPT "SINGLES"

The JSI Editorial Board plans to depart somewhat from the current policy of organizing each number of the *Journal of Social Issues* around an integrating theme or topic. In the future, some *JSI* issues will consist of "singles", i.e., of separate articles that bear no necessary relationship to each other. The single-theme-per-issue policy will still predominate since it provides for comprehensive coverage of the vital social concerns addressed by the Journal. However, there are matters of broad public concern to which social scientists have contributed relatively little theory or research certainly not enough to fill an entire *JSI* number. The Editorial Board feels that if the topic is important enough, and a single paper written on it is compelling enough, some future *JSI* issues ought to be designed to accommodate such "singles".

SSPSI members and their friends and colleagues in the social sciences are therefore invited to submit manuscripts for review and possible inclusion in forthcoming "singles" issues. The editors suggest the following guidelines for preparing "singles":

(a) In keeping with the *JSI* tradition, a "single" should deal with a broadly conceived critical issue. The titles of past *JSI* numbers suggest that the *Journal* has always addressed itself to topics that have breadth and scope rather than those that are conceptually circumscribed, even if their implications are vast. "Singles" submitted for consideration by the *JSI* Editorial Board ought to follow in that spirit.

(b) As in the case of *JSI* numbers planned around one topic, a "single" article should be a contribution growing out of the professional work of the social scientist and should therefore reflect theory or research in his field. It should not be simply a personal essay that would be more suitable for a journal on public affairs.

There is no way of determining as yet how frequently a "singles" issue of *JSI* appear. Wherever possible, a paper that is acceptable to the editors will be published along with other papers on the same topic in order to preserve the current format of topical issues. The "singles" format will appear only when there is not enough social scientific material that can be assembled on the topic to fill an entire Journal number.

Please address all contributions to Dr. J. Diedrick Snoek, Singles Editor, *JSI*, Department of Psychology, Clark Science Center, Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts 01060.

COMMENTS AND REJOINDERS

Readers wishing to discuss or comment upon any of the articles in this or subsequent issues of *JSI* may submit their reactions or criticisms to Dr. Joshua A. Fishman, General Editor, *JSI*, Yeshiva University, 58 Fifth Ave., N.Y., N.Y. 10003. Criticisms or observations of general interest will be published in a *Comments and Rejoinders* section of *JSI*.

THE JSI EDITORIAL BOARD ANNOUNCES "THE ACTIVISTS' CORNER"

The Editorial Board has inaugurated a new department of the *Journal* devoted to the reduction of anomie and the increase of reference-group salience among those who care about the intersection of the social sciences with social problems. It will appear in each issue beginning with this issue. David Krech and Nevitt Sanford are Co-Editors.

National Development from a Social Psychological Perspective

Robert Hefner and John DeLamater
University of Michigan, U.S.A.

The problems faced by the developing countries of the world are numerous and of critical importance. These problems include those of industrialization and economic development, of changing traditional social institutions such as stratification and power mechanisms so that they facilitate rather than inhibit modernization, and of providing ever-increasing percentages of citizens with an education that teaches the economic and social skills requisite to assuming rewarding roles in a changing society. These problems have been accentuated in recent years as the citizens of newly emerging and underdeveloped countries have themselves come to desire and in some cases demand that these changes occur rapidly. These pressures make it nearly impossible for development to occur slowly, over decades or even centuries, as it did in most of the nations which are today relatively highly developed.

It has been obvious for a number of years that social scientists from a variety of disciplines have the potential to make valuable contributions to the solution of these problems. They possess the knowledge, or the skills to obtain the knowledge, necessary to produce social, economic and political changes with minimal damage to the institutions within the society. These potential contributions are being more widely recognized as government agencies and private foundations draw increasing numbers of

social scientists into policy-making for and administrative roles within developmental programs.

However, in the array of social and behavioral sciences that have been brought to bear upon the problems of developing countries, social psychology has been noticeably absent. Anthropologists have carried over their interest in traditional societies to include concern with the problems these societies face in the processes of modernization and development, particularly as these processes affect values and institutions such as the family and religion. Geographers and sociologists have made important contributions to problems of population dispersion and control, while economists and political scientists have provided important insights into mechanisms of change in economic and political institutions. Yet social psychology might itself be termed "under-developed" as to its role in aiding the understanding and solution of problems of development.

The potential relevance of a social psychological perspective to problems of national development is perhaps obvious. In particular, social psychology is unique in possessing concepts and methods which attempt to deal with social environment—*institutions, organizations and group influences—and the individual*. There is a tendency for other social sciences to focus primarily on macro-social problems, such as relations between institutions, consistency or inconsistency in widely-held values, etc. Social psychology, on the other hand, can deal with micro-social issues, and especially the impact of the macro-processes which constitute development on individuals in the society. This ability to deal with both social system and individual processes and variables is nicely demonstrated by several of the papers which appear in this issue (e.g., the Kiray paper).

What appears to be needed, therefore, is to stimulate larger numbers of social psychologists to work on the problems of the individual in the developing countries. In addition, there is a need to draw together those all-too-often isolated social psychologists who have been actively engaged in research on national development. There has been a tendency for these individuals to work independently, without sharing problem orientations, research techniques and findings and resources. Work which is being done now would be greatly enhanced by communication and coordination among those who share a common interest in the problems of developing nations. In view of the great needs for research and conceptualization in this area, relative to the small investment of financial resources and manpower in the work, it is extremely important to draw these social scientists together and open up channels of communication among them.

It was the recognition of these needs that led to discussions

of the possibility of holding a conference of scholars engaged in research of a social-psychological nature within the developing countries. These discussions, followed by two years of planning, culminated in a Conference held at the University of Ibadan, in Nigeria, from December 29, 1966 to January 5, 1967. Approximately 55 delegates and an equal number of observers from some 25 nations attended this Conference, and participated in a series of discussions of the problems of national development and social change which are of major interest to social scientists. The papers brought together here are a direct result of that Conference.

In This Issue . . .

The articles that follow are divided into four sections. Part I contains five conceptual analyses of the potential of social psychology in dealing with problems of development. In one sense, these papers set the stage for the empirical studies that follow in Parts II and III. Herbert Kelman, Conference Chairman and one of its principal organizers, devotes the first half of his paper to the issues, procedures and individuals involved in developing the Conference. He then turns to a consideration of some of the major challenges facing social psychology if it is to make meaningful contributions in this area, and to some of the problems facing social psychologists who do research in developing countries. The paper by Himmelstrand and Okediji, prepared after the Conference but drawing on the Conference discussions, develops a model of the way in which knowledge from social psychology may be organized to provide insights into the development process. The concept of motivational tuning is introduced to account for the complex coordination of many separate factors requisite to successful development.

The papers by Mundy-Castle, Zempleni and Collomb and Doob comprised a symposium on major issues in research in this area. Mundy-Castle considers the problems of communication which create barriers to the successful introduction of social and technological development and to some cognitive differences between members of modernized and modernizing societies. The papers by Doob and by Zempleni and Collomb consider some problems of orientation and conceptualization that confront social scientists working in this area: the former addresses these issues from a general point of view (and with a touch of irony), while the latter focuses on issues particularly relevant to research in Africa.

Part II contains papers by Kiray, Jezernik, Pareek and Iacono. They address themselves to the topic of the Conference's second symposium on motivational aspects of technological development. Pareek presents a general paradigm for considering

the values and motivations of the members of a society and the relation of these to social and economic development. Jezernik and Iacono, discussing research in Yugoslavia and Italy respectively, address themselves to the effects of values on social changes and the reciprocal effects of change on values and motivations. Kiray focuses explicitly on a basic issue implicit in the preceding three papers, the interdependence and mutual adjustment of individual needs and motives and the social structure. Her analysis of two specific instances of social change in Turkey highlights a common thread in several papers—that neither the social nor the individual factor can be adequately considered without references to each other.

Part III is concerned with problems of education and the diffusion of knowledge, with papers by Barbichon, Jahoda, McQueen and Jayasuriya. Barbichon addresses himself to the problem of diffusion of knowledge and particularly to the differences between scientific and technological information and the implications of these differences for the process of diffusion. Jahoda considers some of the problems of research in education and socialization in developing countries. Like Barbichon, he is largely concerned with questions of the psychological capacities for absorbing information and education. McQueen and Jayasuriya, on the other hand, are largely concerned with opportunities within the social system for utilizing education once it has been received. Jayasuriya discusses the problems of an excessive outpouring of the humanistically educated in Ceylon and their subsequent frustrations in seeking appropriate employment. McQueen describes his own research on the school dropout in Nigerian society.

A great deal of the Conference time was devoted to discussions and working groups in which interaction was informal and the issues were explored in depth. Part IV is the concrete record of these discussions. After a brief introduction by Kelman, there are three papers by Diaz-Guerrero, Price-Williams and Fishman which summarize and synthesize the major problems and suggestions that emerged from these sessions. The latter three address themselves respectively to matters of scientific communication, research training and research collaboration and coordination and include summaries of the recommendations in each of these areas adopted at the final plenary session of the Conference.

These papers are followed by a proposal for low-budget cross-cultural research which was circulated at the Conference by Donald Campbell. In addition to the specifics of the research mechanism, his proposal considers some of the major methodological problems which plague studies done in more than one culture.

Finally, M. Brewster Smith, who shared the planning of the Conference program with Kelman, has prepared the concluding remarks. His "Reflections" are written in a personal vein and highlight some of the problems of communication with which potential collaborators across cultures will have to deal. In addition, he draws together some of the themes which are implicit or explicit in earlier papers.

The Conference itself was bilingual, with simultaneous translation into French or English. French-speaking social scientists were encouraged to present papers in their own language and two did. In the interests of an international readership, we have therefore included these papers in French with summaries in English appearing immediately after. The remainder of the papers are in English and summaries of these are in French. We are deeply indebted to Rémi Clignet for editing the French papers and writing and translating the summaries of the other papers.

Since it was the explicit decision of the Conference not to publish full proceedings, much that was important to the work and success of the Conference does not appear in these pages. Gratitude is owed to the many participants who served as chairmen of Conference sessions, as discussants and as contributors of their ideas in small discussion groups or from the floor in plenary sessions.¹ These contributions are of course indirectly reflected in whatever wisdom was achieved in the Conference recommendations. The names of all participants may be found at the end of this issue. Many of the individual contributions are indicated at appropriate points in the various papers.

Finally, the editors wish to thank the Editorial Committee appointed at the Conference for its assistance in preparing this issue. This Committee included Kelman and Smith as Co-chairmen, and Diaz-Guerrero, Fishman, Himmelstrand, Okediji and Price-Williams, in addition to the three editors. It is our collective hope that the material presented herein will constitute a valuable contribution to the field of social psychology, and to the literature on development and developing nations. We will be most pleased if we hereby further the aim of the Conference to stimulate other social scientists to work on the problems discussed in these papers.

¹The following individuals deserve special mention: Arrigo Angelini and Cyril Rogers for chairing symposia; Angelini, E. T. Abiola, T. A. Lambo and F. Kenneth Berrien for chairing discussion groups; and Cecil Gibb, Stephen Imoagene, Eugene Jacobson, Charles Pidoux and Stefan Nowak for serving as rapporteurs for the discussion groups. Finally, Otto Klineberg, Alastair Heron and Jaap Koekebakker chaired the plenary sessions on the problems discussed by the papers in Part IV of this issue.



PART I

Potential Contributions of Social Psychological Research in Developing Countries



Social Psychology and National Development: Background of the Ibadan Conference

Herbert C. Kelman

University of Michigan, U.S.A.

My personal involvement in the Ibadan Conference goes back to early 1964, when I was President-Elect of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues.¹ I knew that my term of

¹The Society is a division of the American Psychological Association, although it is also a separate entity, with an identity and reputation of its own. It differs from most other divisions in that it counts among its members not only psychologists, but also other social scientists concerned with the psychological study of social issues; and in that it is an exceptionally active and enthusiastic organism. The Society publishes its own journal, *The Journal of Social Issues*, and has sponsored the publication of a series of books. It has a number of committees and working groups, it carries out a variety of special projects and periodically it takes stands on public issues by bringing social-psychological concepts and data to bear on them. The Society was founded thirty years ago, when the major issues facing the United States revolved around the great depression. Over the years, the Society has consistently concerned itself with the issues of race relations and of war and peace. More recently, increasing attention has been paid to the general area of social change—particularly problems of poverty, population control, community mental health and social planning.

The Society was one of four sponsoring organizations of the Ibadan Conference. The other three were the Nigerian Association of the Behavioural Sciences (represented at the opening session by F. Olu. Okediji), the Scientific Council of Africa (represented by T. A. Lambo and A. O. Odelola), and the International Social Science Council (represented by Otto Klineberg). The Conference was organized as a joint project of the University of Ibadan (Departments of Psychiatry, Sociology and Adult Education), and the University of Michigan (Center for Research on Conflict Resolution and Doctoral Program in Social Psychology).

office as President would coincide with International Cooperation Year and—both because of my own and because of the Society's long-term commitment to international cooperation—I wanted to find some way of acknowledging International Cooperation Year and contributing to its purposes. I was particularly interested in developing a project that would not represent an isolated event but serve as a springboard for international cooperative activities that would be accelerated and sustained in the future. It was just at that time that I and many others received a letter from Henri Tajfel of the University of Oxford as part of an inquiry about the potential value and feasibility of social-psychological research on various problems relevant to the concerns of new and developing countries. The letter, which was sent to 256 individuals in 50 countries, raised the possibility of an international conference on this topic, if the inquiry produced a sufficiently enthusiastic response.

My own response was highly enthusiastic. Beyond that, however, Tajfel's inquiry gave me the idea for a symbolic recognition of International Cooperation Year that I had been looking for. I suggested to Tajfel that we organize a symposium on social-psychological research in developing countries, to be scheduled as part of the program of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues at the annual meetings of the American Psychological Association; that this symposium include participants from a number of countries around the world; and that it be dedicated to International Cooperation Year. It was our thought that such a symposium would not only be a useful venture in international cooperation in its own right, but that it might also provide the occasion for planning the larger conference envisioned as a possibility in Tajfel's inquiry.

In September 1964, Henri Tajfel completed the report based on his survey. He had received 139 responses from 36 countries, overwhelmingly positive about the possibility of establishing some form of international cooperation in social-psychological research in developing countries. The report concluded with a series of recommendations regarding research training, research institutes, international seminars, cooperative research projects and a clearing house of information concerning current research and resources. It proposed that an international conference be called to discuss these and related problems, stressing that the organization of such a conference would be useful if "it is not an isolated event, leading exclusively to the production of papers and reports (however valuable they may be), but if it provides in addition a basis for the organization of subsequent activities". The Ibadan Conference represents an effort to implement this proposal.

Needless to say, many steps intervened between the proposal and its implementation. Early in 1965 I found that I had somehow agreed to take responsibility for organizing the Conference—which is, of course, the customary reward for premature demonstrations of excessive enthusiasm. I consulted a number of colleagues—mostly in the United States, since it was easier to contact them in person or by telephone, but also in other parts of the world. Out of these consultations we eventually developed an international Program Committee, under the co-chairmanship of M. Brewster Smith and Henri Tajfel.²

We agreed from the beginning to hold the Conference in a developing country, not only because of the symbolic value of such a setting, but also because this would increase the likelihood of concrete follow-ups in terms of research and cooperative arrangements involving investigators from the region in which the Conference would be held. We further decided to look for an African setting, since a number of us were particularly interested in African affairs; and for an English-speaking country, since that would facilitate practical arrangements for what we knew would be a complicated initial venture even in the absence of linguistic hurdles. We finally decided to ask the University of Ibadan to be the host to the Conference, because, in addition to meeting all of these criteria, Ibadan has an active community of social scientists—including African social scientists (who were interested in participating in the planning and conduct of the Conference and in some of the follow-up activities that would emerge from it and who welcomed the potential stimulation of the Conference) and because the University has excellent facilities for holding international conferences.

The groundwork for this arrangement was laid one morning in the Spring of 1965. Having discovered that T. A. Lambo was expected in New York for a meeting, I managed to be there a few hours before his arrival, to book a room in the same hotel and to strew messages across all the paths that I knew he would traverse. Over breakfast the next morning he agreed to participate actively in the preparation and conduct of the Conference and to facilitate local arrangements. In addition to serving on the Program Committee, he organized and chaired the Nigerian Committee which

²The other members of the Program Committee were Donald Campbell (U.S.A.), Henri Collomb (Senegal), Rogelio Diaz-Guerrero (Mexico), Robert A. Hefner (U.S.A.), Eugene Jacobson (U.S.A.), T. A. Lambo (Nigeria), Donald McGranahan (United Nations), Albert J. McQueen, (U.S.A.) and Lamaimas Saradatta (Thailand). Three members of the Committee were, unfortunately, unable to come to Ibadan—Dr. Tajfel because of illness and Drs. McGranahan and Saradatta because of the press of other duties.

represented a number of relevant disciplines and institutions.³

In September, 1965, the meetings of the American Psychological Association were held in Chicago. The symposium on social-psychological research in developing countries that we had organized in honor of International Cooperation Year took place as scheduled, with papers and discussions by several members of the Conference Program Committee. Afterwards the Program Committee met for two full days, to define the aims of the Conference, to outline its program, and to draw up an initial list of Conference participants. We all left these meetings very elated, feeling that we had achieved a shared understanding of the aims of the Conference and that we had already started to build, in a small way, the common scientific community, across national and continental boundaries, which we hoped would grow out of the Conference.

Conference Funding

Not all of our experiences were equally elating. Finding a generally suitable time for the Conference was a bit of a problem. The political situation in Nigeria was a source of concern, but fortunately we were able to proceed with our plans nevertheless. Above all, however, it turned out to be extremely difficult to raise funds for the Conference. We approached innumerable foundations, small and large, as well as a variety of government agencies. Most of them told us that such a Conference was badly needed and was an excellent idea—but that someone else ought to support it. Some agencies expressed an interest in supporting activities that might grow out of the Conference, but were unwilling to support the Conference itself.

One of the few agencies that were prepared to support us was the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, which has a long and solid history of supporting basic research with no strings attached to it. We received a grant from this agency, which has been used for preparatory and administrative expenses. It was

³Francis Olu Okediji served as co-ordinator of the Nigerian Committee and took major responsibility for working out the local arrangements. The other members of the Nigerian Committee were E. T. Abiola, J. O. Anowi, Karin Himmelstrand, Ulf Himmelstrand, Albert Imohiosen, A. A. Marinho, Andrew Taylor and E. A. Yoloye. Arrangements were greatly facilitated by Ulf Himmelstrand, who made the staff and facilities of the Department of Sociology available for this purpose. S. M. Winsala of the Department of Adult Education and Extra-Mural Studies took charge of the numerous details on which the conduct of the Conference and the welfare of the participants depended. Many members of the University community—faculty, staff and students—assisted him in these tasks.

decided, however, not to use any Air Force funds for the Conference itself—that is, for travel and maintenance of Conference participants and for administrative expenses in Ibadan—because this might be embarrassing to some of the participants and because people unfamiliar with patterns of scientific support in the United States might find it difficult to believe that the use of these funds is indeed completely unhampered. The decision not to use these funds for the Conference itself left us not only purer, but considerably poorer!

The general support for the Conference derived from two sources in the United States: The National Institute of Mental Health and the James Marshall Fund, a small private foundation. In addition, a number of organizations in different countries covered the expenses of one, two or three specific Conference participants.⁴

Our difficulty in raising funds for the Conference interfered with our planning to a certain extent. In particular, it delayed the issuing of invitations to some Conference participants. Our financial limitations also contributed to the fact that the distribution of participants was not as balanced in all respects as we would have liked it to be. For example, it is quite evident that Asian countries were underrepresented in our roster of participants. In large part this was due to the fact that we simply did not have enough funds to invite all the participants whom we had hoped to invite. It was particularly difficult to invite participants from countries that are at a great distance from Nigeria and where we did not have the necessary contacts to arrange financing for specific individuals.

Financial limitations were not the only cause of the somewhat imbalanced distribution of participants. In part, we were faced with the problem of sheer size. Even if we had unlimited funds, we would not have wanted more than 70 participants, in order to provide opportunity for the kinds of interactions that the Conference was designed to achieve. Given such an upper limit, it was inevitable that some geographical regions and areas of spe-

⁴These include the National Institute of Health and Medical Research in Accra, the Centre de Recherches Psychopathologiques in Dakar, Télévision Scolaire in Niamey, the offices of UNESCO and of the Ford Foundation in Lagos, the French Secrétariat d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangères Chargé de la Coopération, the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, the National Science Foundation in the United States, the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, the American Psychological Association's Committee on Psychology in National and International Affairs, the Center for Applied Linguistics in Washington, the African Studies Program at Northwestern University and the Center for Research in Social Change and Economic Development at Rice University.

cialization would be less adequately represented than others. Moreover, we were limited by the network of acquaintances of which the members of the Program Committee were a part. Although we made extensive efforts to identify potential participants in different parts of the world, our list of participants was filled long before these efforts had become exhaustive and systematic. This procedure made it less likely for younger colleagues—whose participation in such a venture would be particularly valuable—to be selected. Finally, we were unsuccessful in securing participants from some countries, even though we made repeated efforts. But if our representation was not as perfectly balanced as it might have been, this Conference was not the end, but only the beginning of our efforts to establish an international community of social psychologists.

The Philosophy of the Conference

This leads me to the purposes of the Conference and the philosophy behind it. According to the prospectus, the Conference was designed:

. . . to encourage and promote research on the psychological aspects of social change and development (with special emphasis on developing countries)

. . . to enhance the contributions of social psychology and related disciplines to such research endeavors through the development of patterns of research collaboration and coordination, research training and scientific communication, based on international cooperation

The first part of the Conference focused on substantive issues in the study of social change and in cross-cultural research, while the second part focused on the establishment of mechanisms of cooperation. These two parts were closely linked, however, since the conception of this Conference was based on the dual proposition that social-psychological research has a potentially important contribution to make in the area of social change and development and that this contribution must be built on international cooperative efforts.

Let me spell out briefly some of the assumptions behind this proposition as I see them. The need for and the impact of rapid social change present a powerful challenge to social psychology and related disciplines, as they do to the world community in general. Forces toward social change are most pronounced and most obvious in the developing parts of the world, where demands for political independence, economic development and social reform are producing a pattern of change that is too rapid at some points, too slow at others. For social scientists in developing countries, the issues created by these forces of change are obviously

central to the welfare of their societies. They are equally vital, however, for social scientists in the more fully industrialized nations, not only because the problems of social change and development—wherever they may occur—are world problems, but also because the forces toward social change are by no means restricted to the developing countries. They manifest themselves wherever there are populations that have been excluded from effective participation in the political process, from a share in the benefits of the national economy, and from meaningful roles within the social structure. Most highly industrialized societies, for example, contain within them pockets of poverty—regions that are economically less developed; ethnic or cultural minorities that are not fully integrated into the opportunity systems and the political life of the country; and internal conflicts that inhibit growth and integration. Thus, while some of the problems relating to social change are especially pronounced in developing countries, they are clearly continuous with such problems as racial integration and the extension of economic opportunity in the United States.

Social Significance of Research on Social Change

What can be done to meet the challenge posed by this worldwide revolution of human rights—to facilitate social change and to increase the likelihood that it will move in constructive directions? What kinds of institutional arrangements can be fashioned that would improve the conditions of the masses of the population, that would be consistent with their fundamental human needs for security and dignity, and that would bring ever wider segments of the population into full participation in their societies, polities and economies? What institutions and values might increase, within the population of a developing country, the sense of the legitimacy of its political regime, the feeling of national identity, the readiness for involvement in citizenship responsibilities, in economic enterprises, in population control programs, in other forms of social planning? What techniques of change can be developed that would minimize the use of violence, the brutalization of the active and passive participants in the change process and the predisposition to govern by coercion and repression? How can change be introduced without destroying the existing culture patterns and values that provide meaning and stability to a people, while at the same time helping to build the new patterns and values that an urbanizing, industrializing and ever-changing society requires if it is to remain human?

Any attempt to answer these questions requires the input of new ideas and new data—often, in fact, of entirely new perspec-

tives and ways of thinking. Social psychology is clearly a relevant source of such new inputs, since all of the questions I posed have social-psychological components. Can social-psychological research meet this challenge—can it contribute to the systematic analysis, to the understanding, and to the rational solution of the problems of social change? That it cannot do so alone and that it cannot produce a grand and all-inclusive design for answering the questions goes without saying. But we do have concepts and methods that ought to be applicable and, in my view, we should be able to play a significant role in a many-sided effort to deal with these problems.

I have in mind here research that is *basic*, in the sense that it is concerned with long-range issues and that it is designed to answer general questions, but not *neutral* with respect to value preferences. It is based on the assumption that social change is desirable. It is designed to contribute to the understanding (a) of ways to facilitate constructive change in the direction of meeting human needs and of expanding the participation of people all over the world in the political, economic and social processes of their respective societies, and (b) of ways to minimize the coercive, destructive and psychologically disabling consequences of rapid social change.

Research rooted in such explicit value commitments raises some important questions about the relationship between values and scientific objectivity. One cannot, in the interest of scientific objectivity, simply exclude value considerations from the formulation of the research problem, because it is impossible to work in the area of social change (or in other areas pregnant with value considerations, such as the area of mental health) as a purely disinterested observer, merely looking at whatever presents itself. Value preferences are inevitably built into the assumptions of the research design, which determine the questions that are to be asked, the events that are to be observed, the variables that are to be assessed, the categories in terms of which the data are to be organized. It is not only impossible to conduct basic research on socially significant problems in a value vacuum, but it is also not necessary to do so. To be maximally objective, research need not be value-free. The issue is not whether the investigator has value preferences, but how he takes account of them. It goes without saying that there is no easy solution to the problem of objectivity in research on socially significant matters. Certainly the avoidance of such research is an unsatisfactory answer, nor ought we to pretend that it is possible to conduct such research in disinterested fashion. One of the coming tasks for social psychology is to learn how to work in areas in which important values are engaged—how to combine social commitment with scientific integrity.

Research on Social Change . . . A Unique Opportunity

I have spoken so far of the social significance of research on social change. At the same time, research on social change presents a unique intellectual challenge and provides unusual opportunities for making observations and testing theories pertaining to basic social and psychological processes. Research that addresses itself to such broad questions as, for example, "How can economic development be facilitated in highly traditional, agricultural societies"? or "How can the psychological and social dislocations resulting from rapid social change be minimized and counteracted"? can certainly be a source of important theoretical advances that would not derive from studies formulated in more neutral terms and carried out in more antiseptic settings.

From a methodological point of view, research in developing countries can offer special opportunities to the theoretically oriented social psychologist, linked to the occurrence of major and rapid changes within these societies. It is possible to observe certain phenomena in extreme form and in the process of emerging. Because of the discontinuity and the rapidity with which these changes occur, it is sometimes possible to approximate a before-and-after-design by obtaining measurements before an innovation is introduced and after it has taken its course. The effects of certain variables, whose history is known almost in its entirety, can thus be observed in detail and in relative isolation from contaminating factors.

Research in developing countries can also extend the range of cultures in which theoretical propositions can be put to the test. For example, it ought to be possible to test hypotheses about the determinants of different reactions to social change—of different processes of acceptance and diffusion of change, or of differences in capacity to adjust to rapid societal transformations—by comparing societies that vary along certain relevant cultural dimensions. Sub-Saharan Africa, to take an outstanding case, offers unique opportunities for comparative research, not only because it provides a cultural context different from that in which social-psychological research is generally carried out, but also because it contains within its compass a wide diversity of cultures. Within this region, societies differing greatly with respect to some aspects of culture are, at the same time, characterized by many uniformities, both in culture and in conditions of life. It thus becomes possible to observe the effects of certain cultural differences on the process of social change and reactions to it with some degree of quasi-experimental control.

Finally, research in developing countries can give the social psychologist access to comparative data on a wide variety of phe-

nomena that may not be directly related to social change as such. Such cross-cultural comparisons are crucial at this stage of development of the field. They enable us to check the generality of propositions that have been formulated and tested only in a single culture (typically the United States) or in closely related cultures (the United States and Western Europe), and to develop theoretical models that can encompass contradictory findings in different cultural contexts.

The extent to which we are able to respond to the social and intellectual challenge presented by the problems of social change will have considerable bearing on the future of social psychology in developing countries. It would seem to me that research that is relevant to pressing social problems is most likely to gain support within these societies, given their limited resources. Moreover, problems of social change probably provide the most exciting opportunities for significant research in this setting and will capture the imagination of the most promising students. Thus, this kind of emphasis is most likely to contribute to the growth of social psychology in developing countries—by promoting acceptance for it, by demonstrating its relevance, and by stimulating significant research. With time it would then become possible for research on a variety of other problems to gain increasing support. These favorable developments are far less likely to materialize, however, if we make exaggerated claims about the immediate and direct relevance of psychological research to problems of social change; and if we allow the potential contributions of such research to become narrowly defined, in terms of answering specific operational questions of various agencies involved in one or another aspect of social change. We will have to stress that basic research, even though it may not answer certain immediate operational questions, may build the framework for fundamental answers to long-range problems, and may be highly relevant to issues that are likely to arise in the future but have not yet been recognized by policy-makers.

In Conclusion . . .

I have been saying that, for social and for scientific reasons, the study of social change is of mutual interest to social psychologists in both more and less developed parts of the world. This convergence of interest should provide the necessary motivation for cooperative endeavors in this area. Furthermore, a high degree of cooperation between these two groups is essential if research is to proceed effectively, because of our mutual interdependence. On the one hand, the problems that we wish to investigate and the detailed knowledge of the nature of these problems and their so-

cial and cultural context reside in the developing countries. On the other hand, the human and material resources for investigating these problems are more fully developed in the industrialized nations, where trained research personnel, accumulated research experience, research facilities and research funds are far more readily available. There is thus clearly both a basis for international cooperation in research on social change and a strong necessity for organizing such cooperative efforts.

Mechanisms for international cooperation in research, research training and scientific communication in this area have not yet been established to any significant degree, even though they are essential to further progress in the field. Moreover, social psychologists—or investigators with related interests—from different parts of the world do not yet constitute a common scientific community, whose members can readily identify each other and establish professional contact. A major purpose of the Ibadan Conference was to help develop the sense of such a common community and create the conditions for effective collaboration in cross-cultural research. We did not expect that collaborative research projects would be designed in the course of the Conference, but we did expect that participants would identify colleagues with common interests and would lay the groundwork for future collaboration; that ideas about training needs and possibilities would be exchanged and proposals for new training opportunities would be developed; and that the habit of scientific communication in this area would be strengthened and mechanisms for continuing communication would be set up.

Attention Must be Paid to the Relationship Between the Visiting Researcher and his Local Counterpart

If we are to develop effective mechanisms of international cooperation, we must pay particular attention to the nature of the relationship that is established between investigators from industrialized countries, wishing to do research in a developing society and their local counterparts. It is necessary, first of all, to provide opportunities for the local colleague to become a genuine partner in research, participating in all of its phases, including the formulation of the problem and the interpretation of the results. Such participation increases the likelihood that the research will indeed reflect the interests of local investigators and the needs of their own countries. Moreover, it provides a particularly promising basis for continuing cooperation, since it makes for a reciprocal relationship that is mutually beneficial to both parties, rather than a relationship in which the local investigator merely assists the visitor in pursuing his (the visitor's) interests.

Secondly, it is necessary to combine research with training so that collaboration with a visiting researcher will enhance the capabilities of the local social science community to design and carry out its own research. Such arrangements are important not only for the professional development of individual scholars, but also for the growth of social psychology in developing countries.

Finally, it is necessary to develop mechanisms of mutual exposure and two-way research, which will allow social scientists from developing nations to observe various aspects of industrialized societies and their problems and to contribute to the understanding of their dynamics just as social scientists from industrialized nations come to observe and analyze the developing societies.

It was our hope that the Conference would contribute to the development of patterns of international cooperation in social-psychological research in developing countries that are consistent with these principles—that out of it would emerge mechanisms of research collaboration and coordination, research training and scientific communication based on the values of full participation, reciprocal benefit and mutual exposure.

Allocution inaugurale

Herbert C. Kelman

L'auteur fait tout d'abord l'historique des circonstances qui ont précédé la conférence et rend hommage au Professeur Tajfel qui, le premier, a eu l'idée de préparer la présente rencontre. Le professeur Kelman présente ensuite les deux principaux objectifs de la conférence. Il s'agit (a) d'encourager et de stimuler les recherches ayant trait aux aspects psycho-sociologiques du développement (b) de mettre sur pied des mécanismes de coopération internationale dans ce domaine.

Le problème des changements sociaux est d'une importance vitale pour les sciences sociales contemporaines. Il touche au premier chef les pays neufs, à cause du caractère aigu des mutations qui affectent leurs structures sociales, et à cause des nouvelles exigences de la solidarité internationale. Mais il touche aussi les pays industrialisés qui ont des zones de sous-développement politique, économique et social et n'ont pas nécessairement réussi à coordonner leur croissance et leur intégration.

Le but concret des recherches psycho-sociologiques est donc de faciliter l'intégration politique, économique et sociale des diverses couches sociales d'une société donnée, de réduire la part de l'arbitraire et de la répression dans les processus de développement et de permettre une industrialisation et une urbanisation maximale sans que les pays touchés par le développement perdent pour autant leur originalité culturelle.

Il s'agit donc de recherches fondamentales dans la mesure où les problèmes posés sont universels et de longue durée. Il s'agit

cependant de recherches "engagées" dans la mesure où elles supposent que les changements sociaux ont un caractère souhaitable.

Le psychosociologue fait donc dans ce domaine des jugements de valeur qui affectent le choix des questions posées, des phénomènes observés et des variables analysées. Sa tâche principale est donc de réconcilier la logique des engagements moraux et politiques et celle de la rigueur scientifique. Les conséquences de ces recherches sont autant intellectuelles que sociales. Elles peuvent nous permettre en effet de mieux comprendre l'évolution et le développement des individus et des groupes. Elles peuvent nous permettre d'utiliser des méthodes d'analyse quasi expérimentales, dans la mesure où les changements qui interviennent dans les pays neufs ont souvent un caractère aigu et facilitent donc la mesure de certaines variables, *avant et après* l'introduction de nouvelles techniques ou de nouvelles formes d'organisation. En outre, la diversité des cultures caractéristiques des pays neufs permet d'entreprendre des comparaisons systématiques et, par la méthode des variations concomitantes, d'isoler les dimensions culturelles susceptibles de freiner ou d'accélérer les processus de changement. Enfin, les recherches entreprises dans les pays neufs devraient permettre de vérifier l'universalité de certaines hypothèses formulées à partir de l'étude de milieux industriels ou de groupes sociaux limites.

Les recherches psycho-sociologiques entreprises dans les pays neufs devraient donc permettre (a) de mieux résoudre les problèmes associés au développement économique et social de sociétés globales (b) de faire avancer la théorie et la méthode psychosociologiques.

De là l'importance d'une coopération étroite dans le domaine international. Si les pays neufs constituent un terrain d'enquête privilégié, ils ne disposent pas toujours du capital financier, intellectuel et humain nécessaires pour entreprendre de telles recherches. Il convient donc d'examiner les conditions susceptibles de favoriser une telle coopération. Ces conditions sont les suivantes. (a) Il faut éviter une colonisation des chercheurs appartenant aux pays neufs et délimiter des thèmes de recherche qui soient aussi importants à leurs yeux qu'à ceux des chercheurs venant des pays industriels. (b) Il faut que les contacts établis entre ces deux types de chercheurs soient de longue durée et non pas réduits à la durée d'une seule enquête. (c) Il faut non seulement permettre aux chercheurs des pays neufs de se perfectionner, mais aussi mettre à leur disposition les outils susceptibles de faciliter leurs propres recherches dans les pays industriels.

Il faut espérer que les travaux de la présente conférence permettront de dégager des principes susceptibles de stimuler tant la recherche psycho-sociologique comparative que la coopération internationale nécessaire à une telle recherche.



Social Structure and Motivational Tuning in Social and Economic Development

Ulf Himmelstrand and F. Olu. Okediji

University of Ibadan, Nigeria

Discussions about conditions basic to economic and social development have been focussed rather predominantly on levels rather than on structures or patterns of resources necessary for development. Underdevelopment has been characterized in terms of the levels of capital accumulation, industrialization, marketing capability, education and skills, achievement motivation, receptivity to innovation and new information, empathy, universalistic orientation and so forth. With more capital or more education or more of achievement motivation etc., it is believed that economic and social development will be speeded up. But a relatively high level of capital accumulation in a developing country—even some rather slowly developing countries today probably are slightly better off with regard to capital than some European countries at the time of their take-off—is not in itself a sufficient condition for development. The capital must be fruitfully invested, and this requires the concurrence of control over capital with certain intellectual skills, knowledge and motivational traits that suggest feasible and worthwhile production goals and suitable means to attain them.

Similarly a fairly high level of education in itself is of little value in a developmental perspective unless it is made useful in productive and creative undertakings. If education becomes mainly an item for consumption or a channel of status-seeking

rather than a factor in productivity and creativity, a higher level of education is of little developmental significance as compared with a restructuring of the pattern of skills and motivations such that a concurrence of skills and achievement motivation is brought about.

In the more qualified discussion of underdevelopment one can no doubt find an awareness that a concurrence of preconditions must be found to allow development to occur. These preconditions often must be thought of as combining in a multiplicative rather than an additive way to produce anything like self-sustained growth. The complete or nearly complete lack of one type of resource cannot be compensated for by any attainable amount of another kind of resource. Where there is a lot of causal interaction between resource variables, levels of resources become much less important in explaining variations in rates of development than the structure or degree of concurrence of different kinds of resources. Interaction effects of this kind are of practical significance when resource variables are only moderately correlated with each other; that is, where we find frequent incongruities in resource profiles.

Here, in fact, is another basic presumption underlying what we may call the structural or concurrence approach to developmental preconditions. *Underdevelopment, we presume, is indicated not only or even mainly by low levels of resources but rather by incongruous or imbalanced resource structures.* We can speak of such incongruity or imbalance when individual or collective units who control or exhibit a relatively large amount of resource X turn out to have little if anything of the equally important resource Y. Or when, in macro terms, there are very low positive correlations or even slightly negative correlations between variables of type X and Y in a given population of units. Of course, other statistical measures of relationship besides the correlation coefficient may be more adequate in many cases.

Whatever resources, material or human, that we consider important to development, the concurrence of such resources can be investigated on a number of levels of analysis.

The Personality Level: Does an individual in his personality combine a need for achievement, skills relevant to achievements, fairly accurate perceptions of alternative lines of action and their possible consequences, receptivity to new information, a capability of negotiating differences with other individuals? Or has he developed some of these traits at the expense of other traits? What type of personality dynamics brings about balanced or incongruous types of personality structures and of human resources respectively?

The Group Level: Does an individual in his group easily find individuals with complementary resources so that, for instance, his own need for achievement can be complemented by advice from those who have knowledge and skills relevant to achievement, or vice versa, so as to bring about a concurrence of resources and facilities within the group? Or is such complementarity difficult to attain in the given group?

The Societal Level: Is the structure of society, particularly its stratification system and its institutional set-up, so constituted that a high degree of concurrence of material and human resources is created by the process of socialization of individuals and by the distributional processes in groups? Or does the social structure hamper such concurrence of resources?

If we believe that incongruous human resource structures are serious impediments to self-sustained economic and social development, then social-psychological research in this general area should be directed systematically toward the study of the following kinds of questions:

Which are the kinds of "human resources" that social psychologists might most fruitfully and economically study in the context of development, and to what extent is concurrence or disjuncture of these resources the rule in a given society?

The tentative list of human resources we propose for discussion and research includes the following:

- (a) General knowledge and skills (like literacy, basic arithmetical skills, etc.) useful mainly in the acquisition and maintenance of more specialized knowledge and skills. This can be measured roughly by level of formal education, and more precisely by appropriate achievement tests.
- (b) More specialized knowledge and skills measurable in terms of degree and kind of specialization, and level of qualification.
- (c) Receptivity to ready-made concepts and information about alternative and better means to attain already given and accepted goals; speed of instrumental learning.
- (d) Creativity; degree of ability to form concepts and to "discover" problems; extent of searching and exploring behavior of a problem-solving type; an inquisitive mind even where clear-cut goals are not yet given; capacity to establish new needs and goals for action.
- (e) Strength of achievement values versus values relating to security or permanence in one's social position. Here, McClelland's (1961) work is highly pertinent. What he calls *need for affiliation* and *need for power* are here seen as two different motives underlying *security* values. Security can be attained either by allowing oneself to be controlled by some congenial group of affiliation, or by making effective efforts to control others in a given group or society, i.e. by seeking power.
- (f) Inclination to empathize; habits of negotiation; being accustomed to taking the roles of an increasing range of others without necessarily taking their standpoints.

We do not claim that a multiplicative relationship exists between all of these six types of human resources with regard to their impact on social and economic development. But we believe that some of the relationships are multiplicative, and that it is worth investigating what human resource structures require multiplicative relationships in order to produce what kind of outcomes.

Quite apart from outcomes, it should be of considerable interest to consider the kinds of joint distributions that characterize human resource structures internally. One can establish profiles for individual units of analysis, and matrices of relationships between resource variables for collectivities. It would also be interesting to know whether there is anything like a cumulative structure in these sets of human resources so that one type of resource will emerge above a certain threshold for a given unit of analysis only if another more widespread resource is present, and what deviations from such a cumulative pattern are most common. Knowledge about these aspects of human resource structures could be of considerable value in the practical planning of human resource development. If social-psychological theory does not suggest another interpretation, a cumulative structure can be assumed to be a kind of "natural order" which it would be costly to violate. Resources should be developed in the order they appear in the cumulative structure. But social-psychological theory as well as the existence of deviant, non-cumulative resources may suggest other approaches. It would be correct to start with the improvement of the most "difficult" and rare resource in the cumulative order if it could be reasonably assumed that this particular resource is a sufficient if not necessary condition for the development of all the less "difficult" resources. It seems quite likely that close comparative studies of the internal aspects of human resource structures will sensitize the research-worker to a number of interesting and important hypotheses and hunches.

On sociological grounds one could predict quite different kinds of human resource matrices in societies characterized by what Durkheim (1947) called "mechanical solidarity" as compared with societies exhibiting an "organic solidarity". A society with mechanical solidarity has a low division of labor and consequently little interdependence between economic units. In the absence of the constraints of economic interdependence, cohesion must be created by centralized coercion or external threat. In such a society empathy and wide-ranging role-taking abilities are not required and probably not correlated with the various kinds of instrumental skills necessary in that kind of society. In societies characterized by a fully developed organic solidarity (which implies an elaborate division of labor and a high degree of economic

interdependence) the correlations mentioned previously can be expected to be significantly positive. One could also start from the other end. That is, one could measure the relationships between all the variables in the human resource matrix of a collectivity, and perhaps use these relationships as an indicator of the extent to which the given collectivity has progressed from a mechanical to an organic solidarity.¹

What Causes Imbalance?

Suppose, for instance, that we find in a particularly crucial social problem area a very weak or even slightly negative correlation between (a) level of formal education and (b) creativity. In other words, the better educated are more sterile in their view of the social panorama. We would here be led to look into the content and teaching methods of educational institutions at different levels to find out if there is anything there that blocks concept-formation ability in given problem areas. Or we could determine whether there is such a structure of recruitment into higher schools that individuals with rather peculiar socialization histories detrimental to creativity are predominantly recruited.

What Maintains or Overcomes Incongruities?


There are a number of theories of social stratification, conflict and cleavage, status-crystallization and rank-equilibration, resolution of belief dilemmas, reduction of cognitive dissonance etc., which address themselves to these questions (Davis and Moore, 1945; Dahrendorf, 1961; Coser, 1956; and Festinger, 1957; Lenski, 1954). If we are correct in assuming that incongruous or unbalanced human resource profiles and resource structures are highly characteristic of what is called underdevelopment, then research in the underdeveloped countries ought to be an important challenge to anyone interested in further developing such theories.

Research opportunities in underdeveloped countries should be particularly challenging where human resource incongruities have tended to be permanent or to become even more entrenched. Several of the theories mentioned above predict the opposite—the reduction of incongruity.

What is it That is Changing in Social and Cultural Change?

Tentatively we suggest that any hypotheses about factors in development should be specified as to the following types of ef-

¹Erik Allardt (1964) has elaborated and differentiated Durkheim's typology of solidarities in a way which makes it even more fruitful as a starting point for a discussion of social structure, human resource structures and what we call "motivational tuning" (see below).



fектs: economic growth and development; articulation of social needs and a sense of accomplishment or efficiency; aggregation of needs and the formation of a national identity; and mental health, creativity and rationality.

Before we proceed to present some selected theoretical notions and problems of operationalization which are suggested by the four main questions stated above, we suggest that the reader acquaint himself with the flow chart in Figure 1. In this figure we have included some "material" as well as "human" resources in order to indicate the interplay of resources of diverse kinds in social and economic development.² The relationships which presumably are of special interest to social psychologists are printed with heavier lines in the figure.

Figure 1 contains not only simplifications but also ambiguities of various kinds, which we will not dwell on here. The flow chart is not intended to present a systematic analysis, but only to identify roughly some problems which ought to be prominent in social-psychological research about social and economic development.

There is one detail in the flow-chart that possibly needs some explanation. A circle represents a rather peculiar kind of "switch-board". An arrow pointing to a circle indicates that certain operations are carried out on the switch-board. The arrow originates in those factors operating it. We find, for instance, that there is a switch-board operated by "psycho-dynamic processes". This switch-board further transforms the blend of human resources represented in the previous box.

Selected Problems

The remainder of this essay will concentrate on some aspects of the flow chart. First, we will discuss some notions concerning psycho-dynamic processes that may influence the structure of human resources at the personality level. Second, we will give some examples of ways in which social, institutional and cultural structures may influence these psycho-dynamic processes. Problems of operationalization will be discussed briefly in the context of specific concepts and research hypotheses.

Psycho-dynamic Processes and Motivational Tuning

We approach psycho-dynamics in terms of the concept of "motivational tuning". This, we assume, is a process influenced

²The *Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies* will publish "Concurrence of material and human resources as a condition of economic development" by the senior author to the present paper.

by cultural norms as they apply to the social positions and roles of an individual. The process probably also significantly influences the structure of human resources utilized in the individual performance of required roles.

The concept of motivational tuning is more general than the various lists of needs that have been and are being composed by psychologists and sociologists. The notion of "motivational tuning" disregards the content of needs, intentions, etc., and focuses entirely on their dynamic characteristics. In cross-cultural research—particularly in the diverse cultures of developing societies with their basic needs further diversified by different ecological and economic conditions—it is of great importance from the point of view of comparability to be able to abstract the dynamic properties of motivational states from their actual content. Secondly, it seems considerably easier to measure various facets of motivational tuning in field surveys, and to manipulate motivational tuning in the laboratory (and perhaps in the field) than to measure and manipulate most of the conventionally defined needs and ego-defense mechanisms.

We have borrowed the term "tuning" from Zajonc (1960).³ He demonstrated that subjects who are instructed to act as transmitters of a given message to other subjects cognize this message in a more differentiated, complex, unified and organized way than subjects who are instructed to act as terminal receivers only. When the experimental subjects—both transmitters and receivers—were instructed to anticipate incongruent information, much of this difference between transmitters and receivers disappeared. This occurred because receivers increased their vigilance which raised their performance to a level equal to transmitters.

"Tuning in" a message in the role of a transmitter or a receiver implies entering into a communication with others on two different presuppositions: one acts as a transmitter but is acted upon when playing the role of the receiver. In more strict terms only a true sender can be said to "act"; a transmitter is both "acted upon" and "acting".

It seems that a whole family of different types of tuning could be defined by changing the presuppositions under which an individual enters into interaction (communication), action or cognition. Such a classification could be further subdivided by taking account of the kind of objects involved in the transactions.

The dimensions of tuning to be discussed emerge from a preliminary attempt to systematize a set of concepts which are not

³To us it seems somewhat misleading to use the term *cognitive tuning*. Some of the effects of tuning no doubt are cognitive but tuning itself seems to us a concept of motivation. We therefore prefer the term *motivational tuning*.

unfamiliar to social psychologists. Within the context of subject-object relationships, we propose to distinguish modes of response, terms of response, directions of response and objects of response as facets of motivational tuning.

Subject-object Relationships: The subject may (a) be acting on an object or (b) be acted upon by the object. Many subject-object relationships could be characterized as mixtures of the two; or as a dialogical relationship where the emphasis is constantly shifting from "acting" to "being acted upon", and back again. Both types help to define many other relations besides the sender-transmitter-receiver relation discussed by Zajonc, such as relations between "initiator" and "agent", or "actor" and "spectator". Personality scales of "alienation vs. personal control" seem to tap the dimensions of subjectively "being acted upon vs. being active oneself" (M. Seeman, 1959; Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 1961).

Modes of Response: We here distinguish between (a) a "learning" and a "performance" tuning (a questioning and searching *versus* an assertive mode); (b) between a "consummatory" and an "operant" tuning (expressive *versus* instrumental mode); and (c) between a tuning toward "transaction" or "destruction" (games *versus* fights; bargaining, negotiating or contracting *versus* war or elimination).

Terms of Response: Objects can be "tuned in" in terms of a more general class of objects or as individual cases. We can here talk of (a) "class" *versus* "case" tuning. Linton's distinction between "ascribed" and "acquired" statuses, and Parsons' distinction between criteria of "quality" and "performance" both seem to be instances of these two types of tuning. Secondly (b), one can tune in objects in terms of their agreement with given ideals or in terms of their "reality". From the point of view of cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), it is of some interest that some people seem to have more difficulty in tolerating two inconsistent descriptions of *reality* than two inconsistent descriptions one of which is considered *realistic* and the other one as referring to an *ideal* state of affairs. Response to inconsistencies will thus probably to some extent be determined by the type of tuning—ideal or reality tuning—found in the responding individual.

Direction of Response: Any behavior may imply a movement of escape or evasion, or a movement of approach or of positive confrontation of a challenge. This is another important dimension of motivational tuning which will influence variables relating to the cognitive differentiation and organization of the relevant—"human resources."

Objects of Response: There are many ways of classifying objects, few of which are motivationally relevant. In order to suit our pur-

poses such a classification should distinguish objects that "hit back" or feed back on the subject, and those which do not, and also distinguish between motivationally different types of feedback. We suggest here some very broad categories such as words and symbols, things and people (*Alters* and *Egos*).

Every need, motive or drive can in principle be characterized in terms of the dimensions of tuning suggested in this paper. In studying cognitive and motivational processes—particularly in a cross-cultural context where the content of these may vary a great deal—it seems more useful to characterize motives in terms of such dimensions of tuning than in terms of motivational content like prestige and affiliation needs, sex or hunger. Two motives which are very dissimilar in these conventional terms—that is, in terms of content—may be very much alike with respect to type of tuning, and two motives which are very similar or nearly equivalent in terms of content may turn out to be very dissimilar in terms of tuning.

The complex character of motivational tuning manifests itself not only in the several dimensions involved. Along one single dimension we may sometimes have to distinguish both simple tuning and complex, oscillating sequences of opposite types of tuning. One illustration will prove the point. The typical orientation of a scientist is to shift from tuning in *classes of events* to tuning in *individual cases*, and back again. On the level of theorizing he deals with classes of events; on the level of empirical study he observes a number of individual cases. These shifts and combinations within one single dimension constitutes an instance of what we wish to call phased tuning. A simple tuning in this dimension is implied when an individual persistently keeps tuning in classes of events only, or individual cases only. For various reasons it is rather unlikely that this type of simple tuning persists for a long time. For example, the individual may not have developed the class concepts which permit him to persist in tuning in only classes of events. A shift occurs. Now, it is interesting to note that such shifts can imply a shift of emphasis within one dimension (as they are when a competent scientist shifts from classes of events to individual cases, and back again) or a complete shift of context. The former type of shift we may call an integrated shift, which implies a carry-over of cognitive and motivational processes from one phase of tuning to the other. This occurs with the scientist. But we can also conceive of nonintegrated or discontinuous shifts where practically no such carry-over takes place. The individual switches from one type of tuning to the other within the same dimension of tuning as if he switched between two radio

stations sending entirely unrelated types of programs.⁴

Parsons and Bales (1953, Chapters 3, 5) in their conceptualization of a "phase movement" in a four-dimensional action space seem to acknowledge the very same need for shifts from one type of tuning to another that has been emphasized here. Their discussion has stimulated some of the present formulations. They do not seem to take full account of the discontinuities in phase-movement resulting from nonintegrated shifts, however.

The multitude of combinations and shifts possible within and between the various dimensions of tuning here mentioned calls for a highly selective approach to the task of choosing complex types of tuning for empirical research. Guides to such a selection might be provided by searching for types of tuning which seem to be strategically important to the functioning of personalities, groups, organizations, communities or nations.

Having chosen to emphasize certain dimensions and types of tuning, two main avenues are open to the research worker who wants to explore this problem area. Along the path of experimental research we can easily visualize a series of studies investigating the effects of motivational tuning on cognitive and evaluative structure with the same basic design which was used by Zajonc (1960) in his experiments. Space does not permit discussion of such experimental studies here, but they will be quite challenging. There are also great possibilities along the lines of nonexperimental survey or clinical research investigating the various dimensions of motivational tuning discussed in this essay. Status and role analysis as well as personality research will probably profit from making use of this concept. For instance, a social role may be conceived of as implying a set of instructions inducing a person to get tuned to certain tasks in a particular way. The main advantage of linking status and role concepts to the concept of tuning is to make the whole theory about functions and dysfunctions of social roles more amenable to psychological reasoning and prediction. Through this, we can increase the number of theoretically interesting and empirically testable derivations from the theory.⁵

Operationally speaking, one should explore possibilities of adapting for use in the developing countries some already existing scales and indicators which seem to have a rather clear relation-

⁴A beautiful illustration of such nonintegrated shifts between generalities and specificities can be found in Smith, Bruner and White in the case of Charles Lanlin (1956, 141 ff.).

⁵For a sophisticated functional analysis of statuses and roles, see Merton (1957).

ship to some of the dimensions of motivational tuning indicated above. For example, we have already mentioned scales of "alienation" and "personal control" constructed by Fred Strodtbeck and others (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 1961).⁶ The measures used by Kelman and Cohler (1961) to distinguish "clarifiers" and "simplifiers" could possibly be adapted to measure the "learner-performer" or "questioning *versus* assertive" dimension of tuning. Here belongs Guttman's (1954) scale of "involution" as well. Himmelstrand's (1960) so-called L-scale has been used to measure certain aspects of the "expressive-instrumental" dimension, more precisely the extent of instrumental *versus* expressive tuning of verbal or symbolic activity.

By carrying out surveys of resource structures and motivational tuning in areas where rates of development differ and where earlier social-anthropological and sociological studies have something reliable to say about antecedent traditional and transitional social structures, one should be able to answer some of the general research questions stated earlier in this essay. Furthermore, by carrying out such surveys in developing areas where reform, improvement or extension programs have been initiated, and where the consequent success or failure of these programs can be evaluated, it should be possible to estimate roughly to what extent variations in initial resource structures and variations in motivational tuning account for differences in the results of these programs. Action research or field experiments could also be carried out to find ways to create a motivational climate that will tune individuals to correct existing imbalances in their human resource structures within the limits set by biological inheritance and given societal and institutional structures (Pareek, this issue).

But in order to accomplish comprehensive and meaningful research along the lines suggested, it is necessary to explicate in much more detail the ramifications of "tuning theory" with regard to its internal logical structure, and its external links with taxonomies about antecedent social structures and notions about consequent transformations of human resource matrices. These theoretical tasks are formidable; we should therefore cut out some smaller segments of this large body of theoretical notions, pursue them empirically, and then report our findings.

The ambitious reader undoubtedly could find many examples illustrating various dimensions of motivational tuning and

⁶A number of items from Fred Strodtbeck's scale of "personal control" have been translated into Yoruba and tested for scalability by the senior author on a sample of largely illiterate farmers in Western Nigeria as part of a survey on agricultural decision-making by M. Upton. Not only was scalability satisfactory but the scale correlated meaningfully with other variables.

human resource structures in the papers included in this volume—the papers of Kiray, Pareek, Jayasuria and Barbichon come easily to mind. Reinterpreting these papers in terms of the taxonomy of motivational tuning is of little or no consequence, however, as long as "tuning theory" has not been properly explicated. Several of the papers in this volume provide food for thought that might contribute to such theory building.

Socio-Cultural Structures and Motivational Tuning

Motivational tuning can be viewed as an independent variable maintaining or facilitating changes in human resource structures. But as we have indicated already, motivational tuning can also be considered a dependent variable influenced by variations in social and institutional (cultural) structures and by the positions of given individuals in such structures. The types of threats and types of attractions or challenges produced by cultural and societal structures provide the necessary links with the motivational concepts that we have introduced.

Stratification systems in developing countries are as varied as those in highly developed societies—perhaps more so. There are highly differentiated, more or less closed systems relying mainly on ascriptive criteria of status and perhaps to some extent on achievements of lower-status incumbents in faithfully serving their patrons higher up on the ladder. There are equally differentiated systems where ascription is virtually absent and rank is determined mainly by achievement, with very little or no clientage and patronage. There are fairly undifferentiated systems, and all kinds of mixtures of various kinds of stratification systems. LeVine (1966) has recently demonstrated that one can fruitfully study the relationship between such variations in traditional Nigerian stratification systems and achievement motivation. But social and economic development in most cases implies threats to traditional systems of stratification. The replacement of an ascriptive type of stratification system with the more achievement-oriented system of a modernizing society implies that people who have been accustomed to be acted upon but not to act are required to take initiative; and that persons who have learned new ways of initiating action are met with resistance and hostility when confronting traditional leaders who resent anybody taking action on their own. It would be promising to study the detailed motivational dynamics of these two kinds of situations, and to investigate how motivational tuning in them might be manipulated by changing, for instance, the "objects of response" so that a direct confrontation of old and new patterns is avoided. New patterns may be in-

troduced with regard to new objects and later on transferred to the points of original confrontation.

Quite different types of threat appear where stratification systems in developing countries are more open and competitive. Development itself provides both new positions and opportunities and better qualified manpower for filling new positions. But often opportunity structures do not grow as fast as the amount of qualified manpower and competition becomes extremely intense. How does this influence the tendency to inquire and search for rather than to posit and assert certain solutions to social problems? How does it influence phase-movement between ideal and reality tuning, and between symbolic operations and manipulation of tasks and things? Does competition stimulate or hamper these processes?

In some societies stratification systems and competitive processes are confounded with differential rates of modernization or economic improvement in different strata or ethnic groups of the society. For example: if members of a certain lower stratum ethnic group are able to overcome their social and economic handicap through exposure to modernizing influences, and therefore are recruited in increasing numbers to higher and more influential posts in competition with others, these others often suspect corrupt manipulations of a nepotistic or tribalistic nature. The competition thus loses its character of a "transaction" between equal opportunity candidates and potential employers; the competition is considered unfair (as indeed it may be in some cases) and one cries for the removal, elimination or even destruction of one's competitors. Such shifts from transactional to destructive tuning deserve closer study.

The existence of ascriptive strata on the top of a stratification system which otherwise is based mainly on achievement criteria poses some other interesting questions. Will mobility aspirations in the lower strata in such a system be less prestige-oriented and more task-oriented? Or should we expect the opposite result? If we understand what kind of motivation provides most of the driving force behind effective mobility aspirations, that would help us to understand what kind of people are recruited to higher positions and what kind of performance they can be expected to make there. The predominant type of motivational tuning of the elite in a developing society can be expected to depend largely on the type of stratification system.

Power structures and economic structures in conjunction have many interesting motivational implications quite apart from the overlap between these two types of structures and the stratification system. Particularly characteristic of developing societies are parallel changes in the size of economically viable units; the potential

scope of centralized political power; and the possibilities of creating an acceptable degree of social order with less reliance on coercive political measures and more reliance on interdependence and exchange.

In a traditional subsistence economy the viable unit is very small indeed. Because of the lack of constraining economic interdependence between such small self-sufficient units, any more comprehensive solidarity that is attained must be brought about largely by coercive constraints either from a central authority or, in more uncentralized, segmental societies, from external threats. This is what Durkheim called "mechanical" solidarity. But with an increasing division of labor, which is such an important aspect of modernization, the viability of these smaller units is threatened and destroyed. We can conceive of at least three different types of responses to such a threat.

One way is migration from the less viable unit to a unit which offers more promise. From a motivational point of view it would be interesting to distinguish avoidance-migration or push-migration from approach-migration (pull-migration) and push-pull-migration. Psychologically they probably have quite different effects on the way the mobile individual reacts toward his new environment, the extent of anomie among urban immigrants, etc. Another way out which requires more collective and elite action is to expect a central authority to take on larger responsibilities in coordinating and allocating resources and distributing stewardship to ensure the survival of smaller units; and be prepared to submit to the leadership of such a central authority.

A third way out is to realize that increased division of labor requires a more intense exchange of goods and services, and to try to develop such an exchange inside and outside of traditional markets without relying on authorities to coordinate such exchange. Such exchange always involves some risks particularly in an early "robber baron" and "speculator" stage before the rules of the new game have become fully institutionalized.

It is evident that the two last types of solutions roughly correspond to two different ideological approaches to the politics and economics of modernization, and that these two approaches can be combined. It would be worth studying what invariant relations, if any, exist between such types of responses to viability threats, motivational tuning, and human resource structures.

The Belief-Systems

The last important factor that ought to be taken into account here is the *belief-systems* that may be involved in social and cultural

change. Beliefs about reality as well as moral beliefs can have several different sorts of functional significance in a society. They can be so completely removed from any context of practical action that due respect and veneration can be paid to them without any practical consequences. Arnold (1935) expresses some satisfaction that such dissociation of belief-systems and practical action can be attained. Those who honor various outdated and unrealistic myths about the role of government thus can be kept in peaceful satisfaction by providing them an elevated or secluded context for expressing their beliefs, while practical action can go on in other contexts undisturbed by the myths of government—and sometimes managed by the same people who hail these myths in other contexts. The dissociation of belief systems from practical action (which can be interpreted as a discontinuous type of shift from tuning in words and ideals to tuning in things and realities) is seen by Arnold as functional to the adaptation and integration of the social system. But under certain conditions it may be dysfunctional. When a society faces the challenges of modernization it becomes necessary for the elite to analyse intellectually the problems of economic and social development and to plan with due concern both for political ideals and socio-economic realities. The psychologically significant question then arises whether it is possible to undertake such an intellectual analysis if one's mind is already occupied, as it were, by mythological symbols and concepts completely out of step with the type of intellectual exercise required. It might be possible to dissociate beliefs and actions which are not consistent with each other the way Arnold suggested. But is it possible to hide inconsistencies between beliefs the same way without taking on a type of motivational tuning which undermines the very purpose of the intellectual exercise required?

The matter is further complicated by the fact that incumbents of certain statuses in a given society may have certain well-defined obligations to protect a given set of beliefs against any threat to its "fundamental meaning," or may rely on demonstrated faithfulness to given religious or political beliefs as a source of legitimate authority, or may be expected to enforce the application of given beliefs in contexts of practical action as well as in contexts of more ritualistic significance. In studying the impact of social and institutional structures on motivational tuning in a given society one should be particularly careful to explore the functions of those status-positions which deal in the maintenance, elaboration and application of beliefs. The types of statuses and roles occupied by those who represent new beliefs about national integration, resource and welfare allocation ought

to be of special interest if we wish to understand the predominant types of motivational tuning that are likely to influence the development of new human resource structures. Here as in other respects the increasing division of labor implied and required by modernization may break up status-sets and role-sets so that sets of ritualistic and practical obligations which previously were combined by one person in relationships to all his role-partners are now expected either to be performed by this one person in relationship to only one particular category of role-partners, or be performed by several persons. In a transitional stage when the situation seems to require such further specialization, strains are bound to arise before this degree of specialization is accepted by those who occupy given positions, or by the society at large (Kiray, in this issue, for relevant data). The dynamics of change or resistance to change in the motivational tuning toward belief-systems in transitional societies deserve as profound study as traditional belief-systems themselves.

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Structures sociales et synchronisation des motivations

Ulf Himmelstrand et F. Olu. Okediji

Jusqu'à présent, on a posé le problème du développement économique et social en terme de niveaux plus qu'en terme de structures. Le sous-développement ne résulte cependant pas seulement de la faiblesse des ressources dont une société dispose, mais aussi des déséquilibres et contradictions entre ces ressources. Il est donc indispensable d'évaluer l'interdépendance des différents paliers et différents aspects de la réalité sociale, et ce, au niveau de la société globale, du groupe ou de l'individu.

La psychologie sociale peut contribuer à cette évaluation (a) en identifiant les ressources humaines dont l'interaction favorise ou empêche le développement. Il convient dans ce domaine de définir la distribution de ces ressources parmi différents types de structures sociales et de mesurer à quel point ces distributions sont interdépendantes; (b) en isolant les facteurs susceptibles d'introduire des conflits et des contradictions entre ces ressources; (c) en identifiant les forces qui aggravent ou minimisent de telles contradictions; (d) en définissant les divers aspects des changements sociaux et culturels.

Les auteurs se proposent de traiter certains aspects privilégiés de ces quatre tâches et de montrer comment les structures sociales et culturelles peuvent influencer les processus constitutifs de la dynamique de la personnalité. Plus particulièrement ils se proposent d'examiner plus en détail le concept de synchronisation

des motivations. Il ne s'agit pas d'analyser le contenu de telles motivations, mais d'identifier leurs structures et leurs dynamiques.

Un certain nombre de distinctions sont dès lors nécessaires entre: (a) les situations où le sujet agit en tant que sujet et celles où il agit en tant qu'objet; (b) les divers modes de réponse; (c) les termes de ces réponses; —certaines réponses peuvent être synchronisées avec un idéal, d'autres avec la réalité— (d) la direction de ces réponses; (e) les objets de ces réponses.

Toutes ces distinctions permettent de mieux appréhender le concept de synchronisation des motivations et ainsi de voir comment ce concept infléchit les structures de la connaissance et de la morale. Il permet de mieux comprendre les conflits qui caractérisent une société passant d'un système de castes et de structures pré-déterminées à un système où la position sociale des individus dépend de leur réussite. Il y a alors en effet un conflit entre deux ordres de valeurs et il est important de déterminer comment on peut manipuler la synchronisation des motivations individuelles afin de réduire le conflit entre ordres anciens et nouveaux. De la même manière, on peut se demander comment un système de stratification fluide affecte les structures cognitives et influence la synchronisation des opérations symboliques et concrètes. En tout état de cause, on peut penser que la synchronisation des motivations de l'élite d'une société donnée dépend étroitement du système de stratification sociale de cette société.

De la même manière, il peut être utile d'examiner comment la synchronisation des motivations affecte les structures politiques et économiques. Le développement économique et social constitue une menace à laquelle les sujets peuvent répondre de diverses manières; soit par des migrations, soit par une centralisation des mécanismes et institutions chargés de la répartition des ressources, soit par un accroissement des transactions avec le monde extérieur.

On peut enfin examiner à quel point les motivations cognitives et religieuses sont synchronisées et à quel point le développement économique et social menace une telle synchronisation. Il risque en effet d'y avoir conflit entre rôles anciens et nouveaux, et entre divers types de croyances religieuses.

Les auteurs concluent en montrant que l'étude de cette synchronisation fait appel à une méthodologie particulièrement différenciée.

The Development of Nations: Some Psychological Considerations

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The holding of an international conference on social-psychological research in developing countries reflects a recognition of the role psychology has to play in the shaping of world affairs. As such it represents a potentially significant step in the convergent integration of world-cultures, since it reflects the emergence of a scientific approach to the intensely complex social and psychological problems associated with the development of nations. Hitherto, in Africa at least, the main emphasis has been on political, economic and material development, with relatively little constructive action taken in regard to the psychological implications of social change.¹

Here and now one might well ask: why is it that there are so few African psychologists participating in this Conference? Quite simply because the importance of psychology in relation to national development has yet to be recognized by developing countries in Africa, so that few have established departments of psychology in their universities. It is to be hoped that one of the outcomes of this Conference will be the seeding of this idea among

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¹E.g., a special issue of the OECD Observer (September, 1966) devoted to developmental aid, contains only 15 lines on "social transformation." The rest of the issue, comprising some 50 pages, is concerned with such admittedly important aspects as economic growth, trade, foreign investment, population growth, etc.

African countries, so that their universities may produce psychologists, and psychology may encompass the study of man in all the variety of his cultural backgrounds. This would help pave the way not only for the scientific facilitation of national development, but also for the formulation of generally applicable psychological principles.

National development implies among other things the transformation of a preindustrial society into a state of technological sophistication, a process which today may in theory be enormously accelerated in contrast to the rate of development of the existing modernized industrial societies. The reason for this is simple and obvious: the technological expertise of the latter is formulated and communicable. The problem however is how to communicate it: how are the developing countries most efficiently to absorb the information that is necessary for their economic survival? Only by a process of deliberate social change, involving on the one hand the introduction of the relevant knowledge and skills, on the other the remolding of their social structure into a form that will not only accept and translate into action the incoming information, but that will also be capable of generating new patterns for representing the resulting technological environment. One interesting possibility in this respect is that the traditional social values of African societies may serve to modulate the tough-minded assertiveness which characterizes the modern technologically developed nations, obviously a matter of concern for the world as a whole.

The Politics of Modernization

In suggesting that psychological research is a prerequisite of contemporary national development, full recognition is given to the critical and inextricable part played by politics and economics; indeed, a subject merit^{ing} psychological study in developing countries concerns the kind of mechanism most appropriate for putting into constructive effect actions which psychological research suggests are best suited for the potentiation of human and national resources. In this respect, the recent work of Apter (1965) on the politics of modernization is relevant. According to the interpretation of Glickman (1966), Apter proposes that the development of science is a key factor in the later stages of modernization, and that the burden of conditioning the growing society to respond to scientific requirements must fall on those of its members who themselves have attained an operationally effective level of technological and scientific awareness. In the present author's opinion this would apply in particular to social and behavioral scientists.

It may also be noted that Apter separates the process of modernization from industrialization. The former is held to represent the development of social systems and processes—differentiation, flexibility, absorption of innovation, etc., while industrialization relates development to manufacturing and the technical skills required. The two overlap as processes and as stages in the development of states, but industrialization is regarded as impossible without modernization.

It is of interest that this complementary differentiation by a political scientist between modernization and industrialization bears an analogy to the two major interdependent areas wherein psychology would seem to be of practical relevance for developing countries. These were delineated by the author when drawing up a psychological research program for application in Ghana.² The first major area relates to planned social changes, such as involved in compulsory education, public health schemes, social action programs and the general operation of awakening and fostering national unity. The second major area relates to the identification, measurement and potentiation of national resources, particularly manpower and has its main application in the spheres of education, training and industrialization.

However, before psychology may be applied effectively in these two broad areas, a wide range of basic research is necessary, and it is here that psychology in Africa is automatically significant for psychological theory generally. The need for basic research arises since applications of psychological techniques are necessarily contingent on social communication: they depend on the transmission of information, and in such transactions it is essential that meaning be preserved, or, to use the terminology of Weaver (1958) and Stewart (1965), that the communicative accuracy of the symbol complexes involved is such as to minimize the possibilities of misunderstanding.

"Semeiotics"—a Distortion in the Social Transaction of Information

For these reasons our psychological research program in Ghana was designed with a focus on the study of factors likely to produce semantic—or better: "semeiotic"—distortion in the social transaction of information.

There are many practical examples of the importance of semeiotics as a focus of psychological research in Africa, all relating to the general thesis of this paper, namely that develop-

²Copies available on request.

ment of preindustrial countries rests on their acquisition of technological and scientific expertise, and that, to be acquired, such expertise must be communicated in a manner which is meaningful. To give some examples, education in Africa has relied almost exclusively on materials and methods derived from non-African, usually western cultures, with no evidence to show that they are the most appropriate for African application; indeed there is increasing evidence to suggest that they are not (Biesheuvel, 1952; Verhaegen and Laroche, 1958; Hudson, 1962; and Mundy-Castle, 1967b). The same applies to the inculcation of industrial and technical skills, while classification of manpower in terms of aptitudes and abilities properly demands an understanding of African cognitive functions in order that valid and reliable measuring instruments can be devised. Modified versions of existing western methods may be effective to some extent, at least as makeshift measures, but they are not necessarily the best. The introduction of social action schemes and industrial development programs, the application in practice of economic and political plans, all require knowledge of how they should be presented so that the populations affected understand what is happening, what is required of them, and why. It is also necessary to incorporate mechanisms permitting feedback of information concerning the effectiveness or fate of such projects, so that appropriate corrections may be made if, where and when necessary. As already indicated, precisely the same problems of communication arise whenever either pure or applied psychological research is attempted.

Put in its simplest form, a primary practical aim of psychological research in developing countries is to find out (a) how to impart information with minimal semiotic distortion, particularly information pertaining to culturally unfamiliar concepts, as are most of those on which modernization and industrialization depend; and (b) how to interpret the meaning of observed reactions. There are of course many other aims of social-psychological research in developing countries, but it is submitted that the above are critical for all of them.

A Research Approach in Ghana

There are several levels of attack on this general problem. Our research program in Ghana differentiated three broad approaches, namely neuropsychology, general psychology and social psychology, with developmental psychology cutting across all of them. Emphasis is laid on the interdependence of these different approaches, the implication being that in the long run results derived from one approach cannot adequately be evaluated with-

out regard for results from the other approaches. As a hypothetical but not improbable illustration, consider the following: a psychological deficit may arise as a result of brain damage consequent on infantile malnutrition, e.g. protein-calorie deficiency; this may have occurred not due to lack of appropriate food, but because of social custom, or ignorance; a public health education scheme is conceived in order to modify the inappropriate feeding habits --its outcome will depend on a knowledge of perceptual and cognitive functions generally within the community, and on an appreciation of a variety of socially-determined attitudes, opinions and customs. It may be seen that every step in this hypothetical series is contingent on one or another branch of psychological research.

It is appropriate at this point to refer to the fields of exploration covered by our research program. The primary instrument of the neuropsychological approach is the electro-encephalograph, chosen because of the information it may give concerning cerebral regulatory systems and the possibility of organic disorder of the brain. Some interesting differences have been observed among normal Ghanaian children and adults compared with normal subjects from the Congo (Negroid), South Africa (Negroid and Caucasoid), Europe (Caucasoid), and North America (Negroid and Caucasoid). Since the cause and psychological significance of these differences are not at the moment clear, they will not here be considered further, a comprehensive rationale for their use and evaluation having been presented elsewhere (Mundy-Castle, 1967a).

Several lines of research have been followed under the heading of general psychology, including study of sensory thresholds, sensory discrimination, intersensory equivalences, illusions of various kinds, perceptual-verbal and perceptual-motor responses, remembering, thinking and predicting. Social psychology has involved study of attitudes, beliefs and opinions concerning the causation of diseases and their treatment, behavior during group interviews and leaderless group problem situations and the development of self-concepts and personality. Applied psychological research has been devoted mainly to the study of methods for classifying children and adults according to a variety of psychological variables, using paper and pencil tests, performance tests, individual and group interviews and leaderless group situations.

Some of the results of these studies have been written up, others are still being analyzed (Trent, 1965a, 1965b, 1967; Mundy-Castle, 1967b, 1967c, 1968). For the purposes of the present paper a general statement will be made concerning ideas and hypotheses which have emerged during the course of this work

and which appear to deserve further consideration in the context of the Idadan Conference.

The first proposition is to distinguish between the cultural structures of preindustrial tribal societies on the one hand and industrialized societies on the other, particularly those that are large and technologically sophisticated, and to suggest that this distinction may be of considerable psychological significance. The large, supertechnological societies have created a highly complex and diversified culture incorporating a new, essentially artificial environment, implicit in which is a wide variety of scientific, technological and related social concepts. Individuals growing up in such societies attain and respond to these concepts as a result of informal experience and formal training—the whole process being reinforced by quick-acting media for gathering and diffusing information, such as the press, radio, cinema, television, and so on. The psychological result is a distinctive patterning of intelligence, which, while showing individual variations, in a general sense exhibits a uniformity that is characteristic of the technological culture from which it is derived. It is suggested that this uniformity is largely a consequence of the extent to which behavior in such societies is explicitly and implicitly determined by programs in various guises. It is further suggested that such determination arises because the structural complexity of the supertechnological culture is such that maintenance of order and integration is only possible by the incorporation of such a system of programs.

The Confusion of Plan with Foresight

One of the psychological functions of programs is that they facilitate anticipation and prediction in behavior, while at the same time they probably inspire greater confidence in the outcome of actions. This is partly because among habitual program-users the impression grows that much of the future is secured, since there is a tendency for the program to be projected into objective reality and regarded as already there. In a smoothly-regulated modern social system this assumption may be frequently and repeatedly reinforced (unless there happens to be a major power failure or comparable catastrophe, in which case temporary chaos will almost certainly intervene). The increased confidence arising from the identification of programs with objective reality may be reflected in behavior, both in the speed and manner of conducting affairs, and in the feelings and attitudes of the people concerned toward such affairs. It seems possible that this confidence and its frequent reinforcement may have a facilitatory effect on learning, as well as acting as a potential

source of motivation, since individually conceived programs will tend to become identified with goals, thereby increasing the drive for their fulfillment.

The identification of a program with a goal reflects a confusion with what should properly be called foresight. A program serves as a guide for behavior, and insofar as it correctly allows for eventualities, it fulfills its function. For this to be achieved in practice it is necessary to have built into it a means whereby errors in prediction may be corrected, thereby permitting a readjustment of the program to match the unexpected circumstances. As already implied, rigid adherence to an inappropriate program may result from an excess of confidence based on a confusion of *plan* with *foresight*. Examples of this at a national level are common in 19th and 20th century history of western cultures, and in the recent history of several developing countries. It is also characteristic of bureaucracy.

This discussion of program-determined behavior is presented on the hypothesis that it comprises a critical cultural variable differentiating behavior in modern technological from traditional, preindustrial societies. It is only in the last decade or so, as a result of the beginnings of modernization and industrialization, that the cultural complexity of the developing African countries has shifted towards a level demanding a high degree of determination by plans and programs. Prior to this—and for that matter in many parts still today—a great deal of behavior was—and is—determined according to established customary patterns taken in conjunction with immediate circumstances, with little or no reference to the long-term future. This has proved effective for the maintenance of traditional societies but is probably inappropriate for the future, since technological development seems necessarily to incur an exponential increase in complexity of cultural structure. Regulation and cohesion within such complexity appears possible only by a large number of spatio-temporal constraints on behavior, such that the life of individuals becomes geared to the complexity of the system, much of their behavior being dictated by formulae for action or programs. Associated with this is a greatly increased variety of stimulation and far less contact with natural reality than in the traditional preindustrial cultures. The greater variety of stimulation may be expected to elicit an increase in the range and diversity of behavioral response-patterns, while the shift from natural to artificial reality would be associated with exposure to greater variety and higher orders of abstraction.

The foregoing discussion points to one of the great psychological problems facing the developing countries, namely the profound psychological readjustment that is required of their peoples.

As a corollary it suggests that comparative psychological studies undertaken in developing and "developed" countries will reveal a number of predictable differences, relating first to the way in which behavior is organized in relation to space and time (past, present and future), second to the range and diversity of intellectual and nonintellectual behavior, and third to the range and diversity of abstract concepts. It is likely that revealing information concerning such postulated psychological differences may be elicited by study of the lexical differentiation of languages in societies with differing orders of cultural complexity, particularly if such research is undertaken in conjunction with cognitive and social studies.

Psychological Measurements—Culture Free?

There are several implications arising from this discussion. One relates to psychological measurements. If it is accepted that the patterning of psychological functions is integrally related to culture, then psychological tests cannot be "culture free" or "culture fair". In consequence there can be no validity in any statement concerning racial differences in psychological variables, unless the races concerned have a common and identical cultural background, a condition which is nonexistent in the world today.

On the other hand, differences which are observed as a result of tests or experimental procedures applied cross-culturally may possess an operational significance, in the sense that they may provide information concerning the extent to which a given psychological function has been developed in the cultures concerned. It is on this basis that a substantial body of research in Ghana, and Africa generally, suggests that there has been relatively little development of visual-spatial functions, not because of any inherent inability in this respect, but because such functions have been of little or no importance for survival in African cultures. Similarly it may be expected that people in traditional preindustrial societies will have relatively little experience in matching their behavior with artificially imposed spatio-temporal constraints. In consequence, if they are placed in an environment demanding an increasingly higher degree of program-determination in behavior, as is the case in transitional development, it is to be expected that they may experience difficulty in making the appropriate adjustments.

In presenting these suggestions it is important to point out that African cultures must surely have facilitated the emergence of psychological characteristics that are relatively undeveloped or even atrophied in the highly industrialized societies. One thinks here of social co-operation and togetherness, of rhythm,

song and dance, of story-telling, social ease and shared pleasure, of the acceptance of things as they are, of what some perhaps perceptive members of western societies describe as being "with it" or "hip". In the process of remolding the cultures of developing societies to assimilate the scientific and technological expertise that is necessary for their survival, it would seem important not only that these and other humanistic and vital cultural features are retained, but that consideration be given to the idea of transferring them into the cultural settings of existing industrialized societies. This would introduce a bilateral or multilateral aspect to national development, implicit in which is the recognition that no country in the world today may be regarded as developed in the fullest sense of the word.

In Conclusion . . .

To recapitulate the central argument of this paper, it is proposed that national development involves the communication of a complex body of knowledge from one or more cultures to another. This requires two complementary operations: (a) remolding the cultural structure of the receiving country to permit meaningful absorption of the incoming information, and (b) shaping the latter so that it is culturally appropriate, i.e., so that it is conveyed in a form possessing a high degree of communicative accuracy. It is proposed that these operations cannot be put into effect without comprehensive psychological study of the societies concerned.

Put into the more general context of the developing world rather than of developing countries, it is suggested that cross-cultural psychological research may be likened to a tool permitting the fashioning of knowledge into forms which may be generally understood, thereby accelerating the rate of their diffusion and increasing the probability of creative harmony in human affairs. It is to be hoped that one of the results of the Ibadan Conference will be that such a tool is soon put to use.

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Le développement national Quelques considérations psychologiques

Alastair Mundy-Castle

Pour survivre économiquement, les pays neufs doivent être capables de modifier leurs structures sociales, de façon à pouvoir utiliser d'une manière systématique les informations inédites qui accompagnent les changements technologiques. Le développement d'attitudes scientifiques infléchit en effet des éléments importants des processus de modernisation; il convient donc d'examiner les conditions dans lesquelles on peut faciliter l'acquisition de telles attitudes par une population donnée.

Jusqu'à présent, les moyens d'information utilisés par les écoles, les entreprises et les administrations européennes installées en Afrique ont été "importés" sans aucune transformation et on ne s'est jamais soucié de savoir si les Africains comprennent ce qu'on attend d'eux et à quelles fins. Le but des recherches psychologiques est donc de faciliter la transmission d'informations culturellement nouvelles mais particulièrement importantes en ce qui concerne la modernisation et l'industrialisation, et d'identifier la réaction des pays neufs à la diffusion de telles informations.

L'auteur note d'abord que les réactions neuro-physiologiques des enfants et des adultes Ghanéens présentent des caractéristiques originales qui demeurent difficiles à interpréter. Sous l'angle de la psychologie sociale, l'auteur note ensuite les contrastes suivants entre cultures modernes et traditionnelles: (a) l'intégration des moyens d'information utilisés par les cultures modernes permet

une diffusion rapide, systématique, et homogène des idées et schémas ayant trait au développement et à la modernisation; (b) cette intégration renforce les connaissances acquises par les membres individuels des cultures modernes et permet donc de mieux prévoir leur conduite et leur réponse à une situation donnée. Tous ces traits facilitent l'application de programmes systématiques de planification. En résumé, les études de psychologie comparée sur les pays neufs et les pays industriels devraient permettre de constater qu'il existe des différences dans l'orientation spatiale et temporelle des habitants de ces deux types de pays, que la gamme de leur conduite intellectuelle et affective n'est pas identique, que la nature des concepts abstraits dont ils se servent varie d'une manière systématique. Par exemple, on a pu démontrer que les fonctions de représentation bi-dimensionnelle sont souvent sous-développées chez les Africains parce que l'environnement ne se prête guère à l'usage de telles fonctions. Inversement, les cultures africaines facilitent le développement d'autres fonctions qui sont au contraire atrophiées par l'industrialisation; il conviendrait donc de voir comment on peut non seulement maintenir de telles fonctions en Afrique, mais aussi les réintroduire dans la culture des pays industriels.

En somme, si le développement du fait national exige l'acquisition par certaines sociétés de connaissances scientifiques et "modernes", la psychologie devrait permettre d'accélérer la transmission de telles connaissances.

Sur la position médiatrice et le domaine propre de la psychologie sociale dans l'Afrique actuelle

Andras Zempleni et Henri Collomb
Dakar (Fann) Sénégal

Si la "psychologie sociale des psychologues" se veut autre chose que le refuge des contradictions des trois grandes disciplines qui l'avoisinent ou qu'une panacée destinée à calmer une crise conceptuelle et méthodologique de plus en plus manifeste dans le domaine des sciences sociales, elle devra réexaminer ses fondements, démontrer sa légitimité et établir ses limites propres.

Cette communication ne vise pas aussi loin. Elle se propose de définir le champ d'application de la psychologie sociale en Afrique et de cerner quelques problèmes psycho-sociaux concrets.

Les trois grandes disciplines auxquelles la psychologie sociale, telle qu'elle est pratiquée en Afrique, emprunte une partie de ses références et dont elle médiatise les relations—ethnologie, sociologie, et psychologie—traversent une période de malaise.

L'ethnologie et l'ethnographie

Malgré les tentatives de rapprochement avec la psychologie qu'il faudrait sans doute faire remonter à C. G. Seligman, l'ethnologie traditionnelle s'essouffle pour autant qu'elle ne se consacre qu'à l'étude des divers codes, représentations, institutions et activités traditionnelles. Celles-ci ne régissent plus à elles seules le cours de la vie du paysan le plus isolé. Un abîme se creuse entre

le réel et le codifié. L'ethnographe est contraint à des réajustements constants de sa démarche s'il veut rendre compte de la totalité des faits observables. Consacrés délibérément à des phénomènes sociaux nouveaux tels que le syncrétisme religieux par exemple, limités à un secteur de la vie traditionnelle ou simplement monographiques, ses écrits comportent une valence psycho-sociale de plus en plus prononcée. L'effritement de la société tribale et la diversification consécutive des groupes, des représentations et des conduites l'entraînent nécessairement sur cette voie qu'il ne peut cependant pas suivre trop loin au risque de renier les principes fondamentaux de sa propre discipline.

La sociologie africaine est d'apparition récente. Elle a de la peine à se dégager de l'ethnologie dont elle a trouvé les cadres trop étroits. Dans la mesure où elle entend recourir à la méthodologie et aux concepts d'une sociologie strictement définie, elle est contrainte à la plus grande prudence. Les institutions, les structures, les comportements traditionnels, qui ne sont pas au centre de sa démarche, continuent à influencer la réalité sociale qu'elle sonde. Leur influence latente ou manifeste amène les sociologues à multiplier leurs variables, à émettre des réserves sur leurs propres résultats, et à restreindre la portée de leurs conclusions. La précarité et le vieillissement rapide des informations statistiques doivent les inciter à la circonspection.

La psychologie africaine, en tant que science autonome, vient à peine de naître. Dans sa branche psychométrique, elle se heurte aux problèmes d'étalonnage et d'adaptation des épreuves aux conditions culturelles africaines. Son rameau expérimental n'est guère exploité encore. Le domaine clinique enfin, qu'il s'agisse de consultations scolaires ou plus proprement psychopathologiques, rencontre, entre autres, la difficulté d'isoler le codifié du personnel, la conduite du membre de groupe de la conduite du sujet individuel. Les psychologues sont obligés de solliciter sans cesse une ethnologie qui souvent se dérobe.

L'origine du malaise

Il nous semble que tous ces problèmes résultent davantage des rapports de la réalité sociale africaine avec les disciplines qui tentent de la traduire que de la position occupée par les chercheurs. Si ses origines permettent au chercheur africain d'éviter certains pièges, notamment en psychologie, il risque d'être lui-même pris à d'autres pièges, non moins importants. Dans la mesure où sa recherche constitue le processus par lequel la réalité observable d'une société africaine acquiert une signification scientifique, il utilise nécessairement un corps de concepts et de connaissances issu d'un certain type de société occidentale

et son chemin n'est finalement pas plus aisé que celui de son collègue occidental.

Le malaise de l'ethnologie, de la sociologie et de la psychologie africaines semble se cristalliser autour du même thème: celui de la relation de l'individu au groupe. Un détour en psychologie clinique permet de mieux comprendre le problème qui se pose ici. La situation d'acculturation, objet central des sciences humaines actuelles et futures en Afrique, renvoie à un important processus de transposition psychologique: elle implique une prise de conscience progressive par l'homme de sa propre individualité et de sa nature de sujet. Tout en se conformant à un code social de plus en plus implicite, l'homme cherche et trouve désormais en lui-même les motifs, le sens, la responsabilité de ses actes et de ses pensées.

Cette accession à l'autonomie personnelle, dont les diverses modalités apparaissent nettement dans les études de cas cliniques, n'est pas aisée: oscillations, arrêts, retours en arrière sont nombreux. Souvent ils éveillent, autant qu'ils la résorbent, l'angoisse. Par ailleurs, nombre d'indices font penser que ce processus progresse par paliers successifs, chacun d'eux ayant son originalité et son économie propres. Quels que soient ses contenus particuliers, le changement concerne essentiellement la position de l'individu par rapport au groupe et à ses codes collectifs explicites qui, tout en se transformant eux-mêmes, continuent à donner forme et finalité aux conduites individuelles. C'est ici que l'apport de la psychologie sociale pourrait être décisif.

Apport de la psychologie sociale

Si l'ethnologie a depuis longtemps dépassé le moment où elle représentait les cultures traditionnelles comme simples, harmonieuses et uniformes, elle se réfère néanmoins à ce pôle hypothétique et idéal de la société où la seule connaissance des systèmes de conduite et de représentations collectifs est censée suffire pour prédire, avec une faible marge d'erreur, ce que font et pensent les individus.

Le champ de la psychologie sociale s'ouvrir, bien au contraire, dans ces zones syncrétiques et troubles où le sujet-individu échappe encore au clinicien et oscille entre ses traditionnelles appartences collectives et ses déterminations individuelles. Autrement dit, en plein coeur de la société en voie d'acculturation. Ni l'ethnologie classique, ni la sociologie proprement dite, ni même la psychologie compréhensive ne semblent pouvoir approcher ces zones sans provoquer un appauvrissement et une distorsion variable du phénomène étudié.

En quoi la psychologie sociale est-elle mieux armée? Tout

d'abord, elle marie visées psychologique et sociologique. Or les zones de conduite définies ci-dessus sont précisément caractérisées par des références indifférenciées ou alternées à l'une et l'autre de ces visées. Par ailleurs, le taux d'innovation technique et conceptuelle de la psychologie sociale est élevé. Ces deux qualités présentent un avantage manifeste dans le contexte africain. L'intégration consciente dans ce domaine carrefour tant de ses propres données techniques et conceptuelles que de celles des trois grandes disciplines voisines, fait de la psychologie sociale un ensemble polyvalent, souple et original qui semble trouver son répondant dans la réalité sociale spécifique de l'Afrique en développement.

Partis des hypothèses psychologiques d'individualisation et d'intériorisation progressives qui expliqueraient tant la variabilité et l'oscillation des positions individuelles qu'une certaine vulnérabilité du sujet en voie d'accéder à l'autonomie personnelle, nous aboutissons à une tentative de délimitation de ce qui pourrait être un des domaines propres de la psychologie sociale africaine: elle pourrait adopter délibérément, comme objet d'étude, les faits multiformes, comportements individuels et phénomènes de groupe qui jalonnent les processus d'individualisation, contemporains d'une multiplication et d'un enrichissement considérables des médiations sociales.

Objet de la psychologie sociale en Afrique

La psychologie sociale devrait examiner chaque fait concret d'un triple point de vue:

sa position vis-à-vis de la tradition;

sa relation aux institutions et modèles modernes;

ses implications quant au développement du sujet individuel.

Nous prendrons deux exemples:

Le premier exemple sera celui des innombrables associations spontanées de Jeunes dans les grandes villes africaines

Il est vite dit qu'elles servent à tel ou tel but affiché tels que "loisirs", "entraide", etc. . . . Bien souvent, ces "groupuscules" ne réunissent que quelques membres, juste suffisants en nombre pour occuper la longue série de statuts imaginaires qu'ils comportent: président, vice-président, secrétaire général, commissaires aux comptes, trésorier, vice-trésorier, adjoint du président chargé des relations avec l'extérieur . . . Souvent de jeunes chômeurs, les membres se font confectionner un uniforme élégant en tissu moderne. Fréquemment, une association de jeunes

hommes est couplée avec une association de jeunes filles, fondée sur les mêmes principes.

Une analyse très sommaire d'un tel groupement suggère les remarques suivantes:

Position envers l'univers traditionnel: De tels groupes se réfèrent manifestement à la classe d'âge traditionnelle. Celle-ci est basée sur les principes d'égalité, d'entraide, de solidarité, et sur la séparation des deux sexes; elle exerce une responsabilité collective et possède une devise fondamentale que l'on pourrait formuler ainsi: "Nul ne peut se distinguer des autres hors des institutions prévues à cet effet (chefferie de la classe, activités de compétition telle que la lutte, etc. . . .)". En un sens, l'association tenterait de restituer l'ordre égalitaire et sécurisant de la classe d'âge.

Relations aux institutions et aux modèles modernes: Simultanément, le groupement se réfère aux images prégnantes de la société moderne. L'illusion du pouvoir est entretenue par une comédie de statuts de type administratif et occidental, à style hiérarchisé. Nombre de ces associations font penser à des gouvernements sans citoyens à gourverner. Tout se passe comme si ces statuts administratifs, dont on connaît par ailleurs le pouvoir attractif sur les jeunes africains, introduisaient la notion de compétition inter-individuelle dans un groupe déterminé jusqu'alors par les valeurs de la classe d'âge.

Mais l'opposition entre cette notion de compétition et ces valeurs est partiellement neutralisée par l'existence même de l'association: dans la mesure où le système des statuts la codifie, l'interaction d'ordre compétitif perd le caractère dangereux que lui attribue la tradition et reproduit les interactions institutionnalisées de la classe d'âge. Dans l'un et l'autre cas, ce sont les statuts et non les individus qui s'opposent.

Position de l'individu: Il reste que l'association n'est pas la classe d'âge. La position de l'individu y est ambiguë. Ce phénomène de groupe apparaît comme une formule de compromis où s'intègrent le désir de retrouver la sécurité de la fratrie et le désir de s'affirmer comme individu qui s'assume en tant que tel devant les autres.

Ce cadre social spontané permet aussi un apprentissage tâtonnant des nouvelles réalités interpersonnelles. Le jeu de rôle qu'il comporte rappelle toute une série d'autres phénomènes de groupe où il y a recours au même procédé intégrateur: réunions villageoises où l'on mime les personnages fournis par la radio, séances publiques de possession où les esprits prennent des allures modernes, etc. . . .

Le second exemple concerne un Fait de représentation

On sait que la plupart des pays africains connaissent à l'heure actuelle une véritable flambée de magie. Amulettes, "fétiches", "talismans", "médicaments" de toutes sortes sont très fortement demandés, au point que de nombreuses officines parviennent à réaliser de substantiels bénéfices en vendant par correspondance, à partir de l'Europe.

Ce qu'on désigne, au Sénégal, par le terme de maraboutage, autrement dit l'utilisation de ces "fétiches", "talismans" et "médicaments" et le recours aux procédés magiques des "connaiseurs", s'étend à toutes les couches de la population. "Tout le monde est marabouté ou en instance de maraboutage" remarque une étude récente, car "chacun, dans la mesure où il est bien portant, beau, prospère, intelligent, apprécié, aimé, second, et dans la mesure où cela est censé être perçu par l'entourage, se sent en danger de devenir objet d'envie, de jalouse, donc d'être marabouté". (Ortigues & Ortigues, 1966.)

Dans l'opération de maraboutage, les valences offensive et défensive sont indissolublement liées: on ne peut se défendre qu'en s'attaquant à quelqu'un d'autre. C'est un cycle sans fin de violences cachées.

Ce type de magie, massivement présent dans les sociétés africaines actuelles, renvoie, semble-t-il, au problème éminemment psycho-social de l'évolution des relations inter-personnelles. L'on peut distinguer les mêmes niveaux d'analyse que pour les associations de jeunes.

Position envers l'univers traditionnel: L'exemple illustre heureusement le danger qu'il y a à s'imaginer cet univers comme un tout homogène. La société rurale sénégalaise connaît depuis fort longtemps la notion de maraboutage. L'islam lui-même n'a fait qu'ajuster ses propres concepts et techniques à un fonds de croyances antérieur à lui. Cependant, deux remarques s'imposent: tout d'abord, tout comme ce que les Wolof appellent le "ligej" (travail, travailler), le maraboutage semble avoir été autrefois effectué à la demande d'un roi, d'un chef de lignée ou de famille . . . autrement dit au nom d'un groupe et non aux fins privées d'un individu.

D'autre part, le maraboutage coexistait et coexiste actuellement avec une autre mise en forme de l'adversité interpersonnelle: la sorcellerie anthropophagique, plus archaïque. Le principal trait distinctif entre les deux systèmes est la présence dans un cas, l'absence dans l'autre, de la médiation de l'objet: le sorcier, homme comme tous les autres, dévore directement l'énergie vitale de sa victime au cours de ses voyages nocturnes.

De la sorcellerie, du modèle "traditionnel" si l'on veut, au maraboutage il y a une évolution: la sorcellerie est conçue comme héréditaire, son existence est admise par la société comme un mal inévitable. Le sorcier ne peut rien, dans le fond, pour contrôler le mal dont il est le siège.

L'islamisation a entraîné, chez les Sénégalaïs, une évolution des représentations: d'une part le sorcier traditionnel se métamorphose en "seytané" (esprit malfaisant d'origine islamique): le mal en devient plus contrôlable; la foi, l'accomplissement des devoirs religieux, la soumission au marabout protègent contre les seytané.

D'autre part, le "mauvais oeil", la "mauvaise langue" prennent la relève du sorcier au niveau des relations humaines. La transition est significative: "mauvais oeil" et "mauvaise langue" se maîtrisent par l'homme alors que la sorcellerie ne pouvait l'être.

Il en est de même du maraboutage: il se fait et se défait à la demande du sujet et il suppose une intention délibérée de nuire à son semblable à partir de motifs personnels précis. Contrôlable, ce n'est plus la ruée inconsciente du sorcier sur sa proie.

Alors que la sorcellerie est le système majeur de conceptualisation du mal dans une société traditionnelle où l'individu tend à ne concevoir ses relations avec autrui qu'à travers les catégories collectives, le maraboutage correspond à un état social où la compétition inter-individuelle s'affirme de plus en plus.

Relations aux institutions et modèles modernes: C'est pourquoi la flambée actuelle de cette "magie inter-personnelle" doit être référée aux conditions sociologiques modernes.

Il apparaît, en effet, qu'exception faite des situations plus classiques, comme celle de la rivalité entre coépouses, le maraboutage et les opérations magiques de toutes sortes naissent avant tout de situations concurrentielles, créées et vécues par la nation moderne. Pour parler en termes wolof, on se croit "travaillé" ou on se "travaille" entre écoliers de même classe, entre fonctionnaires ou employés du même service, entre commerçants de la même place, entre politiciens aspirant au même poste, etc. . . . Ou bien alors entre "laissés pour compte" et bénéficiaires du progrès: vieux et jeunes, non-instruits et instruits, pauvres et aisés, chômeurs et salariés, etc. . . . La référence aux institutions et aux modèles de conduite modernes, génératrices d'un nouveau type de relation interpersonnelle, est donc de toute première importance ici.

Position de l'individu: L'analyse clinique des cas pathologiques de "maraboutés" montre, comme l'on peut s'y attendre, que ce thème va toujours de pair, chez les Sénégalaïs, avec la

situation d'affrontement interpersonnel: "être plus ou moins qu'un autre, que les autres". (Ortigues & Ortigues, 1966.)

A l'encontre de la sorcellerie, cette agression magique est ressentie comme menaçante pour les capacités sexuelles, intellectuelles, pour la réussite sociale de l'individu. C'est donc, semble-t-il, aux difficultés d'intégration que posent les nouvelles relations interindividuelles de type compétitif que correspond l'effervescence magique actuelle.

En effet, de telles relations sont réprouvées par la tradition qui admet l'affrontement codifié entre détenteurs de statuts (deux exemples symétriques: la guerre et la lutte), mais non la confrontation d'individualités proprement dites. Se distinguer des autres au-delà d'une certaine limite mène tout droit à l'accusation de sorcellerie. L'angoisse qu'éprouve alors la personne tentée par les voies de la promotion individuelle et les possibilités de choix que lui offre la société moderne est projetée, par un vieux réflexe, sur le monde social ambiant. Le cycle des maraboutages et des contre-maraboutages est ouvert.

En dernier ressort, l'inconfort provient davantage de la nécessité de choisir et de revendiquer comme siens ses propres actes, dans une situation trouble de transition, que de la compétition elle-même. Ainsi la fascination exercée par le monde administratif n'est peut-être pas uniquement due au halo d'avantages matériels dont il est entouré: comme les associations de jeunes, ce monde offre aussi—tout comme l'univers traditionnel—une structure médiatrice de statuts qui rend possible une sécurisante institutionnalisation des interactions.

Il est permis de supposer que le processus de développement entraînera d'abord un accroissement important de ces phénomènes de "magie interpersonnelle", puis leur régression, au fur et à mesure de la transformation des sociétés africaines. Le cycle sans fin qui les caractérise ne devrait pouvoir être rompu que lorsque l'individu parviendra à s'assumer en tant que tel, à chercher en lui-même les ressorts de ses échecs et de ses réussites, les motifs et le sens de ses actes.

Autres exemples des objets d'investigation de la psychologie sociale en Afrique

Ces exemples sont certes particuliers et l'analyse impressioniste ou peu étayée. Nous les avons donnés pour montrer le type de faits que nous voudrions voir aborder par la psychologie sociale, des faits précis que nous livre la réalité africaine et non des problèmes généraux, conçus en laboratoire. Citons au hasard quelques autres thèmes, déjà abordés ou qui pourraient l'être:

L'analyse du fonctionnement d'une coopérative agricole, par exemple, exige également, comme l'a montré une récente étude au Sénégal (Cusenier, n.d.), l'intégration psychosociologique des trois types de références distinguées plus haut.

Tel pourrait être le cas, à plus forte raison—dans un domaine tout à fait éloigné du précédent—de l'analyse des mouvements religieux syncrétiques que connaissent certains pays africains. Quelles influences traditionnelles et modernes et, surtout, quels motifs psychologiques poussent des milliers d'individus chez ces "prophètes" qui surgissent et disparaissent ici et là? Quant à la question plus sociologique de l'interférence de ces phénomènes avec le pouvoir politique moderne, le psychosociologique aurait également son mot à dire.

La signification de l'habillement et, d'une manière plus générale, la relation du jeune africain aux objets de parure et autres mériteraient une analyse analogue: que signifie être habillé de telle ou telle manière, quelles valences psychosociologiques véhiculent les oscillations de grande amplitude (particularisation extrême, uniformisation) des comportements vestimentaires, si l'on veut dépasser l'idée simpliste de l'imitation de l'homme occidental?

L'étude du langage de ces mêmes jeunes pratiquant les langues occidentales pourrait être également révélatrice: quels sont les signifiés véritables auxquels renvoient, par exemple, ces termes et formules de type juridico-administratif dont la profusion frappe l'observateur?

L'analyse des effets des moyens de communication de masse pourrait, quant à elle, se tourner vers l'approfondissement de son acquis: les questionnaires, même appliqués à grande échelle, ne peuvent révéler ce qui se passe tous les soirs dans une salle de cinéma de quartier ou tous les jours autour du seul poste de radio du village: comment se structure le public des habitués? qui commente et qui explique? quelles sont les déformations imprimées au message? comment s'opère le travail d'interprétation personnelle?

La recherche sur les processus de groupe de tous ordres doit, elle aussi, se référer constamment aux trois registres qui informent le fait psychosocial africain. La tradition d'un palabre, par exemple, peut être décisive pour le déroulement d'une réunion quelconque: ses impératifs ayant trait aux relations entre aînés et cadets, et à l'ordre de la prise de parole, ils entreront en conflit avec les règles plus démocratiques des institutions modernes. Celles-ci interviendront à leur tour pour restituer leurs droits aux individus les plus conscients. Mais ces derniers pourraient ressentir comme menaçant d'en user et choisiront souvent la pente de la conformité.

Par quelque niveau qu'il aborde la société africaine, l'observateur est frappé par la récurrence du même problème fondamental: la difficile gestation de l'individu, le passage d'un type de relation à autrui, codifiée et sanctionnée par la tradition, à un autre type de relation interpersonnelle, régie par les normes intérieurisées de la société moderne. L'heure est à l'angoisse: l'observation courante, les études psycho-pathologiques témoignent du désarroi de cet homme de la transition qui, privé de ses vieilles certitudes, se croit entouré d'un monde social hostile et ne cesse de quêter des protections possibles, une sécurité qui se dérobe. S'il est illusoire de penser que la psychologie sociale peut l'aider à traverser ce passage difficile, elle pourrait au moins inventorier les dimensions de ce passage et en intégrer les manifestations multiformes dans une vue compréhensive.

La psychologie sociale ne peut cependant s'exercer matériellement et conceptuellement sans une demande. Cette demande existe et se fait, nous semble-t-il, de plus en plus forte, même si les réalisations actuelles sont rares et dispersées.

Elle se fait jour, d'une part, dans le cadre même des sciences humaines voisines: les psychologues, sociologues, ethnologues, attentifs à tous les aspects de la réalité qu'ils observent, lui font une place, d'abord informellement, puis sur un mode institutionnel. Une activité d'assistance comme la psychiatrie, à mesure qu'elle reconnaît dans la recherche le principal moyen de son progrès, y fait appel pour évaluer la position du malade dans sa famille et sa communauté.

Les organismes et instituts de développement enfin, qui ont longtemps voulu ignorer la dynamique des processus psychosociaux sous-jacents au développement, ne se satisfont plus des études purement économiques, techniques ou financières. L'époque des grandes enquêtes sociologiques extensives, elle-même, semble approcher de sa fin. La démarche psychosociologique compréhensive, qui se propose d'analyser directement et minutieusement la signification des faits collectifs et individuels, semble gagner du terrain.

Il nous semble que la psychologie sociale n'a pas intérêt à se détacher des situations particulières de demande et à se constituer en science de laboratoire. Ces situations lui fournissent les faits concrets, les problèmes réels à résoudre sans lesquels elle risquerait de se figer dans un nouvel académisme, danger qui ne nous paraît pas si lointain.

Pour être adaptés à l'Afrique, ses concepts et ses méthodes devraient être soumis à une épreuve serrée de la réalité. Sans entrer dans le détail, énumérons quelques points éventuels de réflexion à ce sujet:

La technique du questionnaire fermé, certes commode pour le chercheur, peut-elle apporter des informations valides et fidèles sur une population rurale ou semi-urbaine? Nous en doutons.

Quel biais s'introduit dans l'enquête par le caractère obligatoirement collectif de l'entretien, dans ces mêmes milieux?

Difficultés matérielles et légitimité théorique d'un "échantillonnage" au niveau national, compte tenu des problèmes d'accèsibilité géographique, de mise à jour des renseignements statistiques et de l'hétérogénéité structurale des populations.

Avantages et inconvénients de la technique d'entretien libre couplée avec l'observation systématisée: peut-on mettre au point, à l'heure actuelle, des échelles d'observations valides et fidèles?

L'approche quantitative et extensive pour l'étude des opinions et des attitudes n'est-elle pas prématurée dans les zones rurales où la tradition régit les modalités de l'accord et de l'expression? Ne vaut-il pas mieux s'en tenir, dans ce cas, à une démarche de type ethnographique?

L'intérêt opérationnel des concepts de statuts et de rôle. Pertinence de la théorie de rôle et de la théorie de champ dans le contexte africain.

Utilisation éventuelle de la méthode sociométrique comme outil de diagnostic du degré d'acculturation d'une population donnée. Conditions de naissance et d'exercice des affinités et des choix inter-individuels.

Evaluation des techniques de groupe qui semblent particulièrement adaptées à la réalité africaine. Que peut apporter dans l'ordre de la thérapie et de la connaissance psychosociologique la reproduction expérimentale des conditions de fonctionnement des groupes réels?

Conclusions

Pour conclure, nous reviendrons à notre point de départ: il nous semble que la correspondance actuelle et exceptionnelle entre sa démarche, sa nature, son domaine traditionnel d'investigation et les particularités de la situation concrète qui la sollicitent, hisse la psychologie sociale au premier rang des sciences humaines applicables en Afrique Noire. Son statut médiateur spécifique, en regard des disciplines voisines, la zone où ses efforts sont susceptibles de se déployer, reçoivent leur définition de la réalité elle-même: celle de l'homme africain soumis à la triple sollicitation de la tradition, des institutions et des modèles modernes et de la conscience qu'il a de lui-même en tant qu'individu.

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On The Functions and Substance of Social Psychology in Africa

Andras Zempleni and Henri Collomb

There is a great need to define the functions and substance of social psychology in Africa. This need results from the crisis that ethnology, sociology and psychology are currently experiencing. The validity of ethnological investigations declines as the gap between normative and actual patterns of behavior widens. Both the traditional themes of ethnological studies and the methods which supported them have become increasingly obsolete.

The validity of sociological investigations is jeopardized by the fact that phenomena of social change cannot be examined without reference to traditional norms and institutions. In addition, the rate of change is such that it makes difficult the isolation of any regularities in the distribution of these phenomena.

The validity of psychological investigations is limited by the fact that instruments are neither adapted to local conditions nor restandardized. In the field of clinical psychology it remains difficult to differentiate between the normative and the specific components of a particular pattern of behavior, to distinguish between that which belongs to the individual and that which belongs to the group in which he participates.

There is a certain similarity in these crises. The three parent sciences use conceptual tools which are not always appropriate. In addition, they presuppose stable relations between groups and individuals, between norms and responses to norms.

If the dissociation of the individual from the collective norms and structures to which he was originally subjected does indeed present definite patterns and regularities, social psychology is better equipped than the parent social sciences to isolate and examine these regularities. First, because its conceptual and methodological innovations are relatively numerous, social psychology has a unique flexibility. Second, the object of this science is to isolate processes of dissociation between the individual and his group and to determine the conditions under which patterns of behavior develop with reference to both collective and individual factors.

The purpose of social psychological investigations is to examine a concrete phenomenon from a triple viewpoint: (a) in its relation to traditional institutions, (b) in its relation to modern institutions and models, and (c) in its relation to the experience of the individuals involved in the phenomenon. An examination of the circumstances and stereotypes pertaining to sorcery activities will enable us to illustrate the functions and substance of social psychology in Africa today. Indeed, this particular phenomenon is quite typical of the problems posed by the study of social interaction in contemporary Africa.

Relation of Sorcery to Traditional Institutions: First of all, it should be noted that the present form of sorcery activities, called *maraboutage* in Senegal, has existed for a long time but has more recently taken on new form and significance. Patterns of recruitment have changed (witchcraft is no longer hereditary); in addition, its results are no longer unavoidable and its manifestations are more specific. Whereas the archaic form of witchcraft involved collective representations of evil and entailed massive participation of groups, the more recent forms of maraboutage are differentiated, both in terms of representations and of patterns of behavior.

Relation of Sorcery to Modern Institutions and Models: Manifestations of sorcery do not occur randomly. They mainly characterize situations of inter-individual competition. Thus, we must determine those areas of social life where the differentiation of roles and statuses accompanying modernization makes this competition particularly keen and threatening for the individual.

Relation of sorcery to the Experiences of the Individual: Manifestations of sorcery are associated with the desire of "being more than one particular other or more than generalized others". This desire is anxiety-producing in the sense that "being more than" remains ambiguous, referring both to traditional and collecting norms and to modern and differentiated models. The difficulty of choosing is as important a determinant of sorcery

as the tensions resulting from a competitive system. In other words, there is competition not only *between* individuals for access to rewarding positions but also *within* individuals as to the proper definitions of these rewarding positions.

Other examples of substantive issues to be analyzed in the light of social psychological methods are changes in the clothing patterns of individuals, in their language and in their reactions to various forms of mass communication. In short, the main thrust of social psychology should be the examination of change as *process* at the micro-sociological level—the internalization at the level of the individual and his immediate surroundings of the strains accompanying the persistence of traditional mechanisms of social interaction and the introduction of new forms of participation. This raises methodological questions pertaining to the adequacy of the tools used by social psychologists in other contexts, e.g., sociometry, participant observation, techniques of interviewing.

In summary, because it is primarily concerned with processes of change at the micro-sociological level, social psychology provides the most adequate scientific approach to contemporary African reality. This reality is that of the individual subjected to the pressures and tensions resulting from the conflict of traditional and modern norms and models, and from the dissociation produced by his growing self-awareness.

Just a Few of the Presuppositions and Perplexities Confronting Social Psychological Research in Developing Countries

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The lofty rather than the organizational purpose which brought many social psychologists together at Ibadan is, according to the official document of the conference, "to encourage and promote research on the psychological aspects of social change and development (with special emphasis on developing countries)". Any research in those categories? Undoubtedly not, for we already are engulfed during this period of scholarly inflation in discouraging tons of abstracts, articles, monographs and books, many of which deal with this very topic. No, we seek not simply more of a good, or a bad thing; rather we would pursue only research—again the statements are official—which has "social significance" and affords "opportunities for theoretical advances". Presumably, therefore, we are being called upon to be discriminating.

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Discrimination demands that we cast aside for a few moments our usual role. We are not being asked to pay mere lip-service to the banality that the proud generalizations squeezed out of animals in the laboratory, the clinic and especially the school need to be tested cross-culturally to see whether they are valid for all mankind. We are not at this time submitting yet another application for a grant from a foundation, a government or the United Nations. We are not merely to take in each other's compliments concerning the reasons for having been invited, viz., our own research—surely, that is what we never, never do, or hardly ever. We are, let it be assumed, in a mood to peer behind the facade we have helped to erect. Consciously, let it be said, we seem to be, or ought to be disturbed by:

. . . A lack of confidence in the instruments we use to conduct cross-cultural research; and occasionally we must confess that calling interviews, questionnaires and observations by that name is an act or spurious semantics designed to create the illusion of greater validity and reliability than they in truth possess. Those from the West realize, too, how difficult it is to transmit to colleagues, students, and ourselves without sounding sentimental or heroic, the informalities of research which seldom are recorded as significant factors affecting the data, although they do just that; in developing countries these include the personal fruits of experience, the anxieties, the difficulties, the pleasures and the weaknesses and strengths within our own characters.

. . . The suspicion that research is not creeping toward magnificent theories, rather it more frequently culminates in a colleague's compliment that the published discovery is "important"—and he considers it important because he believes it will help him in his own research which hopefully will eventually be called "important" by someone else. How *does* the wheat get separated from the chaff?

. . . Our conviction and observation that the sad, sad world engulfing us is not being appreciably improved by research.

To proceed beyond these pessimistic disturbances and then to try, however vainly, to whistle a little louder, we must close our eyes for a moment of meditation and then, as we open them, view our surroundings unblinkingly. What, then, do we see? The king looks naked. Perhaps he is naked.

It is an easy but perhaps a useful privilege to function as a gadfly by pointing to the nakedness unabashedly. For then others can be goaded into saying that the good king is truly clothed in wondrous garments; thereby in our imagination he will once again appear respectably and suitably attired. The ancient metaphor would linger for another sentence: this paper seeks to rip off

some of the fancy but imaginary clothes and to replace them with mundane but real attire, a feat to be courageously attempted by means of seven cryptic, cynical statements.

We being:

Mediation

Although virtually all data involving or implying behavior and particularly "social change and development" are potentially valuable, the unique, perhaps the greatest service which social psychology can render to cross-cultural research is to infer or establish the internal processes which mediate empirically ascertained sequences.

Unquestionably such sequences must be investigated cross-culturally. It is important, for example, to know whether the stages of human development, as noted in Geneva or Vienna, recur in Ibadan or Bombay; to determine whether Africans or Malaysians succumb to the same visual illusions as Europeans and Americans; or to record whether it is more difficult to change diets than daydreams in all societies. Pointing out differences, however dramatic, is only a step along the road heading to the modification and improvement of a general theory about changing human behavior. To discharge the theoretical function it becomes necessary to know why the differences exist; what are the mediating factors?

The question about mediation can be answered extensively or intensively. The extensive reply springs out of seeking a correlation between the phenomenon arousing the interest of the investigator and some ecological, environmental, or at least objectively ascertainable variable (type of family structure, style of dwelling, symbols of authority); this is the great tradition facilitated by data collections such as the Human Relations Area Files. And the intensive search concentrates upon seeking to determine what the intervening variables are.

Statistically significant correlations based upon valid and reliable information usually offer preliminary clues to the factors mediating the association, and tracking them down is likely to bring the investigator a bit closer to establishing causal sequences. At the very least, the data so gathered enable the correlations to be better understood and better theories to be formulated. For data observed or collected by a social scientist can be subsumed under a variety of concepts serving his particular purpose. Those who grow crops and exchange part of the produce are engaging in economic activities—and the economist may well find it advantageous to see whether the activities can be embraced by the principles of his discipline, regardless of what the people themselves think, believe or say they are doing. Interviewing the people, living

with them, may also reveal religious, political or social components accompanying the growing and marketing of crops. This additional information may possibly account for some of the variance originally noted by the economist. Similarly the *ethno-whatnot* of any action, as the fashionable prefix now designates this type of research, indicates how people view themselves and the forces buffeting them about and, in so doing, adds more to our knowledge than folklore. The conjecture is herewith made as a target for disagreement that, above all other psychological changes, those involving conscious and unconscious anticipations of social rewards and punishments are likely to be the most significant ones in facilitating or inhibiting social changes. But how to measure such anticipations, whether by antecedent or consequent events or by the frontal attack of a direct, semi-projective or projective assault is the perplexing problem which may have resolved a little too glibly.

Even the most perfectly designed social-psychological experiment, in which experimental and control groups either are carefully matched or composed by randomly assigning subjects to them, in which before—and after—measures are successfully and covertly engineered and in which the critical variable in fact is controlled by the experimenter, requires the validation of the manipulation: have members of the experimental group actually perceived and noted the modifications allegedly induced by the critical variable? Likewise in survey work it is desirable to know whether shifts in attitudes or opinions occur over time and also to compare the responses of samples in one society with those from another. But the meaning of the question posed or of the statement offered to the samples adds another dimension. That dimension may make cross-cultural comparison possible or sensible; for unless we know how people in different societies view the stimulus, we can compare only their overt responses (a comparison which, however, may be valuable in its own right) and not their private, internal reactions. It is often noted, for example, that people, especially in developing countries, are likely to give the interviewer the kind of response they believe he seeks rather than what they themselves actually believe. Such information can be labeled invalid only by assuming that the criterion for validity is overt behavior, past or future. Any utterance, including an outright lie, nevertheless, is symptomatic of, and springs from some internal process, and hence is of some significance and worth ascertaining.

Ahistoricity

For psychological purposes, the explanations for the antecedent conditions in the environment which give rise to culture, society and the mediating

processes are decorative but irrelevant; historical estimates, however, are necessary when ahistorical tools are absent or imperfect.

For example, it is fascinating to try to speculate concerning the reasons for the richness or poverty of a language's vocabulary with respect to aspects of the environment or the people therein—and presumably some explanation exists, if it can ever be found—but the explanation need not be known when the psycholinguistic effects of the attribute upon the present generation are investigated. People simply inherit their language with all its peculiarities, and only the peculiarities must be noted. The plea for ahistoricity is an ancient one which, nevertheless, has to be trumpeted again and again. Most social psychologists have a touch of humanism or exhibitionism which they display, not always shyly, by stepping needlessly beyond their depths to worry about historical factors or by providing amateurish historical accounts of the conditions in which their problems find themselves. Historical methods, though they should be avoided if possible, may not in practice be avoided when measurements can be made in no other way or when they demand historical corroboration, just as the clinical psychologist happily admits that a knowledge of life history provides stimulating or confirmatory clues for the data gathered with his own imperfect instruments or from observations. Indeed, it is possible to find common elements in diverse situations which have quite different historical backgrounds, provided no historical claim is advanced and provided the formulator remains aware of the legitimate violence he is doing to history. By adopting such an ahistorical stance social psychologists can emerge with general propositions about social change or development in countries, each of which has necessarily had a unique history.

Solipsism

Inferences concerning mediating processes lead to statements of probability, not certainty.

This statement would provide perverse cheer to cross-cultural research: errors, misunderstandings, blunders characterize all research involving people; hence those arising outside the investigator's own culture are quantitatively, not qualitatively different from the home-sown variety. An example: just as the "meaning" of a question in an interview schedule is different from person to person, from group to group, from area to area within the same society, so it fluctuates from society to society. Translation from one language to another, especially when the first language is a European one and the second a nonwestern one, is not easy but offers a challenge which often may be no greater than that in-

volved in communications between people of different classes who ostensibly share the same native language or between a poet and his audience. Variance is inevitable.

Some consequences of acknowledging solipsism are worthy of note:

Striving for Equivalence: data concerning the mediating processes of more than a single person do not automatically become equivalent when external conditions are uniform. An example: in a survey of any depth it is usually more important to strive to have people's understanding of the question be as equivalent as possible, regardless of the variation in wording that is necessary to elicit such equivalence. If this equivalence is our goal, then social psychologists must cooperate internationally: after deciding what they seek, each must make his own translation of the procedure or schedule and work within the one culture he is best equipped to comprehend—his own.

Striving for Non-Equivalence: data concerning the mediating processes of more than a single person may be inferred when antecedent conditions are deliberately kept uniform. An example: when the same question under identical conditions elicits varied responses, it is possible that the mediating processes are also varied.

Psychologizing: if all men are unapproachable islands from some standpoint, their views of themselves and their milieux can never be completely grasped: the theoretical constructs that are applied to them cannot be totally adequate; sagacious guesses must be made from faulty data, from symptoms or from indices. Such unavoidable psychologizing is often disguised as part of the Discussion section of a paper or monograph, or it is relegated to speculation in which the writer, in a final gasp, would Make-Sense through skillful interpretation.

Singularity

Each situation, each person, each group, each society is unique in some respects, and therefore can never be fully investigated; multivariate analysis, we all know, reduces, it does not eliminate the variance.

Such singularity has implications for:

Concepts and Categories: they are abstractions which must overlook uniqueness or differences. An example: a psychiatric term such as "paranoid" when a patient in any society is so diagnosed. Nobody, therefore, should imagine he is making a sensational discovery when he notes that a concept evolved in one society does not subsume all the details discovered elsewhere in the world; whoever said it would?

Experimentation: whether in the laboratory, with a captive audience, or in the field, the experimental situation by design is

artificial and restricted, as a result of which the emerging generalizations can seldom if ever be utilized in other situations without modification, often of a radical kind. Many tend too quickly to genuflect in the presence of experimental results, even when they have the uneasy feeling that the data have been obtained in a rarefied situation whose parameters from a cross-cultural standpoint can too frequently only be intuited. Obtaining a control group in a field experiment usually turns out to be more of an ideal than a reality, however ingenious the investigator is or however mightily he strains his resources.

Field studies: if the study of history proves anything, it suggests the unique combination of events and circumstances culminating in the configuration which is the group, the region or the society at any given moment of time; hence knowledge can be transferred from one situation to another, but again only after some sort of modification.

To avoid chaos and nihilism, there are these escapes from singularity:

Typologies (ideal or mundane): more or less arbitrary classifications into categories, all of whose members share certain attributes (though they do not share others). Typologies are pragmatic and, hopefully, temporary; they deliberately and justifiably disregard the continuum along which they are the arbitrarily selected modal points.

Principles: more or less precise statements concerning sequences to be anticipated, other things being equal. The difficulty arises when the effort is made, as it must be made, to insure that the other things are actually equal.

Models: a dash of typology combined, prayerfully, with a set of principles; once more, the fit between the situation and the model is likely to be less than perfect.

At the very least these escape exits indicate the kind of observations and measurements to be made in a new situation to be investigated, and they may also serve as the basis for predicting to some extent from the known or the present to the unknown or the future. If the fact of singularity is accepted, moreover, then it may be possible to avoid two idols of the social-science market place:

Insidious generalization: the implication that results obtained from the singular situation transcend that situation. This sin can be committed in various ways, the most prominent of which is either to switch from the past tense (employed honestly to describe the research and its results) to the present tense (with the illegitimate implication that the finding applies to all mankind or all eras) or by citing carefully or unconsciously chosen examples which appear or are tailored to fit the situation at hand.

Pious prayer: after disarming admissions concerning the atyp-

icality of the situation or of ignorance concerning its typicality, the invocation that someone (sometimes the investigator himself) in the future will push the pieces, including the present one, into an Einstein-type formula.

Let not discouragement pervade the aged or the jaundiced who know that the same brave cries concerning the approaching millenium of psychology and social science have been vainly raised for generations, and let despair also remain afar from those who concede that systematic progress has been and is being made, though they remain skeptical concerning any kind of exciting or ultimate synthesis in the foreseeable future. No, the battle need not be abandoned and a retreat be made into the historian's domain of uniqueness where all is peaceful and quiet and smug because nobody usually asks for generalizations transcending unique discoveries and where no further justification is needed to investigate a phenomenon other than the fact of its having been there (although, it may be footnoted, historians also engage in mutual admiration by nodding just as sagely as social scientists when their work is called significant and a colleague's trivial). Instead we in social psychology might take heart from the following:

Geisteswissenschaft: we do the best we can in each investigation, and we must cease groaning when we accomplish nothing more than:

. . . To give an ex-post facto demonstration of determinism: more and more social phenomena are being shown to have known or knowable antecedents. Two-tail tests have their utility: for a moment or two in academic time the capricious seems lawful, and we rejoice that one of our basic *Anschaungen* has been confirmed.

. . . To quantify and/or to give a more accurate account of a situation which will never be repeated in exactly the same way. Being called a better historian is not an insult; we need not always torture or discredit ourselves because we merely determine the unique nature of the unique sequence or because we do not or cannot indicate its more universal implications; no, the torture should be inflicted, the discrediting should occur, only occasionally.

Tool kits: every situation, being singular, is a new adventure to be approached with typologies, principles, models and skepticism; the past carries over into the present and future but not until an empirical check has been employed is it certain which tools from the kit will turn out to be useful.

Spiral

Interactions between mediating processes and external conditions and between people of the same and different generations perpetually occur, as a

result of which the establishment of causal sequences becomes difficult or impossible.

Almost at the very moment that an investigator moves away from a static description of a process, he finds himself whirling about in an effort to comprehend some kind of interaction. Examples: social changes are accepted which conform to pre-existing values and beliefs, and pre-existing values and beliefs change as a result of introduced innovations; leaders are influenced by followers who also influence leaders; institutions affect socialization practices, socialization practices affect institutions. In this sense the Hegelian dialectic, with or without a Marxian touch, seems unavoidable; the way of all flesh continues.

So far cross-cultural research emphasizing the mediating processes has confronted the spiral in the following ways:

Description: the ferreting out of sequences with the upshot being a more or less accurate portrayal of events; theoretical problems are ostensibly avoided.

Correlation: the relating of antecedent and consequent conditions, with or without reference to the mediating processes. Recent efforts to convert correlations into causal sequences must be saluted in passing.

Approximate causation: the effort to approximate experimentation in field situations, seldom—alas—either attempted or feasible.

Most of us, probably, feel uncomfortable when we emerge with one of these three solutions—somehow they seem to be a bit too slick or to be avoiding the historical problem whose ahistorical consequences we believe to be significant.

Extensity-Intensity

Most investigations in social psychology (especially those involving many people, certainly the case when the research focusses upon social change and development) are compelled, inevitably, to find a compromise between extensive coverage of a population and intensive probing of particular people.

Nothing esoteric is meant by the above statement other than the sad fact that money, time and/or opportunity are lacking to accomplish all that the investigator would wish to accomplish. Drawing, locating and interviewing a first-rate probability sample can consume so much energy that the schedule itself is likely to be shortened and the depths of each personality to be left unplumbed. The same problem recurs even with respect to a specific person: is it better to sample his behavior or gauge his mediating processes extensively by a variety of questions, scales, tests or observations than it is to probe into one aspect of that behavior or mediating process more thoroughly? An aggravating, tantalizing example: the unsatisfactory state of knowledge concerning ways to measure national character or basic personality type, information

that is of key importance in cross-cultural research. And another example equally frustrating and inviting: ways of characterizing so-called traditional and modern cultures with respect to their central values or behavioral tendencies.

Nothing new can be squeezed out of the extensity-intensity dilemma other than, perhaps, a firm resolution: let no intensive study avoid the question of its own extensity; and let no extensive study fail to provide intensive illustrations if only (as is usually the case) on an anecdotal level which, at any rate, causes the data (misleadingly or not) to come alive.

Opportunism

For the foreseeable future the choice of problem, of society and of informants therein is arbitrary and opportunistic, but that should occasion neither chagrin nor embarrassment.

This statement has obviously a capricious tone, and deliberately so: it would humbly affirm that we lack the wisdom and the theory to select the crucial problems; that inevitably we shall be guided by practical considerations and by a quest for popularity and fame; and that we should honestly recognize this state of affairs and consequently neither torture ourselves in yet another way by having to make the admission nor delude ourselves into thinking that research can ever be completely otherwise. In addition, it is neither desirable nor possible to hamper the efforts of scholars to be or to appear original and ingenious.

Honest opportunism of this sort may cause some perplexities in effect to vanish:

Theoretical vs. practical: there is no eternal, surefire way to decide whether in the longer run a proposed piece of research dedicated to test or illustrate a theory will or will not have practical consequences or whether the bold decision to produce action-oriented research may or may not eventually make a substantial contribution to theory.

Important vs. non-important: the publicly acclaimed project may turn out to be a passing fad; the published report, though ignored by all save relatives and the *Psychological Abstracts*, eventually may be cited profusely. As a matter of brute fact, we sometimes confess, we do not know how to evaluate the relative worth of research within our own field; who is to say which is more important, an investigation of some general or specific aspect of socialization, the analysis of social structure as a whole or piece-by-piece? In addition, the investigator who indicates next steps or priorities in research stakes out a claim for himself and discourages others from carrying out the very investigations he rates high.

The quickest glance at current research suggests that the danger of avoiding opportunism is slight; most competent inves-

tigators, after securing the freedom which comes when the contractual bonds with a dissertation adviser are academically and emotionally broken, carve out for themselves a seemingly distinctive area to be investigated, or at least provide a neo-neologism to make their work sound distinctive. Although opportunism cannot be combatted—and the arguments in its behalf have now been coyly advanced—it seems patently clear that the tool kit will become more useful and powerful when research is guided by:

Concepts and variables shared by many investigators: too often instruments, especially in cross-cultural research, are designed more or less *de novo*, and therefore comparisons between studies are difficult and sometimes even impossible. In various critical areas—such as development, modernization—checklists need to be developed so that investigators forever after cannot avoid at least appreciating the ideal scope or the parameters of what they contemplate; such lists could well contain references to the best instruments devised for purposes of measurement. No one's reputation for originality is injured when he employs a standardized thermometer to measure the temperature of a body.

Hypotheses and theories: obviously these are as above suspicion as mother's milk, provided we can agree which ones are promising and which false. Can we?

Quelques notes sur les dilemmes de la recherche psyco-sociologique dans les pays en voie de développement

Leonard W. Doob

L'auteur se livre tout d'abord aux constatations suivantes: (a) les instruments utilisés dans le cadre des études comparatives n'ont qu'une validité limitée. Insuffisances, obstacles en tous genres ne sont pas codifiés d'une manière systématique; les chercheurs les surmontent par des techniques artisanales, impossibles à communiquer d'une manière objective; (b) les communications scientifiques sont évaluées en fonction des règlements propres à une société d'admiration mutuelle, plus qu'en fonction de critères scientifiques universels; (c) les recherches sont, la plupart du temps, sans conséquences pratiques et n'ont guère d'emprise sur le monde dans lequel nous vivons.

Ces objets d'inquiétude restent cependant superficiels quand on les compare aux dilemmes plus profonds que la recherche psycho-sociologique doit affronter et que l'auteur se propose d'explorer.

Relations entre signifiant et signifié. La psychologie sociale a pour objet d'analyser la signification de certaines séquences de phénomènes. Bien sûr, il est important d'évaluer l'universalité de telles séquences et de déterminer par exemple si les périodes de développement de l'enfant indien ou africain coïncident bien avec celles de l'enfant européen. Il ne s'agit cependant que d'une

étape préliminaire, le but final étant d'expliquer les similarités ou les différences observées.

Il est dès lors possible de poursuivre deux stratégies. La première consiste à calculer les corrélations entre variables dépendantes (période de développement par exemple) et indépendantes (structures familiales et sociales, etc.) La deuxième consiste à isoler les dimensions susceptibles d'expliquer les corrélations observées. Si ces deux stratégies sont complémentaires, il n'en reste pas moins essentiel de discerner les relations existant entre modèles d'explication conscients et inconscients. On peut affirmer, par exemple, que la manière dont les individus anticipent le système de récompenses et de punitions propres à la société à laquelle ils appartiennent constitue un facteur déterminant des changements qui peuvent intervenir dans l'organisation de ladite société. La mesure de cette variable n'en reste pas moins problématique.

En dépit de toutes les précautions que le chercheur peut prendre, la validité de ses démarches demeure souvent insuffisante. Sait-on par exemple, si les sujets examinés ont pris conscience des modifications apparemment causées par le traitement expérimental? Sait-on si les questions posées et les réponses données ont la même résonance psychologique au sein de deux échantillons culturels distincts? Bien souvent, les personnes interrogées nous disent seulement ce qu'elles croient que nous voulons entendre. Tant que ces problèmes sont insuffisamment étudiés, les études comparatives portent sur les signifiants et non sur les signifiés. Il est regrettable que jusqu'à maintenant, seuls les psychologues se soient posés ce genre de questions.

Absence d'explications historiques. Le psychologue social doit déterminer les conditions dans lesquelles il doit donner priorité à un schéma d'explication fonctionnel et donc a-historique et dans quelles conditions il doit au contraire tenir compte de la dynamique historique de la culture qu'il étudie. Les conditions de ce choix ne sont pas toujours claires.

Solipsisme. Les communications entre chercheurs et sujets d'origines culturelles distinctes facilitent erreurs et malentendus. Il est donc indispensable de rechercher les équivalences entre les signifiants utilisés par différentes cultures, d'examiner les conditions dans lesquelles la relation entre signifiant et signifié varie d'une culture à l'autre, et enfin de ne pas confondre ce qui est observé et ce qui est déduit ou interprété.

Singularité. Les techniques d'analyse les plus raffinées permettent de réduire les erreurs expérimentales, mais non de les éliminer. En outre, toute situation étudiée conserve toujours une part de singularité, qui limite la portée des généralisations qu'on

peut dériver de l'enquête et l'universalité des concepts et catégories utilisés dans l'analyse.

Pour accroître la rentabilité des recherches psyco-sociologiques, il convient donc de faire un plus grand usage des typologies (tout en reconnaissant leur caractère temporaire et limité), des modèles d'analyse construits *a priori* et plus généralement de toute hypothèse permettant de définir *a priori* la direction et l'intensité d'une association entre un jeu de variables indépendantes et dépendantes.

Si nous devons proscrire aussi bien les généralisations abusives que l'absence totale d'explications, ce n'est cependant pas une raison suffisante pour nier le mérite des explications *ex post facto*, ou pour ne pas introduire plus de rigueur dans l'analyse d'une situation que l'on sait pourtant être unique et irrépétable. De la même manière, nous ne devrions pas juger une recherche sur son seul objet, mais aussi sur les progrès qu'elle nous permet de faire dans l'utilisation de certaines méthodes.


Dialectique. Le psychologue social fait souvent face au problème du poussin et de l'oeuf; les interactions entre les divers niveaux de la réalité sociale interdisent souvent l'identification d'une véritable relation causale.

Recherche extensive et intensive. Doit-on examiner superficiellement le plus grand nombre possible de sujets ou doit-on au contraire étudier en profondeur un nombre plus limité d'individus? Doit-on explorer des constellations entières d'attitudes et de comportements ou au contraire ne prêter une attention privilégiée qu'à un seul de ces comportements et attitudes? L'auteur suggère qu'il n'y a pas de réponse *a priori* satisfaisantes à ce problème.

Priorité des problèmes et groupes à étudier. On propose souvent une distinction entre recherches fondamentale et appliquée. Cette distinction n'est guère valable. En outre, ce qui nous semble urgent à connaître aujourd'hui risque d'être dépassé demain. Il est donc préférable de justifier nos priorités en nous appuyant sur d'autres critères. L'auteur suggère que nous devrions, avant toute chose, standardiser nos instruments de mesure et nos procédés d'analyse.

PART II

Motivational Aspects of Technological Development



Values, Social Stratification and Development

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During the last decade, the literature on development has increasingly concerned itself with social and cultural factors, often with an emphasis on their negative impact. However, more systematic analytical studies of the interdependence between development and social change are needed (for models, see Firth, *et al.*, 1958; Hoselitz, 1961; Moore, 1961). In fact, this interdependency implies an incredibly large matrix for study.

The present paper discusses some observations that will enable us to recognize the relative importance of various factors within this large matrix. Specifically, we wish to consider agricultural development on one side of the interdependency, i.e., the emergence of cash-cropping with relatively modern technology. On the other side, we examine the values which may stand in the way of change, such as fatalism and traditionalism, as well as the aspirations and cognitions of people that may also influence development. Parallel to the characteristics of economic development and values, income and aspired levels of living will be considered as they are directly influenced by development and changes in values. But, beyond that, from the exposition of changes in agro-economy, income and values we shall turn to a discussion of some significant motivational and social integrational factors.

To facilitate understanding of the relative importance of the variables listed above and to ascertain their differential effects, we shall compare two rural communities in Turkey with two different types of agricultural development. One is village Y in the

Cukurova, Southern Turkey, and the other is village K in the Western Black Sea region, Northern Turkey. We believe that in the analysis of a complex interdependency it will be more rewarding to follow such a comparative method than to employ a case study or a very general survey.

The material on village K is taken from data about modernization and urbanization collected during the summer of 1962, on a town and a number of surrounding villages. A survey was made of all household heads, and other techniques were used as complementary tools (Kiray, 1964).

The material on village Y was collected during February 1965 for a larger study of interdependencies between agro-economic development and social change.¹ The techniques of observation used in this study also include a survey of all household heads in the village.

Agro-Economic Development

In village Y in the early 1930's the villagers were sharecropping in cotton and wheat with a crop rotation system. The economy was characterized by the traditional half-and-half sharing rules with absentee large landowners and all the complementary feudal sharecropper-landowner patterns of social relationships. The cotton raised was short staple, closed-boll of a local variety, and energy was provided by teams of oxen for wooden plows. A great change was brought about by the introduction in 1943 of a new cotton variety, medium staple *Akala*, which increased yields of seed-cotton per *dönüm* of good cotton land from 50 to 100 kgs.²

This changed the land-use pattern of the area, and cereal growing disappeared altogether in village Y. Along with the emergence of a cotton monoculture the labor patterns altered. The old local kind of cotton could be reaped any time after it was mature since the bolls did not open, a characteristic that made it possible to adjust picking to the locally available labor force. With the new varieties the bolls open in September and cotton must be picked in a short time in order to prevent damage by early autumn rains. Thus, introduction of a new variety of cotton caused a shortage of labor that could be solved only by massive use of seasonal workers from other villages. Later, at the end of the 1940's, the application of chemicals for combating insects and plant diseases, the use of machinery in farming operations, and

¹This study was undertaken in collaboration with Dr. J. Hinderink of Utrecht University, Institute of Geography.

²Later better varieties were introduced, increasing the production per donum in the period of 1950-1962 from 170 to 300 kg.

the introduction of irrigation thoroughly upset the old patterns of farming. With the disappearance of oxen and wooden plows, and the local variety of closed-boll cotton, sharecropping disappeared completely and was replaced by seven to ten weeks of wages per year as laborers in not-yet-mechanized farm operations, such as hoeing the fields and picking cotton, and an extremely limited number of jobs as tractor drivers or assistants. At this stage, however, the cotton production for good cotton land had increased from 50 kgs per *dönüm* to 250 kg per *dönüm*.

One may think that this is a rather special case of development on which to base further discussion of values and motivations involved in the process, as sharecropping was not the most widespread form of farming in Turkey. In order to clarify further any basic generality which could be observed we shall analyze another village from a different region with a different pattern of development in agricultural structure.

During the last twenty years village K in Northern Turkey has also changed from an almost entirely self-sufficient economy to cashcropping in strawberries and to a market economy. The village had a small-landownership pattern which it retains.³ Families with all their productive age-group members work on their plots as an undifferentiated group and they do not need outside labor. Technology is still simple; various sizes and shapes of hoes and picks constitute the main implements. The plow is not used as the land is hilly. In addition to cashcrop strawberries, families have some chickens, own one or two cattle, and raise a very limited amount of vegetables and corn for self-consumption. But the *main* source of income for every household is strawberries. The side-production of their farms is far from sufficient to provide the food they need. Thus, they depend basically on the income obtained by strawberry raising and on outside contacts for their living.

The contacts they must have are centered around their need for transportation of the cashcrop and for marketing facilities. The villagers have not become organized for these purposes. These functions are performed as undifferentiated and loosely organized actions by a merchant in town. This relationship, like the cashcrop, is a new development in the life of the village. Still

³Small landownership in itself is not significant for modernization as it could be either a self-sufficient family farm or a modern cashcropping one. It is significant only if cashcropping has come and the owner can control the production up to the point of the marketing. Otherwise, it is not much different whether land is owned or sharecropped. Frey (1966) discusses small landownership as a base for national identification, and thus for modernization. In our opinion, it is not the size of land or ownership of it but cashcropping and the type of control of the processes involved in production and income obtained from that crop that is significant for modernization.

the new phase of cashcropping is so different that it constitutes a development in agricultural structure.

Change of Attitudes

Here we shall discuss attitudinal changes taking place in these villages which parallel the agro-economic changes. The values that are useful in differentiating modern societies from modernizing ones can also show trends of change, thus indicating the extent to which these communities have moved toward modernity. The attitudes which show qualitative differences between modern societies and modernizing ones with feudal traditional bases are: taking initiative for a better future, and offering rational reasons for success and improvement of conditions of life instead of fatalism, resignation and submission to authority.

In the area of expectations and recognition of need and desire for improving their condition, it is clear that both villages are positively future-oriented. In fact, in both villages, in reply to the question of what was their main concern for the future, only a minor fraction of respondents expresses passive, fatalistic prospects (Table 1). On the other hand, more than half expressed a

TABLE 1
EXPECTATIONS FOR FUTURE

	Village Y (n = 105)	Village K (n = 53)
Better production possibilities	37.8%	51.5%
Better consumption possibilities	45.3	35.3
Other	6.9	12.2
Fatalistic	10.0	1.0

desire to improve their production possibilities—a very constructive orientation to the future. In addition to strictly rural, production-oriented answers, there are those, categorized in Table 1 as "other", such as migration to cities or education of the younger members of the household, which are also essentially nonfeudal and nonfatalistic. The desire for more consumption should also be interpreted as modern since the income of many is barely enough for survival (see Table 5). This type of response is more frequent in village Y than in village K, which is easy to understand since hunger exists in village Y and its possibilities for more production are much more limited. In spite of this, fatalistic and feudal answers such as "it is God's will" or they "cannot think about the future" are only 10 per cent of all responses in village Y.

Furthermore, in addition to rational and modern expectations and desires for the future, opinions concerning the ways to reach such goals are also nonfatalistic. Both of the villages indicate hard work and ability as the main road to success. Simple luck, fatalism and/or good personal connections are far less frequent responses than diligence (see Table 2).

TABLE 2
REASONS FOR SUCCESS

	Village Y (n = 105)	Village K (n = 53)
Hard work and ability	71.3%	67.7%
Personal connections and fatalistic reasons	8.7	13.2
Combination	10.5	17.2
Other	9.5	0.0
Vague	0.0	1.9

TABLE 3
TYPE OF EDUCATION DESIRED FOR SONS

	Village Y (n = 105)	Village K (n = 53)
University or higher	76.2	70.6
Other	18.1	23.6
None	2.87	0.0
Vague	2.87	5.8

The villagers also show great enthusiasm for the education of their sons (see Table 3). It is interesting to note that this enthusiasm is concentrated on higher education; the percentage desiring this is 76.2 for village Y and 70.6 for village K. One should keep in mind that in Turkey education is the most important channel of mobility, but mobility through education characterizes urban rather than rural settings. Thus, interest in education seems to indicate two different things. First, the villagers are not land-bound, just as they are not tradition-bound. Secondly, they are aiming toward a type of change that is significant for non-village environments. The type of education provided today to the villagers and the type of education they desire for their young, i.e., university or its equivalent, have no functional relationship to conditions in the two villages. Literacy is significant and functional only in affairs that involve outside contact.

The responses to the three questions which represent attitudes in our agriculturally developed villages obviously complement each other very well in terms of showing how far the villagers have come from the fatalism, resignation and passive contentment of the traditional feudal situation.

Actual and Aspired Incomes

We have seen that the changes in agro-economic practices in these communities are so intense that we may consider them "developed". We have also seen that the values related to those aspects of social order which could constitute obstacles to development have changed in such a direction that it is impossible to consider them obstacles to development. At this point, inquiry into the change of income of these groups may clarify certain significant relationships between social change and the types of agro-economic development, as the most expected and obvious result of development seems to be rising standards of living and income of the people among whom change is taking place.

Because villages Y and K are characterized by a cashcropping and market economy which has been evolving for the last 20 years, unlike the greater rural part of the country where self-sufficiency is the dominant pattern, one would assume that per capita income in those villages should be considerably more than the national per capita income. The national *rural* per capita income in Turkey is given as TL. 1200 (approximately \$120) by the First Five Year Development Plan in 1962. In both village Y and village K, the mean per capita income per year is conspicuously less than the national figure. In village Y the average per capita income is TL. 556.19 and in village K it is TL. 525.47 (see Table 4).

TABLE 4
YEARLY PER CAPITA INCOME

Income	Village Y %	Village O %	Village K %
< 200 TL	15.2	5.9	13.2
201-300	23.8	11.8	9.2
301-400	14.3	23.6	24.6
401-500	8.6	17.7	11.3
501-600	7.6	8.8	15.1
601-700	4.8	8.8	3.8
701-800	4.8	2.9	1.9
801-1000	3.8	14.7	11.2
1001-1200	3.8	5.8	3.8
1201-1500	4.8	—	3.8
> 1500 TL	8.6	—	1.9
Mean	556.19	517.64	525.47
N	105	34	53

TABLE 5
YEARLY INCOME PER HOUSEHOLD

Income	Village Y %	Village O %	Village K %
< 500 TL	4.8	—	1.9
501-1000	22.9	2.9	1.9
1001-2000	24.8	14.7	24.6
2001-3000	17.1	14.7	32.0
3001-4000	13.3	17.7	9.4
4001-5000	6.7	20.6	11.3
5001-7500	5.7	20.6	15.1
7501-10,000	1.9	8.8	1.9
> 10,000 TL	2.8	—	1.9
Mean	2592.85	4212.64	3372.64
N	105	34	53

Moreover, the average per capita income of a self-sufficient village in the northern part of the Çukurova, Southern Turkey, village O, is only slightly less than the average of villages Y and K: TL. 517.64. Obviously, in spite of agricultural and technological innovations during the last two decades, income per capita in villages Y and K is not substantially more than in village O, and less than that of agriculturally much less developed parts of the country as a whole.

This analysis of the present economic situation gains further depth when it is related to the villagers' awareness of their conditions—that is, with observations on the psychological level of life. With a mean actual yearly income of TL. 2592.85 and TL. 3372.64 per household, the mean aspired income of the villager is TL. 7,200 in village K and 10,000 in village Y (see Tables 5, 6). These figures show very clearly the large discrepancy between their aspirations and actual life experiences.

It seems that the consequence of this reversed economic effect of agricultural development on psychological and social levels presents itself as disequilibrium which has stimulated further change and is a most significant factor in determining the new social configuration of the villages.

⁴The vicious circle of poverty asserted by R. Nurske (1953) is insufficient to explain the perpetuation of poverty, as our analysis here shows. To fall below the average and below the previous level of income is rather different from a vicious circle. In the process of economic development of a certain type, such as that in Turkey, a particular polarization of wealth takes place that is difficult to explain as simply perpetuation of old existing poverty.

TABLE 6
ASPIRED AND ACTUAL YEARLY
PER HOUSEHOLD INCOMES (MEAN)

	Village Y	Village K
Mean yearly income per household considered necessary for a decent living	10,000 TL	7,200 TL
Mean average of actual household income per year	2592.85 TL	3372.64 TL

The immediate effect of earning little more than self-sufficient villages and less than the average of the country, with great discrepancies between actual and aspired conditions of life, shows itself not particularly as frustration but as a greatly intensified and diffused feeling of insecurity, so that every social institution and human relationship pattern that is capable of providing security acquires new importance in determining the mode and direction of the change toward a new social equilibrium and configuration. Among such institutions and relationships, social stratification and power mechanisms seem to be the most important.⁵

Social Stratification and Power Mechanisms

It is clear from the preceding discussion that the process of development and change with its attitudinal dimensions is much more complex than it is usually assumed to be. Another aspect of the same process should be discussed which will enable us to see the less obvious relationships and interaction patterns in the society that emerge as the result of a basic human motivation—need for security.

Village K

In village K, any differentiation of the population in terms of wealth, occupation, education and consequently in terms of power, status and prestige is inconspicuous. However, even though village K is not a dramatically stratified society, power exercised by outside agencies results in a striking differentiation with significant consequences.

In village K, the villagers obtain all their necessities from a nearby town and from a particular merchant in the town. Throughout the year, the villager himself or whichever family

⁵Although most important in development, social stratification is not the only institution which provides security. Family, lineage groups and similar institutions also carry important security-giving functions. But for our purposes, stratification comes to the foreground.

member is in town secures the family's necessities from the merchant's shop on credit. This debt is registered only by the merchant. Payment occurs mainly in June when all the family's strawberries—the cashcrop—are given to the merchant against the family's debts. The villagers even prefer to bring their secondary products such as chickens, eggs, fruits or skins of prey animals to this merchant instead of selling them to somebody else at a higher price. Thus the merchant—or *agha* as he is called by the villagers—not only sells his own merchandise on his own terms and conditions but he also buys all the villagers' products that are of cash value at the price he himself has fixed. In this arrangement, the amount of credit, the rate of interest, the date at which debts are due and other similar terms are all determined by the merchant. This transaction involves no formalities. The accounts are kept in a little notebook in signs understandable only to the merchant himself. Seldom if ever does he let the villager know his debts or balance of payments.

The Merchant . . .

The basic and the most obvious aspect of the peasant-merchant relationship is this transaction and credit mechanism. However, in addition to this very mercantile relationship there are other types of interdependencies and functions that help to maintain the first one. The villager needs money at times other than the harvest season. The easiest way to obtain this money is from the merchant. The merchant provides him with the necessary amount the moment he needs it, without formality. Even if it means paying a large interest later or placing his whole future in the hands of the merchant, obtaining the necessary amount at the moment when he needs it is of vital importance for the villager.

Aside from this, the merchant helps his villagers when they have to do business with other institutions in town. He aids them in government offices and in courts, engages lawyers, tells them which doctor to go to in case of sickness, buys their medicine, etc. Most of the time he pays the expenses and records them along with the other debts. He performs the function of arbitrator in marriages or disputes. His assistance sometimes goes even further. For instance, this merchant sent a villager's son who had contracted bone tuberculosis to the town's hospital and then to a hospital in Istanbul for treatment, without asking for any immediate payment. He thus won the indebtedness not only of the man and his son but of the whole village.

These associations are completely different from the mercantile and anonymous relationships of the modern urban pattern. First, the merchant and the villagers are in a face-to-face relationship. Also, the merchant fulfills the functions of social welfare and insurance on the basis of friendship and personal

contacts. These functions are similar to those of the large land-owner in a feudal order. In spite of these factors, however, the merchant cannot be considered part of a feudal system. The orientation, the way of thinking, and the personality of this merchant are the same as those of big city commercial people. His main aim is also to make more profit and to improve his business through professional transactions.

The merchant has no belief in social welfare as such. He freely admits that he gives such assistance and keeps face-to-face relationships with villagers because these are profitable for his own business. It should be noted that neither the merchant dealing with village K nor other merchants in the same town now or in the past owned land. They have acquired their wealth in the last 20-25 years through trade under conditions applicable to the whole country. And, in the most modern meaning of the word, they have started as merchants. But they learned quickly that they cannot establish themselves fully if they do not function as an agency to meet individual emergencies or provide relief in difficult times. Here a particular aspect of the old pattern has merged with the new pattern, bringing together remnants of the feudal system into a functional whole with the new order.

A particular aspect of the old pattern has changed totally, the relationship of landowner to peasant. On the other hand, the needs and functions connected with this changed aspect have been unfulfilled. Until institutions to satisfy those needs develop in the new pattern, the newly emerged relationship, i.e., merchant-villager, has taken over these functions and acts as a buffer institution. Thus a new configuration in the social structure comes about and a relative equilibrium is established. But the immediate result of this new adjustment mechanism emerging under the stress of insecurity caused by change is to limit the chances of villagers for savings and improvements, both in terms of production as well as level of living, that one expects from more modern agricultural practices and cash-cropping. The main motivation for such a social integration pattern obviously is the lack of much needed security or seeking for at least a limited amount of it in adjusting to the type and speed of change. Here, further development is obstructed not by unchanged values such as fatalism but by the new configuration in society, since more adequate institutions did not evolve to provide security.

Village Y

The largest socially differentiated group in village Y is the 81.8% of villagers who do not own any land. Of these, 80% are strictly agricultural laborers. The land is owned by four large landowners. This represents the dominant aspect of social strat-

ification. The existing power structure evolved mainly in the decade following 1910. What characterizes the social structure which exists today in village Y are the recent developments in agriculture described above, i.e. the introduction of cotton with open bolls and machinery which led to the disappearance of sharecropping and its replacement by wage labor. Thus, the people and institutions that control the wage labor and consequently the life of the wage laborers occupy the most important place in the stratification pattern. Those who control these relations are, of course, still the large landowners.

The Landlords . . .

From the 1920's to the early 1960's, the landlords were absolute powerholders; not only did they control the villager's chance of earning a living but at the same time they interfered informally with every aspect of life, again a characteristic of a feudal social stratification system. Today, however, the situation has begun to change. Everybody agrees that landlords should not interfere with their private lives. The government also tries to control laborer-landowner relationships, particularly by fixing minimum wages. Another organization that could be influential is the Agricultural Laborers Union in Adana but the villagers do not join in, being afraid that if they do they would not be given jobs. On the other hand the landowners are very efficiently organized as *Ciftci Birligi*, Farmers Association. The organized power of landowners is a new phase in the social stratification and power mechanism of our villages.

The corresponding development on the villagers' side, however, is not yet the labor union, but unorganized intra-village resistance to the landowners' arbitrary interference in their lives. The leaders of this movement are described as influential people in the village today. When, as a subjective evaluation, the opinion of the household heads was asked about who was most influential in the life of village Y, four people were named. The landlords, particularly the one that comes to the village frequently, are most frequently named as most influential (47.2%). The *elci*, an intermediary man who supplies laborers to the landowners and finds agricultural jobs for villagers, is second (14.2%). The teacher and the headman follow them (8.5% and 7.5%, respectively). Among them the teacher, who is a member of one of the lineage groups in the village, stands out. He plays an important part in the general current against the large landowners. His importance emerges, of course, not because he is a man of education, but because he takes such active part in the movement against landlords, since he is also a natural permanent member of the community.

The Elci . . .

With the development of wage labor a new position has arisen in the village. To bring the laborer-villagers into contact with the landlords, to guide them and provide them with jobs and protect them from the competition of outside laborers, became a very important function. Such an intermediary man—*elci* as he is called—who actually provides jobs for the villagers when there is great competition from immigrant laborers, is another influential person in the life of villagers. His function, like that of the merchant in village K, is a buffer function as proper organizations have not yet appeared. He makes oral arrangements for work, and sees that the villagers work accordingly. In the power balance in village Y the *elci* is closer to the villagers than to the landowners, and is accepted by the villagers as a trustworthy representative. But he occupies a hopeless bargaining position next to the Farmers Association. He refuses, however, to encourage the laborers to join the labor union, saying that such an act would worsen their position. Another of his functions that adds to his influence in the community is that of advancing small amounts of money to the villagers during the winter months against their labor for the coming season.

The newly emerging specialized occupational group, the tractor drivers, do not have any chance to modify the basic relationship patterns in the social stratification structure either. Most significant, of course, is the fact that they are also employed by the same large landowners. That they are paid a slightly higher salary and have slightly better working conditions does not put them into another status and a different relationship. In fact, many of them are among the most active people in influencing the villagers' attitudes towards landowners.

The Headman . . .

Today's headman in the village is newly elected; he stands on neutral grounds. As far as his familial relations are concerned he is the son of the former (dead) foreman-supervisor of the most powerful landlord. Although his father was the landlord's employee he himself never worked for him. The villagers introduce him as a man whose father worked for the largest landlord for more than 20 years and still acquired no wealth; thus, he must be honest and on their side. The group that backs him and that obviously brought him to his office is the one that is consistently against landlords and is now attempting to increase their power within the village. The previous headman, who held the office from 1943 to 1960, was the most influential landlord's "man", acting always with his backing.

All through this period new forces were developing in the

village so that when, in 1960, the chance arose to challenge the old headman, the opposing villagers organized and voted the old headman out. Today when they discuss their action, it is very significant that they do not pay much attention to the change of headman but rather stress that they have successfully resisted the landlords' influence over the village. The whole fight to change the headman was a fight against the power holders—i.e., the large landowners.

Their recently acquired position as wage-laborers represents such an insecurity for the villagers that new relations had to be found. In village Y today, the anonymity of the wage laborer in relation to the landowner, the prolonged difficulties of earning a living without any potential lessening of anxiety, in short extreme insecurity, are leading the villagers to seek ways to unite and resist the old power holders, and to create new power groups in the village. Thus the power represented by the teacher, *elci* and headman is extremely important to the villagers; all of them are against the landowners' power and provide chances to resist the landlords. Now that the village is experiencing a very low standard of living and is facing extreme difficulties in earning a living, the leadership provided by the *elci*, the teacher and the headman—the newly unified power against landlords—is coming to the foreground.

Security Mechanisms

With the disappearance of sharecropping and landlords' personal responsibility for the welfare of the peasants, together with the worsening of standards of living and prolongation of the period without security, it was critically important to provide institutions or relationships in the form of buffer mechanisms to ease the strain and provide an opportunity for a new integration and equilibrium in social structure to develop. The community at present is channeling its social change into two different types of institutions and relationships, both of which lead to more security. One of them is a new form of political interaction and the other is a new type of work organization. Both of the developments have characteristics that are much more modern; human relations within these institutions are universal, specific and collectivity oriented. Thus, when they really become established aspects of the society, the new configuration will represent a social development as well as an economic development, with the need for security as its basic motivation.

The problem of security seems to occupy a central position under the impact of rapid social change. Every social structure, with its integrated set of institutions, interaction patterns and values, provides its members with mechanisms of security. The

pre-industrial social structure with its small communities, family-centered activities, face-to-face relations, and limited fluidity and mobility is well equipped to provide the needed security. Rights, responsibilities and assets of landlord and sharecropper, or of guild system and customers, were organized in such a way that everybody knew what to do in ordinary as well as in extraordinary times and situations; the system is so well-integrated that its members usually are not aware that the group and its interaction patterns are providing them with security. In fact, it is only after some changes take place and new interaction patterns emerge in the life of the members of the group that they become aware of something important missing in the new situation; in many ways, this may be the principal obstacle with which development, both economic and social, meets.

Lack or delay of emergence and integration of new security mechanisms in the changing structure can influence social development in many ways, as has been shown above.

Many things indicate also that the slow evolution of security mechanisms is a real obstacle to the transformation of the pre-industrial socio-economic structure into a modern, urban-industrial one. Furthermore, the adjustment mechanisms emerging under the stress of social change are creating intermediary institutions and relationships that seem to present strong resistance to the evolution of security structures compatible with a modern industrial structure. The result may be much greater complexity, difficulty and cost in securing necessary additional changes in the future.

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Valeurs sociales, stratification sociale et développement

Mübeccel B. Kıray

L'article a pour objet de comparer deux villages turcs dont les structures agricoles ont évolué dans des directions différentes.

Dans le premier village, on a introduit en 1943 une nouvelle variété de coton. La culture des céréales a disparu; la main-d'œuvre s'est raréfiée; de nouveaux équipements agricoles ont fait leur apparition, tandis qu'émergeait une nouvelle structure de la propriété foncière.

Dans le deuxième village, les paysans sont passé d'une économie de subsistance à une économie de profit basée sur la culture des fraises. Ces changements n'ont affecté ni l'organisation du travail ni l'organisation de la propriété foncière. Dans ce contexte, le niveau de vie est fonction des contacts établis avec le milieu extérieur.

Changements d'attitudes. Dans les deux cas, on peut noter l'apparition d'attitudes modernistes. Les gens sont tournés vers le futur, ils croient à la valeur du travail et des aptitudes individuelles et attachent beaucoup d'importance à la scolarisation de leurs enfants.

Différences entre niveau de vie et aspirations économiques. Comme on pouvait s'y attendre, le revenu et les aspirations économiques des habitants du premier village sont supérieurs à ceux des habitants du deuxième village mais, fait plus remarquable, dans les deux cas, le revenu auquel aspirent les villageois est nettement

plus élevé que leur revenu actuel et dans les deux cas le revenu actuel est inférieur à la moyenne nationale. Il y a donc une relation négative entre le développement agricole de deux villages et les changements sociaux et psychologiques vécus par leurs habitants. Cette relation explique les frustrations et les craintes vécues par ces individus et souligne l'importance des institutions et mécanismes sociaux susceptibles d'accroître le sentiment de sécurité individuel. Parmi ces mécanismes, la hiérarchie sociale occupe une place privilégiée.

Hiérarchie sociale. Dans le deuxième village, les habitants jouissent de statuts et de pouvoirs comparables. Ils sont placés cependant sous la coupe totale d'un marchand de la ville voisine, qui achète tous leurs produits à un prix fixé par lui-même, leur vend ce dont ils ont besoin et leur accorde le crédit nécessaire. Il sert également d'intermédiaire pour toutes les démarches administratives que le village doit entreprendre (auprès d'écoles, de docteurs, etc.). Ses fonctions sont donc doubles. D'une part, il participe au développement économique du pays et fait en ce sens partie du monde moderne. D'autre part, ses activités ne peuvent être rentables que dans la mesure où il est susceptible d'aider les paysans dans leurs relations avec le monde extérieur et en ce sens, il fait partie d'un système féodal. S'il "protège" les paysans, il freine aussi leur mobilité sociale et géographique.

Dans le premier village, on trouve de riches propriétaires fonciers dont le pouvoir individuel est progressivement aboli, mais se transforme en organisation collective. Un deuxième personnage commence à prendre une certaine importance, il s'agit de l'intermédiaire chargé de fournir de la main-d'œuvre aux propriétaires. Sa dépendance à l'égard du pouvoir financier limite cependant les ambitions qu'il peut nourrir. Par contre l'étoile du maire et de l'instituteur devraient grandir sans obstacle du fait de leur indépendance à l'égard des propriétaires terriens. Ils peuvent en effet cristalliser l'opposition populaire envers ces derniers. Il y a donc une différentiation des structures sociales antérieures et l'apparition d'organisations professionnelles et politiques distinctes les unes des autres, mais dont les fonctions demeurent de résoudre les conflits entre individus et groupes et de satisfaire les besoins de sécurité de la population.

Ce problème des besoins de sécurité régit les processus de développement et permet d'expliquer les blocages ou les changements caractéristiques des pays en voie de développement.

Changes in the Hierarchy of Motivational Factors and Social Values in Slovenian Industry

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At the beginning I would like to emphasize the following three points:

First, the phenomena I am trying to describe and partially explain in this paper concern *Yugoslavia*, a state or a society which in many aspects significantly differs from other apparently similar societies. In other words, without taking into consideration the particular frame of reference, any generalization of findings discovered in Yugoslavia would at least be risky.

Then, the data this paper is based upon were collected in *Slovenia*, the most affluent state or republic of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, and are only with certain reservations valid for other states or republics which differ from Slovenia with regard to their specific cultural-historical backgrounds and degrees of industrial development.

And last but not least, I am intentionally avoiding any classification of phenomena dealt with into sociological and social-psychological ones. Our experiences have demonstrated that the discussions usually following such efforts are as a rule fruitless even more, they produce more damage than profit. The fields of both disciplines overlap so much at least in applied research, that it is necessary when describing social phenomena and explaining relevant relationships to use weapons of both arsenals.

Therefore, I think, it would not be too much to present (as an introduction and for the sake of better understanding) a short and rather superficial survey of the society where the phenomena occurred, and that we have to bear in mind when talking about Yugoslavia.

The Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (population of 18,500,000) consists of 6 republics or states with their own national parliaments and governments: Serbia (7,500,000), Croatia (4,000,000), Bosnia (3,600,000), Slovenia (1,500,000), Macedonia (1,400,000) and Montenegro (500,000).

The most industrialized states are Slovenia and Croatia—the least industrialized are Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia which are at the same time the richest in ores, minerals and labor force. However, in spite of considerable differences in industrial development, the whole country has in the last 20 years, after 1945, experienced an extremely rapid industrialization (index of industrial production: $\frac{1964}{1939} = 611!$) which significantly changed its social structure and nearly destroyed its old agricultural and patriarchal way of life.

Slovenia and Croatia, which are Catholic, are an organic part of the Middle-European cultural space. Dalmatia, administratively divided into Croatia and Montenegro, manifests a typical Mediterranean way of life. Bosnia, which is mostly Moslem, shares the values of the Near-eastern Islamic world, while Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro are an integral part of the Orthodox-Christian cultural sphere.

And finally, Yugoslav socialism (which came into power under the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia during and after the war—1941–1945—and integrated the historically separated nations into a relatively stable formation) differs visibly, in theory and practice, from political systems of other countries which are members of the so-called socialist bloc. The consistent decentralization and, especially, self-government or self-management cannot be found in any other socialist country.

The entire history of Yugoslavia since 1941 is relevant to our research. Here I will mention only a few key words to suggest the range of influences: the liberation war—combining a civil war and a war against invaders, leaving 1,700,000 victims; the populistic and universalistic nature of the movement which overcame national differences; the increasing affluence with the development of a middle class and a consumer orientation; etc.

With this introduction, let us now consider the factory and the worker. We will argue that the reconsideration of the concepts of development that must take place will have to be based more

on sociological and social-psychological research, and less on visionary speculations.

Rapid industrialization of Slovenia—though already in 1945 it was the most industrialized state or republic of Yugoslavia and the least destroyed by the war—brought about the same phenomena which have been known in any country experiencing an accelerated industrialization: the decay of peasantry. That is, there was migration of rural masses into industry and cities, intentionally fostered by the policy of the state. There also occurred a fast promotion of cadres—based more on political than on professional criteria—without experience or professional training for their new managerial or governmental positions.

Still in 1962, for workers of peasant origin, the most important problem was how to accommodate to their new, industrial environment, to their new social surrounding.

Research Results

The research results presented here were collected in a panel study in 1960, 1962 and 1964. The study was carried out by the Institute of Sociology and Philosophy at the University of Ljubljana. The subjects were 1200 rank-and-file workers from 15 factories in Slovenia.

The method used was forced-choice pair-comparisons of statements concerning the relative importance of a number of factors affecting working conditions. The responses of inconsistent subjects (more than one circular triad) were omitted from the results.

TABLE 1
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF WORKING CONDITIONS BY SOCIAL ORIGIN

	Workers	Artisans	Peasants
	Rank	Rank	Rank
Work	4	3	4
Wages	2	4	3
Supervisors	5	5	5
Co-workers	3	2	1
Education	1	1	2
Self-management	6	6	6

As we see in Table 1, workers of peasant origin, i.e., people who were only recently urbanized or who were still living a part-worker part-peasant life, ranked "co-workers" in the first position, thereby considering them significantly more important than

workers of artisan or worker origin considered them. In other words, neither abolishing of private ownership in industry nor self-management, which should offer an adequate formal basis for genuine interpersonal relations in workshops, were able to solve this well-known problem in industry properly.

Incidentally, we were surprised how extremely low all three groups rated the factor "self-management" (which was defined to them as real, i.e., not only nominal or formal opportunities for taking part in managerial decision-making processes) and even more, that the differences among all three groups in the rating of "self-management" were statistically insignificant. Workers were either satisfied with the present state of affairs in self-management (which we know is far from the ideal or expected level), or they simply did not care about it.

Whichever subgroup of workers we looked at, classified by sex, qualification, formal education or time spent in the factory, the findings remained the same: all respondents put "self-management" in the last place and there were no significant differences among the groups.

TABLE 2
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF WORKING CONDITIONS BY AGE

	Age		
	to 24 Rank	25-40 Rank	41 and above Rank
Work	3	4	4
Wages	4	3	3
Supervisors	5	5	5
Co-workers	2	1	2
Education	1	2	1
Self-management	6	6	6

Data in Table 3 seem to support the idea that under the given circumstances the "self-managerial need" was a rather inactivated need. For, dissatisfaction with self-management in factories neither influenced the position of the factor in the hierarchy nor put more weight on it; on the contrary, the tendency was even the opposite.

An alternative explanation is that self-management has been given low priority because it does not work. It has ordinarily been introduced as an additional factor alongside the existing management, not as a replacement for it.

As was already noted, the process of decentralization and

TABLE 3
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF WORKING CONDITIONS BY
OPPORTUNITY OF PARTICIPATING IN SELF-MANAGEMENT


	Excellent	Neither Good nor Bad	Bad
	Rank	Rank	Rank
Work	3	3	4
Wages	4	2	3
Supervisors	5	5	5
Co-workers	2	4	1
Education	1	1	2
Self-management	6	6	6

economic development was followed by an increase of real income in industry. For instance, in the period 1960–1962–1964, the real income of Slovenian workers increased in the following progression (non-official data):

1960	1962	1964
100	118	145

But during the same period of time, some significant changes, which deeply influenced the atmosphere in Slovenian factories, took place in the hierarchy of motivational factors. In this period of four years we "succeeded" in creating a more or less materialistic society or at least, a society far from the simplified vision of a socialist society where work should be the highest value. Workers did not care any more what kind of work they were performing, but became only interested in *how much* they got: *how much they made*. Figure 1 indicates the relative importance of work and wages during this period. (This and the fact that Yugoslavian borders are completely open can also explain why so many people are leaving Yugoslavia and looking for jobs abroad!)

FIGURE I
The Relative Importance of work and wages from 1960 to 1964.



Obviously higher incomes activated higher consumer needs. By a simple comparison of realized incomes and aspirations we can see that our assumption is not completely wrong. Neither the realized incomes *per se* nor the aspired incomes *per se* determined the rank of the factor "wages"; on the contrary, workers of factory A, for instance, had on the average much lower wages than workers of factory F, and further, workers of factories B, C and D aspired on the average much higher wages than workers of factories E and F. In other words, the determining factor was the degree to which aspirations were fulfilled by realizations. And, aspirations (the estimations of what a fair wage should be) depended on planned purchases! And planned purchases of consumer goods depended on where the factory was located. Workers of factories located in rural areas, e.g., factory A, and relatively isolated areas (where workers had little chance to compare their own salaries and consumer goods with those of workers in other factories, on the one hand, and on the other, had the opportunity to find an additional source of income by "moonlighting" on their farms) had lower aspirations than workers of factories located in urban areas.

TABLE 4
RELATIONS BETWEEN IMPORTANCE OF WAGES AND
PERCENTAGE OF ASPIRED INCOME REALIZED

Factories	Realized Incomes Aspired Incomes	.100	Rank of the factor* "wages" in the hierarchy
A	83.0%		6
B	71.5%		4
C	64.5%		4
D	60.0%		3
E	58.0%		1
F	58.0%		1

*Data are taken from the 1962 panel. In the 1960 panel no one factory put the factor "wages" in first place, and in the 1964 panel all factories did!

Under these new conditions, where—because of modernization and increased standard of living—money became the main motivational factor, and where the society changed from a revolutionary to a consumer one, problems of integration of workers into new social environments also became more and more severe. This happened particularly because the distribution of power remained *de facto* unchanged and because the latent conflict between management and labor did not become institutionalized.

The same processes also changed the attitudes of workers toward their supervisors. In the era when money did not play such an important role, the quality of supervisors, in the eyes of

the workers, depended mainly on their interpersonal human relations. Their ability to organize and to run their outfit in an efficient way was fairly irrelevant. Now the accent has shifted: workers are eager to have supervisors who will be able to help them to make more money, i.e., who are efficient.

The new attitudes can be traced in Tables 5 and 6. Dissatisfaction with wages (answer to the question: how do you consider your wage?) was mirrored in the ranks assigned to wages. On the other hand, satisfaction or dissatisfaction with supervisors was not reflected in the importance assigned to supervisors. Instead, the effect could be seen in the ranks of the factor "wages". The more dissatisfied workers were with their supervisors, the higher the rank given to the factor "wages".

TABLE 5
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF WORKING CONDITIONS BY
SATISFACTION WITH WAGES

	Satisfaction with Wages		
	Satisfied	Indifferent	Dissatisfied
	Rank	Rank	Rank
Work	3	4	4
Wages	4	3	1
Supervisors	5	5	5
Co-workers	2	1	3
Education	1	2	3
Self-management	6	6	6

TABLE 6
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF WORKING CONDITIONS
BY SATISFACTION WITH SUPERVISION

	Satisfied	Indifferent	Dissatisfied
	Rank	Rank	Rank
Work	3	4	4
Wages	4	2	1
Supervisors	5	5	5
Co-workers	2	3	3
Education	1	1	2
Self-management	6	6	6

What could possibly be the explanation? The first possibility, "If I have to work under lousy supervisors then I should at least be paid well"! does not sound persuasive. Dissatisfactions with the other aspects of factory life were not mirrored in the ranks of the

factor "wages". The second possibility seems more reasonable: "If my salary is too low then this means only that I am working under inefficient supervisors who are not able to organize the work in our department properly"! Today workers demand responsible and professionally competent management. The three largest responses to a question on obstacles to company efficiency were: "lack of competent professionals" (42%), "an inefficient wage-incentive system" (40%), and "lack of personal responsibility" (28%).

After the revolution was won and industrialization started, the country was short of professionals; people without proper professional education had to be promoted. And, secondly, when industry became nationalized, revolutionary cadres distinguished by their revolutionary zeal and political reliability were brought into managerial positions. As long as modernization did not take place and workers did not become "spoiled" by material incentives, these ineffective managers did not disturb anybody seriously. Now they are becoming the main obstacle, nearly an unsolvable problem; they do not want to quit their jobs voluntarily and they sabotage the hiring of young, competent professionals who could menace their positions.

They behave in the same way as the rest of the bureaucracy which would like to have both efficiency and power, and oscillates for that reason between ideology and reality, dictatorship and democracy, politicization and functionalization, dynamics and statics, phrases and facts. Therefore, this conflict (i.e., all problems connected with rotation and abdication of cadres) is another field where sociology and social psychology could contribute much. "Another", I say, because I have already mentioned problems of integration of workers into new environments, which seem to be important for any industrializing country and problems concerning the hiatus between management and self-management.

The need for an efficient wage-incentive system was also mentioned by the workers as a problem (40%). But did workers actually have in mind the Marxist slogan, to everybody according to his work, and if so, is this slogan in practice realizable at all? The slogan anticipates that all work is measurable and translatable into money. However, it appears that neither task is simple. We know that nobody has been able to evaluate with salary the work of a really competent and successful manager or leader. We also know that the adequacy of wage or salary is judged by the extent that it satisfies the activated needs (which are as a matter of fact formed predominately outside the working situation, outside the factory). In other words, the worker enters the factory with already-formed ideas of what a fair wage should be and for that reason asks for it.

In Conclusion . . .

We began our discussion with an analysis of a society with a peculiar history and particular socio-economic system. We still do not know who will take over, who will win the struggle, the visions of the nineteenth century expressed in the Marxist theory, as it has been dogmatically interpreted by the ruling élite and accepted by the masses when the movement started or the mechanisms of a "consumer" society. Is the reinterpretation of the first and the reconsideration of the second a safe way? I mean, does it promise us a better insight? Does industrialization bring about the same phenomena all over the world with ideology playing only a secondary role? Or, what is the share of ideology, what the share of industrialization and what the share of existing social values? To what extent do these problems concern only Yugoslavia, a socialist and self-governing society, how far do they concern all so-called developed countries and how far only countries experiencing industrialization? Some answers to these questions are given in these papers and some will remain open for research or will have to wait for historians of the next generation. Who knows?

Motivations et valeurs professionnelles dans l'industrie slovène

Misha D. Jezernik

La recherche présentée dans le présent article a été conduite en Slovénie, le pays le plus riche de la Fédération Yougoslave. La Slovénie est catholique et appartient aux groupes culturels de l'Europe centrale. Son industrialisation a été rapide et a entraîné le déclin des activités rurales. La recherche a duré de 1960 à 1964. Utilisant la méthode de comparaison par paires, on a demandé aux travailleurs de diverses entreprises de définir l'importance relative de certains facteurs susceptibles d'infléchir les conditions de travail. Quels que soien leur origine, leur âge, leur sexe, leur niveau d'instruction et de qualification, ces ouvriers n'attachent qu'une importance minime à la participation à la gestion de l'entreprise. C'est un problème qui ne les intéresse pas ou qui, dans ses manifestations actuelles, semble être résolu de façon satisfaisante. En fait, les attitudes concernant la participation à la gestion de l'entreprise semblent dépendre de la satisfaction vis-à-vis de la structure hiérarchique et des salaires. Entre 1960 et 1964, le niveau de vie des travailleurs a considérablement augmenté et les ouvriers ont cessé de s'intéresser à leur milieu de travail pour devenir de plus en plus fascinés par les problèmes de salaire.

L'importance relative attachée au salaire en tant que facteur déterminant les conditions de travail ne résulte pas uniquement du montant effectif de ce salaire ou des aspirations que les indivi-

dus nourrissent à ce sujet. Elle dépend des achats que les travailleurs se proposent de faire dans l'immédiat et leurs intentions dans ce domaine sont, à leur tour, déterminées par l'emplacement des usines étudiées.


Dans la mesure où une amélioration du niveau de vie devient le souci primordial des travailleurs, le problème de leur intégration au sein de nouveaux environnements devient chaque jour plus sévère, et ceci d'autant plus que les changements de motivation économique n'ont donné lieu à aucun changement dans l'organisation des relations entre ouvriers et patronat.

Les aspirations économiques des ouvriers ont modifié leurs attitudes à l'égard du personnel d'encadrement. En 1960, quand leur paie était faible et leurs aspirations modérées, les ouvriers voulaient surtout que le personnel d'encadrement ait des qualités humaines. En 1964 et *a fortiori* maintenant, les travailleurs désirent avant tout que ce personnel les aide à se faire plus d'argent et soit donc compétent. En fait, plus les ouvriers se plaignent de l'incompétence de leurs contremaîtres et plus ils attachent d'importance à leur paie.

Il s'agit là d'un problème particulièrement grave dans la mesure où les promotions faites après la guerre ont été rapides et basées sur des critères politiques plus que techniques. Ce système n'avait aucune importance tant que la rentabilité des entreprises n'avait pas une importance cruciale. Il a par contre donné lieu à toutes sortes de difficultés, à partir du moment où la Yougoslavie s'est tournée vers l'économie de marché.

Les attitudes de ce personnel d'encadrement oscillent entre des prises de position idéologiques et des analyses objectives et il peut être important pour le psychologue social d'analyser les éléments de cette oscillation. L'essentiel cependant est de constater que les ouvriers entrent dans les usines avec des idées préconçues sur ce que doit être leur salaire et que ce sont ces idées qui déterminent le salaire qu'ils demandent effectivement.

Sur un plan plus général, les données présentées ici nous amènent à nous poser un certain nombre de questions sur la validité des théories marxistes. Les conséquences de l'industrialisation sont-elles universelles et indépendantes de l'idéologie? Les remarques faites à propos de la Yougoslavie sont-elles caractéristiques de tous les pays ayant atteint un certain niveau de développement, quelle que soit la nature de leur organisation politique et économique?



A Motivational Paradigm of Development

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
The "why" of human behavior has been the most intriguing and the most difficult question to answer. And yet it is the basic question, as "how" very much depends on the answer to this question.

Those who are interested in planning programs of change and spelling out how change should be introduced in order to make it more effective and lasting, are concerned with the question *why people behave* the way they do. Why do people start new industries? Why do people adopt improved farming techniques? Why do people use contraceptive methods? Answers to such questions have wide implications for action programs.

Importance of Motivation

Psychologists' interest in the area of motivation, as evinced by researches and publications, has greatly increased in the last few years. This certainly reflects psychologists' concern for searching for more satisfying answers to the question of "why" of human behavior. But probably a more important reason for the increased interest in motivation is the challenge psychologists face of contributing to better planning of change in the world. If motivation can be "managed", planned changes can be introduced and sustained more effectively. McClelland's work, to which reference will be made later, has provided evidence that motives can be developed.

Motivation "causes" human behavior, and to that extent "causes" changes in a community, like increased entrepreneurial activity or adoption of methods of contraception. But I do not hold the view that it is the primary cause of change in human society. Motivation is a strong and an important link in the dynamic causal cycle of human evolution. The paradigm which I propose is as follows:



SS = Societal System; M = Motivation; V = Values (and Attitudes); B = Behavior

According to this paradigm, a specific societal system¹ generates a specific pattern of motivation and system of values which strengthen it, sustain it, and ensure its continuity. The motivational patterns in turn influence behavior. Behavior of people in a society is thus caused by the dominant motivation in that society, which in turn has been generated by the societal system. The relationship, however, is not unidirectional. In other words, motivational patterns and values not only "cause" behavior of people in the society, but also acquire greater "causal" power and, to that extent, not only strengthen but also "determine" the societal system. A similar relationship probably exists between motivation and behavior. Behavior of people in the society also influences the societal system. There are thus several mutually confirming cycles.

According to this view, motivation occupies an important position, exerting influence in both directions at the same time. It "causes" behavior in the society as well as it exerts almost determining influence on the societal system. Motivation thus has a special significance in the planning of change in a society. However, motivation alone cannot bring about change; it should be accompanied by perceptible changes in the societal system. To borrow a term from Atkinson's model,² "expectancy" is necessary; the societal system provides the "expectancy frame".

¹I am using the term *societal* rather than *social*, since my concept of *societal system* is a little different from the current meaning of "social system". By societal system I mean the system and structure of the society, mainly characterized by the level and kind of technology at which it operates, and the pattern of inter-relationships among the main classes in the society.

²Motivation = Motive × Expectance × Incentive (Atkinson and Feather, 1966). Atkinson differentiates between "motivation" (goal-directed tendency) in the sense of "aroused" tendency, and "motive" (a disposition—or a "capacity"—to strive for a certain kind of satisfaction) in the sense of "latent" capacity. It is implied that motive is more stable. I do not find this distinction of much help, and I use the term interchangeably in the sense of a need, seeking satisfaction.

If motivation occupies such an important position in the dynamic cycle of social change, its functioning should be properly studied. Little work has been done in understanding and measuring different complex motives, especially those that seem to be significant for the social change of development. In this paper reference will be made to three such motives, in connection with a general motivational paradigm of social development.

Achievement Motive

One motive extensively studied in recent years is the achievement motive. McClelland (1961), who initiated studies of this motive, has shown that the achievement motive is significantly related to—and is primarily responsible for—economic and technological progress in a society. McClelland and his associates isolated a motive or a "need"—which is characterized by a concern for excellence expressed in a tendency to compete with a standard of excellence—and called it the need for achievement *n-ach* or the achievement motive. A study of this motive in some contemporary societal systems as well as in some medieval and ancient societies showed that upsurge of economic activity in a society followed an increase in the level of achievement motivation in that society.³ These findings encouraged McClelland to explore the possibility of an experiment in developing achievement motivation to see if this results in increase in entrepreneurial activity in individuals and economic activity in a community.

The first systematic experiment was carried out in India at the Small Industry Extension Training (SIET) Institute. The original plan of the experiment was to develop achievement motivation in a group of about 60 persons in each of a series of towns of approximately 100,000 population. The experiment was conducted fully in one town and went only halfway in another town (with corresponding control towns). The design was to get a group of about 15 potential entrepreneurs at a time from the experimental town for a 10-day achievement motivation development program. Four such groups from one town (and only two from another experimental town) participated in the program. The motivation development program was based on the proposi-

³Some recent findings show high positive correlation between achievement motivation and some indices of development even amongst farmers. Data from eight communities in India show that achievement motivation was significantly correlated with innovativeness in six communities (at the .001 level in five communities and .005 level in one community, the overall correlation being significant at .001 level). It was also correlated with level of living (significant at .001 level). (Personal communication from Professor David C. McClelland of analysis of data in Rogers and Neill, 1966).

tions formulated by McClelland (1965a) for motive acquisition. The details of the program are described elsewhere (Pabaney, et al., 1964). It essentially consisted of influencing the fantasy of the participants with achievement-oriented imagery, providing them an opportunity to examine their current behavior and their possible future plans in the achievement motive framework, and encouraging them to work out future achievement plans and possible ways of collaborative, cooperative endeavors. The results showed that the program influenced entrepreneurial activities of the participants; the post-program-participation activities of the experimental group were significantly higher than those of the pre-program-participation period or those of a control group. Some of these results have been briefly reported by McClelland (1965a, 1965b, 1966). Work is still in progress.

Another important study of this motive has been done in India with high school boys. Prayag Mehta's results (1966a, 1966b) indicate a kind of curvilinear relationship between boys' achievement motivation and their fathers' education. Boys of fathers with high education and of fathers with low education showed higher level of *n-ach* (need achievement) than boys of fathers with secondary school education. Similar patterns of relationship are shown between fathers' profession and boys' *n-ach*. Boys whose fathers were professionals and those whose fathers were workers (both skilled and unskilled) showed higher level of *n-ach* compared to those whose fathers did some kind of lower middle class and/or clerical work. These results have significant implications for development. The lower socioeconomic class seems to have higher motivation for change and can be mobilized in accelerating socio-economic change in a nation.

The achievement motivation development program (four months duration) given by teachers trained for this purpose resulted in a statistically significant increase in the level of achievement motivation of boys as compared with changes in boys who participated only in goal-setting programs or the boys in the control groups (Mehta, 1966b). The results from these two major studies in India in two different fields confirm the hypothesis that motivation can be developed. This has immense implications for planning of change.

Extension Motivation

Achievement motivation has been shown to be responsible for entrepreneurial activity in a society. However, development (economic and other) is not a function of achievement motivation alone. Concern for other people or the society also seems to be important for development. No work has been done on this im-

portant motive. In the absence of an available term I call it "extension motive"—a need to extend the self or the ego and to relate to a larger group and its goals. A superordinate goal probably arouses this motive. Such goals may therefore be important not only in developing harmony (Sherif and Sherif, 1953) but also in sustaining continued motivation of people in development. Religions in the past satisfied this motive, helping an individual extend his self or ego and relate to larger entities. It seems that in the modern world, where religions have outlived their utility, attention should be given to rational systems of developing this motivation. Socialist societies have in some form built this motive into their system, by explicitly linking individual goals with higher social goals.

There seems to be enough evidence in history—at least in Indian history—that many social changes, including economic development, were in the past designed and executed by people who showed great concern for others. The extension motive has certainly been significant in non-economic development—social reforms, anti-orthodox movements, promotion of liberal values, etc. Such changes have indirectly contributed to economic development of a country. The speeches of Indian "leaders"—spokesmen of the nation—during the period of struggle against British colonialism and the period of economic development appear to contain a large amount of imagery related to this motive. It is, however, necessary to define it more clearly and study its contribution to the economic and non-economic development of a nation.

More recently McClelland has acknowledged the importance of this motive for economic growth:

This theme of concern for the common good was also found more often in the children's textbooks . . . used by those countries that subsequently developed more rapidly. That is, their stories more frequently described people being influenced by the wishes and needs of others. . . Furthermore, it is probably in this way that one may most easily explain the correlations that have been found between investments in health and education and subsequent rates of economic growth. (1966)

McClelland calls it "concern for the common welfare of all".

Dependence Motivation

Another important motive which needs thorough study is the "dependence" motive. It appears to me this motive has a great relevance to development; it seems to contribute negatively to development.

The dependence motive may be defined in terms of concern for direction for action—looking for direction from other sources.

Such concern may be reflected either in excessive dependence—seeking support and guidance, or in excessive counterdependency—the aggressive rejection of authority. Lack of initiative when action is called for is characteristic of this motive. I suggest the following behavioral cues as important for this motive: avoidance (e.g. shifting responsibility, exaggerated perception of obstacles), seeking direction (e.g. taking initiative rarely, feeling of security in company), seeking favor of a superior (e.g. maneuvering to get into favor, fear of failure), lack of individual choice and overconformism.

Deeper analysis of some data of the Indian study of the development of the achievement motive has given some interesting findings. Lasker (1966) studied in detail persons who had participated in the achievement motivation development programs from one experimental town in India in terms of their actual entrepreneurial activity in the community. He analyzed the TAT protocols of those who had benefited from the program in terms of increased entrepreneurial activity and those who had not. He also interviewed these people and studied their value orientations. One of his findings was that among those who did not benefit from the course, "inhibition variables" blocked activity changes. He proposed and measured three complexes of inhibition variables—conflict avoidance, defensive set and lack of specificity. These variables point to one general direction—a tendency to avoid taking initiative, which is a form of dependence.

There is a great need to do work on this motive and to determine its relationship with the power motive. In terms of the paradigm presented earlier, the dependence motive seems to be generated by a specific societal system—the feudal system (Pareek, 1966). The literature of some periods of Indian history—and folk literature in areas where feudalism remains strong in India—is rich with dependence imagery—courtiers maneuvering to get into favor of the king by outwitting others, shifting responsibility, etc.⁴ The fear of failure seems to be so great that failures are not mentioned in most of these stories.

Most of the developing countries have had a feudal system and have not yet moved beyond feudal values and behavior.⁵ It is

⁴Harish Chandra, a Hindi literateur of the early nineteenth century, wrote a farce to characterize this tendency: a goat was killed when a wall of a house collapsed. The king wanted to pin down the responsibility for the accident, and the responsibility shifts from one person to another. After shifting between about a score of persons it comes to the prime minister, who is to be hanged and who maneuvers the king to volunteer for the gallows.

⁵For a brief discussion of the psycho-social characteristics of the feudal system and their implications see Pareek (1966). In that paper it is shown how these characteristics still prevail in the Indian society, including the modern bureaucracy.

necessary to reduce this need so that individuals in a developing society may take initiative rather than wait for directions and may become more independent and interdependent. The gains from increased achievement motivation and extension motivation could thus be increased.

One effective way to deal with the dependence motive is the use of laboratory training or sensitivity training. We have found that such training helps participants in developing interdependence and skills of collaboration (Lynton and Pareek, 1967). Laboratory training essentially consists of unfreezing the individual participant from his usual traditional frame of reference by making him sensitive to his own values and modes of behavior (through uninhibited participation in a face-to-face agenda-free discussion group, with some analytic-provocative interventions by the trainer to further and accelerate this process), providing him an opportunity to test his usual modes of behavior and get good feedback, and providing him opportunities of exploring new ways of relating to people—development of trust and interdependence.

The General Paradigm

The general paradigm I propose is:

$$D_v \rightarrow (AM \times EM) - DM$$

D_v = Development; AM = Achievement motivation; EM = Extension motivation; DM = Dependence motivation

Increasing achievement motivation (concern for excellence) and extension motivation (concern for others) are important for general socio-economic development. Equally important is to reduce dependence motive (concern for direction) in order to accelerate development. It is necessary to do research in these motives. For action purposes, a program or a series of programs to develop the first two motives (on the lines of one suggested by McClelland, 1965a) and reducing dependence motivation (by using laboratory training) may be useful. Of course, important changes in the social structure, and developing new expectancy frames, is necessary to foster, sustain and accelerate changes in motivation.

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Les motivations nécessaires à un développement accéléré

Uday Patelch

L'article a pour objectif d'identifier les motivations nécessaires à un développement accéléré par de l'innovation et de l'expansion dans un secteur donné. Cette identification est importante pour la compréhension des interactions entre stratégies d'innovation et de développement et leurs impacts comparatifs sur les résultats. Les auteurs ont examiné par des approches novatrices que les stratégies d'innovation et de développement peuvent être modifiées en fonction de l'environnement et de l'identité de l'entreprise. Ils ont également montré l'organisation d'une entreprise selon deux types de stratégies d'innovation et deux types de comportements. Le premier type de stratégie d'innovation est celle d'un catalyseur qui a une activité de recherche et de développement qui est essentiellement de nature pure à des fins théoriques. Le deuxième type de stratégie d'innovation est celle d'un entrepreneur qui a une activité de recherche et de développement de type appliquée.

Malheureusement, les auteurs ont fait l'analyse sans tenir compte du fait que cette dernière analyse fait partie d'un processus qui sera beaucoup plus difficile à mettre en œuvre dans le secteur de l'industrie manufacturière. De là l'idée de rechercher une façon de faire pour améliorer la situation actuelle de ce secteur industriel.

Une expérience complète avec l'industrie manufacturière a été faite pour déterminer si les stratégies d'innovation et de développement sont effectivement adaptées aux besoins de l'industrie manufacturière.

de villes de 100 000 habitants) à l'aide d'images exaltant la notion de réussite, les expérimentateurs ont noté que le niveau d'activité des sujets après la conclusion de l'expérience était supérieur au niveau *avant*, et que le niveau des groupes expérimentaux était supérieur à celui des groupes témoins.

De la même manière, on a démontré que les motivations de réussite étaient maxima chez les enfants dont les parents occupent des positions situées aux deux extrémités de la hiérarchie socio-économique. Les fils de professionnels et d'ouvriers ont des besoins de réussir plus grands que les fils d'employés de bureau. Les fils d'universitaires et de personnes n'ayant entrepris que des études primaires ont également des besoins de réussir supérieurs à ceux des enfants de personnes ayant atteint le niveau des études secondaires. Des programmes ayant pour objet le développement du besoin de réussir chez les élèves indiens (durée quatre mois) ont été récemment mis au point.

Motivation de mobilisation. Cette motivation a trait aux relations que l'individu établit avec son environnement social et plus particulièrement avec les objectifs du ou des groupes auxquels il appartient. Cette motivation détermine l'intensité de la cohésion d'une société donnée, elle détermine également à quel point buts individuels et collectifs coïncident. Le rôle et la nature exacte de cette motivation, dont la contribution au développement politique semble indéniable (mouvements sociaux réformistes, etc.) sont encore mal connus.

Motivation de dépendance. Elle freine le développement économique. Elle se manifeste sous une forme positive (besoin d'approbation) ou négative (rejet de toute forme d'autorité). Laskar a démontré que cette motivation comprend un certain nombre de dimensions psychologiques (tendance à éviter les situations conflictuelles, tendance à éviter des suggestions ou solutions spécifiques, tendance à adopter systématiquement des réactions défensives). L'auteur suggère que cette motivation est le produit d'un système social féodal et qu'elle résulte des conséquences désastreuses que toute forme d'échec entraîne dans un tel contexte. Il conclut qu'une manipulation effective du besoin de réussir demande une neutralisation préalable des motivations de dépendance.

An Affiliative Society Facing Innovations

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This paper is based on some experiences in the Naples area of Southern Italy. Social psychology there is a new discipline not yet firmly entrenched. The pressure of social problems and the lack of an established tradition result in a centrifugal trend away from the real core of a discipline towards those issues which attempt to cope with the external demands. In the case of social psychology, to reinforce this centrifugal trend there are numerous other factors, which I will not illustrate in detail, but only mention: the background and education of the students, the incentives they find in their work and the motivation implied by their own position in the scientific world.

Looking through the scientific journals of those countries where the disciplines are well established, it is often difficult for the laymen to understand even the titles of the articles because the language and scientific constructs that are accepted by those who are trained in the field are highly specialized and removed from the terminology and facts of common experience. The terminology of behavioral scientists from more recently developed research institutions appears to be more generally understandable, which seems to be due to the particular level of differentiation of techniques and scientific constructs. Correspondingly there is often a closer relationship of these constructs with the problems of common experience. The younger scientist might run on the side of too much eclecticism, of language and doctrinal references which are not always self-consistent, and of redundancy

and conceptual circularity. Nevertheless, he can stimulate the more "sophisticated" scholar to consider new problems, to evaluate the need for synthesis and to observe phenomena which before appeared to him irrelevant. In this context, I should say that for some years my associates and I have been gathering observations in a region which has an old tradition of study and research, but where the autochthonous tradition of behavioral science is still in its infancy. Here I shall attempt to give a review of our conclusions rather than to detail the results which led to these conclusions.¹

By an *affiliative society* is meant one in which the behavior of people and events within institutions may be predicted in terms of mutual dependency between the members of the population.

At the level of each individual, *fear of rejection* (the desire to be accepted, the need for support by and integration with other persons, the gratification associated with the mere physical presence of another person, and other similar factors) seems to be at the center of the attitudes, behavioral norms and values, motivations and cognitive activities of the *affiliative personality*. His structure is such that, in Parsons and Shils' (1954) terms, his actions are oriented towards affectivity rather than towards affective neutrality, towards the self rather than the collectivity, the particular rather than the universal, diffusion and ascription rather than specificity and achievement. Not only are such traits, with their underlying dynamics, widely represented within each personality system of an affiliative society but they are hierarchically prior to other personal aspects. That is, an affiliative orientation of the personality can be inferred when the above-mentioned features play the central role in structuring all other percepts, motives and values within the personality system.

At a social level, the groups and institutions seem oriented towards surface, immediate, interpersonal gratifications, rather than towards the impersonal requirements of the organizational tasks. The latter, conversely, will be embedded in the private feelings of group members and will not be clearly defined. The people in charge will hardly be aware of their subordinates' autonomy, approaching them in a paternalistic or, sometimes, authoritarian manner rather than in a contractualistic one. Foremen and office workers will have a compliant approach towards

¹The researches carried out by the staff of the Institute of Psychology of the University of Naples (Asprea, A. M., Galdo, A. M., Gentile, R., Iacono, G., Messeca, S., Sbandi, M., Villone-Betocchi, G.) on the topic discussed here have been published primarily in the recent Proceedings of the Italian Psychologists' Congresses (*Atti del XIV Congresso degli Psicologi Italiani*, Firenze: Editrice Universitaria, 1965; *Atti del XV Congresso degli Psicologi Italiani*, Firenze: Editr. Univ., 1967) and in "Securitas", 1965 and 1966.

their superiors. Consequently, norms and discipline will not be consistent in one direction or in another, since managerial expectations will often be in conflict with workers' need dispositions. Similarly, the intermediate channels of communication and decision making, status recognition and promotion will often be at odds with the functional premises of the organization.

The majority of the members of such a group will not develop common norms, with consequent unpredictability of group behavior and sudden conflictual outbursts. The development of a common normative frame is hindered not only because of the above mentioned breaks in the communication flow, which result from continual compliance, but also because of the systematic avoidance of discussion wherever views diverge.

In other words, there is here a kind of rigid survival and maintenance of the community values and *Weltanschauung* whereas rational and impersonal interaction in the institutions would be required on functional grounds.

The Affiliative Society . . .

Where is such an affiliative society to be found? What are the crucial facts upon which its existence depends?

I would hardly maintain that such a society exists in pure form. The global formulation that I have given is discordant with the many nuances of any actual social reality.

However, as a conceptual scheme, it provides us with a useful guide for understanding and predicting social phenomena, such as those related to innovation in our region. It has proved helpful for organizing findings and for speculating in a rational, testable way about isolated findings. It suggests otherwise unsuspected relations between observed facts; it stimulates research both in the laboratory (experimental conflict, social perception, thought processes, just to mention some of the current studies in Naples), and in the field (workers' attitudes towards their job, towards organizational development, social participation, social motives, educational strategies, etc.), and provides a convenient point of reference for the integration of much of the data gathered so far. Also, it is a departure point, not a firm conclusion.

The affiliative society is not a construct built in a void. It has been formulated, step by step, in the course of some years of research, trying to understand why workers' behavior seems to be so unpredictable both to the management and trade-unions (much more in the South than in other regions of Italy); why, in spite of many personal contacts and gratifications, citizens' social participation is so low; and why the usual resistance to innova-

tions and organizational development is much greater in this area.

South Italian Culture . . .

It is a matter of debate whether South Italian culture is something apart from the rest of Italian culture; probably it would be better to speak of it as a subculture since the educational system and public institutions are more or less centralized throughout Italy. There is evidence from many sources, aside from the research conducted by my associates and myself, of personality differences between the South and North of Italy. Bansfield (1958), Gans (1962), Grasso (1964), to quote only a few of the scholars in the field, have described people or communities in South Italy in terms of a "familistic", "person-oriented" culture. On the other hand, other authors, e.g. Alberoni and Baglioni (1965), suggest that the difference is rural versus urban, rather than South versus North.

I shall briefly report some data showing the facts and the steps of conceptualization which have suggested the "affiliative orientation" as a key for understanding our Southern society. The following characteristics contrast our subjects with those from other regions:

. . . Wherever a situation is standardized and impersonal, there is evidence that subjects from the South become frustrated. In terms of their behavior, we observe a kind of "giving up" attitude towards their task with expressions of diffuse pessimism. Such submission is a passive reaction to reality which often contains latent aggressiveness towards the work situation. In the laboratory, we observe that their mean scores on intelligence and aptitude tests are significantly lower than those of subjects from other regions. Similarly, on projective techniques they show poor ability to verbalize and their answers are restricted to the immediate stimuli. These observations contrast with the fact that subjects from the South show a versatility and readiness to adjust once the impersonal climate is removed from the test situation. This is inferred from their higher mean scores (in terms of ability to verbalize and correctness of responses) in didactic, colloquial situations vs. collective, paper and pencil test situations.

. . . On the job our subjects show lack of confidence in their abilities to obtain promotion; a tendency to interpret their duties rather than rely on a pre-established routine, with the result that there is on their part a failure to respect the job assignment; interference with the work of others, which often results in unsafe conduct.

. . . Young students as well as workers and the larger population, show low scores in achievement motivation² *n-ach* (need-achievement) versus higher scores in affiliation *n-aff* (need affiliation) and power *n-pow* (need power) motivations. Even foremen tend to have low *n-ach* scores, and, in

²These motivational variables are measured with an adaptation of McClelland's procedures Cf. Villone-Betocchi and Zaccone De Rossi (1963).

one study conducted by us, their *n-ach* scores were actually lower than those of their subordinates. These findings and others (higher *n-aff* and *n-pow* scores in the foremen compared with those in the workers' population) suggest that the Southern institutions reward compliance more than anything else.

. . . Both in the field and in the more controlled laboratory setting, small group discussions reflect the incentive found by Southern subjects in the mere fact of "being together"; low incentive is attached to ability in task achievement; expressive is preferred to instrumental behavior; there is low overt competition for leadership and lack of leadership rotation.

To begin with, we had to explore the factual basis of the widespread stereotype of Southern personality. We have tried to ascertain how objective are the differences so often quoted between Southern people and people from other Italian regions. We assessed personality traits and responses to standardized stimuli using mental tests, individual and group interviews, and participant-observation. In these tests we probed *role-interactions* rather than their content. From the descriptive studies, we arrived at a definition of affiliation and recognized it as the relevant characteristic of our population. We recognized that affiliation—dependence on the physical presence of other people, which is compulsory in those who have never achieved individuality—is a mechanism by which anxiety is controlled, people being manipulated rather than objects or tasks. The pattern of mutual dependency of affiliative individuals, if it is to be effective in controlling anxiety, must be assured at the social level by institutional arrangements. The resulting affiliative society finds its meaning in such a pattern. Why a society is so shaped is a difficult question to answer and requires much speculation.

Once the description "affiliative" clearly applies to a population, we may infer that many institutional devices will have been established in order to maintain this pattern: competition becomes a rejected norm, child-rearing practices will center around dependency training, civic and political life will be centered around personal rather than achievement incentives, there will be low respect for ability and specialization, etc.

Not only do these devices tend to support the system, but they are often, if not always, in opposition to alternative means of social organization and to technological innovations. These rejected options are, today, centered on the task, on the ability to delay gratification, on an achievement orientation, on the projection of tensions in compulsive routine and in objects.

Research carried out by us indicates that workers who leave our region to find work elsewhere, compared with those who stay, have higher *n-ach* scores (statistically significant, with education controlled). It has also been found that *n-ach* scores are higher

among those workers who have been abroad for a period of time and return, compared with workers who have never emigrated.

I wish to emphasize that what has been said does not imply the existence of a purely affiliative society on the one hand, as contrasted with a society which encourages innovations on the other. The introduction, in the Naples area, of new technologies, factories and communication media are the very stimuli which have revealed to us the affiliative response in our region. I think that there is some innovation within the affiliative society, but it will express itself in forms which have to be detected and understood in their own context. Research along these lines is in progress.

When innovations are to be introduced from the outside, there are different ways of dealing with them: one major approach is education. McClelland (1961) has suggested a special technique aimed at developing desirable motives in the local population.

The Naples group has started experiments dealing with the possibility of changing foremen's and workers' attitudes towards authority, job and safety devices. We were dissatisfied with the laboratory techniques of attitude change. They seem to stress changes in factors external to attitude structure (e.g. the personality of the experimenter, his authority, prestige and identification, or the formal aspects of the message sequences, its surface content at a purely verbal level), rather than changes in that structure from within. It is the latter type of change that appears to be necessary if one wishes to enhance innovation, achievement, etc. in an affiliative society.

It is not for us to say whether affiliation or achievement is the "right" orientation. The remote perspectives of our approach lie in an attempt to make the population more and more aware of its affiliative orientation, leaving to them the responsibility to choose new motives and norms or to develop the traditional ones.

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Le problème des innovations dans les sociétés dominées par le besoin d'appartenance

Gustavo Iacono

L'auteur se propose d'examiner la société de l'Italie méridionale, dont les membres sont dominés par la crainte d'être exclus des divers sous-groupes auxquels ils appartiennent. Un examen de cette crainte devrait permettre de prédire le comportement des individus en question. Ce comportement est dominé par l'affectivité, orienté vers des objectifs plus particularistes qu'universalistes, et reflète des motivations individualistes et diffuses plus que des motivations collectives et spécifiques. Au niveau macro-social, groupes et institutions servent à satisfaire des relations interpersonnelles immédiates et non pas les exigences impersonnelles de tâches collectives. Cet ensemble de facteurs donne naissance à d'importantes contradictions entre le fonctionnement des circuits de communication, des structures de commandement et de promotion sociale et les principes fondamentaux sous-jacents à l'organisation des groupes.

Tout ceci explique que les syndicats ouvriers et patronaux ne puissent prédire le comportement des ouvriers du Sud de l'Italie, et que cette région soit dominée tant par un taux particulièrement faible de participation sociale, que par une extraordinaire résistance au changement.

Il reste à analyser plus en détail les éléments constitutifs du besoin d'appartenance et de la crainte d'être exclu du groupe.

(a) On a pu constater que les sujets de cette région sont très

vivement frustrés quand on les expose à une situation objective et impersonnelle.

(b) Dans leur milieu professionnel, les sujets tendent à être pessimistes en ce qui concerne leurs possibilités d'avancer. Interprétant les consignes qui leur sont données, ils sont incapables d'exécuter des tâches répétitives et routinières. Ils satisfont rarement aux obligations de sécurité.

(c) La population de l'Italie méridionale, dans son ensemble, obtient des scores particulièrement faibles aux épreuves mesurant le besoin de réussite. Tout porte à croire que les institutions récompensent davantage le conformisme et l'obéissance que les conduites d'innovation.

(d) Placés dans une situation expérimentale ou dans un contexte naturel, les sujets de cette région aspirent davantage à être ensemble qu'à exécuter les tâches qui leur sont demandées individuellement.

Il reste à établir les origines du besoin d'appartenance. Ce besoin apparaît dans toutes les sociétés dont la survie dépend de la dépendance à laquelle sont soumis leurs membres. De telles sociétés défavorisent les sentiments de concurrence et sanctionnent négativement aptitudes et spécialisations individuelles. Toutes ces caractéristiques sont particulièrement mises en lumière quand de telles sociétés font l'expérience de changements technologiques et économiques. Elles empêchent l'émergence de nouvelles formes d'organisation sociale; le problème est donc de savoir comment on peut changer les motivations individuelles dans un sens permettant de stimuler les conduites d'innovation.

L'auteur montre enfin les difficultés inhérentes à l'établissement de programmes satisfaisants dans ce domaine.

PART III

Problems of Education and Diffusion of Knowledge

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**La diffusion des connaissances scientifiques
et techniques dans le public
Ses conditions dans les Pays en voie
de développement**

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Avant propos

L'expérience qui peut nous excuser d'aborder un problème de diffusion est très limitée. Elle concerne uniquement des pays développés. Elle couvre, dans le processus de diffusion, le segment de la réception des informations. Les études sur lesquelles nous nous appuyons dans nos réflexions font partie d'un ensemble de recherches dont la première est constituée par une enquête de S. Moscovici sur l'image de la psychanalyse dans le public. D'autres enquêtes, d'étendue limitée, ont suivi; elles ont porté sur les représentations des phénomènes de la nature et sur les attitudes vis-à-vis de la science et des hommes de science, dans le public. Des études de même inspiration, sur les représentations scientifiques de techniciens, ont succédé à cette exploration. La dernière en date est en cours d'exploitation; elle vise à cerner la transformation des connaissances, en physique, à l'occasion d'un enseignement. Des projets portent sur la diffusion de connaissances scientifiques—celles qui, par exemple, sont associées au

développement technique du laser—étudiée simultanément dans des organisations professionnelles concernées et dans le public.*

Au fur et à mesure que se déroulera notre propos général sur la diffusion des connaissances scientifiques dans le public, nous formulerois un certain nombre de réflexions, sous forme principalement de questions, relatives aux conditions de la diffusion dans le cas des pays en voie de développement.

Nous nous référons au schéma classique de la communication, sans suivre pour autant, dans le discours, l'ordre de transmission des messages. En effet, pour des raisons de convenance dans l'exposé, nous partons, non de la position de l'émetteur, mais de celle du récepteur; d'ailleurs, à notre regret, nous sommes, faute de matériaux, presque obligés de nous y cantonner.

Les réflexions qui suivent n'ont pas pour but de dresser un tableau synthétique des problèmes soulevés par l'étude de la diffusion des connaissances scientifiques. Notre intention est de signaler quelques lignes d'intérêt ressortant d'études particulières.

L'objet de la diffusion

Une définition, négative, de l'objet de la diffusion des connaissances scientifiques et techniques, dont il sera ici question, est nécessaire. Il ne s'agira point de la diffusion d'informations simples concernant les aspects les plus extérieurs, souvent sensationnels, des grandes découvertes scientifiques ou des réalisations techniques importantes. Schramm (1962) a rapporté les résultats d'enquêtes réalisées aux Etats-Unis portant sur ce type de diffusion superficielle (information globale sur le Spoutnik et la radioactivité, entre autres). Les informations de cette nature sont plutôt des informations sur la science que des informations scientifiques. Elles sont généralement liées de manière étroite à l'information sur les hommes de science. L'analyse de la diffusion de ces matériaux élémentaires est, en fait, menée principalement comme une étude des effets des mass media. L'observation de la diffusion, à ce degré, demeure indispensable, mais elle ne découvre qu'un aspect limité des processus sociaux de transmission des connaissances scientifiques et techniques dans le public.

Nous considérons la distribution d'informations scientifiques complexes impliquant, de la part des récepteurs, un apprentissage notionnel ou, au moins, un effort mental d'organisation de concepts. Plus exactement—la suite de notre propos devrait le montrer—nous voulons attirer l'attention sur la diffusion en tant

*Ces recherches ont été conduites au C.E.R.P. (A.F.P.A.), et coordonnées avec des travaux menés à l'Université de Paris et au C.N.R.S. sous la direction de S. Moscovici.

que *processus de distribution de modèles de comportement cognitif*, ou, pour reprendre une formule de Gronbach (1961), une distribution "d'outils" de connaissance plutôt que de "produits".

La diffusion superficielle d'informations élémentaires peut, dans cette perspective, être appréhendée comme la partie dans le tout; il est en effet essentiel de considérer dans quelles conditions la diffusion de l'information relative aux événements scientifiques et techniques stimule ou entrave la diffusion des connaissances sur les *notions*.

Une de nos premières études exploratoires (Moscovici et al. 1962) a porté sur l'organisation de notions fondamentales de physique chez des personnes ayant achevé des études secondaires. Des entretiens—ayant pour fin d'opposer au sujet ses propres contradictions—ont été conduits autour de ces notions. Plusieurs des thèmes abordés étaient en rapport avec les événements de l'actualité, en particulier le thème de la pesanteur, relié aux déplacements des cosmonautes. Une première analyse fait ressortir, par exemple, que la représentation de la pesanteur peut se trouver, chez des sujets scolarisés, fondée sur la pression de l'atmosphère et non sur la gravitation—laquelle est néanmoins évoquée pour expliquer le mouvement des planètes—. Dans une autre étude, concernant des ouvriers de l'industrie chimique, la même méthode d'investigation a été employée pour tenter de mettre en lumière les modalités selon lesquelles étaient mis en rapport les phénomènes contrôlés au cours du travail (tels que le fonctionnement d'un autoclave) et les phénomènes observables dans la vie extra-professionnelle (tels que le fonctionnement d'une marmite à pression). Dans cette perspective, l'individu dans le public est observé au point terminal de processus divers de diffusion, au confluent des courants d'information de toutes natures auxquels il est exposé dans la vie scolaire, dans la vie de travail et dans l'usage des moyens de communication de masse extra-scolaires.

Cette conception n'est pas posée comme novatrice; nous la mentionnons parce qu'il s'agit, en toute analyse d'un processus de diffusion sociale, de qualifier l'objet induit—croyance, attitude, comportement, valeur . . . —et les modalités de réception de cet objet.

La réception des connaissances scientifiques et techniques

Les progrès dans l'évaluation des effets des processus de diffusion sociale se sont accomplis dans deux directions: celle de la mesure de la distribution spatio-temporelle d'un élément

simple dans une collectivité et celle de la mesure du degré et de la forme d'intégration individuelle de l'élément en circulation.

Dans l'étude de la diffusion de l'innovation, par exemple, on voit (Katz, Levin, Hamilton, 1963) se raffiner les modèles mathématiques de la dissémination tandis qu'une attention plus grande est consacrée à la mesure du degré individuel de l'acceptation et à la détermination de ses formes.

Les psychologues sociaux, par la tradition de leur réflexion théorique et de leur orientation méthodologique, ne peuvent être qu'accueillants à la perspective d'une analyse poussée des conditions d'accueil et d'intégration des informations scientifiques, puisqu'il s'agit d'apprécier l'effet d'un phénomène social sur le plan de l'individu. Pourtant, un ajustement méthodologique nous semble nécessaire dans le cas de la diffusion de connaissances scientifiques. L'étude des processus psycho-sociaux de modification d'états psychologiques a conduit—légitimement à notre sens—à souligner l'action secondaire, quoique nécessaire, des éléments cognitifs dans la détermination des changements individuels. L'effort de subtilité dans l'analyse d'un changement d'attitude est principalement orienté sur l'établissement de modèles explicatifs de l'organisation affective et active du sujet. Les éléments cognitifs y sont analysés en tant qu'instruments et en tant que signes de cette modification. En revanche, dans l'étude de la transmission des connaissances, la place centrale est forcément assignée aux éléments cognitifs.

Cependant, les différences ne doivent pas être exagérées. Que l'on étudie la diffusion d'une attitude ou la diffusion d'un savoir, on est amené à s'interroger successivement;

(a) sur l'acceptation d'informations susceptibles de modifier l'attitude ou les connaissances, et

(b) sur la forme et le degré des transformations internes, individuelles, qu'elles provoquent; ainsi parlera-t-on d'intériorisation des éléments constitutifs de l'attitude, et d'intégration de connaissances nouvelles. En bref, les deux processus aboutissent à une modification plus ou moins étendue d'un état et d'une orientation.

L'intégration des connaissances ne peut donc être abordée comme un groupe de phénomènes étrangers au domaine de la diffusion d'autres éléments psycho-sociaux (opinions, attitudes, valeurs . . .); son étude exige une attention double, relative tant aux aspects affectifs et actifs qu'aux aspects cognitifs. Dans cet esprit, nous pouvons examiner quelquesunes des caractéristiques

(a) des attitudes à l'égard du savoir et des sources de diffusion, dont dépend l'accueil des messages,

(b) des conduites cognitives d'intégration des informations scientifiques et techniques.

Il nous paraît préférable, ici encore, pour la commodité de l'exposition, d'inverser l'ordre chronologique de ces étapes.

Conduites cognitives d'Intégration des connaissances scientifiques et techniques

Un constat d'ignorance

Les enquêtes effectuées aux Etats-Unis sur l'information relative à l'actualité scientifique paraissent converger pour mettre en évidence un faible niveau d'information dans le public, et la corrélation, peu surprenante, entre niveau d'information et niveau d'instruction (Schramm 1962). L'enquête de S. Moscovici (1961) sur la représentation de la psychanalyse faisait apparaître également cette corrélation.

Les enquêtes auxquelles nous avons procédé dans la suite ont porté, non sur l'information relative à l'actualité scientifique, mais sur les connaissances scientifiques fondamentales qui leur sont associées. Nous venons d'indiquer l'un des principaux résultats de ces études: la constatation d'une profonde ignorance des phénomènes et des concepts élémentaires, dans les populations ayant bénéficié d'une scolarité avancée. Ces résultats se sont confirmés dans une étude plus récente (Ackermann, Zygouris, 1966) portant sur une population de jeunes adultes ayant déjà bénéficié d'une instruction approfondie en mathématiques et en physique (du niveau préparatoire à des études d'ingénieur) et recevant une formation spécialisée en vue d'une activité dans l'industrie nucléaire. L'exploration des connaissances a eu lieu avant, et après, la période de formation spécialisée. Il était demandé aux sujets de fournir des explications sur des questions scientifiques, qui n'étaient point directement abordées dans l'enseignement, mais dont tous les éléments de réponse se trouvaient contenus dans le programme. Plusieurs de ces questions avaient trait à l'actualité scientifique et technique: état d'apesanteur des cosmonautes, rayonnement. Une analyse systématique des schémas d'explication fournis par les sujets a été réalisée selon une méthode apparentée aux procédés d'analyse documentaire automatique. L'analyse a fait apparaître que la période d'enseignement intensif, de caractère traditionnel, portant sur des notions générales et sur des notions appliquées, n'améliorait pas sensiblement la qualité des schémas notionnels.

L'étude, en milieu professionnel, d'un groupe de techniciens de l'électronique (Barbichon, Ackermann) met en évidence des ignorances sur des notions centrales, comme la masse ou le principe de l'amplification des courants, dont l'application fait partie d'une pratique professionnelle quotidienne.

Des notions scientifiques de base diffusées par voie scolaire ne permettent pas de fixer de manière cohérente des informations scientifiques nouvelles diffusées dans le public. Des notions scientifiques de base diffusées par voie scolaire ne sont pas intégrées dans la pratique professionnelle qui en implique l'usage.

L'absence de mise en relation des informations

Les observations que nous avons pu faire convergent pour vérifier une constatation du sens commun: l'absence d'intégration des informations diffusées représente une absence d'activité intellectuelle de mise en relation des éléments d'information recueillis par diverses voies et des notions constituées dans différents domaines du savoir. Le phénomène a pu être mesuré dans l'étude sur les futurs techniciens de l'industrie nucléaire (Ackermann, Zygouris). Les schémas d'explication ont été dénombrés aux deux stades de l'observation. Le schéma est ici défini comme un assemblage de notions constituant une explication autonome d'un phénomène. Plusieurs schémas peuvent être élaborés pour une même question, incorporant des rapports logiques et des données empiriques différents. Entre les deux observations, le nombre moyen de schémas élaborés par les sujets n'a pas varié sensiblement, ce qui traduit un faible taux d'intégration de notions nouvelles (en revanche, heureusement, le nombre de schémas erronés diminue).

L'absence d'un schéma unificateur (concept mécanique en électronique par exemple) a été notée chez les électroniciens faisant état de la dispersion des différentes acquisitions qu'ils avaient dû incorporer au cours de leur expérience scolaire et professionnelle.

D'une manière générale, ces explorations nous conduisent à consacrer une attention de plus en plus considérable au cloisonnement qui s'établit entre les différents ordres de maîtrise des connaissances pour un même individu: ordres de la théorie, de la technique et de la pratique professionnelle et extra-professionnelle.

On peut se demander si ce cloisonnement des capacités cognitives d'utilisation des connaissances dans des ordres différents—théorie, technique, pratique—n'est pas renforcé par la situation particulière des milieux sociaux en voie de développement, alors que cette situation même exigerait une plus grande flexibilité intellectuelle. Le cloisonnement pourrait fort bien se trouver, dans cette situation particulière, accentué par la rapidité du passage du stade de la formation théorique au stade de l'utilisation pratique, par la rareté des moyens d'information, spécialement d'informateurs, scientifique, et par l'absence d'un entourage réceptif aux notions théoriques dans le domaine de l'activité quotidienne.

La tolérance à la contradiction

Nos enquêtes, dans les populations scolarisées appartenant à un milieu où la culture rationaliste—scientifique s'est depuis longtemps étendue, nous ont conduits à constater chez les individus une tolérance à la contradiction objective, qui peut surprendre. Les psychologues sociaux ont apporté des contributions essentielles à la mise en évidence des phénomènes de dissonance entre des éléments cognitifs dont les implications personnelles sont immédiates et visibles. Nous nous référerons ici à la contradiction dans le domaine du savoir, sans implications pratiques directes, pour l'individu.

Dans la population scolarisée que nous avons étudiée (Moscovici, Rialan), il a été possible de noter des contradictions du type de celles qui ont été évoquées ci-dessus: "la chute des corps est due au poids de l'air—mais les corps tombent dans le vide", "les planètes obéissent à la loi de la gravitation—mais il n'y a pas de pesanteur sur la lune", "l'endroit de la chute d'une pierre lancée du haut du mât d'un bateau dépend de la hauteur du mât et de la vitesse du bateau—mais l'avion participe à la vitesse de rotation de la terre". Nous avons décrit un tel type de contradiction (Ackermann, Barbichon, 1963): l'éclatement d'un ballon sonde est expliqué d'abord par la pression extérieure plus forte en altitude; à la suite de plusieurs essais de correction, par le sujet, la pression est déclarée plus faible en altitude sans que l'explication initiale soit rectifiée.

Il est nécessaire de distinguer sous ces manifestations des déterminations psychiques bien différentes; un examen grossier permettrait d'isoler:

l'absence de saisie intellectuelle de la contradiction logique, imputable à une incapacité personnelle relevant des aptitudes et des conditions de leur développement,

l'absence de perception de la contradiction, imputable à une attitude du sujet qui tend à réprimer l'image de sa propre incohérence,

la présence d'une perception de la contradiction, associée à une attitude de tolérance fondée sur l'invocation de l'ignorance pure et simple, ou sur l'appel à un élément explicatif inconnu et souvent mystérieux, pour dénouer l'énigme.

la présence d'une perception de la contradiction, conjuguée avec un comportement qui consiste à égarer les témoins éventuels (perçus comme censeurs de la cohérence).

Ces distinctions veulent rappeler l'importance, dans l'activité cognitive, d'attitudes privées acquises socialement, et d'attitudes adoptées en société. Cet examen typologique rudimentaire fait ressortir l'*absence d'une norme de comportement d'exploration et de tentative*

de résolution des dissonances formelles; il met également en relief, dans les deux derniers types mentionnés, l'existence d'une norme de cohérence externe qui peut susciter des pseudo-raisonnements, ou des stratégies de diversion vis-à-vis des interlocuteurs. L'intégration de connaissances concernant des faits sans conséquences directes sur l'univers des individus trouve un obstacle dans les capacités intellectuelles et les attitudes sociales à l'égard du savoir; lorsque se présentent dans le champ cognitif des objets nouveaux qui affectent l'état des croyances et des valeurs, l'orientation et le mode d'existence des individus, *la résistance aux transformations et la tolérance à la contradiction* deviennent, on le sait, plus fondamentales (plus "centrales") et plus difficiles à dissiper.

Dans le groupe des recherches auxquelles nous nous référerons, l'étude de S. Moscovici sur l'image de la psychanalyse propose une analyse des représentations conflictuelles qui s'instaurent à propos d'une théorie scientifique dont les rapports avec les systèmes éthiques et les explications correspondantes de la nature de la personne sont évidents. L'auteur, dans son analyse de la "polyphasie cognitive" s'attache à montrer *la coexistence, pour un même individu, de modes indépendants de représentation* d'un même objet social. L'usage de la psychanalyse, par exemple, sera donné comme fondé moralement dans le cas d'intervention sur des situations sociales dramatiques—délinquance, tentative de suicide—; en revanche, la psychanalyse considérée en tant que théorie est perçue comme immorale et condamnable.

Ces notions méritent une attention spéciale dans l'étude de la communication des connaissances en milieu de transformations culturelles liées au développement économique. Des modèles cognitifs incompatibles peuvent coexister dans une même collectivité; et des modèles cognitifs incompatibles peuvent coexister dans un même individu. Ces deux données nous paraissent fondamentales pour aborder l'examen des conditions de la diffusion dans la perspective du développement. Les récentes confrontations des responsables et d'experts concernés par ce problème, telles que la conférence de Téhéran, ont fait ressortir les effets négatifs d'un système de scolarisation extensif, promu dans des circonstances où les connaissances sont appelées à se dégrader au contact d'un milieu où prédominent des formes culturelles d'organisation cognitive très différentes des modèles de référence de l'enseignement. Ces formes sont désignées, parfois hâtivement, sous les vocables extensifs de mythiques ou magiques; elles semblent posséder en commun, au moins, la caractéristique d'une absence de norme de mise à l'épreuve empirique des représentations.

Les risques d'une cohabitation de modèles incompatibles

sont d'autant plus élevés que la science et la technique engendrent des réalisations dont les éléments déterminants échappent de plus aux constatations sensibles. La représentation scientifique des actions physiques à distance (rayonnement, attraction . . .) constitue, d'après les explorations que nous avons poursuivies, un ensemble d'obstacles intellectuels particulièrement difficile à franchir. On peut deviner, par exemple, les obstacles qui s'opposent, dans nombre de populations, à la diffusion de notions sur les ondes électromagnétiques, lorsque des représentations animistes font partie du patrimoine culturel. Les échanges entre les psychologues sociaux et les anthropologues pourraient être en ce domaine particulièrement productifs.

Absence de modèle cognitif d'exploration

Les études que nous avons entreprises sur une population de chimistes et d'électroniciens ont, d'une manière directe, rappelé à notre attention l'intérêt d'une analyse des ressources d'ajustement cognitif à une situation d'ignorance. Ayant à expliquer les phénomènes qu'ils contrôlent au cours de leur activité quotidienne, les sujets, dans l'ignorance, évoquent des stéréotypes d'un contenu très réduit: désignation de l'ordre des phénomènes concernés, recours à une formule mathématique d'application automatique, référence à une règle opératoire pratique. Lorsqu'ils ont à résoudre des problèmes pratiques où l'usage des notions scientifiques paraît s'imposer, les sujets qui n'ont point la maîtrise de ces notions fondent leur action sur des modèles opératoires tels que l'application d'une formule et l'imitation formelle d'un procédé employé en d'autres circonstances. On sait qu'une telle rigidité est créatrice de résistances à l'introduction d'éléments nouveaux dans le champ des connaissances et de l'activité.

L'acceptation passive de l'erreur et de l'ignorance traduit certes une absence de besoins cognitifs qui peut dépendre des facteurs de personnalité; mais elle nous paraît également révélatrice de l'*absence de modèle culturel d'exploration cognitive*. Dans nombre de milieux culturels, l'aveu d'ignorance, la reconnaissance des erreurs, l'interrogation, la quête d'information, l'investigation, ne constituent pas la norme; et ceci nous renvoie à l'examen des attitudes sociales vis-à-vis du savoir.

L'intérêt d'un modèle normatif d'exploration intellectuelle est mis en relief par tout un courant actuel de la psychologie de l'éducation. L'accent se porte sur la formation de comportements d'apprentissage productifs; un déplacement d'attention s'opère, des produits aux outils de connaissance (Cronbach 1961), des systèmes de savoir organisé aux systèmes d'organisation du savoir, de l'apprentissage des corps de connaissances à l'apprentissage de la découverte. Il est tentant d'isoler un système péda-

gogique du milieu où il s'engendre, s'applique et se prolonge. Aussi appartient-il aux psychologues sociaux de mettre en lumière les conditions de la vie collective dans lesquelles peuvent se développer de telles orientations.

L'étude de la diffusion des connaissances dans les pays en voie de développement implique un examen des possibilités de pénétration des modèles cognitifs d'exploration dans les populations concernées. Ce point revêt une importance capitale dans la mesure où le temps et les moyens consacrés à la formation sont limités, où l'utilisation attendue des connaissances est maximale, où un rôle didactique est couramment assigné aux bénéficiaires de la formation.

Il paraît nécessaire de s'interroger sur les chances d'efficacité des méthodes de diffusion scolaires et non scolaires—dont le premier objectif serait de développer un modèle d'activité intellectuelle fondée sur la prospection des rapports entre les informations et sur la recherche de la preuve.

On peut, en particulier, examiner si cet objectif n'est pas primordial lorsque la culture traditionnelle assimile le savoir à l'autorité sociale et induit la passivité des destinataires de l'information.

Il faudra d'ailleurs se demander si, dans ce dernier cas, l'adoption d'un tel modèle par les individus chargés de transmettre les connaissances n'est pas le moyen le plus adéquat pour éviter qu'un rapport didactique de dépendance n'engendre la réception passive du savoir.

Attitudes à l'égard du savoir scientifique

L'examen des conditions d'une intégration cohérente des connaissances nous a renvoyés constamment à l'analyse des attitudes qui orientent la réception des informations. Nous avons été conduits à placer un accent spécial sur les attitudes relatives à l'ignorance et à l'erreur, lesquelles nous paraissent aussi importantes à étudier que les attitudes qui s'expriment dans la possession du savoir.

Dans cet esprit, nous avons entrepris de distinguer, chez les électroniciens de notre étude, les modes de réduction des dissonances qui s'établissent entre la forme idéale de connaissance à laquelle un sujet se réfère et l'image qu'il propose de ses propres connaissances scientifiques et techniques. Un sujet, par exemple, exprime, comme idéal de connaissance, la possession des notions théoriques sur lesquelles se fondent les notions techniques; en revanche, il formule une évaluation négative de ses propres capacités sous le rapport de la maîtrise des notions théoriques; le conflit entre la perception de son incompétence et son aspiration

est résolu chez lui par une invocation de la complexité des notions théoriques. Chez un autre sujet, le même conflit est résolu par une accusation du système d'enseignement technique.

Nous mentionnons cette tentative à seule fin d'illustrer l'intérêt que présente, dans la formation des attitudes de réception de l'information scientifique, le rapport entre la norme du savoir et l'auto-évaluation. Il est généralement acquis qu'une enquête sur les besoins doit précéder la distribution d'un produit. Mais il est peut-être plus difficile de reconnaître qu'une action de diffusion ne devrait pas être entreprise sans une connaissance préalable de la représentation que les destinataires se font de leurs propres capacités d'accéder au produit désiré.

Il est indispensable de discerner, au-delà de la variété des normes idéales individuelles de conduite cognitive, l'action des normes collectives. Cette tâche ne peut être menée à bien sans le concours des sociologues et des anthropologues. Les psychologues sociaux pourraient s'attacher à distinguer qualitativement ces normes de connaissance. Il leur faudrait pour cela persévérer dans l'identification des styles cognitifs (Cohler, Kelman), *le style cognitif* n'étant pas considéré seulement en tant que variable de personnalité mais *en tant que variable culturelle*. La société impose des styles d'apprentissage intellectuel, des modes d'approche des problèmes, que les individus sont amenés à intérieuriser. Le champ des études sur les types culturels de style cognitif et sur leur mode de diffusion nous paraît loin d'être systématiquement exploré à l'aide des ressources conceptuelles et méthodologiques de la psychologie sociale.

L'analyse des styles cognitifs de référence présente un intérêt immédiat dans le cas de la diffusion de nouveaux modèles de connaissance en pays de développement. L'étude des rapports entre les différents styles en présence permet d'éclairer le processus de la transmission. Le style cognitif de référence comporte des traits nombreux dont il importe d'établir la configuration à partir des éléments proposés par les psychologues (couples clarification-simplification, différenciation-intégration, analyse-globalisme, ouverture-fermeture) et des éléments mis en relief par les sociologues (identification du savoir et de l'autorité, représentation de la sagesse associée à l'expérience . . .). Il s'agit de déterminer à la fois le *modèle normatif d'accès à la connaissance* (la mémoire par exemple) et le *modèle idéal de possession des connaissances* (l'érudition spécialisée, l'encyclopédisme, ou la virtuosité à résoudre les problèmes), qui contribuent à donner la mesure des attentes dans le domaine du savoir.

Attitudes vis-à-vis de la science et des hommes de science

L'image de la science—Science—Technique—Croyances

Dans les populations que nous avons abordées, l'association en une même image de la science et de la technique occupe une place considérable. Il faudrait pouvoir déterminer l'influence de l'information de masse sur cette vision. La science est, sous cet aspect, considérée comme un instrument de puissance matérielle, ambivalent, susceptible de servir pour le meilleur et pour le pire. Cette conception a peu de rapports avec la nature de l'activité scientifique considérée comme exploration des connaissances sur le monde. On peut penser que cette *identification de la science à la technique* entretient un appétit d'information, mais n'encourage pas spécialement le développement d'une disposition à la mise en relation des notions générales, qui permettrait une intégration de données nouvelles. L'interférence des valeurs morales et des explications du monde proposées par la science joue un rôle dans la réduction de l'image de la science à des aspects techniques. Dans son étude des représentations de la psychanalyse, S. Moscovici (1961) a montré les conflits nés de la rencontre entre une théorie psychologique, et une technique thérapeutique, et des idéologies—catholique et marxiste—dominant dans le public.

Nous avons rappelé le phénomène de la coexistence de systèmes de pensée différents pour un même individu; une question se pose à ce propos si l'on examine les difficultés soulevées par la confrontation de représentations scientifiques et de représentations associées à des normes et des valeurs éthiques, intégrées dans un ensemble idéologique. On est en droit de se demander s'il ne faut pas souhaiter—and dans l'action, encourager—une coexistence dans l'indépendance (une "polyphasie cognitive" dans l'acception du terme proposée par Moscovici). Pour faire accepter les connaissances scientifiques et le progrès technique, jusqu'à quel point est-il nécessaire de changer préalablement les représentations liées à des idéologies et des systèmes de croyances? Certains ensembles, respectivement composés de représentations non-scientifiques et de notions scientifiques, *logiquement* incompatibles, ne sont-ils pas *cognitivement* compatibles? Des représentations animistes des phénomènes téluriques ne sont-elles pas compatibles avec une représentation plus scientifique du fonctionnement des lampes à incandescence?

La stratégie de la diffusion sera hautement améliorée si, des nombreux travaux sur le changement culturel et sur le changement cognitif, peut se dégager une réponse—unificatrice et différentielle—à cette question.

La perception de la science à travers la technique et ses réalisations prestigieuses semble étroitement liée à une représentation de l'homme de science où les démarches de l'intelligence scientifique occupent peu de place. Une enquête exploratoire de Moscovici, en France (1962), a abouti à dégager les lignes d'un portrait de l'homme de science qui diffèrent peu de celles qui ont été établies par M. Mead et R. Métraux (1957) à partir d'une enquête portant sur des adolescents. L'homme de science apparaît comme un être supérieur et isolé, dont la nature est étrangère à celle du commun. L'enquête de M. Mead et R. Métraux fait ressortir la perception d'une inaptitude à communiquer du savant; celle de S. Moscovici montre que les capacités scientifiques du savant sont imputées à deux éléments: le "don" intellectuel et l'accumulation de savoir. Tous ces traits concourent à présenter l'homme de science comme un *personnage inaccessible, avec lequel l'identification est impossible*. Les caractéristiques de l'activité mentale scientifique qui pourraient rapprocher l'homme de science de l'homme de la rue sont en effet absentes de ces représentations; ainsi en est-il de la curiosité, de la patiente exploration, de la recherche de la preuve, de l'utilisation des erreurs dans les découvertes. Que le savant soit perçu comme un personnage prestigieux, ou comme un personnage peu considéré, risque de ne pas changer grand-chose à la non communication des modèles cognitifs souhaitables; rejeté ou trop loin ou trop bas, ses démarches restent ignorées. Son image ne peut, dans ces conditions, servir de modèle.

L'acceptation de la science comme objet social nouveau n'implique pas nécessairement l'intégration des attitudes cognitives sur lesquelles elle est fondée. Des effets positifs dans le changement peuvent lui être reconnus; elle peut être perçue comme un moyen de prestige pour ceux qui la possèdent, sans que se développe une représentation approchée des produits et des instruments qui la caractérisent. L'acceptation des produits techniques, et des comportements techniques élémentaires est loin de traduire des besoins de connaissances scientifiques. La détection de tels besoins de connaissances devrait donc être d'autant plus précise qu'on sait combien ils sont peu développés. Des enquêtes sur les attentes en matière d'informations scientifiques et techniques sont nécessaires; les enquêtes réalisées au Cameroun (Célarié 1962-1965) ont, par exemple, décelé des demandes d'informations radiophoniques sur les techniques agricoles et médicales, et un intérêt pour les informations relatives aux phénomènes supra-terrestres. Ces indications devraient permettre un ancrage des informations scientifiques distribuées par la radio sur des besoins que n'auraient pu deviner les auteurs d'émissions éducatives.

Développement et diffusion: ce qu'il importe de diffuser, ce qu'il importe d'étudier

L'examen des conditions de réception, dans le processus de diffusion des connaissances scientifiques, examen réalisé dans des pays qui bénéficient d'une avance dans le domaine scolaire et technique, permet de formuler, en résumé, quelques propositions pratiques qui nous paraissent susceptibles d'application dans le cas des pays en voie de développement. Elles appellent, naturellement, discussion.

La diffusion des connaissances scientifiques est subordonnée à l'intégration des *modèles d'activité cognitive* requis pour l'intégration de ces connaissances. Dans cette perspective le modèle aurait priorité sur le matériel.

Ces modèles comportent essentiellement les démarches *logiques* de la mise en relation des informations disponibles et de la recherche des preuves, et la soumission au donné empirique.

Les *techniques quotidiennes* semblent constituer un matériel privilégié pour l'apprentissage de ces comportements intellectuels (la mécanique peut, par exemple, offrir un matériau pour l'initiation à des modèles de causalité en chaîne et d'interaction).

La crainte de diffuser des connaissances *théoriques générales* ne paraît pas fondée lorsque ces connaissances permettent la référence à un schéma simple qui sauvegarde l'idée de cohérence. (Pour offrir un schéma de référence permettant de rendre compte des réactions chimiques, sans en expliquer le détail, il n'est pas impossible de proposer un schéma atomique, moins abstrait que l'énoncé d'une réaction).

La diffusion de modèles de conduite cognitive que nous avons appelés *exploratoires* nous paraît constituer un des premiers objectifs souhaitables d'une diffusion organisée (pour éviter la passivité, compte tenu de l'identification du savoir de l'autorité).

Il est important de savoir si la *personnalisation* du modèle cognitif d'exploration grâce à son adoption par les transmetteurs de connaissances n'est pas un des moyens privilégiés pour lever les attitudes cognitives de soumission.

Des conflits sont susceptibles de naître de l'interférence de représentations scientifiques et de représentations associées à des systèmes de croyances et de normes de vie. On peut se demander dans quelle mesure il est possible de ménager un état de coexistence cognitive, de représentations traditionnelles et de représentations scientifiques, en attendant que s'élaborent les modèles culturels nouveaux qui entraînent la désuétude des représentations traditionnelles.

Ces propositions impliquent un développement de l'étude des modèles culturels de connaissance, en particulier des normes

de styles cognitifs, des attitudes à l'égard de la possession du savoir, des conflits de représentations et de modèles. Ces études préalables ne peuvent être conduites avec profit que dans une perspective d'intersection avec la sociologie de la connaissance et l'anthropologie.

Attitude et langage de l'émetteur

Trois variables ont particulièrement retenu notre attention dans le comportement de l'émetteur, considéré sous l'angle de l'efficacité de la diffusion: la propension à communiquer l'information scientifique, l'image du destinataire, l'ajustement du langage employé.

La propension à communiquer

Les modèles de diffusion de connaissances scientifiques ne sont pas assimilables aux modèles de la campagne publicitaire ou électorale. Dans ces dernières, la volonté d'induire le comportement de consommation ou de vote, ne souffre pas de réserve. L'émetteur est mu par le désir de maximiser la diffusion. Il en est autrement lorsqu'il s'agit de diffuser des connaissances scientifiques, techniques, et culturelles. Les connaissances constituent un bien et les détenteurs de ce bien ne sont pas nécessairement motivés pour le diffuser efficacement si cette diffusion peut être ressentie comme préjudiciable à leurs intérêts. Qu'elle se développe au sein d'un groupe primaire d'atelier, dans une organisation ou entre des groupes professionnels, la diffusion des informations techniques et scientifiques peut donner matière à des pratiques et mesures sélectives et restrictives. De telles pratiques peuvent avoir pour effet d'empêcher que la distribution du savoir ne se retourne contre les distributeurs. La restriction par voie quantitative s'exprime par la proportion du public à laquelle les messages sont communiqués: la masse ou les "happy few". La restriction par voie qualitative consiste en une composition des messages qui réduit la matière susceptible d'être communiquée. Pour illustrer la première forme de restriction, on citera l'association d'ingénieurs qui s'interdit de publier hors de son groupe une technique nouvelle que pourraient assimiler des techniciens subalternes; les historiens sociaux européens ont pu analyser, dans les classes dirigeantes, des attitudes de résistance à l'expansion de la scolarisation, qui au XIX^e siècle au moins, s'exprimaient sans détours.

Une orientation restrictive peut se manifester sur le plan de la composition des messages:

par une rétention pure et simple de l'information (les formes de rationalisation pour la justifier sont nombreuses; l'invocation

de la complexité des problèmes théoriques soulevés par le thème du message en est une);

ou, au contraire, par une "surdistribution" de données et de notions, qui aboutit à l'égarement du récepteur sous le flot d'informations (une *pratique amplificatrice* constitue ainsi l'instrument d'une action restrictive; elle est conciliable avec une stratégie de prestige qui consiste pour l'émetteur à faire valoir son savoir sans le communiquer);

par une organisation des messages en forme de développements théoriques qui seraient appropriés à l'exposition, encyclopédique, de l'état exhaustif des connaissances sur une question, mais qui ne le sont pas à la présentation progressive, didactique, de notions;

par le recours exclusif aux "explications nobles", écartant la référence aux notions et aux observations familières;

par l'emploi d'un langage scientifique ésotérique sans référence aux correspondances—et aux non-correspondances—with le langage familier.

Les stratégies de restriction ne doivent pas cacher les stratégies contraires—stratégies "*inflationnistes*" inspirées par une motivation de diffusion maximale. La pression à communiquer est telle chez l'émetteur—individu ou collectivité—qu'elle provoque la profusion dans la distribution de l'information; celle-ci détermine un encombrement des canaux et une saturation des possibilités d'intégration des récepteurs. Une orientation positive de diffusion engendre ainsi des effets similaires à ceux de certaines pratiques de brouillage déterminées par une orientation restrictive, que nous venons de mentionner. Dans les relations primaires le désir de tout dire empêche de faire passer l'essentiel. Quand il s'agit des groupes sociaux étendus, on peut avancer l'hypothèse que le développement de certains systèmes d'instruction élémentaire, dans le sens de l'accumulation des connaissances, plus que de la transmission des outils, est imputable, pour une part non négligeable, à la volonté des promoteurs sociaux de l'éducation populaire de transmettre le maximum de connaissances dans le minimum de temps. On peut faire cette hypothèse, par exemple, dans le cas du développement de l'enseignement primaire obligatoire en France à la fin du XIXe siècle. (Sans négliger d'autres facteurs, tels que le recrutement endogène des éducateurs dans le groupe social touché par l'éducation primaire, la force du modèle de l'autodidacte dans ce groupe, et tous les facteurs relevant des actions restrictives des groupes sociaux de décision, bénéficiant de l'accès à l'enseignement supérieur.)

Lorsqu'on se réfère aux pays en voie de développement, il est facile d'apprécier l'ampleur des conséquences des orientations des attitudes des émetteurs, et des stratégies de diffusion qui leur

sont associées. Il est, à ce titre, instructif d'identifier ces attitudes et ces stratégies chez les élites détentrices du pouvoir de diffusion, à tous les stades du processus. L'enquête déjà citée sur la diffusion radiophonique au Cameroun (Célarie 1962-1965) fait état d'une propension collective à communiquer le savoir, positive chez les jeunes, et négative chez les individus âgés. On peut penser que, dans la situation de changement social de ce pays, les jeunes ont intérêt à affirmer une capacité de posséder des connaissances, qui leur est refusée par la culture traditionnelle, où le savoir est la propriété des gens âgés. Il est probable qu'un tel comportement évolue lorsque le statut des jeunes s'est lui-même transformé. Des rapports de concurrence peuvent alors s'établir au sein d'une même génération et inverser le sens des attitudes à l'égard de la dissémination des connaissances.

L'image du récepteur

La propension à communiquer ne suffit pas à expliquer l'efficacité de la communication. *L'image du récepteur* qui se compose chez l'émetteur intervient comme une variable majeure. C'est une représentation inexacte de la capacité réceptive du destinataire qui explique l'échec des actions de diffusion inflationniste, inspirées par une motivation puissante de communication. Une image négative du récepteur est, au contraire, susceptible de déterminer une diffusion restrictive, ceci indépendamment d'une stratégie défensive dictée par l'intérêt (il n'en est pas moins vrai qu'une des formes privilégiées de rationalisation des pratiques défensives est offerte par l'élaboration d'une image défavorable du destinataire).

Il est indispensable de pousser l'analyse de cette image en précisant comment l'émetteur perçoit, chez le récepteur, les capacités psychologiques d'intégration des connaissances scientifiques. Les psychologues estiment qu'il est très difficile d'élucider les mécanismes de l'acquisition; mais les psychologues sociaux pourraient au moins explorer l'image de l'acquisition qui règle le comportement de la transmission. Cette nécessité devient impérieuse lorsqu'une grande distance culturelle sépare les deux agents de la communication. Il serait alors possible de chercher comment cette image influence le mode de présentation des messages. Si par exemple, l'émetteur n'a aucune idée des aptitudes d'exploration et de mise en rapport qui existent chez les récepteurs, on peut s'attendre à ce qu'il se confine dans l'emploi de modes de présentation qui ne sollicitent pas l'activité investigatrice. S'il ignore le niveau de généralité auquel se situe la curiosité du récepteur, s'il ignore également sa capacité de fixer des notions abstraites élémentaires, on comprendra qu'il soit réticent à

l'égard de tentatives d'organisation de notions éparses autour d'un schéma théorique, général et simple.

Conjointement, il est essentiel de déterminer la nature des normes de la transmission des connaissances auxquelles se conforment les émetteurs. Indépendamment de l'image du récepteur et des attitudes à l'égard de celui-ci, l'émetteur est soumis à l'influence de modèles de communication qui lui sont imposés par la culture. Les sociologues de l'éducation pourraient contribuer à isoler de tels modèles dans une perspective interculturelle; il appartiendrait aux psychologues sociaux d'identifier les configurations possibles de ces modes de communication.

Dans la même perspective, il conviendrait de s'interroger sur les déterminants des choix qui, chez les élites, règlent quantitativement et qualitativement la diffusion planifiée. Au Cameroun, par exemple, les programmes de la radio s'ajustent à un public urbain et scolarisé (Célarié 1965). Il n'est pas établi si cet état de fait est la conséquence du choix délibéré d'une éducation par étapes, celle d'une stratégie inexplicite en faveur d'un groupe privilégié proche des émetteurs, ou enfin celle d'une surestimation des capacités réceptives de la population rurale. L'exploration des objectifs des émetteurs se révèle indispensable. L'étude des communications de masse offre déjà des ressources en ce domaine.

Champs et moyens de diffusion

Les enseignements tirés de l'étude des communications éclairent l'analyse de la diffusion des connaissances scientifiques et techniques, dans la mesure où celle-ci est processus de transmission d'attitudes. L'étude des communications a mis en relief l'importance des relations de face à face comme variable de la modification des attitudes et des opinions. Dans la réflexion sur la diffusion des connaissances, scientifiques et techniques, les circuits scolaires et les moyens de communication de masse occupent généralement une place prépondérante. Dans nos enquêtes en milieu de travail, nous avons pu accorder une attention plus grande aux circuits formels et informels des organisations par lesquels se véhiculent l'information technique et l'information scientifique qui lui est associée. *Le champ de diffusion constitué par le milieu de travail* représente une zone privilégiée pour la formation d'attitudes et pour la transmission d'informations par voie d'interactions personnelles. Le milieu de travail offre une situation de communication d'information "à la commande", pour répondre à des besoins spécifiques qui se manifestent à l'occasion de tâches concrètes. Les modèles d'apprentissage et d'utilisation du savoir s'y communiquent dans des conditions qu'il est intéressant d'opposer à celles qui prévalent dans les cadres scolaires magistraux. Dans le milieu de travail, les modèles cognitifs s'exhibent sous une

forme vivante; dans le cadre scolaire traditionnel, les maîtres exposent des règles et un savoir constitués, sans dévoiler leurs propres démarches. L'intérêt pratique que peut présenter le milieu de travail comme moyen de diffusion mérite d'être examiné.

Les pays en voie de développement ne disposent pas de réseaux scolaires denses; des réseaux vicariants doivent être cherchés. Le *cadre de l'activité quotidienne* constitue un domaine d'ancre des connaissances et offre des ressources d'échanges dont il importe d'apprécier les qualités en se délivrant de la référence limitative au système de diffusion scolaire.

Un autre aspect de la communication didactique en milieu de développement doit être rappelé. On sait l'importance de la transmission des techniques sous forme de savoir faire et par voie d'imitation, dans les groupes traditionnels. Si l'on considère qu'il est possible et souhaitable, d'une part, de créer des chaînes de transmission du savoir indépendantes des circuits scolaires et, d'autre part, d'utiliser la diffusion scolaire comme relai d'une diffusion extra-scolaire, les modèles de transmission des connaissances demandent à être modifiés.

Un modèle d'imitation, une norme de soumission à l'autorité du savoir collectif (opposée au savoir individuel autonome) sont étrangers aux formes de communication susceptibles d'induire les modèles de l'apprehension scientifique. La recherche de l'efficacité ordonne donc de diffuser des *modèles de transmission* nouveaux; en ce sens, il nous paraît qu'un savoir ne devrait être communiqué que s'il est associé à l'apprentissage de sa transmission. Notre incomptence nous interdit de définir les formes possibles de cette transmission. Néanmoins, il est clair qu'une hypothèse s'inscrit en filigrane dans notre propos. Elle est toute gratuite, puisqu'elle est inspirée par l'expérience de milieux très différents des milieux du développement. Le style de l'exploration du matériel concret immédiat constitue, à notre sens, à la fois un modèle d'acquisition de "l'attitude scientifique" et un modèle de transmission: "apprendre en cherchant, et enseigner en cherchant, fonder l'autorité scientifique des savants, dont on est amené à accepter les propositions, sur leur soumission à l'impératif de la recherche et de la vérification des faits". Ce type de participation active est directement inspiré d'une psychologie pédagogique conçue dans et pour un milieu de développement socio-économique avancé. Il peut au moins servir d'illustration de la notion d'apprentissage de la transmission.

La place des moyens de communication de masse

L'opinion attribue souvent une grande puissance aux moyens de communication de masse; on sait combien cette appréciation doit être nuancée lorsqu'il s'agit de la détermination des change-

ments d'attitude, d'opinion, et de comportement (Klapper). En revanche, on dispose de fort peu d'indications sur les effets que peuvent avoir les moyens de masse dans la transmission des informations complexes et des modèles cognitifs d'orientation scientifique. Cependant l'efficacité des moyens de communication de masse, utilisés, sous leur forme habituelle, dans le but de diffuser des connaissances scientifiques approfondies, peut être sérieusement mise en doute.

Le thème de l'usage des moyens audio-visuels jouit d'une grande faveur; l'usage de ces moyens risque d'être perçu d'une manière stéréotypée comme une simple utilisation, dans un cadre scolaire, des moyens de communication de masse sous leur forme classique, ou comme une miniaturisation de ces moyens. Le public est naturellement impressionné par l'aspect matériel, technique, de l'utilisation des moyens audio-visuels. La représentation d'un apprentissage automatique, passif, devient centrale dans ce modèle de transmission, et nuit directement à la constitution d'une image de l'apprentissage saisi comme activité.

L'utilisation des moyens de communication de masse—lorsqu'ils sont disponibles—dans le pays en voie de développement présente des difficultés spécifiques. Elle doit affronter une grande hétérogénéité culturelle et linguistique, et une grande diversité des niveaux d'instruction.

En se référant à l'hypothèse du "two steps flow" de communication, on pourrait suivre l'étude de l'efficacité pratique de procédures composites, intégrant les ressources offertes par l'utilisation des moyens de masse et les ressources du face à face personnel. Les moyens de masse sont susceptibles de servir:

à orienter les attitudes à l'égard de la science et des savants; ils pourraient contribuer à édifier une représentation plus intime du style d'activité du savant, celui-ci étant présenté comme travailleur et chercheur plutôt qu'autorité distante;

à diffuser des informations scientifiques élémentaires, provocatrices de l'intérêt; cette fonction est mise en relief par Schramm (1962);

à fournir des matériaux techniques et scientifiques utilisables dans des formes d'apprentissage par participation active.

L'étude des techniques d'*association des moyens de diffusion de masse* et des procédés d'une pédagogie active offre aux psychologues sociaux un champ étendu de recherches. Son intérêt apparaît à travers les premiers travaux d'évaluation du rendement de l'audition radiophonique groupée, ou de la combinaison de projection de film, de programme de télévision, avec des procédés faisant appel à la participation des publics concernés.

La planification de la diffusion doit être conçue en dehors du modèle conventionnel de l'étanchéité des circuits scolaires et

des circuits extra-scolaires (circuits de l'activité quotidienne et circuits relevant des moyens de communication de masse). En particulier, on peut étudier l'organisation, dans le champ de l'activité extra-scolaire, de campagnes d'instruction et de dispositifs d'instruction permanente: qui lient l'information scientifique et technique à des *besoins immédiats*, qui permettent d'appliquer à une population étendue le bénéfice de la diffusion, qui demandent la *participation* de tous les détenteurs de connaissances techniques et scientifiques.

L'illustration élémentaire d'un tel type de diffusion serait dans le domaine de la vulgarisation biologique et médicale, un système de dispositions permanentes qui associerait aux mesures de vaccination humaine et animale un minimum d'informations sur le phénomène de l'immunisation; un tel système exigerait la participation des agents médicaux et vétérinaires et demanderait que soit développée chez eux une attitude de transmission que l'éducation scolaire ne cultive pas toujours.

Un examen des conditions de la diffusion des connaissances scientifiques et techniques, dans l'état actuel de la psychologie sociale, conduit d'abord, à notre sens, à une mise en garde contre les illusions d'efficacité des procédés de diffusion superficielle des informations et à un appel de l'attention sur les attitudes qui déterminent la qualité de la diffusion. Cet accent porté sur les attitudes ne concerne pas seulement les récepteurs de l'information scientifique; il s'applique également aux émetteurs dont le comportement règle l'économie de la communication. Enfin, les résultats des études sur la diffusion dans le public font aussi apparaître l'intérêt d'une utilisation de circuits extra-scolaires et l'importance d'une action conçue non plus simplement comme la diffusion de connaissances, mais bien comme diffusion sociale de la fonction didactique.

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The Diffusion of Scientific and Technical Knowledge

Guy Barbichon

Social psychologists explore the problems raised by (a) the acceptance of information likely to modify attitudes and knowledge, and (b) the intensity and specificity of these modifications. The examination of these problems requires (a) the analysis of attitudes toward knowledge and the sources of knowledge, and (b) the study of the cognitive processes by which we integrate scientific and technical knowledge.

Examination of the Cognitive Processes of Integration of Scientific and Technical Knowledge: Many studies have shown that the scientific notions and ideas acquired by an individual during his formal education do not enable him to integrate new scientific information, nor does he integrate these notions and ideas in the practice of his profession. In fact, there is a marked segregation between the various types of knowledge—theoretical, technical and practical. It is particularly important to assess the intensity of this segregation in developing nations.

Other studies have shown that the cognitive exploration involved in the acquisition of new knowledge depends on certain norms. These norms are particularly important when individuals are exposed to several independent models of knowledge. Indeed, independent cognitive models can co-exist both within a culture and within an individual, a situation which occurs in many developing nations.

Not only are there variations in the desirability of scientific exploration among cultures, but these variations also characterize

the models pertaining to this exploration. The role of social psychologists is to determine the conditions under which norms and models of exploration develop in a variety of contexts. This study is particularly crucial where knowledge and power are coterminous and where, accordingly, learning is perceived as a form of dependence.

Attitudes Toward Scientific Knowledge: If there are both inter-individual and inter-cultural differences in cognitive styles, it is essential to identify the various components of these styles, i.e., (a) the relative importance of analytical and synthetic processes, of differentiation and integration, (b) the normative form of access to knowledge (e.g., memorization), and (c) the ideals pertaining to the possession of knowledge (erudition vs. encyclopedism vs. ability to solve problems).

It is equally important to determine the degree and forms of compatibility between various types of cognitive processes; for example, although mutually exclusive in logical terms, animist representations of meteorological phenomena and more empirical representations of electric phenomena are not necessarily incompatible in terms of cognition. Scientific activities remain marginal in many developing nations and it is necessary to determine on which social and psychological needs the systematic diffusion of scientific knowledge should be based.


Attitudes of the Emitter: It is important to determine the restrictions underlying the emission of new knowledge. These restrictions may pertain to the size of the audience, the content of the message or the cognitive supports of the message. We should know more about the differential effects of these various forms of restriction. Similarly, it is important to determine what image the emitter has of the receiver (in terms of his needs, his cognitive styles, etc.).

Occupational activities seem to represent a particularly adequate medium through which to diffuse new knowledge in developing nations. Indeed, it is at this level that the three types of knowledge are most likely to be easily integrated. In this context, one should aim not only at transmitting a message with a specific content but also at teaching new processes of exchange and communication. In short, teaching should be concerned not only with substantive issues but with structures and processes of reasoning as well.

Use of Mass Media: Mass media are very fashionable as instruments of diffusion of scientific knowledge in developing nations. Yet, their efficient use is hindered by the consequences of cultural and linguistic heterogeneity. It is possible, however, to utilize such media in order to (a) modify attitudes toward scientific knowledge and scientists, (b) diffuse specific scientific informa-

tion likely to create a certain interest among the masses, and (c) provide technical and scientific materials likely to be re-used in various forms of active pedagogy.

The main point is to use such techniques in ways which reinforce the diffusion of scientific knowledge through academic channels. They may indeed help in closing the gap between the schools and daily experience.



Some Research Problems in African Education

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Education in the wider sense, in which I propose to use it here, is an integral part of the organization of any society, since all societies need to prepare their young to fulfill their adult roles adequately. In traditional African subsistence economies, no clear distinction could be drawn between child rearing and education, which were in the main undertaken by the extended family. In this manner not only the necessary basic skills were transmitted but also moral rules, attempts being made to shape the qualities of character deemed desirable. Some aspects of the educational process were more specific. Thus, the preparation for puberty rites was often a period of intensive and specialized instruction for both sexes. Again, there was systematic teaching for certain occupational roles such as fishing, or the exceptionally high-status position of drummer; the latter was not merely a most accomplished performer, but had to be a ritual and historico-mythological specialist as well. This process of indigenous education has been extensively studied, from their own point of view, by social anthropologists (Fortes, 1949; Read, 1959).

Gradually from the beginning of this century, and during the past two decades at a rate probably unprecedented in history, formal education at school has come to be superimposed upon the traditional ways of rearing children. This has taken place in the context of a social and cultural transformation which has been much more drastic in urban areas than in rural ones. The fact that two systems co-exist in varying degrees is of course common-

place; on the other hand, very little is known in psychological terms about the effects of their interaction. There are indications of problems of adjustment, though the evidence is mainly anecdotal, as in the following example from Ghana:

My boy seems to have improved considerably. The education he is getting at school is wonderful. But I must confess to one thing. I do not like the way he behaves nowadays. I think there is a lack of discipline in the school. It may be due to the boys he has been playing with. He has become stubborn and refuses to eat with his brothers or to share the same bed with them. He always goes to bed early, but when the other children join him later he gets up, sits on the bed and cries the best part of the night, just because his younger brother is sharing his bed. (Darkwa, 1962).

The existence of tensions resulting from conflicting norms, which is unavoidable, probably has some effect on progress at school, but so have numerous other factors about which we are equally ill-informed. My difficulty is that of selecting from the potentially vast array of research problems in this sphere those likely to yield the maximum pay-off. This immediately raises the further question of "pay-off in terms of what?", and here I must declare my own value-judgments, setting out the educational objectives to which I subscribe. The first three are slightly modified from the formulation by Alva Myrdal (1962):

- ... Adaptability—readiness to accept change.
- ... Enterprise—initiative for improvement.
- ... Rationality—critical analysis instead of blind acceptance.

To these three, which like Myrdal I would regard as valid universally, I would add one particularly necessary in Africa:

- ... Wide as opposed to narrow sentiments and loyalties.

There is another issue that I intend to ignore, not because it is unimportant but because I feel it has only an indirect bearing on the problem of research; that is the extent to which school education should endeavor to preserve African cultural values. On this I would only point out in passing that it is as well to realize that one cannot have one's cake and eat it, as certain writers on African education seem to promise; for instance, economic progress requires bureaucratic institutions, which in turn entail the curtailment of kinship obligations. I shall not pursue this discussion of goals, and shall proceed to the review of research areas which appear to me related to these goals; admittedly, though, my selection remains a personal and somewhat arbitrary one.

On Child Rearing . . .

Apart from global investigations relying in part on African material recorded in cross-cultural files, few psychologically

oriented studies have been done in Africa so far. At the University of Ghana information was collected through students in education about child rearing practices in their home villages (Kaye, 1962); a somewhat similar inquiry has recently been completed in Nigeria (Uka, 1966). This kind of approach has of course severe limitations, fully recognized by those who undertook this useful work. From other parts of the continent there is the study by Dr. Knapen (1962) in the Congo, and the account of Nyasongo Kenya (LeVine, 1963), which forms part of the Cornell-Harvard-Yale project. The theoretical orientation of both the latter is in the main that of the culture-personality school. In the fieldwork, strenuous efforts were made to provide descriptive details of practically everything bearing on child rearing. Whilst this avoids a partial and myopic perspective, it has the serious disadvantage that it becomes exceedingly difficult to link specific antecedents with subsequent behavior. A more profitable strategy would perhaps be to plan observations on the basis of definite theoretical formulations which might well include psychoanalytic ones, but should not be confined to these. Without presuming to lay down any detailed prescriptions, a few examples may help to indicate the broad lines that could be followed.

Two theories which focus on particular types of child-parent relationships, and have important practical implications, are those of McClelland (1961) and Witkin (1962) respectively. McClelland's statements about achievement motivation in African societies are based on indirect evidence and have left anthropologists somewhat puzzled. Thus Kikuyu and Chagga, widely regarded as among the most enterprising peoples of East Africa, are near the bottom of his list of *n-ach* (Need Achievement) scorers. On the other hand, a recent study using dreams of Nigerian schoolboys as its raw material yielded findings about *n-ach* levels of Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba that are strikingly consistent with the known behaviour of these groups (LeVine, 1966). In any case, a direct study of the relevant child rearing variables among different African peoples might not only clarify some of these issues, but also might suggest the kinds of changes in child rearing that might be encouraged. Witkin's generalisations about field-dependence and independence have received confirmation in several parts of the world, including Africa. His theory also has the virtue that the predictions, unlike those of McClelland, lend themselves to relatively straightforward testing in later childhood. These theories are bracketed together because they would involve the collection of much the same type of child rearing data; moreover, both would benefit from a longitudinal approach and comparisons in different areas.

Another obvious suggestion is that the theoretical schema of Bandura and Walters (1963) might be employed, leading to the following kinds of specific questions: What are the models to which the growing child is exposed? What reinforcements are or are not applied in what types of situations? Initially, at any rate, the approach would have to be exploratory and descriptive rather than experimental. The nature of the child's social and physical environment would need to be systematically mapped out, and for this purpose the ecological methods advocated by Barker (1963) could be adopted; they seem eminently suitable for African conditions, where a large proportion of social behavior is enacted in public "behavior settings". Hypotheses could be elaborated and tested, about the probable effects of varying degrees of exposure to westernized models, a term which would of course need careful operational definition. Although not cast explicitly in a learning theory framework, a certain amount of relevant work has been done. In a study comparing certain features of child rearing among traditional versus elite Yoruba mothers Barbara Lloyd (1966) uncovered some striking differences. Asked "what do you do when your five-year-old brings home a good report or will in future, if he's not yet at school?", nearly all "elite" mothers answered in terms of praise and/or reward, half using both; this was true of only one-third of the "traditional" mothers, the remainder saying they would thank God and/or feel happy. With careful observational methods it should be possible to detect such differences at an even earlier stage.

This example also serves to bring out two further aspects. First, in addition to the observational studies, parents should also be questioned about their child rearing methods and aims, so that the two sets of data could be juxtaposed. This would help to throw light on the extent to which people are trying to prepare their children for the world of tomorrow, and also how far their good intentions are matched by actual behavior. Let me quote a small illustration, based on one of my studies in which I inquired from parents how they were handling their children in comparison with the way they themselves had been brought up. One frequent response of literate fathers was that they always patiently answered any questions their children asked them; their own father, by contrast and in accordance with traditional expectations about child behavior, had always discouraged them from asking questions. When seeing some of these parents in their homes, I noted that in fact the children were often scolded for speaking out of turn, if not by the father or mother then by other kin present. There is probably often a considerable gap between verbally expressed attitudes or intentions and everyday behavior, which is

subject to powerful social pressures. It would be important to collect more systematic information about this relationship. There are furthermore people who, although like everybody acutely conscious of social transformations, are completely at a loss to know how to help their children to cope. When Meyer Fortes returned in 1963 to the region in which he had worked a generation before, he met one of his former informants with whom he discussed the question of schooling. The old man said: "Well, you see, things have changed, I don't know what sort of a world my grandchildren are going to live in. We used to know, we don't know any more". Among the ultimate objects of any inquiry should be to help people in this kind of predicament.

The second aspect is that one should attempt to plot the changes in child rearing aims and practices in relation to other variables. One obvious one is of course the experience of schooling; but there is also the presence in a person's environment of western-type technological products. In connection with the above-mentioned study carried out in Ghana (Jahoda, 1961), I constructed an "index of westernization" in terms of material conditions of life (e.g. access to a functioning, as opposed to ornamental, clock or watch). It was possible to show that this index was associated with attitudes independently of the level of formal education reached.

The last point I wish to make briefly is that studies in this sphere should also examine the relationship between the child's home and school experiences so as to pinpoint areas of conflict liable to retard the child's progress.

On Cognitive Development and Language

This general area is in a much more healthy and vigorous state than the preceding one. There has been much concern with problems of perception, though the emphasis has been more on theoretical advance than on relevance for education. An exception is the research by Hudson (1962) on pictorial depth perception, which has a strong educational slant. A recent ingenious replication and extension of Hudson's work in Zambia by Deregowski (1966), who required his subjects to build three-dimensional models of objects represented in drawings, indicates that the issue may be more complex than Hudson envisaged. A substantial proportion of subjects identified as 2D perceivers on Hudson's test were able to build such models, though these often had certain distortions. Whilst much remains to be explored in this field, there is sufficient evidence to leave little room for doubt that African children tend to be deficient in space perception. One can

be equally confident that this deficiency arises from environmental factors. I encountered a striking instance of this when administering the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test to final year Ghanaian physics students (Jahoda, 1956). Nearly all of them were able to solve the most elaborate problems involving levers with ease; in contrast, even quite simple questions concerning cog-wheels left many of them completely baffled. Subsequent inquiry elicited the fact that they had all carried out experiments on levers during their courses, but a majority had never handled cog-wheels directly. This suggests the possibility of an unorthodox use of Euramerican tests in Africa: conspicuous failures could provide the starting-point for a systematic tracking down of the gaps in experience responsible. Many of these, like the cog-wheel case quoted, could then be remedied by suitable provision within the school curriculum.

Whilst cross-cultural comparisons by means of tests standardized in the west have, for well-known reasons, fallen into disrepute, such tests do remain potentially valuable tools when properly employed. A good example would be the work of Abiola (1965, 1966) who studied intellectual development in children between one and five, drawn from different social backgrounds. It is worth mentioning in passing that Abiola is perhaps unduly critical of cross-cultural comparisons of certain kinds. For instance, his finding that the superiority of elite children *decreased* with age becomes particularly interesting in the light of similar research in Europe and America, where the opposite is usually found. If this result is confirmed, it would be valuable to search for the causes of the difference in developmental trends. In another context, certain tests such as Kohs' Blocks have been used in conjunction with the Embedded Figures Test by Dawson (1963) and Berry (1966) to assess the effects of field-dependence or independence, and this in turn links up with patterns of child rearing discussed earlier; moreover, some studies of the outcome of special training on performance have led to encouraging results.

Among the most exciting recent work have been Piaget-type investigations, begun by Price-Williams (1962) with Tiv children and followed by Greenfield, guided by Bruner (1966), in Senegal. For the present purpose I must confine myself to singling out two features of these studies. First, the radical difference in the achievement of conservation and the mode of concept formation as between Tiv and Wolof reveals the urgent need for comparative developmental studies in a variety of African cultures. Secondly, whilst Greenfield dramatically demonstrates the impact of formal schooling on the nature of cognitive processes, it is by no means clear what elements of the complex set of experiences that make

up formal schooling are salient in producing this effect. I am inclined to suspect that the linguistic factor may be a major determinant, namely the early use of French as a medium of instruction. Verification of this hunch would call for careful comparisons, within different populations, of school children exposed to the vernacular only and those who learn a European language from the outset.

This leads on to the general question about the effects of the use of vernaculars in primary school teaching. Over the past twenty years or so there has been constant discussion of this in educational journals, yet a sound empirical basis for judgment is almost totally lacking. One issue is the effect of the medium of instruction on academic progress, which might be investigated along the lines indicated earlier. A wider, and I should think more profitable, approach has been advocated by Le Page (1966), an expert in linguistics anxious to co-operate with psychologists on this problem. I should like to quote his own words:

Major decisions are being taken in Africa about the organization of the primary schools, without anybody knowing whether any particular program is feasible in terms of running along with, or against the grain of, the linguistic probabilities. In every country, decisions about the medium of education in the school should be made in the light of informed opinion as to what any particular program is likely to achieve. What are the pressures on a Yoruba child to speak Yoruba, or Pidgin, or English in a particular situation? Given those pressures, what kind of English, say, is he likely to acquire in three or four years of primary education? How useful is that kind of English likely to be to him in the next stage of his education? What can a study of this tell us about the pressures at work on [these children]?

A joint operation by specialists in linguistics, psychology and anthropology in this sphere would help to lay the foundations for more rational decisions. This is not to imply that purely academic considerations should be the only ones. Thus it is not unlikely that the use or otherwise of vernaculars in schools may have an influence on children's value-orientations. This possibility is suggested by the pronounced differences in outlook of Africans in the Anglophone and Francophone countries; the former usually stress the vernacular, and the latter tend to exclude it from schools. Naturally it would be foolish to ignore the whole gamut of other differences between these sets of countries, which certainly contribute in shaping their contrasting outlook. In any case, there is no doubt that language is a powerful group symbol, as witness for instance its deliberate cultivation or preservation in some countries with the object of enhancing national sentiment. In an African country the group thus symbolized is the tribe rather than the nation, historically often a somewhat artificial entity. Thus it may well be that the use of the vernacular tends to encourage

the persistence of tribal as opposed to national identifications and loyalties. It has been proposed by Ikejiani (1964) that in Nigeria each child should be taught not only his own but one of the other three main languages, in the expectation that this would reduce tribalism. This again remains open to empirical verification. Since, as is unhappily well known, this is perhaps the most dangerous line of fission in African societies, any contribution we psychologists might make towards the understanding of this problem would be of immense value.

On So-called "Superstitious" Beliefs

Until fairly recently it was widely held not only that such beliefs are undesirable, but also that it is a straightforward matter to eliminate them through conventional teaching. This is how it was put in an official document (Western Regional Government, Nigeria, 1952):

We want men in which the elements of European civilization are fully integrated and harmonised with indigenous African culture, men without mental dichotomy. In order to do this, effort must be made at all levels to distinguish between true knowledge and superstitious beliefs . . . They must know about the soil and the worms, the germs and the microbes which cause diseases . . . Such an approach will dispel superstitious ideas about the firmament, the stars of men and princes; . . . it will eliminate the worship of the gods of rain and harvest; . . . no disease will be the work of juju but will be just what they are—the invasion of microbes and viruses.

The first question is whether in fact "superstitions" are undesirable, in the sense that they make for less effective personal functioning. I am on record as arguing (Jahoda, 1961), even before it became generally fashionable to do so, that indigenous healers and medicine men perform an important task coping with mental ill-health in the absence of adequate psychiatric services; they could not do this otherwise than on the basis of prevailing superstitious beliefs. I have further argued, though admittedly on impressionistic grounds and without solid evidence, that minor superstitions and especially magical practices of an instrumental type (e.g. in connection with jobs and examinations) are probably a close equivalent of alleged "nerve-foods" and pep drugs in the west; in other words, some psychological gain may be derived from such magical practices, in so far as they engender confidence and sustain morale in a struggle against what are often heavy odds.

On the other side of the balance sheet, there is the possibility that superstitious beliefs may inhibit some aspects of cognitive development, especially by stifling curiosity and active explora-

tion of natural phenomena. Where a ready-made mythical explanation is at hand for every kind of phenomenon, independent questioning is apt to be discouraged from the start.¹ In a recent paper Greenfield and Bruner (1966) have put forward an even wider interpretation along these lines, concerning the communal values governing thinking in tribal societies, whereby the existence of social consensus prevents people from searching for a physical account. The problem of superstition would be only one part of such a broader explanatory framework. This collective value orientation is, according to Greenfield and Bruner, so powerful as to prevent the emergence of a western type of self-consciousness among unschooled Wolof children; they are said to be incapable of distinguishing "between their own thought or statement about something and the thing itself". I must confess to some reservations about so radical a view; it seems to me that this is the kind of conclusion that might well stem from some lexical confusion. Nonetheless, it presents an important challenge for further investigations. If it turns out to be correct, then one major aim of education would have to be a modification of the collective orientation of which superstition constitutes a substantial component. Otherwise, as stressed by Kavadia (1966), there can be no effective absorption of scientific and technological ideas essential for modernization.²

Let us assume that Greenfield and Bruner are correct, then what follows? They appear to hold that exposure to formal education is enough to produce a fundamental change—the alleged absence of self-consciousness was not found among Wolof school children. Would it then also be true that superstitious belief can be eliminated by the teaching of science? I am entirely confident that the answer must be in the negative, as there is ample evidence that such beliefs survive educational processes up to and including university. There are several reasons why the teaching of science

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- ¹Compare for instance the following summary of the Yoruba outlook:
- . . . Encourages an interest in people and society, rather than in the world of things.
 - . . . Encourages acceptance of what one is told by one's elders and superiors.
 - . . . Assumes that natural phenomena are usually caused by God, supernatural beings, or mortals who can call upon supernatural beings.
 - . . . Assumes that natural phenomena are to be interpreted in terms of their influences on mankind. Those who control them bring them about in order to punish or bless. Thus we are to look for a subjective purpose in natural events (Stone, 1965).

²In this connection Wober (1966) reports a significant negative correlation for skilled manual workers between rated job efficiency and belief in witchcraft. Unfortunately the matter is as usual far from simple, since no such correlation was found in the case of clerical workers.

is relatively ineffective here. Contrary to a commonly held notion, there is no inevitable *logical* contradiction between scientific knowledge and many forms of superstitious belief. Then as the Ottenbergs (1964) put it: ". . . the scientific 'facts' as presented to school children take on a magical—almost mythical—quality . . ."; moreover, science is apt to be taught as a corpus of ideas largely unrelated to behavior in everyday life. I recall sitting in at a lesson in a small village school where the teacher recited the dangers of water-borne diseases and the way to prevent these by boiling and filtering; some time after this he sent one of the children to fetch him a calabash of water from a neighbouring stream, which he proceeded to drink unboiled and unfiltered. Lastly, there are indications that receptiveness to superstitious beliefs is established in the course of emotional learning early in life, and even when overlaid by rationalistic knowledge they are apt to emerge powerfully in situations of anxiety and stress. Hence I would urge that in studies of child rearing special attention should be paid to the use of supernatural sanctions in enforcing control of behaviour. This is likely to be particularly prevalent in traditional families, where strict obedience to elders is a dominant norm; in more westernised families remote from illiterate kin and with a more relaxed atmosphere one would expect less susceptibility to superstitious belief.

Perhaps I ought to add that I am not unaware of the studies by Whiting and others on this theme (e.g. Whiting, 1959; Spiro and D'Andrade, 1958). There is of course no reason why their hypotheses should not be examined in this context; but it seems to me doubtful whether the data from cross-cultural files, mainly based on older fieldwork, could be considered appropriate for the present situation of rapid change.

Although as already pointed out conventional teaching is unlikely to dispel superstitions, it is an intriguing question whether any form of instruction might help to do so. One possible strategy could take as its starting-point the lack of any sharp differentiation between the natural and the supernatural, all phenomena being conceived as equally determined. In order to modify this, it would be necessary to inculcate the notion of chance. An essential preliminary step would be an investigation, like that of Piaget and Inhelder (1951), to discover how far this concept does in fact develop among children in various kinds of social settings. If my guess is right that ideas of chance tend to lag considerably behind other facets of cognitive development, one could attempt to devise a training program for the specific purpose of remedying this. While I have no illusion that such an approach could eliminate superstitious beliefs, it might have a measurable effect.

On Teachers and Pupils . . .

The powerful impact of schooling on modes of thinking has emerged from every investigation undertaken in this sphere. From this it might be imagined that the teaching is highly efficient; paradoxically, the opposite is nearer the truth. Primary school teachers in particular are commonly ill-trained, rigid in approach and authoritarian in their relationship with the pupils. From this, incidentally, one is led to suspect that the effect of schooling may be a kind of threshold phenomenon, brought about by the acquisition of basic skills in reading, writing, numbers and possibly a western language beyond a certain modest level, coupled with the environmental concomitants of the school setting.

Professor Lewis (1964) suggested that the modification of what he called the "ultra-conservatism" of teachers and educational administrators ought to be a major aim of research. Whilst in full agreement with him about the prevalence of strong resistances against innovations in both content and methods of education, I am not very confident that attempts to change such attitudes by techniques of persuasion alone would have much chance of success. This is because the roots of such attitudes are, in my view, deeply embedded in the social and economic circumstances of the teaching profession. Knowing themselves to be inadequately equipped, and insecure in their status, they are fearful of venturing into the unknown where they might neither be able to cope with unfamiliar methods nor retain the firm control of the class that goes readily with mechanical routine. This is not to deny that such efforts should be made at training colleges, where the appropriate skills are imparted simultaneously with a fresh orientation towards teaching—it has in fact been done in some places (Ferron, 1965).

It seems to me that a broader investigation of the roles and attitudes of teachers might be more promising. This should be followed by an attempt to assess the influence of teachers on the value-orientation of their pupils, keeping in mind that it operates not only by verbal means but also by the teacher serving as a model, both within and outside the school. The first stage would be to explore the value orientations of the teachers themselves, about which far too little is known. Professor Nketia (1964) of the Institute of African Studies at Legon posed the problem as follows:

The crucial question then is, what is the Ghanaian educator's image of his own country and its cultural heritage? . . . Is it the sort of image that makes him proud of his heritage or one that makes him feel ashamed of it or makes him feel inferior to other people? Is it an image formed out of knowledge and understanding of the African past or an image based on prejudices which he has acquired or inherited from his Western or "colonial" upbringing?

I think this goes to the heart of the matter, and if we translate it into our jargon the question becomes "is the teacher a marginal man"? My guess is that a study would show that he is, at least in some respects. Teachers often feel obliged to adopt a western stance in the classroom, returning to a more traditional orientation in their home life. This is likely to involve some problems of ego-identity for the teacher, as well as having repercussions on the pupils who, at least in small communities, witness the teacher in both guises. A study of this kind should devote special attention to the influence of the teacher in connection with such key values as tribal sentiments or supernatural beliefs. The outcome of such research would be of interest to training colleges who might, hopefully, be able to produce changes in the longer term.

One of the results of schooling which may be affected by the teachers, albeit indirectly, is a rise in the pupils' level of social and occupational aspirations. Yet, and here we come to one of the most intractable problems of all, suitable occupational outlets provided by the economies of most African countries are strictly limited. Hence the tragic situation that the widening of educational opportunities and improvements in educational practice increase the number of those school leavers whose hopes for reasonable jobs are doomed to frustration; and the existence of a pool of dissatisfied young people constitutes a threat to social stability. As far as I can see, there is not much psychologists might do to help. One could study patterns of aspirations, often unrealistically high, and devise means for modifying them; one could contribute to the provision of badly needed vocational guidance and training schemes, and possibly assist with campaigns aimed at making agriculture (which most school leavers and their parents feel they have left behind for good) more attractive. However, these would be mere palliatives, the fundamental problem being an economic one (Callaway, 1963).

In Conclusion . . .

At the beginning of this paper the criteria for selecting certain research areas for more detailed review have been set out. There are of course numerous others of considerable importance that had to be omitted for reasons of space, and some of these may perhaps be briefly mentioned.

First of all, there is the puzzling problem of the rapid rate of development of African children (compared with European or American ones) during the first two years of life; while this is not yet clearly understood, it may well have a bearing on subsequent intellectual growth (Geber, 1958; Ainsworth, 1963).

Little is known in detail about the effects of nutritional deficiencies and various forms of endemic disease on the learning capacity of African children. There is, incidentally, also a task here of educating parents in regions where certain serious illnesses are so prevalent among children that they have come to be regarded as part of normal growth (McGregor *et al.*, 1961).

The range of social and economic conditions under which children do their schoolwork at home, and their effects in terms of educational performance, also deserve scrutiny. Some children are expected to perform their traditional chores in spite of the fact that they attend school. This may mean that they have to get up before dawn and help in the household before going to school, and again after their return in the afternoon; only the fittest and keenest of these will have the energy to study seriously at night, especially if the only source of light is a storm lantern. Others work under conditions more nearly approximating those in industrialized countries. One imagines that such differences would be reflected in their school progress, but it does not seem to have been investigated.

Another question also bordering on sociology concerns the nature and determinants of the enormous dropout rate towards the end of primary schooling common in African countries. In the absence of adequate information one suspects that economic and social factors may decide who stays on or leaves as much as, or even more than, children's ability. How large is the loss of exceptional talent through this leakage?

There is clearly no shortage of research problems, but existing resources are woefully inadequate. Outside help is badly needed, and visiting teams of researchers can render valuable service, handicapped though they often are by lack of intimate acquaintance with the local culture which takes time to acquire. Better still is the establishment of field-stations, like that planned at Makerere; these provide more permanent bases of operation, ensuring continuity of research effort. Field stations can also function as centers for the training of African psychologists in research methods. The aim must be to increase the output of competent African research psychologists from the departments which are fortunately coming to be established in various parts of the continent. In the long run the bulk of the burden and challenge should pass into their own hands. African psychologists will then be in a position not only to help their countries to cope with practical difficulties, but also to make a substantial contribution towards the advancement of psychology as a field of knowledge.

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Les recherches pédagogiques en Afrique

Gustav Jahoda

Le concept de pédagogie a des sens variés et les individus doivent, en fait, apprendre un grand nombre de rôles. En Afrique, la socialisation porte à la fois sur l'adaptation aux demandes de la société traditionnelle et de la société moderne, et les recherches pédagogiques doivent tenir compte de cette dualité. Il s'agit de déterminer comment on peut accroître l'adaptabilité, l'esprit d'entreprise, les facultés critiques des individus à former, tout en donnant une base plus large à leurs attachements affectifs. Prenant cet idéal comme point de départ, l'auteur se propose de faire le point sur les travaux déjà publiés sur ces questions et de dégager quelques principes permettant d'approfondir la portée de nos connaissances dans ce domaine.

Demandes parentales. Certaines études portent sur de multiples aspects des relations entre parents et enfants. Malheureusement ces études ne permettent pas toujours d'établir des relations univoques entre tel ou tel aspect des demandes parentales et les comportements qui en résultent chez les enfants. Il est donc souhaitable d'intégrer de telles études dans des perspectives théoriques plus systématiques. Par exemple, l'utilisation des hypothèses proposées par Witkin devrait permettre (a) de rassembler des informations comparables sur des échantillons culturels distincts (b) d'utiliser des techniques d'investigation analogues sur des groupes d'âge différents (c) de procéder à des enquêtes longitudinales. De la même manière, les thèses de Bandura et Walters peuvent permettre de cerner avec davantage

de précision la nature exacte des divers modèles auxquels les enfants africains sont exposés, d'isoler les facteurs susceptibles d'introduire des variations dans de tels modèles et enfin d'examiner l'influence de tels modèles sur les changements qui affectent la société globale. Dans cet ordre d'idées, l'auteur souligne à quel point il est important d'explorer les distinctions entre comportements verbaux et comportements réels, entre les effets intentionnels des demandes parentales et leurs effets latents.

Développement de l'intelligence: L'influence du langage. Bien que les travaux sur la perception en milieu africain soient relativement nombreux, l'origine des déficiences observables dans ce domaine demeure souvent incertaine et l'auteur note l'importance, dans cette perspective, du rôle joué par l'environnement. Par exemple, les étudiants africains se servent plus fréquemment de leviers que de roues dentées et cette différence dans l'usage affecte leur compréhension relative des problèmes faisant référence à l'un ou l'autre de ces instruments.

Les travaux sur le développement cognitif du jeune Africain sont également assez nombreux. De plus, les conditions dans lesquelles l'enfant africain acquiert des notions telles que la conservation ou la réversibilité varient d'une culture africaine à l'autre. Il est donc indispensable d'entreprendre des comparaisons systématiques sur un certain nombre de peuples africains. Par exemple, il serait souhaitable d'examiner le rôle joué sous cet angle par les divers langages que l'enfant africain utilise dans les différents milieux où il vit. En fait, l'auteur note que les relations entre langage et croissance intellectuelle sont loin d'être connues et il déplore que les prises de position favorables ou défavorables à l'emploi des langues africaines en milieu scolaire ne reposent que sur des considérations idéologiques.

Education et superstitions. Tout d'abord, il est indispensable de dresser un bilan des effets positifs et négatifs que les superstitions exercent sur le développement affectif et intellectuel de l'enfant. Ensuite, il convient d'étudier dans quelles conditions des modes de pensée radicalement étrangers les uns aux autres peuvent co-exister chez un même individu. Enfin, si on note que l'enfant africain admet difficilement qu'un objet puisse exister indépendamment de l'idée qu'il s'en fait, on peut se demander si sa scolarisation contribue vraiment à éliminer cette confusion et si certaines techniques pédagogiques sont plus aptes que d'autres à détruire les superstitions correspondantes.

Relations entre professeurs et élèves. La scolarisation transforme radicalement les modes de pensée et d'action des élèves africains. Le milieu enseignant est professionnellement conservateur, et en outre, rencontre, particulièrement dans le système primaire, des difficultés considérables à recruter le personnel dont il a besoin.

Il conviendrait donc d'analyser en profondeur (a) les attitudes des enseignants à l'égard de la position qu'ils occupent dans la structure sociale de leur pays (b) les conséquences que ces attitudes ont sur leurs méthodes d'enseignement (c) l'influence que les professeurs et instituteurs ont sur le choix et les aspirations professionnelles de leurs élèves (d) l'action qu'ils peuvent entreprendre dans le domaine de l'orientation scolaire et professionnelle.

En conclusion, l'auteur note l'importance d'un certain nombre d'autres problèmes: l'origine de la croissance particulièrement rapide de l'enfant africain, l'effet de certaines carences alimentaires et de certaines maladies tropicales sur les facultés d'apprentissage, les variations dans les conditions dans lesquelles les élèves africains sont amenés à apprendre leurs leçons et faire leurs devoirs. L'importance et le nombre des problèmes à étudier nécessitent un accroissement du nombre des chercheurs africains. Eux seuls sont capables de trouver les clefs permettant de résoudre certaines des questions esquissées ci-dessus. Encore faut-il former ces chercheurs et le faire rapidement.

Education and Marginality of African Youth¹

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A salient feature of social change in Africa has been the introduction of mass education in countries that are fundamentally rural and traditional. In villages and towns throughout the continent, children are being lifted out of the exclusive guardianship of the traditional family and community and imbued with knowledge, skills and values appropriate to life in the modern sector of society. Education holds the promise of making them both agents and prime beneficiaries of economic and social development. At the same time, exposure to education renders the youth peculiarly susceptible to social dislocation in swiftly changing societies. This paper dwells on those aspects of education and society that generate unintended stresses and hardships for certain "educated" African youth.

Informed observers of the African scene agree that a dangerous youth problem is steadily mounting with the copious outpouring from educational institutions of "school leavers"² whose career preparations are interrupted and who endure unemploy-

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²The term "school leaver" is a British expression denoting youth who have left primary and secondary level schools for whatever reason: graduation, "dropping out", expulsion, etc.

ment, frustration and insecurity for long periods (CCTA, 1964). Archibald Callaway has rightly described unemployment among school leavers as "perhaps the most serious long-run socio-political problem facing African countries" (1963, 371). It is noteworthy that although these young people are suitable candidates for social deviance and political rebellion, they have, on the whole, not yet been seriously disruptive in their societies. The purpose of this paper is to outline a theoretical framework that identifies forces which, on the one hand, stimulate youth to be socially deviant and politically rebellious and, on the other, constrain them from such behavior. The accent is on *adaptive processes* of youth acting purposively in problematic situations.

Social science research thus far has yielded little understanding of patterns and processes of adaptation among school leavers. Suitable social theory in this instance should take account of two simple facts: a large portion of the youth in modernizing societies of Africa are being socialized for adult careers in the modern sector, and the traditional family and community are the primary social foundations from which they make their way into the changing society. The theory should be comparative and not culture-bound, but adaptable to variations in cultural patterns and social structures in different societies.¹

Education and Mobility

The educational process is a transitional phase in the lives of traditional African youth when they are resocialized for careers radically different from those anticipated in their early upbringing. In the present early stage of social and economic development of African countries, one of the vital functions of the school is to transform persons from traditional to modern perspectives, commitments and styles of life. It would be misleading and grossly in error, where personality is concerned, to assume that the modernizing process ever completely replaces traditional attributes with modern ones. As Erikson (1959) has so cogently argued, a person is a more or less successfully and continuously ordered amalgam of predispositions and images learned later in life, as well as those acquired in infancy and childhood. This suggests that it is more useful to identify a continuum of interaction of traditional and modern forces in the life space of youth than to seek to establish precise and necessarily artificial lines of demarcation between traditional, transitional and modern statuses.

¹Robert LeVine (1961) has cautioned that theory and research should take account of the marked differences among traditional and, I might add, modern cultures.

Our first step in theory-building is to specify the conditions that are essential for the absorption of youth into the modern occupational structure. This approach assumes the primacy of occupations in forming modern persons, in that the kind of work a person does dominates his total life situation. Three variables are important for accomplishing occupational modernity: (a) modern conceptions of oneself; (b) qualifications for modern careers, and (c) assuming modern work roles.

Self-conception: If a young person considers himself to be modern or aspires to that status and receives self-esteem from it, we may expect him to act in ways designed to reinforce that image or to accomplish it in reality. He would be subject to the powerful, inner motivational mechanism of anticipatory socialization guiding him in specific situations toward the kinds of behavior and attributes he perceives to be appropriate to modern life (Merton, 1957, 265-267).

Qualifications: Aspirations must be translated into qualifications for modern careers before modern status is achievable. Being a transitional youth means precisely that one faces the challenge of learning a range of appropriate knowledge, values and skills for modern occupational careers. While positive orientations to modernity may be gained in traditional family and community circles, effective training for modern occupational roles is apt to occur only in formal educational contexts.

Role enactment: The full status of a modern person is reached only when the above two requisites are met and when a youth actually assumes an occupational role in the modern sector of society. Those values associated with modern life-income level,

TABLE I
TYPOLOGY OF TRANSITIONAL AND MODERN YOUTH

Typology	Presence (+) or Absence (-) of Criteria for Modern Status		
	Self Concept of Modernity	Qualified for Modern Career	Performing Modern Roles
I Aspiring to Modern Status	+	-	-
II Uncertain Modern Status	+	-	?
III Qualified for Modern Status	+	+	-
IV Full Modern Status	+	+	+

standard of living, style of life and social status—will flow from his occupational position.

Combining these three factors, we arrive at the typology of youth indicated in Table 1. This typology may be conceived of as a scale in which Types I, II and III are transitional in character, with each more closely approximating the fully modern status of Type IV. Type I persons may be students or school leavers whose self-concepts and aspirations are substantially modern, but who lack the other two requisites. Type II persons have no qualifications, or at best minimal qualifications, for careers above the unskilled or semi-skilled level. They may be employed in higher skill positions for which they are unqualified when qualified persons are not available, or they may hold unskilled and semi-skilled jobs that would be difficult to replace in a tight job market should they ever lose them. Their position in the modern economy is precarious and holds dubious prospects for stable careers. The Type III person who is qualified for modern careers is probably either experiencing a "normal" delay in securing work, is a victim of a tight job market, or is unwilling to accept work below the occupational level for which he is qualified. Full modern status, Type IV, denotes successful mobility into modern life.

To conclude this section, we have identified the essential patterns of vertical or status mobility to positions that are generally more prestigious than those available in traditional life. It should be noted that transitional youth undoubtedly gain great incentive value from having as their comparison reference group the highly visible westernized African elites who have successfully achieved the accoutrements of modern status (Lloyd, 1966, 1-65).

Education and Mobility Aspirations: An Empirical Assessment

The foregoing discussion, for convenience, deals with African youth and with formal education as undifferentiated categories and thus does not indicate the variety of effects formal education may have on their motivations. Not all students and school leavers are necessarily motivated to become modern persons. Yet there is considerable evidence to support the hypothesis that their values and aspirations usually are oriented to modern life. Four generalizations from research findings are pertinent to this point.⁴

. . . Few students or school leavers aspire to traditional occupations, even when they favor semi-skilled and unskilled ones.

⁴These generalizations are drawn primarily from the works of Abernethy (n.d.), Callaway (1963), Foster, (1965), McQueen (1965), and Peil (1966).

. . . Youths who have reached or completed the secondary level of education tend to choose higher status modern occupations than those at the primary level.

. . . Educated youth appear to be more interested in the earning power of occupations than in intrinsic values and satisfactions to be gained from work. Margaret Peil, writing about middle school leavers (Form IV) in Ghana, concludes:

These boys do not object to working with their hands; they merely want some training so that the job will pay fairly well and bring them into the modern sector of the economy (Peil, 1966, 10).

. . . Students and school leavers generally do not conform to the Durkheimian notion that individuals tend to develop unrealistically high aspirations under conditions of rapid social change and weakened social constraints (Durkheim, 1951, 241-276). Instead, they are more likely to perceive occupational and income structures realistically and to gear their aspirations to shrewd evaluations of mobility chances.

Data from my 1962 attitudinal survey of male⁸ primary and secondary school leavers in communities throughout the western and eastern regions of Nigeria provide information on school leavers' educational aspirations, the values they see in education and the extent to which their educational aspirations are modern in character. Interviews (with a questionnaire) of 876 employed and unemployed youth were carried out by trained Ibo and Yoruba students from the University of Ibadan, with the two groups working in the eastern and western regions respectively. As it was not feasible under the circumstances to draw a random probability sample for such an extensive survey, four pragmatic procedures were used to locate school leavers:

. . . names and addresses of school leavers known to be living in the community were secured from teachers and headmasters and the boys were interviewed in their homes;

. . . old and new registrants were interviewed at Federal Labor Exchanges in Port Harcourt and Ibadan;

. . . interviews were sought in residential areas by going from door to door; and

. . . school leavers were contacted in offices, motor parks, at petrol stations, on farms and at other places where they worked or were apt to seek work.

⁸My research and the theory that has developed from it are concerned primarily with male school leavers. However, the theory, with some qualifications, should apply equally to females. This emphasis should not be taken to mean that the problems of female school leavers are insignificant, only that male school leavers pose the more immediate and serious problems for the social order, thus creating more urgent needs for facts, understanding and, hopefully, answers.

This unsystematic approach to sampling yielded an aggregate of youth whose backgrounds were largely traditional. Only 18 per cent of the primary school leavers' fathers had any education, compared to 31 per cent of the fathers of secondary school leavers. Traditional occupations of farmer, trader and fisherman were held by 78 per cent of the former and 68 per cent of the latter.

TABLE 2
PERCENTAGES OF NIGERIAN SCHOOL LEAVERS WISHING TO
CONTINUE THEIR EDUCATION BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND AGE

Educational Level and Age	Employment Status	
	Employed	Unemployed
<i>Primary</i>		
18 years and under	33.3	88.8
19 years and over	34.3	72.6
<i>Secondary</i>		
18 years and under	75.0	90.9
19 years and over	88.8	89.3

Table 2 indicates that the great majority of school leavers place high value on education and want to continue their education. While age causes no striking differences, employment for primary school leavers is associated with sharply lower desires to continue education. It should be noted that 57 per cent of the employed primary school leavers were farmers, the majority of whom were interviewed at farm settlements.⁶ They were undergoing training for *modern farming* and evidenced strong commitments to that career pattern. The remaining employed primary school leavers worked in a variety of jobs (night watchman, messenger, ship loader, cook, teacher, brick layer, news vender, etc.), few of which guaranteed settled careers for persons with their education.

By contrast, three of four employed secondary school leavers held "white collar" positions such as teacher, clerk, store keeper, nurse, public health inspector and librarian, and only 12 per cent were farmers. Despite their employment in such positions, the great majority were bent on continuing their education.

It is obvious that both the employed and unemployed school leavers were aware of the competitive advantages of education. This conclusion is substantiated by the following responses to the query as to why they wanted to continue their education:

⁶These young men were seen at two farm settlements in the Western Region of Nigeria, which included farm institutes for the express purpose of training primary school leavers to become modern farmers and returning them to the land.

	Primary	Secondary
Self-improvement	36%	47%
Employment, better job	36	24
Altruism: family and nation	15	15
Money, prestige, influence	13	13
	100%	100%

When asked how much education they needed to accomplish their goals, over 80 per cent, indicated that they would need at least special technical and professional training (at teacher training colleges or commercial colleges, for example) or university level study.

When occupational aspirations were classified in terms of whether or not they involve roles in the modern sector of the economy that require specialized training to qualify, the distribution in Table 3 resulted. Again, there is little room for doubt that school leavers are powerfully drawn to modern life.⁷

TABLE 3
PERCENTAGES OF NIGERIAN SCHOOL LEAVERS ASPIRING
TO MODERN OCCUPATIONS BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND AGE

Educational Level and Age	Employment Status	
	Employed	Unemployed
<i>Primary</i>		
18 years and under	45.0	96.4
19 years and over	48.5	90.3
<i>Secondary</i>		
18 years and under	85.7	97.7
19 years and over	92.0	97.5

In conclusion, it is apparent that, in terms of occupational goals and educational means, nearly all these school leavers have adopted at least an aspired self that is constituted of modern images and values. It would seem, therefore, that from the perspective of the youths themselves, none has reached the type of competence signifying full qualifications for modern status (Type III) or full modern status (Type IV). They remain transitional persons. The unemployed presumably fall into Type I as those aspiring to modern status, while employed school leavers would be in the position of uncertain modern status (Type II).

⁷"Farmer" could not be distinguished in the respondents' answers as traditional or modern and thus was not included as a modern occupation, despite the fact that youths in farm settlements obviously wanted to be modern farmers.

The Marginality of Transitional Youth

Emile Durkheim, in his classic study, *Suicide*, identifies two conditions which are associated with high rates of suicide and which have direct bearing on our analysis: (a) low integration of persons into group life (egoism), and (b) insufficient normative regulation of behavior (anomie) (1951, Chaps. 2, 3, 5). These two conditions are no doubt empirically closely associated, but it will be useful in the present context to keep them analytically separated.⁸ Anomie, as Merton has so cogently demonstrated, implies a means-goals discrepancy which, in itself, is a valuable interpretative relationship (1957, Chap. 4). Our aim is to show how the level of integration of transitional youth into traditional group life affects their capacity to cope with problems they encounter in the transitional phase, as well as how it influences their predispositions to respond in ways that conform to or circumvent institutional paths to their goals.

We have defined transitional youth as persons who move between two sharply different social and cultural worlds. This is functionally equivalent to migration between societies and cultures with the resulting condition of marginality that Robert E. Park spelled out four decades ago (1928). Park made it clear that mobility between cultures is not in itself a sufficient condition for marginality; equivocal commitment, insecurity and not being sure of where one belongs or is going are essential attitudinal components. For our purposes, marginality is a state of having no social ties or of being attached to two or more groups or cultures with weak commitment or sense of belonging.

The nature, intensity and duration of marginality experiences among transitional youth will vary with a number of conditions which are beyond their control. A complex of structural factors condemns untold tens and hundreds of thousands who climb onto the educational treadmill to be pushed off into a life of frustrated yearnings and dim hopes. The main cause of this situation is inherent in the striking imbalance of capacities of institutions at the primary and secondary levels. Policies of mass education are most readily implemented by the rapid expansion of primary schools, with the result that in some independent African countries close to 80 per cent of all primary age children are enrolled in school (Hunter, 1962, Chap. 10). Yet in these countries, the expansion of secondary education generally has not been sufficient to accommodate as much as 10 per cent of the children who

⁸Barclay Johnson (1965), in reinterpreting egoism and anomie, concludes that they are identical phenomena, but this is not the place to examine his arguments.

complete primary schools. This means that a vast surplus of school leavers cannot complete their education and are unqualified for anything but intense and discouraging competition for scarce unskilled jobs. The option of returning to traditional careers is not readily taken up by these aspirants to modern status. A low level of literacy is their primary competence, but the urgent manpower needs of modernizing economies are for persons with post-secondary training at the technical, supervisory, and managerial levels (Cowan, 1965; Coleman, 1965). Increasingly, even unskilled secondary school leavers are encountering difficulties in obtaining work.

Unemployment on the massive scale found in Africa means that few traditional children who enter school will be able to enjoy smooth transition to the status of modern persons. When they become school leavers, they are subject to pressures which tend subtly to undermine family and community ties and often to rupture the social relations that anchor persons to society. These pressures are generated in conditions such as moving to towns and cities away from the close family circle, determined pursuit of modern career goals and resistance to taking up traditional careers, and unsatisfying dependency relationships to the extended family and the community. These considerations cast two facts in high relief: socialization is seriously defective for the great majority of transitional youth and their efforts to adapt themselves to their plight sets in motion a marginality-inducing process.

Although problems of transitional youth are unique to specific persons, times and places, they may be classified according to physical, generational and social psychological dimensions, and within each dimension core adaptive problems can be identified. We assume that attitudinal and behavioral reactions of the youth will depend on the extent to which they are able to solve the core problems, and that contingency in turn is very much a consequence of the amount of assistance and social support the extended family and community are able to provide.

The core problem of the physical dimension is the immediate one of survival and subsistence. When school leavers are not reabsorbed into the traditional community and economy, they are cut off from productive roles and activities that offer a livelihood. In towns and cities, they are usually largely or wholly self-supporting. Relatives and friends to whom they turn for support most likely are not affluent and have their own nuclear families to care for, as well as extended family obligations to meet, and thus able to offer only minimal assistance. The chances for finding steady employment are usually remote, and there is great competition for part-time work and odd jobs.

The generational dimension highlights relationships to social structures. Transitional youth inhabit the same social location, in the sense of being in an unresolved relationship to both traditional and modern social structures. In Karl Mannheim's terms, they constitute an *actual generation* in that their perspectives, needs and tendencies are all shaped by "the same concrete historical problems" (1952, 304). Their core problem in generational terms is to change their social location so that they are clearly integrated into the modern sphere of society. This, we have postulated, is basically a career phenomenon. In order to change his social location the young person must, in the first instance, qualify for an occupation in the modern sector of the economy. Then, depending on the availability of positions, he may become integrated into that sector.

From a field theoretical perspective, we conceptualize the person as a purposive, goal-directed agent seeking the most efficient paths to goals in a field of conflicting, blocking and enabling forces (Lewin, 1951). This brings us to the social psychological dimension that has been implicit throughout this paper, where the stress is on predispositions of the person and his capacity to cope with the external environment. The core social psychological problem of transitional youth derives from the fact that they have undergone partial socialization in two socio-cultural spheres. The young person must draw from widely divergent values, attitudes and habits a measure of unity and continuity of self and a hierarchy of values that are the bases for sustained, purposive career-oriented behavior. To the degree that this is accomplished, he has acquired what Erikson calls a "sense of ego identity" (1959, 88-91). Such a youth would have become a relatively autonomous person, one who enjoys a measure of self-esteem, can respect himself as a person, and has confidence in his ability to cope with problematic situations and to determine the goals and direction of his life within a set of constraints and possibilities. Identity diffusion, on the other hand, is characterized by low self-esteem and ambiguous and fragmented images of the qualities that make up the self and the values that give direction and meaning to existence. This psychological state of uncertainty would tend to limit the ability of the young person to provide his own direction and self-reliantly to make choices in a changing, modernizing scene. The autonomous youth, by contrast, could be expected to have a high level of adaptive competence for coping with the environment.

Table 4 outlines the core problems of transitional youth, possible contributions the traditional family and community can make to solving them, and patterns of psychological response the youth are apt to make as they endeavor to cope with core problems.

TABLE 4
PARADIGM FOR THE ANALYSIS OF PROBLEM SOLVING
AMONG TRANSITIONAL YOUTH

Orientations to Problems	Dimensions of Problems		
	Physical	Generational	Social Psychological
Core Problems	subsistence: physical well-being vs. survival distress	career qualifications and opportunities: high vs. low access	autonomy of self: sense of identity vs. identity diffusion
Family and Community Contexts for Solving Problems	extent of support and assistance: food, residential, financial	extent of aids for careers: guidance, educational support, access to influentials	extent of social integration, cohesiveness, encouragement, social status
Personal Responses to Failures and Successes	anxiety and deprivation vs. fulfillment and well-being	uncertainty, low sense of efficacy re goals vs. clarity and high efficacy	alienation and low self-esteem vs. commitment and autonomy

It is fortunate for the new nations of Africa that transitional youth need not necessarily face their core problems alone and become rootless persons who break with the past and lose all institutional foundations for their lives. While disengagement may be expected to occur under some circumstances, the welfare system based on extended family and community obligations to care for needy members is a backstop against disaster. In all probability, most school leavers do receive some form of assistance from relatives and friends. They still may endure great hardships, however, because of poverty, living in towns where there are no relatives or home villagers, and limited capacity of the extended family to support increasing numbers of dependent members.

The generational problem of becoming fully educated for modern careers may be managed by family and community members pooling their resources to raise school fees and to provide funds for other relevant needs. In cases where some persons in the family are educated and successful or where community elders have contacts with politicians and other influential persons, the young person may be the recipient of valuable advice, guidance and entrée to influential persons who may be helpful for securing admission to school and jobs.

By the very nature of the transitional situation, we would not expect social psychological problems of identity and sense of effi-

acy to be completely resolved in the traditional family and community. Nevertheless, being integrated into a cohesive and richly meaningful extended family could heighten the sense of being a worthwhile person whose self-esteem is well grounded in acceptance and respect and whose status is recognized in the home community, albeit not in modern circles. Self-esteem would tend to be particularly strong where literacy is highly valued by elders and where the youth is given special recognition and functions because of his education. Under certain conditions, of course, these psychological gains may not accrue to the school leaver, as when there is extended separation from family and community influences, when the youth himself denigrates and rejects traditional ways and influences, or when family misfortune, strife, poverty, or other conditions drastically undermine effectiveness and cohesiveness.

The reactions of transitional youth to their successes and failures are assumed to depend on whether they are socially integrated or marginal. Socially integrated youth should be disposed to feel that core problems are appreciably manageable and that their destiny is not one of isolated struggle against incomprehensible and ever-threatening forces. In contrast, marginal youth are more likely to experience defeatism and to be overtaken by the psychological syndrome of anomie: anxiety, alienation and feelings of inefficacy (Srole, 1956; Merton, 1957, 161-162).

TABLE 5
A TYPOLOGY OF YOUTH

Economic Integration: Modern Sector	Socio-Cultural Integration	
	High	Low
High	Stable Modern Young Adults	Marginal Modern Young Adults
Low	Stable Transitional Youth	Marginal Transitional Youth

The preceding two sections have dealt separately with transitional processes and with marginality. Interrelating these variables (economic and socio-cultural integration) yields the typology of youth and young adults shown in Table 5. In an empirical analysis, educational level should be taken into account on the economic integration dimension. It would also be important to determine whether socio-cultural integration is of the traditional or modern type, for each undoubtedly has distinctive consequences for behavior.

Both economic and socio-cultural integration are continual rather than discrete categories, but dichotomies were used to simplify the typology. In the category of high socio-cultural integration, the emphasis is on *stability* of social relations and commitments, although they are obviously subject to change.

No attempt has been made thus far to define the term "youth" or to indicate the point at which a young person ceases being a youth and enters adulthood. Notions of "social maturity" are, of course, cultural and vary from one society to another. The main shift in age roles that brings on adulthood, according to S. N. Eisenstadt, occurs when the young person gains the right to establish a family or procreation (1956, 30). The difficulty with this single criterion is that physical maturity may be recognized, but dependencies and subordination associated with adolescence may be maintained in other role spheres. Perhaps full social maturity of adulthood might better be considered to occur when the young person has the capacity, because of a relatively independent economic position, to establish his own family and to maintain a social status in the community for himself and his family. This definition places the accent on the economic roles and social capabilities derived from them. This means that those young men who have become integrated into the modern economy have achieved the requisite role condition that makes other aspects of adulthood possible. It is therefore appropriate that they be labeled "young adults" rather than youths.

. . . Stable modern young adults are neither transitional nor marginal, having attained full modern status in the economy and presumably a sense of personal and social well-being through social solidarity and commitment.

. . . Marginal modern young adults, while no longer transitional, have not consolidated their social position to either the modern or the traditional world. The social psychological problems of identity and social status would tend to remain as powerful, potentially unsettling influences upon their lives.

. . . Stable transitional youth have not realized their goal of modern status, but they are integrated into traditional social groups which add stability to their lives as sources of support, psychological security and social status.

. . . Marginal transitional youth are in the least favorable position and may be expected to be enveloped in continuing distress and crisis situations as they wrestle with their problems, largely alone and in psychological and perhaps physical isolation from a stabilizing socio-cultural context. These are the truly uprooted youth who have only the most tenuous relationship to the established institutions of society.

Definitions of the Situation and Behavior Outcomes

W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki pointed out many years ago that a person's actions rest largely on his definition of the situation (1927, Vol. II, 1846-49). It has already been made evident that the capacity of the extended family to provide aid is a vital part of the transitional situation of African youth. Two other aspects of that situation are equally important: definition of the role of youth, which will be heavily influenced by traditional concepts, western educational values and peer groups; and perceptions of effectiveness and equity of governmental actions for development and expanding opportunities.

Frustration and discontent in the transitional situation may be manifested in many behavior outcomes, but two are of greatest significance for African countries at present—the political and the criminal. Different perspectives on the possibilities in the situation may lead some youths toward political radicalism and others toward conservative politics, while some may eschew politics altogether. Regardless of their political orientation, crime will have the considerable appeals of immediate material and psychic rewards for transitional youth.

From the standpoint of the actor, criminal behavior may be classified as either functional or expressive. Functional crime has the purpose of fulfilling physical needs, *as perceived by the person committing the crime*, whereas expressive crimes are those having primarily emotional and symbolic significance for the person, either with regard to the safety-valve function of relieving tension and thwarted feelings or as attempted resolutions of social psychological problems such as identity diffusion and status deprivation.

Specifically, my theoretical framework for the analysis of transitional processes suggests the following hypotheses about expected criminal and political behavioral outcomes for each of the four types of youths and young adults:

. . . Stable modern young adults will tend to be political moderates or conservatives who are oriented to maintaining the institutions of society.

. . . Marginal modern young adults will tend to be highly susceptible to illegal and unprincipled practices for occupational, financial and social gains; to have opportunistic orientations to politics which result in support for established parties and groups when they see ready paths to power in them; and to turn to radical politics when their power ambitions are continually blocked in established political parties and groups.

. . . Stable transitional youth will tend to be essentially nonpolitical in their orientation to public life; to be strongly

predisposed to commit functional crimes to meet their subsistence needs, and to be strongly inclined to risk illegal and unconventional practices which are functional for gaining education and work.

. . . Marginal transitional youths will tend to have a non-political orientation to society; to establish relatively stable patterns of criminal behavior which are primarily expressive but which have functional components as well; and to establish contracultures (Yinger, 1960) with distinctive normative patterns and worldviews and embodying fundamentally hostile attitudes toward society.

Space does not permit me to elaborate on these hypotheses or on the ways in which they have been derived from the theoretical framework presented in this paper. The framework itself consists of a set of ideal-type constructs developed from interrelated concepts. The measure of its value is not how closely it approximates reality in this first rough statement but how useful it proves to be as a heuristic model to stimulate research and theory on a set of problems that tax the understanding and ingenuity of political leader, development planner, and social researcher alike. If the profiles of youth appear overdrawn in two stark contrasts, this is only an indication that the theory has to be refined and perhaps revised as it is confronted with data.

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Scolarisation et marginalité de la jeunesse africaine

Albert J. McQueen

Le chômage de la jeunesse africaine scolarisée est un des problèmes les plus importants que les gouvernements locaux devront résoudre à long terme. Il est donc indispensable d'examiner en détail les mécanismes qui régissent l'intégration de cette jeunesse au monde adulte. D'après les recherches publiées à ce jour, la jeunesse africaine scolarisée (a) aspire en majorité à entrer dans le secteur moderne de l'économie (b) a des ambitions professionnelles d'autant plus vives que son niveau scolaire est élevé (c) attache davantage d'importance aux satisfactions économiques qu'aux satisfactions professionnelles (d) a une appréciation réaliste des structures économiques et professionnelles et des chances offertes par le monde du travail (e) attache une importance considérable à l'éducation et pense ainsi que le niveau scolaire d'un individu est le plus puissant déterminant de la position qu'il peut espérer occuper dans la hiérarchie des professions. En résumé, la jeunesse africaine est attirée vers un monde moderne, mais demeure malgré tout marginale en raison de son faible niveau d'éducation.

Marginalité de cette jeunesse. Le but de l'auteur est de démontrer que l'intégration de la jeunesse est le facteur déterminant le plus important de sa capacité à résoudre les problèmes qui résultent de son insertion dans un univers urbain. Il s'agit donc de mesurer la nature, l'intensité et la durée des expériences de

marginalité vécues par cette jeunesse. Ces facteurs dépendent de conditions macro-sociales et résultent par exemple de la discordance entre la progression de la scolarisation et la progression de la vie économique. Cette discordance entraîne en effet de violentes contradictions entre les devoirs de la jeunesse à l'égard du milieu traditionnel, son désir et son incapacité de participer à un monde moderne. L'auteur propose donc d'établir une typologie des expériences de marginalité vécues par les sujets auxquels il s'intéresse.

Les problèmes auxquels cette jeunesse se heurte sont de trois ordres (a) physique (alimentation, habitation, etc.) (b) professionnel—et il s'agit de mesurer l'écart opposant leurs qualifications à l'état du marché—(c) psychologique—et il s'agit de mesurer le sens que les sujets ont de leur propre identité. Dans ces trois perspectives, il est important de déterminer l'aide que les institutions familiales et politiques accordent à la jeunesse et d'isoler les réponses de chaque sujet à une situation de succès ou d'échec.


L'auteur suggère ensuite que l'intégration de la jeunesse africaine doit être étudiée dans une double perspective (a) professionnelle et (b) socio-culturelle.

L'absence de l'une ou l'autre de ces deux formes d'intégration donne naissance à certains comportements caractéristiques. Ces comportements peuvent être politiques et la jeunesse doit faire pression tant sur les groupes traditionnels qui peuvent faciliter sa survie et sa mobilité que sur les institutions politiques qui infléchissent l'état actuel du marché du travail. De là l'importance de la socialisation politique.

Même si les frustrations vécues par les sujets ont une origine politique, leurs réponses peuvent cependant prendre une autre forme et c'est dans cette perspective que devraient être étudiées les diverses manifestations de délinquance observables dans les grandes villes africaines contemporaines.

L'auteur propose alors quatre hypothèses (a) la jeunesse parfaitement intégrée a des orientations politiques conservatrices destinées à assurer la survie des institutions sociales actuelles; (b) la jeunesse intégrée économiquement mais marginale sur le plan culturel a tendance à utiliser des techniques illégales pour s'assurer des gains économiques ou sociaux. Elle a des orientations politiques "opportunistes" et supporte les partis et groupes politiques susceptibles de favoriser une croissance de son propre pouvoir. Enfin, elle est d'autant plus "gauchisante" que les pouvoirs établis l'empêchent de satisfaire ses ambitions professionnelles et sociales; (c) la jeunesse intégrée sur le plan culturel mais économiquement marginale a tendance à demeurer apoli-

tique. Elle a tendance à commettre des crimes "fonctionnels" si sa survie en dépend et est prête à utiliser des techniques illégales pour satisfaire ses ambitions scolaires et professionnelles; (d) la jeunesse marginale sur un plan à la fois socio-culturel et économique est apolitique, a tendance à adopter des comportements asociaux à la fois expressifs et instrumentaux, et à adopter une sous-culture globale fondamentalement hostile à l'idéologie dominante.



Educational Dilemmas of a Developing Country—Ceylon

J. E. Jayasuriya
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The educational scene in Ceylon is one that encourages a sense of complacency if one does not look at it too closely. 70.8% of the population was literate in 1963. The peak of school attendance is reached by the age of eight when 91% of children are in school. The number of pupils presenting themselves for the General Certificate of Education (GCE, for short) Advanced Level examination, which also serves as an entrance examination to the Universities, was 40,000 in 1966, while the output of university graduates in 1965 amounted to 2,100. Compared with many developing countries, this is commendable for a country with a population of 11 million people. Yet, beneath the superficial attractiveness of the educational scene there is much that is dysfunctional, both from the point of view of the individual and from that of society at large.

The schools of the first three decades of this century belonged quite distinctly to two categories. One group was fee-levying, exclusive and efficient, and provided a high quality humanistic education through the medium of English for a small number of children. Those who received this education were generally able to enter into lucrative, white-collar employment. The other category of school was non-fee-levying, relatively inefficient, and provided education in the national languages to the mass of children. It was an apology for education but the masses had to be satisfied with it. Only a microscopic minority of the children

attending this category of school succeeded in achieving any kind of social advancement as a result of education. The rest went into poorly paid, low status occupations after their schooling. Whatever the social injustices of this dual system of schools, it was at any rate functional and did not cause any serious discontent, as the products of the schools met the needs of the times and were employable.

The year 1931 marked a turning point in the educational development of the country, for it was the year in which the universal adult franchise was introduced. This step immediately raised the number of voters from 200,000 to 1,150,000 and the legislature and the executive had thereafter to be sensitive to the needs of the common man, who began to take note of the inequalities in the provision of education and began to ask for a fair deal. Educational progress then took the form of extending the elitist education to more and more children. "A Royal College in every town and village" became in fact a popular slogan with the Minister of Education in the 1940's. Royal College was the premier Government school in the capital city, Colombo. It was modelled on the British grammar school, and it provided an elitist education which led its alumni to the learned professions and the higher administrative service. While the products of a few such schools could no doubt be easily absorbed in employment, it was unrealistic to hope that the products of a great many such schools would have an equally assured future. Yet, the slogan was compelling in its demagogic appeal, and true to its intentions schools in many parts of the country began to be stepped up in the direction of Royal College. The replication, however, was not of Royal College in its entirety. With a few exceptions, only the humanistic curriculum of Royal College was replicated, as this was easy to achieve. The replication of the science side of Royal College was a difficult affair, needing laboratories and science teachers, and was done only in a limited number of schools. The net result of the efforts of these years to set up a Royal College in every town and village was by and large the introduction of the humanistic curriculum of a British grammar school into a very large number of town and village schools.

It would be unwise to underestimate the good that this did. Many thousands of children of poor socio-economic conditions broadened their horizons by being exposed to humanistic studies conceived in a quite liberal spirit, for they were now receiving a good humanistic education in contrast to the third-rate humanistic education they had received earlier. A few children excelled in these studies to such an extent that they were able to enter university education or obtain white-collar employment through success

in competitive examinations, and they broke into what had been the traditional preserves of the rich and privileged. While, in this way, the improved schools provided the opportunity for social advancement to possibly five per cent of the school population, the others were left disappointed. Schooling gave them some new vistas in the humanities, but it left them unemployed and unemployable, for their vocational aspirations were now in the direction of white-collar jobs, which were not available. Exposure to a predominantly humanistic curriculum (that set its sights on university matriculation or university entrance requirements and an almost complete neglect of studies with some closer social relevance) alienated them from the society into which they had been born. Students completing their secondary education with passes in a number of subjects at the GCE Ordinary Level examinations find it quite impossible to get the kind of employment they want and it is estimated that there are about 200,000 such persons. Employment prospects for Arts graduates from the universities are dim, and at least 25% of the 1000 Arts graduates of 1965 are known to be unemployed and with no immediate prospects of employment. The teaching profession which absorbed most of them in the past is taking very few of them, not because there are no vacancies for teachers in schools but because their salary bill would be high.

The Dilemma of Ceylon's Educational System

In brief, one of Ceylon's most pressing educational dilemmas is that while increasing numbers enroll in elementary, secondary and higher education, the kind of education sought and provided continues to be strongly humanistic and elitist, with the result that the products of education, not being absorbed in satisfying employment, become a disappointed and alienated group of angry young men and women. No simple solution exists to resolve this dilemma. It is easy enough to suggest that young people should be diverted to agriculture, handicrafts, fisheries and be trained to engage in productive employment. It is more easily said than done, for education is but one facet of a complex situation in which socio-psychological and economic factors are woven in an intricate web, and educational change does not seem possible except in the context of simultaneous changes in these factors.

Early Ceylonese society appears to have held manual work, especially agriculture, in high esteem, and this attitude is exemplified in the statement, "Take a farmer, wipe off the dust and mud clinging to his body, and he is fit to occupy a throne". Apparently, with the onset of foreign rule, this attitude changed, and the respectable occupations were those white-collar occupa-

tions in which persons belonging to the ruling race (namely, the British in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) were seen to be engaged. These occupations were the plums that were eagerly sought by the most ambitious of the indigenous population. An education in the English language became an essential prerequisite for these occupations. For this reason as well as because English was the language of the rulers, the English language became a badge of superiority. The English-educated became an elitist group. A western style of dress became an essential accompaniment of English education and of superior status. Thus, the English-speaking, western-attired person engaged in a white-collar occupation symbolized social advancement and status, and all else was lowly and despised.

With such attitudes taking firm root in the minds of people, there sprang up a distorted scale of values that placed verbal knowledge, especially in English, at a premium and scorned work involving the hands. The attractive economic rewards associated with white-collar occupations also helped to consolidate this process. In this way, the twin attributes of social status and economic reward together produced the image of the ideal Ceylonese as an English-educated, western-attired person in essentially lucrative white-collar employment. While every young person aspired to this ideal, it was to elude the grasp of about ninety per cent of the population who had to be content with being educated in the national languages with a smattering of English thrown in, wearing national dress, and finally pursuing non-white-collar employment. There has not been sufficient realism to abandon aspiration when it is seen to be so short of fulfilment, and the image of the English-speaking, western-attired, white-collar employee continues to dominate the thoughts of young people.

. . . English Learning

There is much insistence on learning English. Pursued far enough by the intelligent few, it opens the door to modern knowledge and to professional advancement. But the little English that the vast majority learn, while being inadequate to open the door to knowledge or advancement, acts dysfunctionally by alienating them from the pursuit of occupations that involve manual labor. In this sense, the wider diffusion of English has carried with it the seeds of social and economic disruption. This is another dilemma of Ceylon education. A partial resolution of this dilemma has been achieved by the progressive use of the national languages as the media of instruction at all levels, including the university. English, however, continues to occupy a prominent place in the administrative life of the country, and will for many years to come serve to separate the privileged from the not-privileged.

. . . *Western Attire*

Western attire is still the standard mode of dress of the privileged. While national attire has made some headway among a few of the elite, it still continues to be associated largely with relatively low social status and occupations. It is unthinkable that anyone who dons western attire should work in the fields as a farmer or pursue carpentry, metal work or fishing as an occupation.

The prestige symbols of English and western attire associated with white-collar employment are reinforced by a wage scale that pays unrealistically high wages to white-collar workers. The wages paid to white-collar workers are generally many times the national per capita income. A young university graduate recruited to the administrative grade of the public service gets a salary nearly ten times the per capita national income. A young person completing secondary education and becoming a teacher gets a salary that is double the per capita national income. The high wages paid to white-collar workers in the public sector have their parallels in the private sector. In contrast, self-employment in agriculture or the trades, and employment in non-white-collar occupations tend to give poor economic rewards.

With white-collar employment so inextricably mixed with the prestige symbols of English, western attire and money, it is not surprising that the general population strongly resists any attempt to diversify education. The fact that the present system of academic education brings economic reward only to a very small percentage does not make it any less sought. Everyone fondly hopes to belong to the small minority to whom academic education is the road to social and economic advancement. In a democracy, the will of the people prevails, however damaging their will may be to themselves, and it is the will of the people that an academic education at least in the humanities must be provided at once for all, even if an education that includes science would take time to be provided in adequate measure.

Ceylon's Economic Crisis

The development of science education is going on at a slow pace, conditioned by the setting-up of laboratories and the supply of teachers in the context of a serious economic crisis. A high birth rate and a relatively efficient health service that has reduced mortality together produce an increasing population. The staple food, rice, is not grown in sufficient quantity and has to be imported at competitive prices from Burma and China. Ceylon's own primary products of tea and rubber fetch poor prices. Tea

fetches poor prices because big foreign combines rig the prices at tea auctions by agreeing, after a few bids, to bid no more and to share the stocks at the last price bid. The Government does not step in to stop such malpractices. Rubber fetches poor prices on account of the competition from synthetic rubber. Industrial development is taking place only at a slow pace quite incommensurate with the growth of population. All in all, the country is in the throes of a grave economic crisis, and money is not available for expanding science and technical education on a large scale. One cannot, of course, be certain whether the expansion of science and technical education can bring any but meagre returns, unless there is an appreciation of the interdependence of social, economic and educational factors, and the necessity of an overall plan that takes into account the changes that must simultaneously take place in all these factors to rescue the country from its present impasse.

Programs of adult education do not exist at all, in spite of the need for them. This need, it must be noted, arises partly from the social and economic irrelevance of school education. If school education were more functional, there would not be such a sad state of affairs as that the diseases from which fifty per cent of the population suffer are preventable, that the practice of scientific agriculture is so uncommon, that there is so little cooperative effort to solve common problems. Because school education has done nothing about them, these naturally suggest themselves as tasks for adult education, but there is little awareness at the official level of the importance of adult education.

The people who achieve positions of leadership by political processes are distinguished by their demagogic and not by any capacity to work out reasoned solutions to national problems. They depend heavily on bureaucratic officials, who have reached the top rungs of the administrative hierarchy by their consummate skill in tinkering with problems, maintaining the status quo, and attempting nothing unhallowed by long tradition. Unimaginatively rooted in the grooves of their own thinking, they are unappreciative that any wisdom could exist outside their own ranks. They nominate themselves for training opportunities abroad, and more often than not the persons so nominated have not been interested in the fields of training before the training, nor do they use the training after they return. Generally speaking, officialdom is quite willing to welcome foreign expertise.

Herein seems to lie a ray of hope for working out some possible solutions to Ceylon's educational dilemmas. If a high-powered team of foreign experts with some local personnel would work out a program of action that takes into account the interrelationships of society, economy and education and make foreign

aid an integral part of its implementation rather than a simple act of generosity, there is every likelihood of some progress being achieved in the course of time, and the present aimless drift in Ceylon education arrested.

Les problèmes posés par la scolarisation d'un pays neuf. Le cas de Ceylan

J. E. Jayasuriya


L'auteur se propose de montrer les goulots d'étranglement qui menacent un développement harmonieux du système scolaire à Ceylan.

Jusqu'en 1940 il y avait deux types d'écoles dans ce pays. Certaines écoles étaient payantes, et prodiguaient une éducation classique de type anglais à une couche très étroite de la population. D'autres écoles étaient gratuites et prodiguaient un enseignement de base dans les langues locales à la majeure partie de la société cinghalaise. Depuis, les taux de fréquentation primaire, secondaire et post-secondaire ont augmenté régulièrement, mais la nature des programmes—élitistes et classiques—défavorise une utilisation satisfaisante de la main-d'œuvre ainsi formée. Les anciens élèves sont progressivement aliénés du reste de la population.

L'auteur analyse ensuite les facteurs qui ont contribué à rendre les programmes d'éducation dysfonctionnels. Alors que la hiérarchie professionnelle traditionnelle attachait une grande importance aux travaux manuels, l'administration britannique a survalorisé les emplois de bureau et a donc favorisé les individus parlant anglais et assimilés aux moeurs et coutumes britanniques. De tels individus ont joui pendant longtemps d'un prestige et d'un revenu supérieurs à ceux de l'ensemble de la population et leur image a suffisamment impressionné les masses pour que les


programmes de formation demeurent classiques, tournés vers l'enseignement de l'anglais et de la culture britannique.

La prééminence accordée aux emplois de bureau-trop rares-voit ses effets aggravés par la faible rentabilité des activités agricoles. L'industrialisation demeure faible et les emplois industriels ne peuvent absorber qu'une infime partie de la population scolarisée. Enfin l'élite politique, elle-même formée à l'anglaise, est incapable de communiquer effectivement avec les masses et de comprendre leurs besoins. L'auteur conclut en souhaitant une assistance technique plus effective.



PART IV

The Organization of Research in Developing Countries: Issues and Potential Solutions



Introduction to Part IV

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The preceding papers have discussed and demonstrated some of the special contributions of social-psychological analysis to the study of development and social change. Thus, they have been concerned with the relationship between psychological and social-structural factors in the determination of the pace and character of changes in a modernizing direction. At the simplest level, such an analysis focuses on the effects of motivational and cognitive orientations on economic and social development; or, conversely, on the effects of the social stratification and power structure of a society on the development of attitudes and motives consistent with modernization. At a more complex level, a social-psychological analysis can contribute to an understanding of the interplay between capacities and opportunities in facilitating or impeding change. Some of the papers have indicated, for example, that the presence of psychological capacities—such as achievement motivation or “planfullness”—may or may not lead to economic development, depending on the opportunity structures within the society; and that the presence of social opportunities—such as technological innovations or educational facilities—may or may not lead to social and attitudinal change, depending on the motivational and cognitive capacities of the population.

To be maximally useful, such an analysis must—as several of the papers have stressed—go beyond the mere statement of relationships of change to various social and psychological antecedents or consequences. It must attempt to trace in detail the

mediating processes that account for these relationships. Exploration of mediating processes is particularly important if we wish to understand negative or unexpected findings. The paper by Kiray, for example, reports on the occurrence of technological and attitudinal changes that did not have the expected consequences in terms of a higher level of income and modern social institutions. To explain these surprising findings, she postulates a heightened need for security and the resultant institutionalization of certain new patterns of personal relations which blocked further economic and social changes. To take another example, Jahoda points out that the frequent failure of formal education to produce the expected changes in beliefs and values can be understood, in part, by an analysis of the roles and attitudes of teachers and the kinds of interactions with their students that they establish in the classroom.

In short, by examining motivational and social-interactional processes in a changing situation we can gain a better understanding of the occurrence or non-occurrence of social change and of some of its outcomes. We can also gain some insight into a fascinating consequence of rapid social change, described in several of the preceding papers (e.g., those by Zempleni and Collomb, by Kiray, and by McQueen): the emergence of new institutional arrangements based on novel and unique combinations of modern with traditional patterns.

From the Discussion Groups

The Importance of Comparative Research

The preceding papers (with two exceptions) were presented at three symposia held during the first three days of the Ibadan Conference. In addition to the symposia, eight smaller and more informal discussion groups were convened during this period. Two of these continued discussion of the symposia on motivational aspects of technological development and on problems of education and diffusion of knowledge, respectively. The others concerned themselves with attitude change and resistances to it; problems of mental health under conditions of rapid social change; conflicts and continuities between existing values and new institutions; child rearing and personality development in relation to social change; development of national identity; and methodological problems of cross-cultural research. Perhaps the major theme that the discussion groups added to those brought out in the symposia concerned the importance of comparative research: The special contributions of social-psychological analysis to the study of development and social change, which were

stressed in the symposium papers and largely illustrated by studies done within single cultures, would be greatly enhanced by cross-cultural comparisons.

Broadly speaking, most of the discussion groups focused upon the two obvious types of relationships: (a) those in which change (in attitudes, values, motives, institutions) is the dependent variable, and studied as a function of existing social structures, value systems, cognitive styles, socialization patterns and so on; and (b) those in which change is the independent variable, and the concern is with studying its further effects on traditional patterns, on mental health, on status relationships, and so on.

One conclusion that recurred in most of the group reports is that the *nature* of these various relationships differs in different cultures. Thus, for example, a given value system (such as traditionalism) or a given set of beliefs (such as superstitious ones) may have a different relationship to change, depending on the nature of the change under consideration or on certain characteristics of the social structure. The same condition may be functional—i.e., promote desirable change—in one situation, but dysfunctional in another. Similarly, a given institutional change may have different effects, depending on such contextual factors as the existing social structure, motivational patterns and cultural values. In short, then, it is not just the behavioral and institutional patterns but the *relationships* between variables that differ in different cultural contexts.

It follows that comparisons between different societies are essential to research on social change. Such comparisons are not merely an added refinement, but a necessity for the proper understanding of processes of change. This is true for all of the different types of change on which the various discussion groups focused. It is true whether the form of change under investigation is socialization, or education, or attitude and motive change, or institutional change; whether the target of change is the mental health of the individual, or the value patterns of a segment of the population, or the social structure of the society; and whether the content of the change refers to attitudes and values in the area of work, or the area of education, or the area of political behavior and national identity.

Some Problems of Comparative Research

If there was consensus among the various discussion groups on the necessity for comparative research, there was also consensus on the existence of recurrent sources of difficulty in carrying out comparative research. Among the problems raised were the following:

Sharing of Knowledge: Because of geographical and linguistic separation, investigators are often unaware of data relevant to their interests that are already available in the literature, or of related work that has been completed elsewhere, or of relevant work in progress. This may make for unnecessary duplication of effort, for failure to build on knowledge that is already available and for failure to employ existing comparative data in the planning and interpretation of research.

Identification of Potential Colleagues: Comparative research generally requires the collaboration of investigators in different societies—either as resource persons for one another or as partners in a series of parallel studies carried out in different countries. Since we do not yet have a genuine community of social scientists from all parts of the world, it is often difficult to identify colleagues with the relevant skills and interests in different countries.

Developing Patterns of Collaboration for Cross-Cultural Work: Any work involving collaboration across national boundaries requires careful attention to the interests and sensitivities of one's colleagues from the other society and to the nature of the relationship between the two (or more) societies involved. This is particularly true where the collaborators and their respective societies differ sharply in the resources available to them. Some of the problems that I discussed in my paper in Part I of this issue—such as the problem of maintaining true equality of the collaborating partners—become crucial to the establishment of a productive, working relationship.

Establishing the Meaningfulness of Research Problems: The differences between cultures in their dominant frames of reference make for differences in the way in which research problems are defined. A given problem, and a given formulation of it, may be more meaningful in one cultural setting than in another. Thus, in choosing and defining a problem for cross-cultural research, it is necessary to view it within the context of all the cultures involved.


Establishing the Validity of Research Instruments: Again, because of different cultural frames of reference, there is always a question of whether a given instrument is useable in different settings. The same instrument may not necessarily measure the same thing in different cultures. The problem of translation is a tricky one, since the same words and ideas do not necessarily carry the same meaning in different cultural contexts.

These problems have implications for needed developments with respect to research collaboration, scientific communication and research training. With respect to research collaboration, major points that emerged from the different discussion groups were the need to establish proper norms for the relationship between collaborators in cross-cultural research; the need to develop

common understandings that would guide our choice and definition of research problems; and the need to improve our procedures for selecting research instruments in cross-cultural research and for translating these instruments (in the broadest sense of the term translation) for use in different cultural settings. With respect to scientific communication, major points that emerged from the discussions were the need to establish a world-wide network of social scientists, having personal contact with one another; the need to develop mechanisms for wide dissemination of specific information about available data and on-going research activities; and the need to provide opportunities for social scientists to expose their different frames of reference to one another. Problems of research training were not specifically discussed in the various groups, but there was an obvious implication that—both in the more and in the less developed countries—there is a need to work out patterns of training *for* and *through* collaboration in comparative research.

The program for the second half of the Conference focused on these pervasive issues. Three plenary sessions were devoted, respectively, to research collaboration, research training and scientific communication. The Conference then divided into three subgroups, each of which explored one of these topics in more detail and developed recommendations for procedures and organizational mechanisms designed to improve our patterns of communication, training and collaboration. Finally, recommendations from the three groups were reviewed in plenary sessions.¹ The next three papers present some of the highlights of the discussions of these three topics and the recommendations adopted by the Conference in each of these areas. They are followed by a specific proposal for cross-cultural research collaboration which served as an important focus for discussion on that topic.

¹At its final session, the Conference also appointed a continuing committee to explore appropriate follow-ups to the Conference and to serve as a clearing-house for various activities developing out of the Conference. Charles Pidoux (c/o United Nations, BP 492, Niamey, Niger) is Co-ordinator of the committee. Its members include Iraj Ayman, Rogelio Diaz-Guerrero, Herbert Kelman, Hans-Joachim Kornadt, Stefan Nowak, Francis Olu, Okediji, Udai Pareek, Fatou Sow and Henri Tajfel.



Problems of Scientific Communication

Rogelio Diaz-Guerrero
University of Mexico

Two sessions were devoted by the Conference to the problems of scientific communication. If one uses the number of issues raised and the number of people taking the floor at the two sessions as indicators, one should conclude that this is one of the most important and least systematically discussed areas of scientific research in social psychology in the developing countries. Another parameter demonstrating the importance of this problem would be the variety and heterogeneity of the issues. By each one of these parameters, the interest, the amount of discussion and the variety of the points of view, the importance of these problems was consistently underlined.

It may be that communication and reporting in our field is chaotic on many counts. It may be that standards for scientific communication in our field have not been established. It may be that the variety of interests of the different social psychologists in different countries make it difficult to establish contact across barriers. These may appear as barriers of discipline, of methodology, of the basic theoretical viewpoints from which each one departs or barriers due to the different purposes that each one has in his work. What is certainly true is that our conference brought social psychologists—and others doing related work—from the developing countries together for the first time. Let us take a comprehensive look at the number and the variety of issues that were discussed in order to get a better understanding of what occurred.

Problems and Needs

Stylistic Suggestions: Our scientific communication would be more interpretable if we followed a certain standard format in reporting empirical studies. We should describe in our reports exactly what we did and exactly what we found. We should scrupulously define the populations where we did our work and restrict our conclusions to them. Further, if we must report in varying fashions, we could perhaps agree on simultaneously making abstracts following a strict format and sending these abstracts to widely circulated journals.

Publication Lag: There is an average of six years between the beginning of a research project and its publication. People engaged in research should make available interim information, through the means of a specialized newsletter and other media, about the topics, preliminary results and stages of their work. Such information would provide an up-to-date account of the conceptions, methodologies and purposes of social psychological research. Published materials are often too dated for such purposes.

Insufficient Publication of Results of Research: Often, only successful research is published. In order to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and in order to spread the value of the lesson a failure implies, results from unsuccessful research should be published with the same consistency as other results.

Annual Sources of Information: The idea was presented that in our field we need something similar to the *Annual Review of Psychology*. There should be an annual review of social-psychological research of international or cross-cultural significance and of importance to scientific workers in the developing nations.

Underdeveloped Languages: Several languages, e.g., Spanish, were described as "underdeveloped languages". Work done and reported in these languages is discriminated against. The results of studies published in these languages never reach any agency that will give them wide circulation and make them available to other workers in the field. Again, duplication and unnecessary effort results. Efforts should be made to establish either regional centers which would be aware of the materials in these languages and report them to other such centers, or some other device in order to counter-balance this lower communicative value of papers written in underdeveloped languages.

Use of Existing Institutions and Centers for the Integration of Information: There are in almost every region of the world, universities, research institutes or centers where social scientists have been working with the problems of developing nations. It would be of value to engage the cooperation of these centers or institutes in

serving as repositories for and providing a systematic integration of relevant empirical and conceptual material, making this integrated information available through some central means of communication.

Newsletter: The necessity of some central means of communication was repeatedly stressed—whatever the previous steps of gathering information would be in order to provide this central medium with the relevant information. The main means of achieving a central medium was considered to be the development of a newsletter. In fact, a desire was expressed for regional newsletters as well as a central newsletter. A newsletter could gather information from either individuals or centers and provide a means for the publication of reports or research interests, of intention to undertake research, of research in progress, and summaries of completed work. It was felt that such a central newsletter should take among its responsibilities that of establishing contact with every known social psychologist who is doing research and inviting him to send abstracts, letters and reports of research in progress. This would allow an investigator to locate those with similar interests and/or relevant information. Such a newsletter, to be effective, should have the widest possible circulation.

Systematic Meetings: Scientific communication among social scientists is not very effective—and perhaps it is unrealistic to expect that it will—by means other than meetings. It would probably be best to systematically develop regional meetings of social scientists. These meetings should not be overly limited in time, but rather might take the form of summer workshops. The experiences of these regional meetings could then be summarized by those attending and sent to the central source of information.

Communication Across Developing Countries: Some means should be developed in order to assist the growth of informal communication of social scientists across developing countries. There is very little knowledge in other developing countries about the large amount of social research that has been done in Africa in recent years. It was indicated that perhaps UNESCO could become a central depository for social research relevant to our purposes from different areas of the world and could try to stimulate communication across developing countries. Also, something should be done with regard to the economic barriers to scientific communication, i.e., the high cost of books, of journals and the high cost of faster and surer ways of postal communication. These barriers are most strongly felt by those working in developing nations. The crucial question here is why informal communication of social scientists across the developing countries is so limited. It is probably partially a problem of economic poten-

tiality but perhaps is also a problem of the attitude of social scientists; workers in some countries may be convinced that the reports of other social scientists working in other countries do not have much relevance to their own problems.

A Directory: In order to encourage communication among individual scientists who are engaged in similar kinds of work, and particularly when the problem is communication across the developing countries, a directory should be developed that would include the names of the people engaged in relevant social-psychological work, and perhaps even a statement about their main interests and the kinds of work they are currently engaged in. Such a directory would permit the most direct as well as the most informal communication, by letter.

Visiting Research Teams: An important type of scientific communication could be easily increased if all researchers from developed countries who work in the developing countries at least notified psychology departments and other relevant institutes or centers of the research that they intend to do or have done and the methodology that they have utilized. This might by itself increase the interest and curiosity of local scientists in regard to the focus of such studies and their approaches.

Thought Rather than Facts: Often, instead of just learning of the results and the usual "scientific facts", it would be of greater value to ongoing work to have access to the thinking of the social scientist: the problems with which he deals, the general assumptions from which he departs, the methods developed in keeping with his problems, and particularly the methods which he has found adaptive to the culture where he is doing his work.

Too Much or Too Little? As social scientists we seem to be complaining on the one hand about the fact that there is not enough availability of information and on the other that there is too much information, that we are inundated with books, journal articles and technical reports. Perhaps the main problem of communication consists in finding some way to specify the criteria for the kind of information that would be relevant to social psychologists in general or in some of its specific fields. One speaker gave an example of his own search of the literature on cross-cultural research; at first sight this was an impossible accomplishment, but as soon as he stated the criteria for the pertinent literature to be that the data had been generated in at least two cultures, the available information in terms of number of papers was reduced to one percent of the original bibliographic sources. Quite possibly abstracts should be the center of our communications; every social scientist should be responsible for sending to *Psychological Abstracts* or *Sociological Abstracts* a coherent but summarized statement of his own work.

Funds for Information Dissemination: It was felt that any well-financed cross-cultural study should provide within its budget—and funding institutions should become very aware of the need for this—an amount specifically designated for establishing the facilities for sending the information gathered to other workers in the field. This perhaps could be combined with the existence of a center capable of preserving all the information, collecting it from the workers in the field and providing copies to those interested for the cost of reproduction. It was felt, however, that such a center would face the tremendous and not yet resolved problem of categorizing the information available in our field. There has to be developed some type of classification system or cataloguing of research topics that are most usual in the field, and the investigators should systematically apply such a system to their own work. This work may be in itself an extremely important first step before other problems of scientific communication are considered.

Available Resources of Communication

Two organizations which have as their primary purpose the exchanging of information between social scientists are UNESCO and the International Union of Psychological Science.

UNESCO's Department of Social Sciences performs a number of functions: it brings together social scientists from all over the world to discuss specific topics; provides personnel to aid in the building up of academic departments in the social sciences; publishes a series of pamphlets on the teaching of various subjects in the social science; and serves as a clearinghouse, providing information to any interested persons on the activities of social scientists. UNESCO also includes the International Documentation Commission, which accumulates bibliographies of work in various areas as well as publishing some materials in its own right. Among its publications is the *International Social Science Journal*, which contains scholarly articles as well as articles on the activities of various social scientists. A third UNESCO agency is the International Social Science Council, which has recently established a European center for coordination and documentation in research; the center is located in Vienna and explicitly encourages cross-cultural studies. There are now some fifteen projects working through it.

The International Union is a group composed of psychologists from 35 countries. It holds international meetings, seminars on specific topics, etc. which draw psychologists from various countries together. The Union also publishes a journal, the *International Journal of Psychology*; this journal is explicitly designed

to encourage cross-cultural research. The Union also publishes an international directory, the second edition of which has just been released, and includes over 12,000 entries. Finally, the Union and the American Psychological Association have published *Opportunities for Advanced Training and Research in Psychology*, which is an excellent summary.

For those who are interested in the research which is being done in Latin America, there is the *Inter-American Journal of Psychology*, which publishes cross-cultural studies in English, Spanish and Portuguese. Also, the Interamerican Society of Psychology has published several volumes of the *Proceedings of the Interamerican Congresses*. In these *Proceedings*, particularly from the 5th Inter-American Congress on, the number of social-psychological and particularly cross-cultural researches reported has been steadily on the increase. Another valuable source of relevant information is the *Latin American Research Review* published by the University of Texas.

Recommendations

A working group met during the Conference, with two goals: (a) bringing together and analyzing problems of scientific communication which exist; and (b) arriving at some recommendations as to specific means of dealing with the problems raised.

The members of the working session produced a series of recommendations, some of which were later approved by the Conference. These recommendations, however, should be considered as only a series of first steps in this problem area. Perhaps the best way to visualize them is to consider them as our setting down of a series of dimensions to be worked with, after going over the many aspects of the problems. It should be understood that these dimensions are hypothetical dimensions of action about the problems and that they are therefore experimental devices. They are to be evaluated as they are carried out; it is hoped that the information and results that we derive from the carrying out of these recommendations will lead to better solutions in the future. It should also be realized that only some of the issues were addressed by these recommendations since others, e.g., the development of a series of regional meetings, were considered to be too complex to be dealt with within the framework of developing generalized means of basic communication. Further, those aspects of the entire "problematica" which were finally set into recommendations appeared—to the members of the working session—as more common denominator solutions to many of the problems raised.

It is in this perspective that concrete recommendations were

developed regarding several single means of scientific communication in our field. These means were the following: (a) a newsletter; (b) a set of recommendations to people already engaged in the production of relevant directories; (c) recommendations regarding communication of social scientists with decision makers; and (d) recommendations regarding communication of the social psychologist with (a) undergraduate students, and (b) other disciplines.

Recommendations Regarding a Newsletter

It was recommended that a newsletter be instituted, with the following characteristics:

. . . The newsletter should be open to letters, abstracts and news items from people engaged in any type of social-psychological research of international relevance, particularly research relevant to problems in the developing countries. These letters and all abstracts should have the name and address of the sender and, whenever possible, information regarding previous publication and/or future publication of material referred to in the letter or abstract.

. . . The newsletter should provide for geographic differentiation of the incoming information, that is, there should be sections for Africa, Latin America, Asia, etc.

. . . Preference should be given to communications coming from the developing countries.

. . . The newsletter editors should gather information and be ready to give it to inquirers regarding documentation centers, both worldwide and regional.

This Newsletter is now being published, under the editorship of Dr. Harry Triandis (Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois, U.S.A.).¹

Recommendations Regarding a Directory

It is of great importance to have a comprehensive and current directory of people engaged in social-psychological research of international importance and/or of relevance to the problems of

¹Dr. Triandis is being assisted in collecting relevant information by a Committee which includes members from the several regions of the world. The members and the region for which each is responsible are: Marshall Segal, East Africa; E. T. Abiola, West Africa; Udai Pareek, Southern Asia; Iraj Ayman, Western Asia; Triandis, North America; A. L. Angelini, South America; Rita Liljestrom, Northern Europe; Stefan Nowak, Eastern Europe; Guy Barbichon, Western Europe; and J. W. Berry, Australia and the Pacific. Anyone who wishes to be on the Newsletter mailing list or has relevant material should communicate with the appropriate member. Addresses will be found at the end of this issue.

developing nations. Such a directory is indispensable in fostering informal communication between researchers.

The following recommendations were arrived at in this connection.

Since a directory of psychologists engaged in cross-cultural research is being prepared by Dr. J. W. Berry of the Department of Psychology of the University of Sydney, Australia, it was recommended that the list of Conference participants be sent to Dr. Berry so that he will include them.

The group felt that there is also a need for directories covering a wider range of subject matter and disciplines, along the lines of the directory of "Social Scientists Specializing in African Studies", published for UNESCO by the Ecole Pratique Des Hautes Etudes in 1963. It was recommended that the Conference encourage UNESCO to up-date this directory for social scientists specializing in African studies, and to produce similar directories for Latin America and Asia, and that the members of the Conference offer their services as consultants to UNESCO for such undertakings.

Communication of Social Scientists with Decision Makers

In view of the complexity of this problem, it was felt that at the present time only the following recommendation should be made:

A greater degree of attention should be given to the relationships—and the ways of establishing better and more useful communication—between social psychologists and decision makers. Both the social psychologist and the decision maker should be more aware of the problems that each has to face in arriving at his respective conclusions or decisions.

Communication from the Social Psychologist to Students and Other Professionals

The following recommendations were developed.

Each social psychologist who is carrying out research in any country should report on his research to undergraduate students. This is particularly important for social scientists working in areas other than their own nation. These social scientists should make themselves available for formal or informal presentation of their work to local students.

Each social psychologist should make an effort to communicate his approaches and findings to other members of related professions and disciplines.

Problèmes posés par les communications scientifiques

Rogelio Diaz-Guerrero

L'auteur se propose de passer en revue les facteurs susceptibles d'améliorer l'efficacité des communications scientifiques.

Normalisation des communications. Il est indispensable de décrire plus systématiquement les conditions de l'expérimentation et les populations étudiées.

Délais de publication. Le laps de temps entre le début d'une recherche et la publication du rapport final étant de 6 ans environ, il est indispensable de mieux faire connaître l'état intérimaire des travaux entrepris par tel ou tel chercheur. Dans l'état actuel des choses, les travaux publiés sont bien souvent dépassés.

Publication des résultats. Les résultats négatifs ont autant d'importance que les résultats positifs et devraient donc faire l'objet de communications scientifiques.

Annuaires. Il est souhaitable de dresser un bilan annuel des recherches comparatives entreprises dans le domaine de la psychologie sociale.

Langues sous-développées. Certains rapports de recherches sont mal connus parce que rédigés dans une langue scientifiquement sous-développée. Il est indispensable d'accroître la diffusion de tels travaux.

Archives. La plupart des universités ont été à l'origine de travaux sur les problèmes de développement; elles se doivent de participer à la création d'un centre commun d'archives et de docu-

mentation faisant le point des connaissances acquises dans tel ou tel domaine de la psychologie sociale. En plus de ce système d'archives, il est souhaitable de lancer un Bulletin de liaison permettant aux psycho-sociologues faisant des études comparatives d'établir et de maintenir un contact fructueux. Il convient également d'organiser des conférences internationales et régionales afin de mieux coordonner les recherches entreprises.

Communications entre pays neufs. Les chercheurs des pays neufs sont souvent ignorants des travaux faits sur des pays analogues aux leurs et il est souhaitable qu'un organisme de coopération, sous l'égide de l'UNESCO par exemple, soit mis sur pied afin de faciliter les échanges entre les chercheurs des pays neufs.

Toutes ces recommandations posent des problèmes financiers (où trouver les ressources nécessaires?), mais aussi techniques (les bibliographies disponibles donnent souvent à la fois *trop* et *pas assez* d'informations susceptibles de servir à l'élaboration d'études comparatives). Faisant le point des moyens d'information existants, l'auteur analyse les recommandations émises à l'issue de la conférence.

La première de ces recommandations a trait à la publication d'un Bulletin de liaison et porte sur sa forme et son contenu. Son premier rédacteur en chef est le Docteur TRIANDIS, Département de Psychologie, Université de l'Illinois, Urbana, Illinois.

La deuxième recommandation a trait à la préparation d'un annuaire des psycho-sociologues faisant des recherches comparatives. Cette préparation devrait être faite en collaboration avec les organismes qui ont déjà entrepris des tâches analogues.

Enfin la troisième recommandation porte sur les relations que les psycho-sociologues doivent établir avec le monde extérieur. Il est indispensable d'établir des contacts plus étroits avec (a) les administrateurs et les hommes politiques (b) avec les étudiants afin de permettre un renouvellement de la profession et de faciliter la diffusion des travaux entrepris au sein du grand public (c) les représentants des autres disciplines pour faciliter la création de véritables équipes de recherches.

Problems of Research Training¹

Douglass Price-Williams
Rice University, U.S.A.

Two basic themes were discussed at the Conference, although only the first was given full attention. The two were: the training of psychologists in developing countries and the specific problem of cross-cultural training.

Training of Psychologists

Representatives of several universities described the curricula that have been worked out for relatively new psychology departments and the problems that have been encountered. There appear to be several recurring problems for programs in developing countries. First, there is the question of staffing. In many developing countries this problem is acute, because students who are sent to European or American centers of learning for graduate training often fail to return. A variety of events tend to interfere with their return. Some of them lose interest in their training and drift away from it. Others become emotionally disturbed, at times due to "culture shock" phenomena. Many of those who successfully complete their training and achieve their degrees stay in the developed countries and make their careers there.

Solutions to this problem do not seem to lie in the direction

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of governmental control or prior written declarations by the student that he will return. Rather, one possibility is that students be selected who already belong to administrative or academic structures in their home country and who have, therefore, some ties to that country. Ideally, there should be adequate training in the home country so that students do not need to be sent abroad in the first place. It is manifest that adequate staffing in the home country is the ideal solution, but it is also manifest that in the interim until this is achieved faculty members will have to be procured from elsewhere. If, in the meantime, students must be sent abroad, then certain kinds of measures can be taken so as to enable the student to keep in touch with events at home. For example, students could return to their parent country to do their dissertation research. This would at once accommodate them to research problems in their country and, of course, maintain their ties. Alternatively, a student could be sent to centers with a strong interest in his home area; this might maintain or increase his identification with that area.

The staffing problem is connected with a second problem, a financial one. The source of funds for research in developing countries all too often originates from outside the country, and these funds are given to researches from developed countries. What is required is a wider distribution of possibly smaller grants, so that local researches could be conducted. This would make it possible for faculty members in developing countries to provide training in the problems of and research strategies appropriate to the country. Also, it was pointed out that the Swedish Government makes available small amounts of money for foreign students to do research in their home country; this practice might be adopted by the universities or governments of other developed countries.

Means of training students in the home country raised a third topic: that of so-called field stations and summer schools. When these suggestions were brought up, a nice touch of semantics was sparked off. "Field station" apparently carries overtones of an army of imperialist scholars encamping on foreign soil, and as such, is an objectionable term. An alternative wording, "training centers", was suggested. The other term, "summer school", innocuous as it might seem, has overtones of what might be called ethnocentric climatology. With slight tongue in cheek, the representative from Peru pointed out that in some countries, including his own, it was *always* summer, and thus to emphasize the word summer showed only too plainly the background of those that suggested the word. The term was therefore altered to read "vacation school". Nomenclature apart, both concepts were developed into recommendations which the Conference adopted.

It was recommended that, wherever possible, psychologists from "developed" countries, interested in research in developing countries, carry out their work in the context of local "training centers". These should be instituted in various regions with the following characteristics:

- . . . They should be affiliated with existing universities or research institutes.
- . . . There should be continuity of both personnel and research problems and topics over time.
- . . . Such training centers should facilitate the training of local scholars and students. Training and research are equally important and interdependent.
- . . . There should be Government blessing for these centers so that later employment of the products of training would be facilitated.

Recommendations regarding vacation schools were two-fold:

- . . . Such schools should be composed of young students, and be of eight to ten weeks duration, during which time the students should be exposed to experienced researchers working in the region and also to local specialists (such as linguists and ethnographers).
- . . . Each such school should focus on a specific topic. Examples might be: problems of method in cross-cultural research; problems of social change; the teaching of psychology in developing countries.

A fourth, and last, topic emerged, which revolved around the desirable content of a psychology curriculum. The discussion broadened to include all areas in which the introduction of psychology as a discipline was new, not just in developing countries. The bone of controversy concerned the perspective of a biological versus sociological basis in the teaching of psychology. Each side had its supporters, and there were some who argued for a middle course.

Cross-Cultural Training

The last point above borders on the second theme which was not discussed fully. This was the theme of training psychologists specifically for cross-cultural work.

It is worth considering for a moment why the first theme monopolized Conference discussion. It might be that the participants felt the problems of cross-cultural training would be resolved once there is adequate training of psychologists in the developing countries. It is a sober reflection that there is an implicit sense of an "expedition" (after the style of the Torres Straits research at the turn of the century) for many an American

or British based research in developing countries. This, I think, is an unconscious assumption, which people in the developing societies are more sensitive to than European or American scholars, and which was reflected in the reaction to a term like "field station". Research in developing areas, then was seen less as a need for specially trained personnel sent from the U.S. or Britain than as an indirect result of basic training in the various subdisciplines of psychology. Hence the need for more staff and better training facilities in the home country. Incidentally, if this comes about, a considerable change may come over cross-cultural research. With the increase of university departments and research institutes in developing countries, there will also come a mass of new data about people in the country or region, so that a comparison of culturally different "peoples" may become possible to a much greater extent than is possible at present. On the other hand, the need for proper comparative design still holds. For example, social scientists in England and the United States each have a mass of data from studies performed separately in each country without it in any way necessarily being compared. Cross-cultural research necessitates, even for these countries, collaboration between scholars. It would seem that collaboration among workers in developing countries will become possible when there are sufficient researchers available.

However, the question of personnel and collaboration apart, there is still the problem of specific training for working in a cultural framework. A set of issues to be considered in the training of students involved in cross-cultural research was offered by the author. This consisted of the following:

. . . Selection of students

. . . At what stage would cross-cultural training be introduced? Undergraduate; graduate, or even later (post-doctoral)?

. . . Curriculum

(a) Within the field of psychology

(b) Other relevant disciplines, e.g., anthropology, sociology, linguistics

. . . Facilities for research experience

(a) Training centers

(b) Vacation schools

. . . Exchange of experienced researchers and teachers

(a) From one developing area to another (e.g., Nigeria to Zambia)

(b) From a developed country (e.g., U.S.A.) to a developing country

(c) Inter-faculty exchange for training programs within a developed country

. . . Prefiled seminars for students

Most of these points are interdependent. Thus, selection of students depends on the level at which training in this field should begin. Nevertheless, the fundamental issue concerns the stage at which training for cross-cultural research should be introduced in a student's life. To a certain but limited extent, most training in psychology in the undergraduate stages could contain facts of a cross-cultural nature, certainly in social-psychology courses. The real question emerges when there is a consideration of training for research as distinct from just information about cultures. The key point is that working in a cultural context creates problems of a special nature which are usually not met in conventional psychology curricula. Also, these problems necessitate knowledge of other disciplines, such as anthropology and linguistics, which again are disciplines not necessarily confronted by the usual psychology undergraduate. Even if the student does confront other disciplines, the knowledge gained is of a general nature and not of the depth probably required when the student goes into a specific geographical area.

Granted, then, that some special set of skills is required, the question remains at what level in the student's life this should be given. There seems to be the paramount requirement, antecedent both in logic and in sequence, that a student should be a good psychologist *first*, skilled in the techniques of the art and familiar with the concepts, theories and related data of the various sub-disciplines in the science. The attitude of those teaching psychology in the developing countries seems to be correct when they selected this topic as the one that was of first importance for discussion. This leaves the later problem of what kind of training should be given for cross-cultural or even sub-cultural work. It would seem that some additional graduate training (after, and only after, the graduate student has reached a peak of proficiency in the general discipline) is needed.

It needs to be pointed out that the mere fact that a student is a national of the country in which he works does not of itself give that student any expertise in research in a cultural context. There are minority groups and sub-cultures in many countries that have a quite distinct ethos, of a sociological, linguistic and social psychological nature, that requires special study. What is needed in cross-cultural training, from the point of view of related disciplines, is not only exposure to the basic ideas of anthropology, for example, but a detailed knowledge of the geographical area selected. The need, indeed, can go beyond the related social sciences: if the information is available, medical knowledge of diet and illness, which may be pertinent to psychological information sought, is also relevant. Probably the ideal situation is a re-

search institute in any given area in which training and research are intertwined and interdisciplinary. This would give adequate on-the-spot training but there has to be a background training some time before this in order to take best advantage of this facility. If we were to think of the education in terms of years we would envision a preliminary year spent specifically on problems of cross-cultural psychology (from cognition and perception through traditional topics within personality and social psychology) to be followed by one year "internship" as it were in a selected region at which stage a supervised research plus specialized ethnographic teaching about the region would be linked together.

The lack of resources in the sense of educators and breadth of problems for research make interchange of students or faculty or both a desirable feature. One suggestion was a network of institutions among which there could be interchange, after the style of a league of cross-cultural research. The paucity of experts in this kind of work even in a country like the U.S. makes it desirable for that country alone few if any existing departments of psychology have sufficient teachers who have had experience in this field. Furthermore the demands of other branches of psychology, with a longer history and with a higher status of respectability, always a factor to be weighed in the academic community, make it more difficult to gain a complete focus on and commitment of resources to this relatively new branch of psychology in any one institution.

Certain ingredients are always contingent upon other ingredients. Training in any formal sense of specialists in cross-cultural work requires educators who have already done this. A requisite for increase of the latter is the valence of this kind of work in the psychological community. This has to be demonstrated earlier than argued. In the last analysis research training for cross-cultural work is possibly best aided by competent pieces of published research.

Problèmes de formation

Douglas Price-Williams

Formation des psychologues. Le principal problème concerne le recrutement de psychologues dans les pays noirs. Dans l'état actuel des choses, de tels psychologues sont formés dans des universités américaines ou européennes et ne sont pas nécessairement soucieux de rentrer dans leur pays d'origine. Pour faire face à cet état de choses, il conviendrait à de recruter ~~comme~~ ^{des} étudiants des personnes appartenant déjà aux structures administratives ou universitaires de leur pays d'origine. Il faudrait les étudiants originaires des pays noirs à écrire leur thèse de doctorat sur des sujets ayant trait à leur propre pays et de mobiliser la répartition des fonds de recherche ayant trait aux pays noirs et faciliter le financement de recherches entreprises par des fondations ou chercheurs locaux et de favoriser l'implantation des étudiants originaires de pays noirs dans des établissements universitaires européens ou américains ayant des contacts étroits avec ceux d'origine. Il faudrait favoriser l'implantation de centres de perfectionnement dans les pays noirs. Ces centres de perfectionnement seraient affiliés à des organisations universitaires. Ils seraient orientés tant vers la recherche que vers l'enseignement dans une base permanente tant au point de vue de leur personnel que des programmes de recherche traités et discutés au sein de leurs séminaires par l'intermédiaire des séances annuelles ou, par exemple. Ces centres de perfectionnement devraient faire des excursions d'étude de deux à trois mois pendant lesquelles les étudiants jeunes seraient mis entre les mains de chercheurs

spécialisés. Chaque cycle porterait sur un problème particulier (changements sociaux, enseignement de la psychologie dans les pays nuds, problèmes des méthodes comparatives, etc.).

L'enseignement à l'étranger de la psychologie dans les pays nuds. Ce problème suppose bien entendu qu'il existe des psychologues dans les pays nuds. Mais il suppose aussi que l'on fasse des progrès dans le domaine plus général de la coordination entre les travaux de diverses disciplines et de divers pays. L'auteur néanmoins suggère certains thèmes de réflexion. A quel niveau d'études convient-il d'introduire la notion de comparaison interculturelle? Faire un Doctorat en 'Cultures sont les matières qui devraient être enseignées pour appuyer une telle notion'? Au sein de quels organismes? Sur quels bases convient-il de développer un programme d'échanges entre chercheurs, enseignants et étudiants entre pays nuds, entre pays industrialisés, entre pays nuds et industrialisés, etc. Bien sûr toutes ces questions sont interdépendantes. A propos de quel niveau peut-on établir une distinction entre information de spécielles des comparaisons culturelles et la formation de psychologues au sens large du terme?

L'auteur souligne par ailleurs que le fait d'être originaire d'un pays nus n'est pas nécessairement un obstacle dans une recherche psychologique par rapport aux méthodologies qu'il se propose d'employer. Il est toutefois préférable que l'on informe les autres de ce fait et que l'on soit prudent concernant la recherche de son conseil. Il faut donc d'une manière générale envisager une ou deux études sur la psychologie générale de ce pays, sur les théories de l'apprentissage et de la perception, auxquelles il faut associer de bonnes œuvres dans diverses disciplines et enfin une étude dans la direction d'une ethnologie générale, etc.

Il convient de rappeler que, une fois dans les recherches comparatives, le rôle de l'ethnologue est fondamentalement de juger et non pas de décrire le phénomène de comparaison entre diverses cultures. Ce processus peut évidemment prendre forme d'opposition, c'est-à-dire lorsque comparaisons démontrent un caractère spécifique d'une psychologie.

Problems of Research Collaboration and Cooperation

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Throughout the Conference there were references to the great need for research collaboration and cooperation on the one hand and to the difficulties encountered in practice on the other. In the very patient and judicious discussion of this paper brings together the various contributions of scholars and researchers from diverse fields of study, and it is hoped those who contemplate cross-cultural research in applied research on language development will find in this paper some of the practices which we discussed for developing an atmosphere which we thought to be conducive.

Research on What Topics?

In so far as possible research should be research oriented so that all parties concerned have a common purpose at least on the main issue rather than a general interest in the matter that the research may produce generally. The following

list of topics of the present Conference was made available by the local organizing committee. Yeshiva University, New York, USA, October 1980.

The following were the areas of interest of the present Conference:
1. Theoretical and methodological issues in the study of language development.
2. The study of language development in the context of the family, the community, the school, the workplace, and the public sphere.
3. The study of language development in the context of the individual, the group, and the society.

grounds and in light of the possible early disintegration of certain societies as a result of modernization.

Collaborative research between investigators in developed and in developing nations should attempt to deal with variables that are pertinent to both settings rather than surrender entirely to the needs and interests of one or the other setting or group of participants.

The above two points emphasize the principle of reciprocity between the needs of science and the needs of society. This principle will become increasingly obvious in the course of the maturation of international social science endeavors. The following resolution was adopted in this connection:

Resolution 1: The principle of dual reciprocity is basic to the maturation of international social psychology, particularly as it pertains to the developing countries. Reciprocity is vital in two connections:

. . . between visiting researchers on the one hand and indigenous researchers, institutions or agencies in the developing countries on the other; and

. . . between the pressing practical needs of the developing nations, on the one hand, and the long-term theoretical interests of social scientists all over the world, on the other. Dual reciprocity is basic to good relations between researchers, to more worthwhile and valid scientific work and to the avoidance of unnecessary difficulties and disappointments *within* the scientific community as well as *between* that community and segments of government or the lay public.

Methodology

Researchers must take pains to be aware of and to avoid semantic and conceptual problems that may result from the translation of instruments from one language to another or even from attempts to apply the same instruments to widely differing social classes within the "same" language boundaries. At any rate, the natural language(s) of the locality under study must be known to the investigator or to well-trained assistants who are maximally aware of the goals of the research.

Since all instruments are imperfect it is desirable to obtain independent confirmation of findings via multiple methodologies (experiments, questionnaires, interviews, participant observation, etc.).

Whenever possible, population differences should be phrased in systematic social-psychological terms rather than left in terms of national differences *per se*.

Dimensions unfortunately not controlled in one or another

setting may be controlled in yet others so as to test whether rival hypotheses can be ruled out.

Archives and data-banks should be established so as to permit secondary analyses of data from various parts of the world (also see Research Communication).

Sampling

Sampling should be attempted not merely in terms of *kinds of respondents* but in terms of kinds of respondents exposed to particular *kinds of stimuli* at particular *times* in particular situations and permitted a *particular response repertoire*.

. . . Demographic, political, economic and other non-psychological dimensions may have significance for sampling in connection with social-psychological research (as well as for the interpretation of findings).

The above two points seek to emphasize the need to take explicit notice of the context of behavior. Considerations that investigators take for granted or know to be unimportant in their own societies may be of crucial importance—for the conduct of research or for the occurrence of the behavior being investigated—in another society.

Unidisciplinary versus Multidisciplinary

Problem-centered research is particularly in need of interdisciplinary collaboration. This requires that the individual scholar himself be as interdisciplinary as possible, at least to the extent of being in close consultative contact with scholars from other disciplines (e.g., geography, history and linguistics).

Research that is simultaneously interdisciplinary and cross-cultural must be prepared to face more than the usual number of problems. However, only such research can hope to overcome the unconscious ethnocentrism that inevitably obtains when research hypotheses, methods and funds all flow from one source.

Mechanisms are needed to develop and maintain a sense of "community of interest" among social psychologists interested in research on developing nations and between them and political scientists, anthropologists, historians, linguists, etc. who are similarly interested.

Single versus Multiple Control

Projects under single control (of funding, formulation, methodology, sampling, etc.) are exposed to biases that are hard to compensate for.

When multiple-control-projects are conducted, all involved

should have equal ownership rights to the data obtained and be at liberty to publish independently, after prior consultative review and with proper acknowledgments.

It may be possible to establish cross-cultural multiple-control teams of a rather permanent sort in which all collaborators help each other on several (interrelated) projects and in which the role of chief decision-maker is rotated. At any rate, initiators of collaborative research from developed countries should make explicit their willingness to reciprocate, i.e., in their turn to collect data in their own countries on problems initiated by their collaborators from the developing nations.

The following resolution was adopted in this connection:

Resolution 2: A Committee on Multinational Research Collaboration and Cooperation is needed in order to assist and advise prospective research collaborators from various countries with respect to the mechanisms and procedures for interdisciplinary, multiple-controlled, low cost research on developing countries.³

Financing

More adequate research is possible with modest funds than is now commonly realized in most developed countries. Funding should be as neutral as possible (with respect to any matters other than the quality of the research design) and, where possible, should be administered through an institution in a developing country.

Funds are also needed for small collaborative projects, such as "summer seminars" for collaborative research planning in developing countries, and for periodic meetings between dispersed research teams.

Staffing

Researchers and students from developing nations should be enabled to join cross-cultural research projects that are conducted in developed nations, in order to provide additional skill and perspective for those projects. Such involvement should also enable and encourage both researchers and students from developing nations to return to their home institutions with additional skill and perspective.

³This recommendation was discussed and adopted in the light of a report prepared and distributed by Donald T. Campbell, "A Cooperative Multinational Opinion Sample Exchange", which is reprinted immediately following this article. The spirit and the procedures advocated by this report were found to be applicable to substantive areas other than opinion sampling. The initial members of this committee are Campbell, Ayman and Diaz-Guerrero.

Research Communication

Collaborative and cooperative research would be greatly fostered by a *Newsletter* on Cross-Cultural Social-Psychological Research which would provide news of research in progress, research plans, names of individuals about to go into the field or on trips abroad, news of the establishment or the operation of new or relatively unknown research centers in developing nations, visiting-professor openings, new instruments and techniques, portions of anthropological field notes of interest to psychologists, etc.⁴

Regional centers for cross-cultural research are needed to serve as regional data-banks, registries of research in progress and newly accepted proposals and depositories for abstracts or reports of completed research.

Ethical and Political Considerations

Researching the "wrong" topic at the "wrong" time in the "wrong" way—in terms of local sensitivities and needs—may adversely influence the chances for future research (by the same or by other investigators) to obtain the cooperation and permission of local authorities and/or researchers.

Those with whose help the research is done should share in the control and in the benefits of that research. Local researchers and local institutions and agencies must be known, respected, and, in so far as possible, involved in the research.

Rather than deprive local universities and agencies of their limited staff or make excessive demands upon their time and facilities, projects should seek to contribute to the staff, programs and facilities of cooperating institutions in developing nations.

Participant observation and other informal research methods often arouse less concern or opposition than formal questionnaires or interviews which may contain embarrassing options or questions.

A detailed statement is needed of ethical considerations in cross-cultural research on developing nations. The following resolution was adopted in this connection:

Resolution 3: A committee is needed to gather case studies of successful and unsuccessful attempts to collaboratively conduct cross-cultural social-psychological research in developing nations. These case studies should be analyzed and classified in such a way as to support and illustrate a set

⁴Such a newsletter is being published under the editorship of Harry Triandis, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois, U.S.A. See Diaz-Guerrero, "Problems of Scientific Communication", in this issue.

of explicit guidelines for the ethical conduct of collaborative cross-cultural social psychological research, including the problems of research on politically sensitive topics.

In Conclusion . . .

It is difficult to convey the full sense of the discussion on research collaboration and cooperation via an enumeration of the topics covered or the agreements reached. The pervasiveness of this topic may be evidenced by the combination of substantive procedural, ethical, and pragmatic considerations that were raised. However, the intensity with which the topic was discussed cannot easily be recovered in print and may merit a few additional words in closing.

Isolation and Lack of Recognition

Many of our colleagues and counterparts in the developing nations have a deep sense of isolation and lack of recognition. This may, in some small measure, explain their timeliness concerning collaborative work with social scientists from more affluent and prominent research centers. In large part this is explicable as a result of the lack of understanding, lack of sensitivity, and lack of tact with which they have frequently been approached in the past. As a result, research collaboration and cooperation for them and for their institutions and governments often an *extraordinary* matter rather than merely a rational one. It is also clearly important that we as best we can, recognize rather than ignore this.

What we see are as exacerbated as they now seem to be because things are changing and things can take on unusual and unexpected forms and unexpected proportions. Seemingly innocuous factors such as localization or even summer session may be necessary in adapting a industry or a country relatively, but not so much as in terms of its willingness to consider or in terms of their frame of reference. Thus, it is not necessary to look elsewhere in the world when it is summer in the U.S.A., for example. As a result, fears of future research collaboration and cross-cultural participation may be fed by well-meaning but ill-informed, untrained comments, requests and suggestions on the part of investigators from developed nations.

"Outsiders" and "Insiders"

The research structure in any nation is often an extremely complicated one. Indigenous researchers may be at odds with each other and organized into contending groups. The outsider may need to seek ways of being acceptable to all before even while working most closely with only one. This is not an impossible task if we remember that sympathetic foreigners can at times have greater freedom of interaction between them than that which is available to indigenous researchers. Outsiders can also help "insiders" come into closer contact with each other or at least with each other's work; this too is an important obligation and opportunity.

It is also necessary for researchers from more developed countries to realize that social research itself can at times be a touchy issue in a developing country. For the researcher from a developed country it may well seem that such situations are exactly those from which most can be learned. Nevertheless, he must appreciate the fact that such situations may not lead them to a cooperative or collaborative effort, for they pose a threat to indigenous researchers in altogether too vulnerable and risky positions. As a result, indigenous researchers may at times contract and prefer to work directly with official bodies rather than with or through individual indigenous researchers. Furthermore, indigenous researchers may have their own funds strengthened when the rationale for research on a seemingly touchy issue seems to come from impartial outside sources such as international professional groups.

No Hidden Aspects

Finally, the Ibadan discussions of research collaboration and cooperation clearly implied that the governmental research is also affected by the political relations between government. It was not urgent hope that there would be no hidden agenda or secret aspects to governmental research to be used in research in developing nations. This is not to say that such research should have no government service aspects. But it does mean that these aspects should be used openly and explicitly so that their acceptance or rejection by the parties involved can be discussed and agreed upon from the very outset.

Coopération et recherche

Joshua A. Fishman

Cet article a pour objet de faire le point sur les stratégies susceptibles de favoriser la coopération internationale en matière de recherches psycho-sociologiques.

Objet de la recherche. (a) Les priorités doivent autant tenir compte de préoccupations fondamentales que de préoccupations appliquées; (b) la définition des recherches doit reposer sur le principe de *réciprocité*. Ces recherches doivent traiter de problèmes qui intéressent autant les pays neufs que les pays industrialisés. Le principe de *réciprocité* vise les relations entre chercheurs expatriés et les chercheurs, instituts, universités, et administrations des pays neufs. Il vise également les relations entre les préoccupations à long terme des chercheurs et les soucis à court terme des gouvernements et administrations.

Méthodologie. Il est essentiel de chercher à améliorer la validité des instruments de recherche. Il convient donc d'utiliser systématiquement des méthodes différentes les unes des autres afin (a) d'examiner si les résultats obtenus dépendent de la méthode d'analyse suivie (b) de mieux contrôler certaines dimensions négligées jusqu'à présent (c) de pouvoir tester des hypothèses contradictoires. En outre, il est indispensable de systématiser le langage psycho-sociologique et de favoriser la création de systèmes d'archives et de documentations facilitant le développement d'analyses secondaires.

Échantillonnage. Les principes d'échantillonnage doivent être raffinés et tenir davantage compte du fait que *certaines* catégories

sociales sont exposées sous *certaines* conditions à *cetains* stimuli et disposent d'une gamme *limitée* de réponses. Ce qui semble évident ou connu dans un contexte social ne l'est pas nécessairement dans un autre milieu.

Problèmes des études interdisciplinaires. Les chercheurs travaillant dans les pays neufs doivent être favorables à l'idée de travailler en équipe, avec des représentants de disciplines autres que la leur. La collaboration entre disciplines doit se faire à long terme et ne doit pas être a priori circonscrite à des problèmes limités.

Problèmes de coopération. Le fait qu'une recherche soit placée sous le contrôle d'une seule personne morale ou physique (contrôle financier, théorique, méthodologique) accroît les risques d'erreur. Il convient donc de placer le maximum de projets de recherche dans un contexte de coopération. Chacune des personnes participant à de tels projets jouit de droits absolus de propriété sur les matériaux recueillis et peut donc faire des publications indépendantes ou collectives après avoir obtenu l'accord des autres participants. Les projets coopératifs doivent en outre être permanents et porter sur plusieurs problèmes à la fois. Il va sans dire que les chercheurs des pays neufs doivent avoir toute facilité pour répéter l'étude faite dans leur propre pays sur d'autres échantillons et d'autres milieux.

Financement. Le financement doit être politiquement neutre et dans la mesure du possible les fonds doivent être gérés par une université ou un institut du pays où la recherche est entreprise. Il convient en outre que des ressources soient trouvées pour permettre une meilleure coordination des projets de recherche intéressant les pays neufs. Enfin, il convient de mettre sur pied des méthodes permettant d'utiliser plus rationnellement les fonds de recherche portant sur des études dans les pays neufs.

Personnel. Il faut permettre aux chercheurs des pays neufs de participer à des études comparatives sur les pays industriels afin de faciliter leur perfectionnement théorique et méthodologique.

Information. La création d'un bulletin d'informations psychosociologiques devrait faciliter la coopération internationale et permettre aux différents chercheurs de se tenir au courant des nouveautés en matière de techniques, de méthodes et de problèmes théoriques.

Considérations morales et politiques. Il faut être conscient des difficultés que peuvent causer des projets portant sur des problèmes trop brûlants, faisant appel à des instruments qui ne conviennent pas aux conditions politiques ou sociales de la société étudiée, etc. Il convient donc de mettre au courant les universités locales des recherches que l'on se propose d'entreprendre, de les

aider et non pas de se servir d'elles et d'utiliser des techniques de recherche qui ne risquent pas de placer les organismes locaux dans une situation embarrassante. Les membres de la présente conférence ont décidé de rédiger un code de déontologie pour les chercheurs se proposant de faire des études comparatives dans les pays neufs.

En dernier lieu, il convient d'insister sur le fait que les chercheurs des pays neufs ont souvent le sentiment d'être isolés et d'être exploités par les chercheurs venant des pays industriels. De sérieux efforts doivent être entrepris pour remédier à cet état de choses.

A Cooperative Multinational Opinion Sample Exchange^{1,2}

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Each of a cooperating group of social psychologists all over the world finds local secondary schools that will donate classroom time to opinion surveys, life history questionnaires, aspiration and value measures and the like. From time to time, each social psychologist develops such a questionnaire which members of other nations translate and administer to their local samples. Thus each cooperating scholar might every three years or so end up with a five or ten nation comparative study of his own devising and might have cooperated with a similar number of other studies.

It is the purpose of this report to initiate consideration of the values and problems of such an enterprise. It is believed that such a program would be worthwhile, both in value to participants and in value to social science. Attention will be addressed first to these potential values. The problem of research quality in the light of modern scientific standards will be discussed subsequently.

¹The preparation of this paper has been facilitated by the Council for Inter-societal Studies which operates under a grant from the Ford Foundation to Northwestern University.

²This report is printed here in essentially the form distributed at the Ibadan Conference. The press of other business precluded collective editing of it into a joint statement. An ad hoc committee interested in furthering the effort emerged, headed by Dr. Rogelio Diaz-Guerrero, and including Dr. Iraj Ayman and the present writer. Many of the reservations and emendations that emerged in discussion at Ibadan are recorded in footnotes.

"Decentering" in Cross-National Research While social psychologists may be among the first to recognize the dangers of ethnocentrism in social science—the dangers that is, of unconsciously assuming one's own provincial worldview to be superior or universal—the realities of social psychological research are such as to foster such an ethnocentrism. Current scientific standards define acceptable research in such terms as to make it very costly, and the countries in which such funds are available are few, if not one, in number. In collaborative multinational ventures, the member bringing the funds sets the research problem, and ethnocentrism shows itself fully as much in the questions asked as in the interpretation of answers. And if a social psychologist in a developing area wants to do some research on his own of interest to the wider scientific community, he is often almost by necessity limited to translating and applying locally instruments designed for use in one of three or four European-type nations.

The need for more and better comparative research in social psychology is apparent to all students in the field, and the amount of such research will no doubt increase. But unless specific means are taken, it will predominately bear a "Made in U.S.A." label with the initiative, the problem setting, the analysis and write-ups being controlled by Unitedstatesian social psychologists. Even in minor matters such as translation, this asymmetrical centering of the enterprise on one leg of the comparison takes place: all translation efforts are aimed at matching a fixed Unitedstatesian original; all of the banality and awkwardness of wording necessitated by the requirement of comparability are forced into the other language. Much better from a scientific point of view would be a goal of multi-centered translation-equivalence in which, in the course of revisions, the Unitedstatesian version would be as subject to revision as the others, and the Unitedstatesian comparison sample would be collected as the other samples, after all translation problems had been worked out.

Two aspects of the proposed plan speak to the goal of decentering. First, it proposes low cost research. Even today some useful research can be done with institutional or administrative supplies and the voluntary labor of the professor and his advanced students. While such research is usually of a local nature, a cooperative pooling of such resources on the basis of reciprocal

¹ Possible substitutes for this awkward word were discussed. Not considered however was anything in the existing pre-history of the term American. In the continental hemisphere, however, the term Gringo was seriously considered, as in Mexico. Its ordinary usage seems to refer to Unitedstatesians to the exclusion of Canadians and Mexicans. However, the Mexican delegate reported that in his country, the term referred to all North Americans, including Mexicans.

exchange makes it possible to increase the scope greatly without removing it from the realm of no-budget research. The second and most important aspect of decentering is, of course, the turn-taking in the design of the research instrument, and this would be valuable even if research funds were available. If instead of trying to reflect European or United Statesian research interests social psychologists drew upon the local problems, values and images of man for the content and setting of comparative research not only would the privileges and experience of initiative be better distributed, but also the collective perspective of social science would be expanded.

Isolation and Participation. Numerous problems beset the social-psychological researcher on the faculty of the university in a developing area; these often include heavy teaching loads, heavy administrative and community duties, inadequate facilities etc. But probably more important than these is isolation from a community of active research scholars of his own specialty. Even where he is lucky enough to have visitors from the "developed" or "travel-budget" countries, the asymmetries resulting from differential resources and the reactivation of teacher-student or employer-research assistant status make these contacts fail of colleguehip. Colleagueship with true peers in a collaboration involving truly egalitarian distribution of initiative, even if attained only via correspondence, might be in the long run more valuable than these chronically asymmetric face-to-face relations with visiting scholars.

Provincialism and Ethnocentrism in Choice of Problems and Method. In addition to values to participants there should be gains for social science as a whole. When all of the hypotheses being tested or all of the structuring of inquiry come from a single culture one can be sure that an undesirably narrow range of problems and perspectives are being examined. Culture does have effects upon social scientists as well as upon other citizens. It is of the essence of the resulting provincialism that those most provincial are least aware of this fact. For an optimal social science contributions from all provinces are needed. The preponderance of any one province, no matter which one, is undesirable.

When that one province is the United States, the problem may in fact be unavoidably accentuated. United Statesians find this hard to believe. They pride themselves on their cultural heterogeneity, their history as a "melting pot" for the peoples of the world, their xenophilia in artistic taste, their evident absence of cultural relativism, their uniform anti-racialism. Yet for most it is the practical fact that the melting pot produced a potter long ago. Due to the vastness and cultural homogeneity of the

country (and the confounding of occupational class with the residual ethnicity), few if any grow up with that effective contact with other cultures which is a commonplace for the European, the African and the coastal Asian. The ubiquitous failure of most Unitedstatesians, social scientists included, to gain an effective multilingualism, with its attendant insights into cultural relativity, is one conspicuous evidence. Accentuating this ethnocentrism is the fact that Unitedstatesians have most abundantly the new universal materialistic culture toward which the majority of all peoples aspire. Indeed, one aspect of this universal culture is the machinery of science, including social science.⁴

Details of the Proposed Method

Number and Location of Cooperating Groups: Too many cross-cultural studies compare but two cultures, or even use only one culture. There would be great gains in moving to five or ten as the typical number. At the same time the Opinion Sample Exchange would be unwieldy if too large. The delay between turns for each investigator, or the number of surveys he felt obligated to do for others each year, could easily become too large. When considerations of translation, duplication and administration are made, three or four cooperations a year would certainly be a maximum, and one turn every three years a maximum spacing. Nine to twelve active members for each exchange would thus seem to be a maximum. Allowing for the fact that not all could cooperate on each survey topic, five-region comparisons might end up as typical. When more investigators than 12 were available, other independent exchanges should be set up. Each such exchange should probably have maximum diversity, world-wide coverage if possible. It would be understood that for each col-

⁴Discussion at Ibadan and since has made clear a particular inhibition to utilizing local cultural perspectives which these same cultural patterns of deference provide. Whereas in the major universities of the United States, a sizeable portion of the local graduate students are chronically convinced that the older generation of scholarship has become irrelevant, and that they themselves are more creative than their professors, such attitudes are rare among graduate students coming from underdeveloped areas. They are apt instead to have attitudes of extreme respect and deference, for perhaps three reasons. First, they are apt to come from cultures requiring great deference to persons of seniority and power, attitudes which are automatically transferred to their professors. Second, colonial and traditional school systems have typically favored the extremely deferent student at the expense of the self-assertive. Third, the prestige accorded to Western technological and physical science is generalized uncritically to social science. In any event, there is the danger than uncritical deference to Unitedstatesian research models would stamp even locally initiated research in underdeveloped areas with a "Made in U.S.A." label.

laborative administration, each participant would be free to abstain if the content of the specific inquiry were judged unfeasible, politically or on other grounds.⁵

The Research Setting . . . Low Cost and Replicable: The facilities envisaged are instructional facilities, with cyclostyle or mimeograph equipment, college students needing research experience, and secondary school students for whom three or four hours of questionnaire answering per year might be regarded as educational, particularly if subsequent feedback of the results were available.

As a minimum each collaborating scientist might locate sufficient cooperating secondary schools to provide 100 to 150 men and 50 to 100 women on each wave. Ideally, several schools would be involved, maximizing (without incurring travel budgets) socio-economic or parental education differences and rural-urban differences. (A standard triad might be sought: high socio-economic level urban, low socio-economic level both urban and rural.) Anonymous questionnaires answered during class time would be the minimum standard method. While secondary schools seem more representative, a parallel procedure for college classes could also be easily included, once the instruments were prepared.

Instructional budget research can be more ambitious than this. Introductory students in psychology and sociology courses can profit from doing ten door-to-door interviews, and graduate students from supervising, verifying and tabulating. Instructional programs for undergraduate majors can be modified by dropping some of the passive lecture courses in favor of research-activity courses of equal educational value. Similar assignments can require systematic observation of social behavior. Secondary students can interview their own parents and siblings, using as interview schedules extra copies of questionnaires they have themselves answered, etc. All that is argued is that the lowest cost, least ambitious utilization of classroom time could produce interesting and valuable results. (Even for well-funded cross-

⁵Dr. Diaz-Guerrero has given considerable thought to the ordering of nations in turn-taking, recommending that the first initiators be selected with recognition that they will serve in a sense as teachers of the others. Such starters might well come from intermediately developed nations and from persons with greater experience in such research. Discussion at the Conference also brought out the fact that a number of potential collaborators would prefer to postpone their own initiation for several years, while profiting from the experience of collecting data for other collaborators.

national research, perhaps two-thirds of published studies use such facilities.)⁶

Purposes and Topics: Three types of purpose seem optimal in research using this machinery. (a) Confirming and exploring the universality of some relationship or attribute of social man. For this purpose, multiple nations are used in larger application of the same interests that lead us to use more than one person or more than one laboratory. Such research usually will involve two or more variables already discovered to have an interesting relationship within the initiator's own nation. (b) Natural experiments, in which regions differ in some environmental factor which can be regarded as an experimental treatment. (c) Maximum variability studies, in which the respondents from a variety of nations can be pooled so as to study the relationships between variables over a maximum range for each variable. For all three of these purposes, research reports can be prepared that present results in terms of relevant psychological, sociological and environmental variables, without mention of nations or ethnic groups per se.

What seems well to avoid is ad hominum, ad gentium or ad nationem research that focuses upon idiosyncrasies of national and ethnic groups per se. These political units are rarely, if ever, categories relevant to social psychological theory. Outcomes stated in such terms readily become misused in evaluative ways, become fuel for political argument and may effectively jeopardize the privacy of even anonymous respondents, to say nothing of the local investigator.

Analysis and Ownership of Data: Hand tabulations of data are envisaged. Indeed, these remain essential to the training of all social scientists; one should never delegate to the computer tasks one cannot do oneself. Pooled data analyses, postponing all feedback of results until all administrations are completed, seems very undesirable. Instead, it would seem desirable for each local administrator to make major tallies of the data of his administration immediately. For some surveys, this might be all he would need to ship on to the originator. In any event, he would have

⁶Dr. Diaz-Guerrero also emphasized the importance of including individual experimental research, to be "exchanged" perhaps at the rate of one individual experimental respondent to ten questionnaire respondents. Conversation with Dr. Hafeez Zaidi of the University of Karachi, subsequent to the Ibadan Conference, developed the point that while group-administered classroom questionnaires do require mimeograph equipment, public opinion surveys by class members can, if necessary, be handled without this equipment, through each student's making a longhand copy of the questions to read from and recording the answers on separate sheets properly indexed.

available a basis for discussion of results with the cooperating classrooms of respondents.

It would also seem desirable to regard both the initiator and the local administrator as having full ownership rights of the locally collected data, including rights of publishing. This awkward arrangement has been successfully used in voluntary multinational collaboration.

Wording, Translation and Instrumental Equivalence: The instrument should ideally be one that the initiator has already used to produce interesting results in his own locale. But for the purposes of the multinational survey, this form would be regarded as a pretest. It would be translated by the initiator from the local language into the one or more exchange languages being used. For each, he would secure an independent back translation to guide his acceptance of the translations. Each collaborator would translate from one exchange language into his local secondary school language, and then secure an independent back translation. Upon this basis, he would not only revise his local language version, but would also recommend to the initiator revisions in the tentative basic version. A small local language pretest would also be desirable.

Such procedures may help, but do not guarantee adequate translation, and if national differences are found, translation inadequacies and failures of comprehension are plausible explanations. Each item of inquiry should be represented by at least two questions, worded if possible without any repetition of specific words in any of the language versions. If these two show parallel results, translation inadequacy becomes a much less plausible explanation. By extension, attitude scale scores are more interpretable than single or double opinion items.

Translation is, of course, but a part of the problem. Respondent comprehension and conscientiousness are also to be considered. While free-response items more often draw blanks, they provide enough texture to reveal misunderstandings and mis-translations. Yes-no or multiple choice answers may be blindly chosen unbeknownst to the researcher.

Suitable translation controls can perhaps be depended upon to assure equivalence of meaning dimensions, equivalence of correlations if indeed the psychological laws are constant. Equivalence of *mean* scores is quite a separate issue, as is shown in the dramatic shifts in item responses produced by slight shifts in the intensity of adverbs and adjectives in experimental studies of wording. This sensitivity can be illustrated within any one of the cooperating languages through comparing means or frequencies of two supposedly "equivalent" but independently worded items.

Cross-nationally there are apt to be systematic trends in the intensity thresholds of the commonly available vocabulary, producing misleading mean differences even for multi-item tests (Such cultural differences can, of course, be found even for groups speaking "the same" language.)

The fundamental psychological processes involved in sensory and evaluational *adaptation levels* create a special set of translation problems, even within a common language. For a great bulk of relativistic terms, the thresholds for use will reflect the local adaptation level for that dimension. Thus the question, "Is it hot or is it cold today?" to our secondary school populations would fail to reflect the full range of environmental differences. Terms like "happy", "intelligent", "hard-working", "strict discipline", "friendly", "prudish", "brave", etc. are inevitably relative to differing local adaptation levels. It would be better to use differentials than such pseudo-absolutes. Rather than "Are people here happy?" ask "Are children happier than grown-ups?" Perhaps some behaviors will show less dependence upon adaptation-level effects, questions about specific occasions of laughing, crying, frowning, etc., might perhaps be better than questions about happiness. Another approach to this problem is to get comparative ratings from people who are recently arrived in the locality, who bring with them a differing adaptation level.

Funding with Autonomy Were such a multinational sample exchange to be underway, it would probably do no harm and perhaps be of considerable help were some international agency or philanthropic source to provide funds for local expenses or even face-to-face conferences. But valuable autonomy would be

Dr. Diaz-Guerrero while enthusiastic for the general program recommended that it not be undertaken as an international collaborative venture without some minimal financial support. Amounts of \$4000 to \$5000 per collaborator and budgeted face-to-face conferences among collaborators were suggested. Such funding would ideally also provide a 'Central Station' co-ordinating the activities of the group, duplicating and distributing reports, and perhaps providing computer facilities for complex statistical analyses.

While the present writer agrees that such funding would be desirable if available, he strongly disagrees that it is essential. Perhaps without funding the scope should be greatly reduced. But useful research can be and is being done without research support, as in England and the United States, and the absence of such research in the developing areas is probably more a result of lack of self-confidence and lack of a local social system that supports it. Institutional changes could increase the possibility some within the professor's own power such as redefining courses so that they are based on research participation. A social-system bias produces a bias in the perceptions of scholars in the under-developed areas—the only intermediate researchers they see are those with ample research funding. If they would inspect the journals, they would find many papers with no research grant footnotes. If research funds become perceived as absolutely essential, then all hopes of an autonomous nonaligned-stateview research tradition become lost.

lost were the Opinion Sample Exchange to be seen as impossible without such funding, or if the funding was contingent on the evaluation of scientific merit of each specific project.

Weaknesses of the Method and Possibilities of Control

Encouraging Second-Rate Research. A common criticism of this plan is that it encourages and multiplies second-rate, undependable research. "Leave research to the properly trained and properly staffed" is the recommendation. Such a reaction seems wrong on a number of counts. There is no perfect social science methodology that can be learned in a remote laboratory and then applied blindly to all settings. Quite the contrary, excellent methodology in any arena is a product of the vigorous mutual criticism of active participants in the field of application. Much big-budget multinational research has had hidden local inappropriateness, due in part to the rigidity of remote centralized planning, in part to the absence of local collaborators, or their silencing through apprentice or research assistant status. It is anticipated that the mutual criticism shared in the protest and translation would produce new dimensions of methodological sophistication.

Perhaps also implied in the criticism is the assumption of "once-and-for-all" research—research done so well that never again is there need to go over the same ground. Even with big-budget research, this is not achieved, as can be verified in the criticism that well-trained big-budget researchers make of each other's accomplished research. The actual course of science is the opposite. Among many explorations by many explorers a provocative finding is encountered. The setting that provided it allows many alternative explanations and the mutual criticism of competing scientists lead to a focus of efforts at replication with variation. Only after many rounds and years is a finding established. In the area of crosscultural research, the Multinational Opinion Sample Exchange would provide very useful machinery for such iterative research.

This perspective on puzzling data and plausible rival hypotheses makes explicit the great advantage of ten-nation or two-nation comparisons (and a large per cent of the big-budget studies are the latter). With only two nations being compared, the number of plausible rival hypotheses is almost infinitely great. Freud's Vienna and Malinowski's Trobriand Islands varied on so many significant dimensions that explaining a difference as due to family structure was highly gratuitous. For a consistent finding, the

more nations or sampling points involved, the fewer the consistent plausible rival hypotheses there are.

Randomized Representative Sampling: One of the obvious big-cost items, required in our best methodological training and sacrificed in the Multinational Opinion Sample Exchange, is the use of random representative sampling. Is the research worth doing without it? Yes, indeed, and the most important intrnational as well as multinational research somehow does without it, too. Let us distinguish two uses of randomization. On the one hand, the experimenter takes a biased, provincial, local sample (e.g., volunteers from the introductory psychology class in a specific Unitedstatesian university) and uses randomization in assigning the sample to two or more experimental groups. Randomization here assures a pragmatic average equivalence between treatment groups, but leaves the sample pathetically unrepresentative of any universe of scientific interest at all. Such within-sample randomization is available also in the Multinational Opinion Sample Exchange.

The other purpose of randomization is to secure representativeness of some universe of scientific concern, and is typified by the samples of national and other political units of the political polls. For some purposes, but rarely those of a social psychologist, such universes may be of focal scientific importance. For us, random samples are probably most valuable as a means of achieving replicability across space and time. As the proportion of teenagers in secondary schools goes up (and as the proportion of urban population increases), the sampling characteristics of schools change in unrecorded ways. The sample is, of course, biased for some purposes at any stage of development. Let us indeed use random representative samples where we can. But where we cannot, let us examine the specific plausible rival hypotheses let in by this lack, and do subanalyses and collect additional, more extreme, samples of convenience so as to test the plausibility of the specific rival hypotheses which our lack of randomization has let in.

Note, too, that even were our Multinational Opinion Sample Exchange to be using random representative samples, this would still leave many plausible rival hypotheses to explain the differences. One could still argue that the differences were due to differences in urbanization, or literacy, or per cent Moslem or per cent Protestant, etc.; one would need to go to further breakdowns of the data to control these, and some needed control factors would turn out to be missing from our schedules, calling for another round of research, etc.

Lack of Standardized Tests and Norms: One of the most misleading incursions of applied psychological practice into scientific

thinking has been our respect for "standardized" tests, for which "norms" are available. For the applied test administrator, such norms may seem to offer an all-purpose control group or comparison base. Not so, however, for science. In science we ourselves have to be responsible for both sides of any comparison; we have to collect data on our own control groups, and provide assurance of the comparability of both or all of the comparison groups. When cross-cultural researchers have used instruments "standardized" (rigidified) in one language, the results have been less interpretable than if they had felt free to revise the original to make it a more accurate translation of the other-language versions being used. Nor should one feel that tests are well constructed just because they have been expensively conceived or are much used. The methodology of test construction is in such flux that any well trained graduate student today can construct a better test (for cross-cultural or intracultural purposes) than the Manifest Anxiety Scale, the MMPI, the *F* scale measure of authoritarianism, etc. For the applied practitioner it may be well to use a test rigidly in its original format as a magical bundle of rituals of which he dare not disturb any part. But his is not science, and one does not then know what aspect of the test is producing its correlates. For the scientist's test of intersubjective communicability of scientific constructs, loyalty is required only to the *theoretically relevant aspects* of the tests—all the rest of the vehicular specifics should be free to vary. If they are *not* irrelevant, then one should learn this by so varying them.

The liberating opportunities of the Multinational Opinion Sample Exchange will not be utilized unless the seductive appeal of popular gadgets is avoided. To take a concrete example: the Semantic Differential is a uniquely ingenious invention in the study of word and concept meaning. Yet in most of its uses, this is not at issue. Instead it is being used as a rating scale for the evaluative dimension. For this purpose it offers no disguise (were one wanted) and the apparent bizarreness of the task requirements makes it a liability rather than an asset to rapport. Simpler, shorter, more old-fashioned, and more appropriately worded rating scales are usually to be preferred for the evaluative purpose. Even for its original and unique purpose, other tasks should be found, so that the fascinating generalizations can be cross-validated independently of the specific irrelevancies of the one apparatus.

Dependence upon Verbal Methods. Criticism of cross-cultural psychological research has recently turned to suggesting less dependence upon purely verbal procedures. The advice is well taken as a call for a multiple operationalism, avoiding dependence

on any single method by adding others. But as a substitute for verbal means, it would be unwise. Linguistic techniques are often better than pictorial ones just because for language, we at least recognize the necessity of translation. But even if the translation problem for pictorial stimuli is recognized, it is rarely solved adequately. A verbal projective personality test asking, "Tell me a story about a little boy and his mother", is more adequately translated than is a corresponding assignment to "tell me a story about this picture". Non-verbal intelligence tests have never been more culture-fair than well-translated linguistic ones. Tests games and puzzles, even with culturally novel playing pieces, are still a culturally provincial universe of content, and to administer them with an untranslated language of gesture only makes matters worse. If through poverty, we must get by with but one method, the linguistic is the best, frail and feeble reed that it is.

In Summary . . .

Much too much multinational social psychology research bears the "Made in U.S.A." brand. Increasingly high research standards mean increasingly high research budgets which further increase the predominance of U.S.A. initiative. We need research machinery which will make possible the distribution of research initiative among all nations, at the same time achieving the value of multinational comparison. We need a model of low budget or even instructional budget research which can obviate dependence upon asymmetrically located sources of funds. Many of the high cost features of modern social psychology research can be irrelevant to the purposes of a specific research project.

It is argued that a cooperating group of five to ten social psychologists in various nations, each locating local secondary schools willing to donate a few hours of classroom time per year in exchange for feedback, each initiating his own multinational survey once every three years or so, each collaborating in administering locally two or three surveys each year initiated by his colleagues, could produce on instructional budgets very useful research, better in comparative scope than much that is now being done.

Proposition concrètes en vue de l'établissement de recherches internationales

Donald T. Campbell

L'auteur note qu'il devient chaque jour plus urgent de "décenter" les recherches internationales. Le financement de ces recherches est entrepris selon des critères valables pour les pays industriels mais illégitimes en ce qui concerne des pays neufs et en voie de développement. Les chercheurs eux-mêmes n'échappent guère aux accusations d'ethnocentrisme et leurs investigations ressemblent plus les thèmes de leur culture d'origine que ceux de la culture qu'ils sont supposés étudier. Enfin, les échantillons qu'ils utilisent à des fins comparatives sont trop restreints.

L'auteur propose donc de regrouper les ressources de 5 à 10 chercheurs appartenant à des pays différents. Ces chercheurs devraient avoir accès à des écoles secondaires qui leur serviraient de laboratoires; ils devraient pouvoir aussi utiliser les services d'étudiants en sociologie, en psychologie, ou en anthropologie. Cette organisation devrait permettre de tester l'universalité de propositions concernant les caractéristiques de sociétés humaines ou de la personnalité individuelle. La taille de l'échantillon devrait permettre de maximiser les variations des variables dépendantes et indépendantes et d'utiliser ainsi les canons d'une méthode expérimentale.

L'auteur examine ensuite les conditions qui doivent être réunies pour assurer le succès d'une telle entreprise. Les tabulations des données doivent pouvoir être faites manuellement. Les

droits de publication doivent être donnés à chacun des participants. Le matériel utilisé doit être traduit dans chacune des langues parlées dans l'échantillon, mais aussi retraduit dans la langue originale de façon que les erreurs et leur origine puissent être plus facilement décelées. De la même manière, l'auteur suggère que les stimuli utilisés doivent être tournés vers le concret plus que vers l'abstrait et doivent porter sur des comparaisons plus que sur des propositions absolues. Dans tous les cas, il faut tenir compte des variations de l'environnement et les neutraliser.

L'auteur fait ensuite le point des avantages et des faiblesses de la méthode qu'il préconise. Il note à ce sujet que les critères permettant de définir une bonne recherche sont encore vagues et imprécis et qu'une recherche coûteuse n'est pas nécessairement une recherche de bonne qualité. Il note ensuite que sa méthode devrait permettre de mieux tester des hypothèses contradictoires et d'introduire des variations systématiques à l'intérieur des échantillons. Enfin il montre que la dépendance actuelle de la psychologie sociale à l'égard de matériels verbaux ne pose pas nécessairement des difficultés insurmontables.

In Conclusion . . .



International Collaboration in Social Psychology: Some Reflections on the Ibadan Conference

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Inevitably, the proceedings of an international meeting, even one in tropical Nigeria, are like an iceberg—only a fraction of the value of the exchange appears above the surface in the published transactions. Such is very much the case with the Ibadan Conference. The reader who has perused the foregoing pages will know from Kelman's initial article the thinking and planning that lay behind the Conference. In the papers in Parts I to III, he will also have shared in the major substantive presentations that launched the Conference discussion. And in the articles in Part IV, he will have learned of the outcomes in recommendations about scientific communication, research collaboration and research training. But he will have missed what for most participants was the meat of the Conference: personal interchange with international colleagues, whether in formal discussions in plenary sessions and in smaller topically-organized groups or in informal talk in convivial social settings.

I cannot make good this lack here. But I can try to communicate some of the things that as a North American social psychologist I have learned from the Conference, drawing on my participation in the interchanges that lie beneath the surface of these transactions as well as touching upon some of the themes that emerge in the foregoing papers.

I learned, in the first place, something about the pleasures and the difficulties of cross-national communication in social psychology and adjacent fields. The pleasures came with difficulties overcome, or when communication turned out to be easier than anticipated.

The barriers were not quite those that I expected. Neither version of the gulf between East and West posed any major problem. In the European frame of reference, the East as represented by social scientists from Yugoslavia and Poland was in full and uncomplicated communication with the contingent from West Europe and the United States. The reader will sense the common intellectual ground that Jezernik's contribution shares with those from the "west". In the global framework, the east had only token representation, but perhaps it is symbolically appropriate that Pareek's contribution from India, drawing as it does on the tradition of experimental and manipulative research on motivation initiated by McClelland, could be regarded as typically "American" in spirit.

The Communication Gap

The gap between Francophone and Anglophone Africa, on the other hand, was larger than I had anticipated. Simultaneous translation permitted full interchange in the plenary sessions and in some of the topical discussion groups. I was surprised to learn, however, that such participation across boundaries defined by disparate colonial traditions was a rare event, facilitated in the present case by the fact that the auspices of the Conference were broader than Africa. Informal clusterings outside the formal sessions understandably tended to follow linguistic lines. When these lines were crossed, it was more often because of the attractiveness of some of the female participants than because of intellectual affinities!

In psychology, the Anglophone finds himself in an unfamiliar intellectual tradition as well as coping with a foreign tongue when he seeks to penetrate Francophonia. He comes to realize that he has not internalized Durkheim as have his French-speaking colleagues. In the present proceedings, the contribution by Zempleni and Collomb illustrates this distinctively French tradition. (That by Barbichon occupies a common ground of scientific empiricism.) American behavioral scientists with their ethnocentric self-assurance about issues of method may find it a chastening and instructive experience to encounter equal self-assurance among bearers of the French subculture in sociology and social psychology.

There are differences in style, too, that make cross-national

communication interesting. Early in the Conference, some of the North American participants could be heard to mutter impatiently at the beautifully proclaimed statements of intellectual position that emanated from one French-speaking participant. As the Conference proceeded, impatience was supplanted by respect: both for the ideas expressed and for the art involved in their expression. The Americans became less impatient: the Conference could indeed be productive without all the urgencies of American task-orientation. But it takes time for such revisions of appreciation to develop. We were lucky to have scheduled enough time for real communication to occur.

The selection of conferees and the translation facilities provided were such as to make the French-English distinction salient. Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking America were scantily represented, for reasons of cost, but the able representation was highly articulate. The barriers in communication between the United States and Latin America came in for explicit notice (see the paper by Diaz-Guerrero), with the Latin contingent bitter in their complaints about North American linguocentrism. Perhaps it was easier for both parties to discuss these issues constructively in Ibadan than it would have been in Washington, Mexico City or Buenos Aires.

Toward Collaborative Planning For Research . . .

Of course, the main communication gap that the Conference was explicitly designed to bridge was the one between social psychologists from the industrialized countries of Europe and America and their counterparts from the developing countries, particularly in Africa. The strategy of the Conference, seemingly confirmed by the result, was that communication toward collaborative planning for research, training and scientific communication could proceed most freely and constructively if it occurred after considerable discussion of concrete research topics and considerable opportunity to grow to know and like one another personally outside the formal Conference sessions.

The formal papers that are included in this issue reflect the interests and current research of the conferees. As the reader has seen, they converge on issues of motivation for national development, of education and the diffusion of information, and of general research methodology. The topical discussion sessions, also organized around the stated interests of the conferees as ascertained before the Conference, followed up on these problems and touched on a variety of others, including child rearing, personality, and mental health under conditions of rapid change; effects

of continuities and discontinuities between traditional and modern value systems; and problems of emerging national identity.

An important theme in several of the papers and discussions cut through the dichotomy of Europe as modern vs. Africa as developing. The papers by Iacono, Jezernik and Kiray, for example, reminded the conferees that Mediterranean Europe and Asia Minor face problems of development that parallel those of the former colonial world. The treatment by Barbichon of his research on the diffusion of scientific and technical information had a dual relevance in this regard. On the one hand, it brought European data to bear on problems of direct concern to the educational programs of developing countries. But at the same time, the evidence that it summarized tended to undercut the assumed contrast (still with us in the current research literature) between the abstract-differentiated "mentality" of modern peoples as compared with the concrete-undifferentiated mentality of the traditional illiterate. If, as Barbichon shows, not even trained scientific and technical workers in Europe think "scientifically", the problems of diffusing a scientific perspective in hitherto unlettered Africa assume a different, and by no means simpler, guise.

The discussion group that dealt with emerging national identity brought further parallels into view, and incidentally exposed some latent ethnocentrism in terminology that came as a surprise to participants. Discussants saw that the "nationality" problems of Yugoslavia and other multi-lingual, multi-national European countries are not entirely different from the problems of "tribalism" in new African nations. The differences in social context are of course not to be neglected, but we found ourselves wondering at the freight of connotation that linked "tribalism" to Africa and the "nationality problem" to Europe. The problems, practical and theoretical, that concern people's identification with smaller and larger groupings are obviously neither European nor African.

The discussion of emerging nationality illustrates another consideration that bears on communication and collaboration between social scientists in industrialized countries and those in developing ones. Although the topic was dear to the hearts of the American organizers of the Conference, the participants who turned up for the discussion, insofar as they came from African countries, were mainly expatriate Europeans who were working in those countries, not African social scientists. Given the fact that the Conference met during a lull in the tribal-regional strife that has so grievously affected Nigeria (and the invited presence in Western Nigeria of a delegate from Nsukka in the East was an achievement in which much pride was taken, but one involving risks about which considerable concern was expressed), perhaps

some important topics were too sensitive and involving even for Conference discussion. Matters that lead to civil war can hardly be claimed for research, convinced as one may be that in the longer run the findings of research might make it possible to avoid destructive conflict.

“Intellectual Neo-Colonialism”

I have just mentioned expatriate European social scientists. Because of the present dearth of Africans trained in psychology (see the paper by Price-Williams), representation from sub-Saharan Africa was quite substantially in the hands of such expatriates. All concerned would have preferred the Conference to have a somewhat different predominant complexion, and the recommendations in regard to training seek to promote such an outcome for the future. But it is important, especially for North Americans new to relations with social scientists in developing countries, to shed the stereotyped imagery concerning expatriates that clings to the term from the heritage of colonialism. The Europeans who have remained to help staff the new African universities and their research institutes—or who have newly come to Africa to do so—do not, of course, reflect the old colonial view. As represented in the Conference, they are fully committed to the emergence of the new African countries which provide their temporary homes, and look to their own replacement by qualified Africans. They were as likely as their African colleagues to articulate the new nations' sensitivities about “intellectual neo-colonialism”. Before the ice was fully broken in the Conference discussions, it was they who were likely to express these sensitivities most strongly—speaking for themselves, not just as reporters of the views of others.

It is in regard to this issue of “intellectual neo-colonialism” that we encounter the deepest barriers to communication between social scientists from the industrialized world of the “haves” and those from the “have-not” modernizing world that was largely under colonial domination until ever so recently. In advance of the Conference, I thought I had a fair understanding of the sensitivity and the resentment always ready to come to the surface in the new nations, as they encounter requests for “cooperation” from social scientists from metropolitan Europe, and especially from the United States. The asymmetries of relationship that are involved when the financing and control of research projects stems from the United States and the intellectual benefits are largely to be reaped there, I recognized, are the source of warranted sensitivity and resentment quite apart from the nature of the Camelot affair (Camelot and psychological tests, 1966) and the

duplicity of university participation in the Cold War projects of the C.I.A. After the Conference, I can only say that I underestimated the pervasiveness of these sensitivities and resentments. All participants from the United States came to a much keener realization of how American initiative in the social sciences is bound to look from the perspective of our counterparts in the developing world. It was a mark of substantial progress in the Conference that participants gained enough confidence in one another's good will to express and discuss these sensitivities openly. It was a mark of signal success that a variety of measures (embodied in the Conference recommendations contained in Part IV above) could be suggested to deal with the causes of the resentment.

The principle that underlies these measures is best expressed in the concept of "dual reciprocity" as adopted by the Conference. As phrased by Fishman (this issue):

Reciprocity is vital in two connections: (a) between visiting researchers on the one hand and indigenous researchers, institutions or agencies in the developing countries, on the other; and (b) between the pressing needs of the developing nations, on the one hand, and the long term theoretical interests of social scientists all over the world, on the other.

Dual reciprocity is basic to good relations between researchers, to more worthwhile and valid scientific work and to the avoidance of unnecessary difficulties and disappointments *within* the scientific community as well as between that community and segments of government of the lay public.

I came away from the Conference painfully aware of the extent to which even competent and well-meaning American research in other countries has typically violated this essential principle. I came back hopefully aware that a number of things could be done to establish relationships of greater mutuality.

The social psychologists who convened at Ibadan would agree, I am sure, that other academic disciplines and specialties in the social sciences might profitably build on the Ibadan experience. The problems of international collaboration with which the Conference was concerned are by no means peculiar to social psychology. Neither these problems nor those of the developing countries in the modern world are going to be solved quickly. They deserve our best thought, and our continuing commitment over the long haul.

REFERENCE

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Réflexions sur la conférence d'Ibadan. Les difficultés de la coopération scientifique internationale

M. Brewster Smith

L'auteur se propose de faire le point des difficultés rencontrées par les participants à la présente conférence dans leurs échanges et leurs présentations. Les barrières entre Est et Ouest n'ont pas été aussi importantes qu'on aurait pu le prévoir. Par contre il existe de sérieuses différences entre l'expérience coloniale et la tradition intellectuelle des mondes anglophones et franco-phones; il a donc été relativement difficile pour les représentants de ces deux mondes d'établir un dialogue véritablement authentique. De la même manière il est certain que la coopération entre chercheurs de l'Amérique du Nord et du Sud pose des problèmes délicats et le fait que la conférence ait lieu sur un terrain "neutre" a, sans nul doute, aidé les chercheurs à se débarasser de leurs préventions.

Les communications présentées au cours de la conférence suggèrent que les problèmes de développement ne sont pas propres à des zones géographiques limitées, mais caractérisent aussi les pays industriels.

La conférence a surtout montré que le "néo colonialisme" intellectuel demeure la principale pierre d'achoppement pour l'épanouissement d'une coopération authentique entre chercheurs des pays neufs et chercheurs des pays industriels. Les recherches faites dans les pays neufs sont, en effet, trop souvent conduites

par et pour les représentants des universités européennes et américaines. L'auteur se félicite que tous les participants aient pris conscience de l'importance de ce phénomène et souligne l'importance des recommandations émises pour assurer une plus grande égalité entre chercheurs et entre institutions.

Biographical Sketches

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
of national identity and definitions of the role of a national and the leadership process in developing societies and the development of new elites. He is presently engaged in research on relationships between values, education and fertility among Nigerian women.

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ANDRAS ZEMPLÉNI is an Attaché de Recherche at the National Center of Scientific Research in Paris (France). He was trained in social psychology at the University of Paris. His present research interests are in the penetration of the mass media in developing countries and in styles of treatment of the mentally ill in African countries. He is currently attempting to develop multidisciplinary and multimethodological approaches to problems of development.



GUY BARBICHON, The Diffusion of Scientific and Technical Knowledge.
Journal of Social Issues, 1968, XXIV, No. 2, 135-156.

Numerous studies show that scientific and technical information tends to be segregated in an individual's mind from his actual behavior in relevant situations. This problem is particularly important in developing countries. Socially psychologically, reducing this segregation requires a) determining prevailing cognitive styles in a culture, b) determining the norms of the culture toward acquisition, integration and use of such knowledge, and c) determining the intra-personal and social factors which facilitate and inhibit the transmission of new knowledge. It is suggested that, under certain conditions, occupational activities and mass media provide the best mechanisms for diffusing knowledge in developing countries.

DONALD T. CAMPBELL, A Cooperative Multinational Opinion Sample Exchange. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 2, 245-256.

Much too much multinational social psychology research bears the "Made in U.S.A." brand. Increasingly high research standards mean increasingly high research budgets which further increase the predominance of U.S.A. initiative. Research machinery is needed to distribute research initiative among all nations, at the same time permitting multinational comparison. A model is proposed for low budget research that can obviate dependence upon asymmetrically located sources of funds.

ROGELIO DIAZ-GUERRERO, Problems of Scientific Communication. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 2, 217-224.

Problems of communication are numerous and severe among researchers interested in developing nations. These problems include the lack of a standard stylistic format, long publication lags, the lack of availability of material published in "underdeveloped languages", and the lack of informal means of communications. These problems could be in part alleviated through mechanisms such as the use of existing research centers for the integration of information, a newsletter, a directory of those engaged in research in this area, and the allocation of funds for the establishment and development of repositories of information.

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LEONARD W. DOOB, Just a Few of the Presuppositions and Perplexities
Confronting Social-Psychological Research in Developing Countries.
Journal of Social Issues, 1968, XXIV, No. 2, 71-81.


Peering behind the facade of science, one ought to be disturbed by: a lack of confidence in the instruments used in cross-cultural research; the suspicion that our research is not directing us toward valid, general theories; and the conviction that the problems of the world are not being markedly improved by our activities. Improvement in these areas depends upon eliminating several weaknesses in current cross-cultural methods and conceptualizations. The consequences of full acceptance of some metamethodological realities presented are explored in detail.

JOSHUA A. FISHMAN, Problems of Research Collaboration and Cooperation.
Journal of Social Issues, 1968, XXIV, No. 2, 235-241.

There are many problems in attempting to carry out collaborative research, but these are not insolvable. First and foremost, the research effort must be truly collaborative, allowing each investigator a full chance to participate in decision-making at all stages. Research should be performed on problems of common interest, using multiple techniques. In addition, researchers who go into developing nations should accept the responsibility for training students in those countries while they are conducting their research and should avoid the use of methods or the study of problems which are politically sensitive which might reduce the freedom of future investigators.

ULF HIMMELSTRAND and F. OLU. OKEDIJI, Social Structure and Motivational Tuning in Social and Economic Development. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 2, 25-42.

Previous work on problems of development has focused on levels of one or more types of human and material resources as the critical factor. A much more fruitful approach is the structural or "concurrence of resources" view of developmental preconditions. This approach can be studied from the personality, group and societal levels and thus is quite comprehensive. Within the framework presented, the concept of motivational tuning is introduced as the major intervening variable. The dimensions of tuning are discussed in detail, and some implications for tuning of variations in social institutions are considered.



GUSTAVO IACONO, An Affiliative Society Facing Innovations. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 2, 125-130.


Numerous research findings from Southern Italy suggest that many of the social characteristics of this region and its members can be subsumed under the concept of the "affiliative society". Relationships between people in such a society are characterized by an orientation toward immediate interpersonal gratifications rather than an orientation toward external, achievements goals. Such a conception renders intelligible both informal observations of Southern Italian personality and data obtained in organizational settings. Of primary importance are the implications that follow from such a conception for the types of innovations which will be adopted by such a society and for the mechanisms through which these innovations should be introduced.

GUSTAV JAHODA, Some Research Problems in African Education. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 2, 161-175.

Relatively little comprehensive knowledge exists about the nature and effects of education, both formal and informal, in African countries. Of the numerous research problems in this area, four are in particular need of extensive and intensive study: child-rearing practices, cognitive development and language, "superstitious" beliefs, and the relationship between teachers and pupils. Within each of these, major problem areas are demarcated, and those factors which seem to be of primary importance are discussed. The extent and severity of these problems clearly indicate the need for collaborative efforts between social scientists from developed and developing countries.

J. E. JAYASURIYA, Educational Dilemmas of a Developing Country. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 2, 199-205.

While increased opportunity for higher education is generally viewed as desirable, a rapid increase in the proportion of college-educated in a population without corresponding shifts in job opportunities produces severe dislocations. Historical conditions in Ceylon have produced colleges which transmit humanistic, white-collar values to their students; yet these students are either frustrated or unemployed and alienated because jobs do not exist which would allow them to realize these values. These problems are intensified by the relatively slow development of scientific and technical curricula, and by the unwillingness of government officials to develop and implement reasoned solutions to the problems.



MISHA D. JEZERNIK, Changes in the Hierarchy of Motivational Factors and Social Values in Slovenian Industry. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 2, 103-111.


The relationship between individual motivation and the societal value system is clearly demonstrated in Slovenian industrial workers. As the basic values of Yugoslavian society have shifted from those of a revolutionary one to a consumer-oriented society, parallel shifts in the values of workers have occurred from work-centered to wage-centered. Although the self-management organization of Yugoslavian industry has had some effect on workers' values, the freedom and delegated authority thus achieved by the workers themselves have not been strong enough to override their primary concern with wages.

HERBERT C. KELMAN, Social Psychology and National Development: Background of the Ibadan Conference. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 2, 9-19.

The background of the International Conference on Social Psychological Research in Developing Countries at the University of Ibadan and some of the problems encountered in organizing it are discussed. Social psychology is seen as an active force toward the ideal of international cooperation and as having major contributions to make to the understanding and solution of problems of national development. Conversely, the study of social change and development can in turn contribute to the understanding of various substantive issues with which social psychology is concerned.

MÜBECCEL B. KIRAY, Values, Social Stratification and Development. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 2, 87-100.

Agro-economic development in two rural villages in Turkey has produced marked changes in the traditional ways of life and created new patterns of labor and social structure. These economic and social changes, however, have not resulted in increased incomes for these villages. They have resulted in aspirations for income which is much higher than the actual income per household. This has created a feeling of diffuse insecurity among the people, and placed strong demands on those social institutions and patterns of relationships which are capable of providing security. Within these villages, the mechanisms of social stratification and power are those which have been most heavily affected by these demands.



ALBERT J. McQUEEN, Education and Marginality of African Youth. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 2, 179-194.


A cross-cultural social psychological conceptualization of the process by which youth makes the transition from traditional to modern society is presented in detail. This conception highlights the importance of three factors in determining the success of the economic transition: a) modern conceptions of self; b) possession of qualifications for modern careers; and c) the assumption of modern work roles. Socio-cultural integration is discussed as a second dimension of basic importance in making the transition. The interrelations of these two types of integration produce a typology of four types of youth, two of which are in stable roles, and two of which occupy marginal positions.

ALASTAIRE MUNDY-CASTLE, The Development of Nations: Some Psychological Considerations. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 2, 45-54.

The major task facing social psychology if it is to contribute to the problems of developing nations is the specification of how technological information can best be communicated so that it will be properly absorbed. Such a specification in turn requires a considerable amount of basic psychological research. Information is needed about the neuro-psychological processes by which individuals receive and process information. In the area of general psychology, studies of sensory discrimination, perceptual-verbal and perceptual-motor responses and remembering and thinking are necessary. At a social psychological level, studies should focus on attitudes, values and norms about the reception and use of information. Available research information suggests that there are important cognitive and perceptual differences between the developed countries and some African nations.

UDAI PAREEK, A Motivational Paradigm of Development. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 2, 115-122.

The relationship between the societal system and the motivational patterns of individuals is one of constant interplay. Each both affects and depends on the other. Therefore, from a psychological point of view, one can approach problems of development by attempting to change the motivations of individuals. A review of studies which have attempted to develop achievement motivation in individuals through laboratory training in India indicates that this is not the sole relevant motive. In addition, expansion motivation, an altruistic concern for other people or the society in which one lives, can facilitate development. At the same time, strong dependency needs in the population may inhibit social change and development. A general model is presented which integrates these three motives.



DOUGLASS PRICE-WILLIAMS. Problems of Research Training. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 2, 221-232.

Problems of research training in developing nations are of two types: those of training psychologists and those of training social scientists for cross-cultural research. Specific problems in the first area include problems of staffing academic departments, of funds and of issues concerning the mechanisms by which social scientists from developed nations can assist in training local students. Specific training for cross-cultural research raises many issues, including the selection of students, the stage at which the training should be introduced, the curriculum and the types of facilities for research expertise. The desirable directions which future efforts in each of these areas should take are indicated.

M. BREWSTER SMITH. International Collaboration in Social Psychology. Some Reflections on the Ibadan Conference. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 2, 261-266.

The major purpose of the Conference, to promote collaboration between social psychologists from modernized countries with those from modernizing ones, was approached via the discussion of concrete research topics and problems. The most formidable barrier dividing the two groups appeared to be the charge of "intellectual neo-colonialism" arising from asymmetrical initiative, funding and gain from American-based foreign research. The principle of "dual reciprocity" - between visiting researchers and indigenous researchers and institutions, and between the needs of developing countries and the theoretical interests of social scientists - was seen as essential to effective collaboration.

ANDRAS ZEMPLÉN and HENRI COELOMB. On the Functions and Substance of Social Psychology in Africa. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 2, 57-67.

Social psychological concepts are potentially extremely well suited to the analysis of major social problems which the developing nations in Africa face today. These problems include the effects of the disappearance of traditional social norms, the nature and effects of conflicts between traditional norms and modern ones, and more generally the disruptions and conflicts occurring at the macro-structural level of African society. The advantages of social psychological analysis are illustrated with respect to the role of youth groups and of authority in contemporary African society.



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
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The Activists' Corner

David Krech

University of California, Berkeley

Nevitt Sanford

Stanford University

If nothing else, I mused as I prepared for our editorial meeting to plan this initial column of *The Activists's Corner*—if nothing else, our readers should be able to find in these columns psychological insight applied with wisdom to problems of current social import. Certainly our society is not in short supply of problems of most weighty and grievous import, and certainly neither Nevitt Sanford nor I are in short supply of psychological erudition or wisdom (Is this not true of any SPSSI member?). Thus did I ruminate. And soon I was off in a reverie—Walter Mittyng at a great rate. Why indeed could not Nevitt and I, from our luncheon table in the Berkeley Faculty Club (where, by tradition, the editorial meetings of THE ACTIVISTS' CORNER are always held) survey the world about us, select the Most Urgent Social Problem of the Quarter, and then address ourselves to it—drawing upon our psychological science gleaned from the laboratory, the field study, the clinic and seasoning all this professional lore with understanding, with concern and with compassion?

We could, for example, examine the short-term and long-term effects on the hearts and minds of our countrymen of the "body-counts" served up daily with our breakfasts. Or we could

spell out—in the rough, of course—the effects on the morale and will of our people should the American Army suffer a disastrous military defeat in Vietnam. Or we could assess the reactions of the white populace of this or that city to the initiation of a city-wide bussing program for school children. Or we could indicate the dangers facing us in the developing town-and-gown conflict as student activists continue to be student activists. Or we could draw an incisive psychological profile of Ronald Reagan's Americans, or George Wallace's Americans, or Senator Eugene McCarthy's Americans—and thereby pinpoint the possible dangers for the body politic.

Having written, and the SPSSI members having read and with their added wisdom and knowledge having re-interpreted, enriched, revised and reformulated what we had written, all of us could go forth by the tens and by the hundreds (for we do number ourselves by the many hundreds now) and advise and counsel our editorial writers, political leaders, neighbors and fellow men on these matters. And thus could our Society fulfill the mission for which it was founded—bringing to bear on the public discussion of the immediate social issues of the day the special perceptions and knowledge of psychology.

But even a Walter Mitty is not completely out of touch with reality. As I chug-chugged and kerplunk-kerplunked away in the best Walter Mitty style, helping SPSSI raise the level of public discussion of Significant Social Issue after Significant Social Issue, I began to consider some trivial problems Nevitt and I would run into. (By definition we would not have any difficulty with what might appear as major problems to others—the requisite science and discernment to do all this.) One trivial problem seemed to persist and it was this: Nevitt and I having written, our manuscript would be sent off to the *Journal* editorial offices in New York, and then eventually to the printer, and then very, very eventually to the readers. This would mean that whatever we would write about Vietnam or the Presidency or Civil Rights or Student Activism would be read by the SPSSI members months and months later. But that would be a most impossible state of affairs! In the long interval between the writing of our column and its reading all kinds of catastrophies might befall our body politic—catastrophies which would completely outdated our column: Peace might break out!; a President of the United States might be elected!; the war between the Blacks and the Whites might escalate to civil warfare!; and student activism!—who could foretell? I suppose that had I remained on the Walter Mitty level I would have solved this trivial problem of publication-lag. For some reason or other I did not and then it was too late, for I had roused myself from my reverie.

And then, down to earth and in cold soberness, I reflected upon my dream, and it soon appeared to me that the trivial problem which had bugged me in my Walter Mitty fantasy was not to be understood in its manifest content, but in its *latent* content. And its latent meaning pointed to a major, profound and general obstacle which lay in the way of our Society's fulfillment of its original mission, and this obstacle had nothing at all to do with mere publication-lag. (And certainly it had very little to do with our column.) This, in turn, led to further worrisome thought about the SPSSI and about its possible role in society. Eventually I began to see a way of overcoming the "major, profound and general" obstacle. At that point I was ready for our Editorial meeting. Let me tell you, then, about the obstacle and the solution, as I later talked it out with Nevitt Sanford.

A Problem Stated

Consider the social psychologist who a scientist would be, and who his science would advance and promote, and who a respectable and substantial bibliography would amass, and who promotions (or better still, "jump promotions") and the regard of his colleagues would earn. Consider the research he would do and how he would go about doing it. It is quite clear that he would seek to do that which the physiological psychologist, or learning-theory psychologist (by the way, are there any more such?), or psychophysics psychologist or any other respectable psychologist would do. He would seek to isolate problems of *general* significance for his sub-discipline; he would seek to formulate his questions so that they would have maximal *theoretical* interest and value; he would seek a study design which would garner him not only relevant and sound data, but also *compelling* and substantial and massive data. And he would pursue this work with all the humble pride, and flashy skills, and practical honesty, and self-dedication, and necessary care of which he was capable. And he would then submit a carefully written report (replete with prudent qualifications and *caveats* to the reader) for publication to a refereed journal of repute. This is what he would do, and it is meet and proper that he do so—and all of us do so, or at least we seek to do so. And herein, in these most virtuous pursuits, lies the fault.

The social psychologists of SPSSI have joined together to help society deal with its social problems. Let us never forget that. To be helpful with the insistent controversial issues facing society, however, the social psychologist must be a *clinician* to society. He must approach his problems, gather his data and make his analyses, decisions and recommendations as does a clinician. And no number of pious statements can erase the differences—in

attitude and in behavior and in activity-tempo—between the scientist and clinician. Let me call the litany of the honest clichés which should guide us here. Not for the clinician the concern with problems of general significance; not for the clinician the withholding of judgments until all the data, or most of the data, or even—sometimes—*enough* of the data are in; not for the clinician the tolerance of the lapse of months and even seasons of the year before the announcement of his findings to those vitally concerned. These are all reserved for the scientist. For the scientist deals with (so he believes or, suspending disbelief, so he pretends) eternal verities; the clinician, with immediate verities.

Now the reason the social psychologist must be a clinician to society lies within this: social ills or problems or issues or controversies are simultaneously eternal and ephemeral, simultaneously exemplars of basic generalities and of unique events. Wars have always been with us—we are told. Yet which social scientist does not differentiate between wars and wars? Which social scientist does not need to know a great many multitudes of specifics if he is to understand the behavior of man in this war or that war? This is equally true of prejudice, and generational gaps, and political rebellion. No serious social psychologist would think of reaching up to his shelf for his volumes on attitude formation and the expression of aggression and read off from them—through extrapolation—a diagnosis of, and of course of prophylactic treatment for, the threatened disturbances during the 1968 Democratic Party convention in Chicago. This is not because our monographs on prejudice and aggression and our special *JOURNAL* issues are inadequate (although, of course, they may be) but this is because such extrapolation, for the scientist, is impossible (and perhaps even unethical) *in principle*. He must know much more than any monograph can give him. He must know the *immediate* social milieu in which the convention will take place, who the chief actors will be, and what relevant events will have happened the day before. Without such data he is merely speculating. And such data, in kind and quantity, the scientist, *qua scientist*, cannot get and process in time to do society any immediate good.

What of the clinical social psychologist? For him such an extrapolation is essential, *in principle*—and required by his code of ethics. The clinical psychologist must be prepared to live dangerously and make quick and hazardous diagnoses, and prescribe immediately. He, too, must know his monographs and his science; he, too, must collect detailed and specific and “non-basic” and “non-generalizable” data, *but only as much data as he (and society) has time for*—and then speak up! He cannot wait, he cannot be shy. And sometimes this may mean that he must give

his decision almost immediately—with only a twenty-four hour, or three hour, "research" period. For if he refuses to speak up and insists on waiting for all the data, or even enough data, to come in, will the social problems and the impending riots, and the continuing turmoil "freeze" and wait for him? Will society's quacks and charlatans and self-aggrandizers wait for him for enough data to come in before acting?

"But", some of you will quickly reply, "if our clinical social psychologist does speak up without adequate data, is he any better than a quack or a charlatan"?

The answer, for me, is easy enough. Of course he is better—think of the alternative! I believe, you see, that the accumulated knowledge and understanding of the science of psychology in the hands of a responsible and mature psychologist *who has been alerted* to act on these problems can provide much better guides for public discussion and ways of dealing with many social problems than can the precepts derived from partisan politics, prayer-breakfast inspirations, common sense, patriotic impulses and sentiments of self-regard held by our leaders.

But there are very few—if any at all—social psychologists who are clinicians to society of the kind I have described. Most of our social psychologists and SPSSI members are scientists (some, of course, are applied scientists for this or that special interest group—labor union, industry, municipality, racial organization, etc.). Most of our SPSSI members behave and work like scientists within a SPSSI which functions like an honorable scientific organization. Our members are not at all reluctant to study a race riot—but they will seek therein the universal and the eternally true and the theoretically new. And they will gladly publish in our *Journal* and gladly tolerate a half-year's or a year's publication lag. Indeed, they would prefer to wait until *after* the riot has run its full course before making the diagnosis and preparing the *Journal* issue. This is what I had in mind when I said that, after coming out of my Walter Mitty reverie, I thought I had isolated a major obstacle which lay in the SPSSI's fulfillment of its mission. Our SPSSI social psychologists are of minimal use to society, *not* because of so trivial an obstacle as "publication lag", but because our SPSSI social psychologists *scientists would be—and scientists they must be*. And the institutional forms and the ways and the uses of the SPSSI have gradually been shaped by their needs as scientists.

A Solution Proposed

What to do about it? And here I have a proposal for the SPSSI membership and the Board to consider. Essentially the

proposal seeks to provide an appointed number of "Social Psychological Clinicians". But before presenting my proposal in any detail, let me nail up three fundamental and guiding theses—lest I be misunderstood (I know I will be misunderstood—but let my try, anyway):

First: I do *not* think that SPSSI needs fewer scientists among our social psychologists. I think we need more than we now have, and better ones than we now have (Will not this always be so?).

Second: I do think that before a social psychologist can become an effective clinician to society, such a role will have to be quite consciously created and defined, institutional support provided and the men who will function in that role will have to be clothed with prestige, authority and responsibility.

Third: The same man can play both roles—of scientist and clinician—if the roles and the institutional support for each role are clearly differentiated, and if certain other to-be-specified precautions are taken.

Now for my proposal. Let there be appointed, by the SPSSI Board and after very careful consideration, a number of special and specialized Committees. Each Committee would be charged with the task of staying on top of a specific problem: *Racial Problems*—in the north, in the south, in schools, on college and university campuses, in housing, crime-in-the-streets and crime-in-the-precinct-houses; *War Problems*—how to prevent and end this or that war, non-violent and not-so-non-violent peace movements, draft resistance and army defections; *Presidential Campaigns*—campaign literature, speeches, "deals", tactics and voting procedures; etc., etc., etc.

Each Committee would be charged with the responsibility of using such data as it can get, and such psychological wisdom as it can muster for speaking up, and sounding-off, and publicly declaring, and loudly announcing what it, as a group of "authorized" psychologists has to contribute to the public discussion of this or that crisis, episode, riot, election result, court decision, proposed law, administrative ruling or any other significant public event. The Committee would be charged to make its pronouncements whenever and as often and as insistently, and in any manner it deemed necessary. It could call press conferences, appear before Congressional or other investigating committees, distribute press-releases, buy newspaper advertising and even call special convocations and meetings.

Each Committee would be an "authorized" group of psychologists only in the sense that each Committee would gather data and speak and act as an official SPSSI Committee, carefully selected for that specific function. Let this be clear: What each Committee did or said would not imply that the entire—or even

most—of the SPSSI membership associated themselves with that action or that statement. All that would be implied—and clearly stated—is that these Committees were appointed by the SPSSI as the chosen, trained and competent psychologists to whom members of the public might repair, for responsible, knowledgeable and considered judgments and interpretations about social problems.

Each Committee, if it is to keep on top of the problems within its domain, and accumulate data from fast-breaking events, and if it is to perform its function in contributing to reasonable and effective public discussion of vital issues—each Committee would be authorized to draw upon the SPSSI treasury, and the SPSSI Secretariat, and the SPSSI Board, and the SPSSI membership for help and guidance. But, to repeat, the final responsibility and the final authority would remain in the hands of the Committee.

Each Committee, if it is to be effective in these most important and most hazardous social functions, would have to consist of the best we have. Each Committee would have to be made up of the most prestigious social psychologists in the country, of the most socially-minded and most dedicated SPSSI members, of the most alert and capable scientists. Nothing less would fit the bill.

This, then, in essence, was the solution I finally arrived at—the solution to what I saw as the major obstacle to the achievement of SPSSI's mission. Note this, however: SPSSI would change its role. It would become less-and-less a vehicle for the scientific advancement of its members, and take on more-and-more the attributes of a voluntary society for the definition and carrying out of the social responsibility of its special membership—the scientist-citizen. All men are hyphenated, they tell us. All men play many roles. Our members, as scientists, would be supported by and find their expression through other institutions—universities, research organizations, refereed journals, medals, awards, honors, citations, promotions, etc.; our members as citizens would find their guidance and encouragement and their opportunity for expression through the SPSSI—either as members of these Special Committees, or (for most of us) as their supporters and occasional counsellors.

As so often happens, my enthusiasm lifted me as I thought upon these things, and ran away with me, and I began to believe that the creation and nurturance and strengthening of these Committees could very well become the only activity of the SPSSI. And when I had reached that point, I felt that I had more than enough controversial material to bring to the editorial meeting of *The Activists' Corner*. At our meeting I suggested to Nevitt that

we present this proposal to the SPSSI members in this, our first column. Nevitt heard me out—and now I will step aside and turn the podium over to him so that he can tell you what he thought about it.

David Krech

I am afraid we may have some trouble with Krech. His flights into fantasy and his foible for clinical approaches will have to be watched. I must say, however, that he has a good idea here and I join him in urging the Board to act immediately.

Something very similar to what he has in mind was done by Barry Commoner, the biologist, who, in connection with the public discussion of nuclear fallout a few years back, marshalled a group of prominent scientists and produced statements to counter those being put out by the AEC. I have been told that this work did much to prepare the ground for the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Similarly, Paul Ekman and his associates not only made statements but did some hurry-up research on beliefs and attitudes respecting fallout shelters and made, I believe, a significant impact on public opinion—at least in the San Francisco Bay Area. This helped to ameliorate a particularly dangerous display of madness on the part of the New Frontiersmen.

I would start with one Committee and give it the services of one full-time paid staff man—a young, energetic generalist in social science with journalistic experience and literary gifts.

What I am not clear about is whether these Committees would remain sufficiently above the battle to maintain tax-free status. Some of what is needed would surely come under the heading of political advertisement—at least until SPSSI gains status of the sort that used to be enjoyed by the AMA. But why not just pay the tax?

Nevitt Sanford

P.S. But Nevitt, to paraphrase Kurt Lewin: There is nothing so practical as a good fantasy!

David Krech

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
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
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
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The Journal of **SOCIAL ISSUES**



JULY 1968 VOL XXX NO 3

PERSONALITY AND POLITICS THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Issue Editor: Fred J. Gossman

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Editorial Notes

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES WILL ACCEPT "SINGLES"

The JSI Editorial Board plans to depart somewhat from the current policy of organizing each number of the *Journal of Social Issues* around an integrating theme or topic. In the future, some JSI issues will consist of "singles," i.e., of separate articles that bear no necessary relationship to each other. The single-theme, pre-issue policy will still predominate since it provides for comprehensive coverage of the vital social concerns addressed by the Journal. However, there are matters of broad public concern to which social scientists have contributed relatively little theory or research—certainly not enough to fill an entire JSI number. The Editorial Board feels that if the topic is important enough, and a single paper written on it is compelling enough, some future JSI issues ought to be designed to accommodate such "singles."

JSI numbers and their friends and colleagues in the social sciences are therefore invited to submit manuscripts for review and possible inclusion in forthcoming "single" issues. The editors suggest the following guidelines for preparing "singles":

(a) In keeping with the JSI tradition, a "single" should deal with a broadly concerned critical issue. The roles of past JSI numbers suggest that the *Journal* has always addressed itself to topics that have breadth and scope rather than those that are conceptually circumscribed, even if their implications are vast. *Singer* submitted for consideration by the JSI Editorial Board ought to follow in that spirit.

(b) As in the case of JSI numbers planned around one topic, a "single" article should be a contribution growing out of the professional work of the social scientist and should therefore reflect theory or research in his field. It should not be simply a personal essay that would be more suitable for a journal in public affairs.

There is no way of determining as yet how frequently a "single" issue of JSI will appear. Wherever possible, a paper that is acceptable to the editors will be published along with other papers on the same topic in order to preserve the current format of topical issues. The "single" format will appear only when there is not enough serial scientific material that can be assembled on the topic to fill an entire Journal number.

Please address all contributions to Dr. J. Dredrick Snarek, Singles Editor, JSI, Department of Psychology, Clark Science Center, Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts 01060.

COMMENTS AND REJOINDERS

Readers wishing to discuss or comment upon any of the articles in this or subsequent issues of JSI may submit their reactions or criticisms to Dr. Joshua A. Fischman, General Editor, JSI, Yeshiva University, 55 Fifth Ave., N.Y., N.Y. 10003. Criticisms or observations of general interest will be published in a Comments and Rejoinders section of JSI.

FORTHCOMING ISSUES

Tradition and Modernity: Conflict or Congruence Issue Editor Joseph R. Gusfield
 "Singles" Issue Editor, J. Dredrick Snarek. Alienated Youth & J. Tannenbaum

The Need for Systematic Inquiry Into Personality and Politics: Introduction and Overview

Fred I. Greenstein

Wesleyan University

The intellectual problems dealt with in this number—problems of how to apply personality theories and data to the analysis of politics—have not been fashionable in recent years. The task taken by the contributors—that of clarifying theoretical and methodological aspects of the study of personality and politics—is not specially dramatic. Therefore it is useful to begin with an exceptionally vivid illustration of the kinds of practical, as well as intellectual, dilemmas that generate the need for systematic knowledge of personality and politics. My illustration is taken from the Cuban missile crisis—both the crisis itself and a scholarly debate of more than scholarly significance that broke out in its midst.

For the few days in 1962 of the missile crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union seemed dizzyingly close to nuclear war. Soviet missiles, potentially capable of neutralizing the American defense system, had been set up in Cuba. Soviet ships, some of them carrying additional missiles, were on the high seas in transit to Cuba. President Kennedy issued an ultimatum demanding the removal of the missiles already in Cuba and stating the American intention to inspect the Soviet ships and stop those which were carrying missiles. It was by no means clear whether the Soviet reaction would be to fire the first shot in what might quickly become

the third and final World War, or to comply with inspection, halt the missile-carrying ships in mid-voyage and withdraw the missiles which had already been landed.

At the immediate point of the crisis over the ships and in the subsequent days until the missiles had been withdrawn, decisions were inevitably being based upon assumptions about the psychological predispositions of the Soviet leaders—assumptions about how Khrushchev and his associates were likely to respond to the various possible American actions, including the "action of failure to respond." The missile-bearing ships did stop and return to the Soviet Union. Somewhat later the missiles which had already been set up in Cuba were withdrawn. At either of these two stages, miscalculations of the Russian leaders' psychology would have led to a drastic change in the international balance of power, or (depending upon the further actions of the American leaders) to shooting and possibly a full-scale war.

In the interim between the halting of the Soviet ships and the withdrawal of the missiles already in Cuba, an exchange of correspondence took place in the *New York Times* which underlined the intimate connection between "academic" assumptions about the psychology of political actors and the decisions made by policy makers. One group of writers sought to stress the urgency of exercising restraint and, in particular, of providing the Soviet leaders with face-saving means of withdrawal:

If the United States is to be effective in the world today those who are pushing for an "active" approach must restrain their enthusiasm. Both victory and peace depend upon keeping the size of an international issue under control and upon making it as amenable to other, unmet needs as possible.¹

The effectiveness of our posture will depend not only on how much pressure is applied but on how easy we make it to yield. . . . The United States had demonstrated its determination and its unwillingness to be pushed around by the Soviet Union. Our flexibility in negotiation should not be handicapped by the insistence of extremists that other countries live face-to-face (1962).

Another correspondent, Bernard Brodie, took sharp exception to these seemingly unequivocal "common-sense" warnings, suggesting that the writers, by failing to take account of the "special character" of the Soviet leaders, were in fact proposing a policy likely to endanger the peace. In making his point Brodie explicitly cited one of the leading academic writers on personality and politics, Nathan Leites:

¹ The Soviet policy makers were, of course, equally dependent upon assumptions about the psychology of their American counterparts.

The argument that it is the worse part of diplomacy for us to make sure that Khrushchev has an easy way out of his predicament and to avoid something smacking of "humiliation" is an argument appropriate to pre-1956 diplomats. Neither his venturesome missile adventure into the Caribbean nor his uncharted retreat under strong American reaction would fit the pattern of pre-1956 diplomacy. Both are, on the other hand, best fully explained in connection with such a "conditioning" of Khrushchev behavior as that postulated.

Dr. Nathan Leites This study has now received documented confirmation in the Cuban affair.

Among the Soviet characteristics that Dr. Leites pointed out were the following. It is tantamount to a moral imperative to the Communist leader that he must advance against the opposition wherever opportunity allows; he must not, in other words, be lax in carrying forward the revolution. On the other hand, it is equally imperative that he must at no point venture to grow rich or hazard the basic achievement already accomplished. He must, therefore, be absolutely ready to retreat whenever a crisis requires it, without regard to shameful nature of "humiliation" and the like, provided, of course, the cause is real and not fake.

We had absolutely nothing to thank . . . [Khrushchev] for but if we seemed to be lenient to him, the best way was to make our threats absolutely uncompromising—to save him and his colleagues remorse for wondering whether their hasty retreat was really necessary. What would be satisfactory to Khrushchev personally and to his position in the Soviet Union would be the feeling that he had yielded prematurely to a weak threat rather than having handed away appropriate gains from a serious menace. We should then escape from the premature retarding of our time not only as possible but actually the second (Brenner 1962).¹

I will not go further into the specifics of this particular debate. The contending positions are certainly not exhaustive, and in further analysis they might even prove not to be mutually exclusive. My point is that the issues raised by the debate are elements of fundamental significance for the understanding and analysis of political affairs. This is true both of the actual events of the New York Times exchange, and of the analytic problem arising in the infinitely larger set of situations in which the Cuban missile crisis can be included. This set consists of instances in which persons or the other stimuli have been administered to persons, among such consequences for their behavior which we can only vaguely anticipate if we have knowledge of the active participants in the interaction and of the elements of personal motivation that motivate their economic and political response.

¹ Another reference is to the article by Nathan Leites, "The Russian Foreign Policy of Nikita Khrushchev," in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 56, No. 3, September 1962, pp. 611-631. A more recent article by Leites, "Russia's Foreign Policy Under Khrushchev," in *Journal of International Relations and World Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1963, pp. 1-20, also discusses the Cuban missile crisis.

One might think therefore that substantial scholarly resources would be devoted to clarifying and resolving questions bearing on the psychology of politics. This is not the case. In fact, the entire enterprise of "psychologizing" about politics and other large-scale social phenomena is widely suspect. As a result, we know much less than we should about psychological aspects of politics, and have failed to perfect the tools and standards for redressing this deficiency.

Problems with Existing Personality and Politics Literature


The very general rubric "personality and politics" has commonly been used by political scientists to refer to such work as the Leites codification of Communist behavior cited by Brodie in his comments on the missile crisis. An extraordinarily diverse array of controversial research and speculation fits under this heading. As a preliminary way of ordering this diversity, much of the personality and politics literature can be grouped into the three rough categories which serve to organize the contributions to the present symposium: psychological *case histories of single political actors*, psychological studies of *types of political actors* and *aggregative accounts* of the collective effects of the distribution of individual political actors and types of actors on the functioning of political institutions (ranging from face-to-face groups through interactions among nations).

The case study literature includes "in-depth" studies of members of the general population by investigators such as Lane (1962) and Smith, Bruner and White (1956). It also includes psychological biographies of public figures (George and George, 1956; Edinger, 1965; Rogow, 1963; Wolfenstein, 1967). I am using "typological" to refer to all classifications of political actors in psychological terms—ranging from the mere classification of an aggregate population in terms of the categories of some variable, through complex typologies identifying syndromes of interrelated attributes. The best known and best developed (and possibly most controversial) of the typological literatures is that on "authoritarianism" (Adorno *et al.*, 1950; Christie and Jahoda, 1954). Other political relevant categorizations are in terms of "dogmatism" (Rokeach, 1960), "misanthropy" (Rosenberg, 1956), "tradition-inner-other directedness" (Riesman, 1950), as well as the various psychological classifications of actual political role incumbents such as Lasswell's (1930) agitator-administrator-theorist classification and Barber's (1965) spectator-advertiser-reluctant-lawmaker typology.

Finally, in the aggregative literature of personality and politics (I borrow the term from the analyses of "aggregation" in the literature on the relationship between micro- and macro-economics; Ackley, 1961) we find, for example the very extensive corpus of writings on "national character" and the numerous speculations connecting intra-personal emotional "tension" with conflict among nations (Gorer, 1948, 1950; Mead, 1942; Klineberg, 1950; Bramson and Goethals, 1964).

These Divisions are Useful . . .

There is an unfolding logic that makes these three divisions heuristically useful as a way of organizing the issues that arise in personality and politics inquiry, even though any actual contribution to the literature may in fact contain more than one of the three kinds of analysis. First of all there are moderately discrete and separable methodological issues that arise in each instance depending upon whether one chooses (a) to diagnose a single actor, (b) to classify actors and to explain the origin and behavior of the types in the classification, or (c) to make use of knowledge obtained from the study of individuals in order to explain aspects of the larger system of which the individuals are a part. Secondly, there are interesting interdependencies among the analytic modes, as can be easily seen schematically:



Frequently, for example, it is our inability to explain why some single political actor has behaved in a fashion that does not seem consistent with our normal expectations for behavior in comparable situations that initially turns our attention to political personality. In the course of inferring the personality structures that account for the idiosyncrasies of our subject's behavior, we then may come to suspect that in important respects our actor resembles certain other political actors, and if we pursue the resemblances, we find ourselves moving inductively in the direction of creating a typology ($A \rightarrow B$). But it is also possible that an existing typology with which there is associated a body of theory and empirical evidence will lead us to move deductively toward a set of

predictions about our biographical subject and the ways in which his behavior is patterned ($B \rightarrow A$). Thus Alexander George in his contribution to this issue alludes to the way in which he and Juliette George were able to use the clinical literature on compulsive types in their biographical analysis of Woodrow Wilson.

Moving from individuals and types of individuals to aggregate structures, we find that there are many theories about the relevance for systems of the distribution of types in the system ($B \rightarrow C$)—for example, Fromm's (1941) speculations about the significance of a high incidence of authoritarian personality types for the collapse of Weimar Germany. And it is true in politics (perhaps more so than in other spheres of life) that particularly well placed individuals can have a substantial impact on the aggregate system ($A \rightarrow C$)—a potential relationship that was all too evident during the Cuban missile crisis.¹ Finally, we have a long, if not completely edifying, history of culture-and-personality (and social structure-and-personality) inquiry to remind us that the causal arrow also points in the opposite direction—that systems have impacts on the individuals and types of individuals that compose them ($C \rightarrow A$, $C \rightarrow B$).

Each Category Poses Difficulties . . .

Just as each of these categories of personality and politics analysis has somewhat distinctive methodological requirements, each poses more or less unique difficulties, many of which have been pointed out by the numerous critics of personality and politics writings and of other work in the general realm of culture-and-personality. In single case psychological analyses of political figures, for example, the diagnostic interpretations of personality and explanations of behavior have often seemed "arbitrary", or at least of doubtful replicability. The uncertainty of grounds for explanation has been evident in biographies of well-known public figures, especially the earlier examples in this genre (for example, Clark's 1933 biography of Lincoln) as well as in clinical case studies of lesser political actors (Smith, et al., 1956; Davies, 1966; Greenstein, 1967a). Clinical case histories also have frequently seemed to overemphasize elements of pathology in the adaptive styles of their subjects and to have been insufficiently sensitive to personal strengths and to capacities for creative adaptation.²

Investigators employing quantitative, typological modes of analysis based on questionnaire data have encountered formidable difficulties in developing reliable and valid measures of personality and its correlates. Thus, for example, the research of the 1950's on

¹For a biography that consciously sets out to redress this imbalance see Erikson (1958) on Luther.

authoritarian personality was plagued by problems of response set and possible artefactually generated correlations. During an earlier research epoch, the numerous studies reported in the 1930's in which measures of personality and of politics were inter-correlated tended in general to report weak and unstable correlations.⁴ And finally, at the aggregative level attempts at psychological explanation of aggregate phenomena - "national character", "international tensions", the functioning of various political institutions - have been most controversial of all. The standard label for the fallacy of advancing necessary and sufficient explanations of (say) Germany in terms of the personality (and perhaps early life experiences) of the typical German is "reductionism". (A kind of reductionism was also implicit in the early psychiatric biographies which tended to reduce political actors to a catalogue of pathological symptoms).⁵

Although there are additional difficulties, real and putative, with existing personality and politics work, I have said enough to indicate why scholars have been discouraged from contributing to the development of what (even if we were not confronted with such chilling events as the Cuban missile crisis) seems very much to be needed - a systematic, progressively developing body of knowledge about personality and politics.

New Trends in the Study of Personality and Politics

In recent years there has been a very large amount of research into the way a certain limited class of personal psychological variables is related to a certain limited category of political activity. I am referring to the growing body of inquiry into psychological determinants of electoral behavior, especially the contributions of

⁴For a discussion of the early "trait-correlational" literature see Smith et al (1956), Ch. 2.

⁵In addition to the specific complaints about existing research in each of the three modes, there have been more general complaints and cautions about the personality and politics literature. For example, studies in all three modes have often seemed excessively ahistorical and overly insensitive to social determinants of behavior. More fundamentally, certain formal reservations have been expressed about the usefulness of any kind of psychological data for political analysis. One might argue, for example, that political behavior is so heavily circumstantiated and situation bound that actors of very diverse personal characteristics tend to behave similarly when placed in common situations. Hence the personal variations in political action, it has been argued, may not be targets of research opportunity. In fact, however, it is possible to indicate the contingencies under which personal characteristics are and are not, "washed out" by situational factors. For example, personal variables tend not to be related to behavior in situations where severe sanctions force alternate courses of action; they do tend to be important, however, in ambiguous unstructured situations. For a much more extended discussion see (Gerrard, 1967b).

Angus Campbell and his associates at the University of Michigan Survey Research Center (Campbell *et al.*, 1954; 1960, 1966). To a degree that has few precedents in the social sciences, the Michigan investigators have elaborated detailed, non-obvious theories about the aspect of behavior that concerns them, grounding these theories in a formidable array of data collected over the past two decades.

The variables which to date have proved most useful in explaining electoral choice in the mass electorate are largely attitudinal—citizens' views of the issues of the day, their underlying political beliefs, their responses to candidates, and above all, their party loyalties. Most psychologists would consider such attitudinal variables under the heading of "personality". Most political scientists, including the Michigan group (Campbell, 1960, Ch. 18), would relegate the term "personality" to "deeper", nonpolitical psychological dispositions that characterize individuals: dispositions of the sort that typically are described in personality theories—e.g., "introversion", "need for achievement", "ego-strength", and countless other constructs describing personal traits singly or in constellations. Both usages of the term "personality"—the comprehensive psychologist's usage and the more restrictive usage of political scientists—are to be found in the present symposium (compare for example, M. Brewster Smith and J. David Singer). What is important to note is that, no matter what one's usage, any observer of recent political and psychological research would agree that there has been little recent systematic use of *personality psychology* to illuminate political behavior.

Our contributors can thus be seen, in David Riesman's useful term, to be engaged in a "counter-cyclical" enterprise. The purpose of the symposium is to bring together their various individual efforts in this important, but untidy and hence "unsafe" area of research. Once these hitherto unconnected, or only loosely connected, strands of inquiry are brought together we can see that the ground gradually is being laid for a systematic personality and politics literature, and that much has been learned—at the theoretical and methodological, as well as empirical planes—which should enable the next generation of investigators in this area to avoid the typical difficulties of much of the pioneering work.

We may very briefly note some of the signs of progress, at the same time exhibiting in a general way what is to come in the remainder of the number, without however attempting to anticipate in detail the content of the papers that follow.

Increase in Conceptual Sophistication . . .

One sign of progress is the general increase in theoretical and conceptual sophistication which tends to de-fuse polemical, "either-

or" combat about the usefulness or the uselessness of studying personality determinants of political behavior. There is, for example, increasingly less tendency for theorizing about personality and politics to proceed in reductionistic terms. The constructive alternative to reduction might be called "contextualism"—a multivariate, contingent approach to social explanation which is well illustrated in the second of the two introductory essays in this issue, M. Brewster Smith's lucid "A Map for the Analysis of Personality". In *Opinions and Personality* (1956) Smith, along with Bruner and White pointed out that the "same" attitude can serve quite different functions in the psychic economies of different individuals. For one individual a cluster of attitudes—for example, his opinions about various racial and ethnic groups—may serve to "externalize" unconscious inner conflicts; that is, to perform an ego-defensive function. However, Smith and his associates were concerned to avoid the one-sided emphasis on ego-defensive determinants of attitudes in much of the previous work on personality and belief. Therefore they emphasized that for another individual the same attitudes might be held for "rational" reasons, as a learned means of coping with the environment ("object appraisal" in Smith's nomenclature), or might simply be a means of adapting to a social environment.

Thus, the *Opinions and Personality* authors pointed out, it is inappropriate merely to reduce political attitudes and behavior to the pathological, ego-defensive level. And it is also inappropriate, as Smith indicates in his elaboration on his earlier position in the present number, even to reduce behavior to its psychological determinants. Smith's "map" places special emphasis, as do the substantive contributions to this number, on the interaction of social situation and personality in determining behavior, and in addition Smith emphasizes the importance of taking account of social factors as determinants of personality factors and as macroscopic system characteristics which impinge indirectly on the immediate environments within which people are socialized and interact.

In addition to the general advances in conceptual and theoretical sophistication, there have been specific advances in the various modes of personality and politics analysis—the individual case study, typological analysis and aggregative analysis.

Single Case Analysis . . .

Among single case analyses, light-years separate the early reductionist pathographies of political actors from such sophisticated recent works as the George and George volume on *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House* (1956) and Erikson's *Young Man Luther* (1958). The George and George work is of particular interest to students of politics not only because the protagonist is an impor-

tant modern political figure, but also at a methodological level. Although George and George employ a narrative form and minimize discussion of evidence and inference in the text of their biography, their work clearly is guided by a very high degree of methodological (and theoretical) self-consciousness, and many of its methodological premises have been discussed in the appendix to the book, in a number of influential unpublished papers by one or both of the authors, and in Alexander George's paper in this issue. In general the Georges are moving toward a set of specific criteria that would standardize the assessment and interpretation of single case data. And while the degree of precision which single case analysis can achieve is no doubt limited, the possibilities for advancing beyond present practice are considerable.⁶

Typological Analysis . . .

Typological study also has progressed. James D. Barber's contribution to this number, which makes extensive use of biographical data on Presidents Coolidge and Hoover, is like George's paper in that it entails single-case analysis of political actors. Barber's purpose, however, is typological, as the title of his essay makes clear. In presenting criteria for "Classifying and Predicting Presidential Styles" Barber builds explicitly upon his earlier work reported in *The Lawmakers* (1965). In that study Barber administered questionnaires to and conducted extended interviews with state legislators. He generated a four-fold typology based upon the two dichotomous variables of level of political activity in office and psychological commitment to the office.⁷ Barber, like Smith and his associates, finds that the motivations of political actors are variable. One of the four categories of legislators, the group Barber labels "lawmakers", proved to be high in needs for intelligent "object appraisal" based on rational canvassing of alternatives. This category included the politicians who were active in the legislature and positively oriented toward the legislature (as indicated by a desire to run for re-election for several future terms). The three remaining categories of legislators showed varying degrees and types of political styles that served ends other than that of legislative accomplishment. The inactive-uncommitted "reluctant" tended to be

⁶For the political analyst, single-case analysis is especially important, because individual political actors often can (to varying degrees, depending upon the political system) have profound effects on political outcomes.

⁷In his study of legislators Barber used willingness to run for office again as an indicator of commitment to the institution. In his work on Presidential style he makes use of traditional biographical materials: the historical record of the president's incumbency, including, presidential statements, memoirs, reports of the president's intimates.

in the legislature to fulfill a dutiful obligation; the inactive-committed "spectator" exhibited a Riesmanesque tendency to be dependent upon the political environment for signs of emotional reassurance; the active-uncommitted "advertisers" tended to be "young men on the make"—exploitive types whose political activity was a way of obtaining personal attention and career advancement.

In generating a typology out of the relationships among a few central variables, Barber follows the intellectual strategy that was first enunciated by Harold D. Lasswell in the pioneering work on political personality, his *Psychopathology and Politics* (1930, chap. 4), a work that continues to bear careful reading. Lasswell, in an analysis that he expands on in his contribution to this issue, suggests that typological analysis should begin by identifying "nuclear types" of the sort that result from Barber's two dichotomous variables. Then, Lasswell points out, it becomes strategic to identify the clusters or syndromes of inter-related further characteristics that are associated with the nuclear defining characteristics. Thus Barber's "lawmaker" type tends to be a college graduate from a party-competitive urban area who is high in self esteem; the "spectator" tends to be female, from a small town, and highly deficient in self esteem; and the other two types also show clusters of distinctive characteristics. Similar findings, including possibilities for subtypes, emerge from Barber's work on presidential style. Lasswell calls this second stage of typological analysis "corelational" typing: he makes it clear that the logic of inquiry leads one from nuclear to corelational types.

Similarly, the logic of inquiry also fosters a movement from corelational types to, in Lasswell's phrase, "developmental types":

Many of the terms which are used to describe adult traits are no doubt unpredictable from the less differentiated traits of infancy, childhood, and youth. But the growth of full-blown developmental types requires the sifting and refinement of terms until they are adequate to the description of sequences of growth. Developmental types will describe a set of terminal, adult reactions, and relate them to those critical experiences in the antecedent life of the individual which dispose him to set up such a mode of dealing with the world (Lasswell, 1930, 61).

Consistent with the tendency in modern personality theory to see critical developmental experiences as occurring throughout the life-cycle, rather than merely in early childhood, Barber finds in his canvass of presidential biographical records that certain adult political experiences—notably the president-to-be's first independent political success—appear to be of very great significance for later political behavior.

Aggregative Analysis . . .

Advances in the direction of satisfactory theory and method for personality and politics analysis also are evident in the realm of what I have called aggregative analysis. Students of politics are drawn toward analyzing and classifying the psychology of political actors not because of their intrinsic interest of this enterprise, but rather because of a concern for *political systems*—for the collectivities that are composed out of political actors. Since the time of Plato and Aristotle questions have been asked about the forms of political systems, their variations in performance, the conditions of stable systems, the conditions of change.

There is an extensive range of epistemological stances on the micro-macro issue, ranging from a Durkheimian unwillingness to explain "social facts" psychologically, to a failure to realize that social systems have properties that are not predictable from mere addition of the psychological properties of their members. As Singer points out in this issue, the problem of moving from parts to wholes is endemic in the natural sciences as well as the social sciences—or at least it is endemic among theorists. Empirical "workers . . . appear content to note the difficulties and then to get on with the work at hand" (Howland, 1968). One example of empirical work that seeks rigorously to weave together data on the characteristics of political systems with data on the motivational characteristics of political actors (based on classifications of politicians according to their scores on McClelland's projective tests of the need for achievement, power and affiliation) is reported by Browning in the present issue. Using simulation techniques to make precise predictions, Browning is attempting to determine what kinds of politicians will be recruited in what kinds of systems with what consequences. His analysis (Browning and Jacob, 1964) is exemplary in its fit with Smith's account of how behavior needs to be analyzed in terms of the joint interaction of social and psychological determinants. Important recent advances in the use of micro data to deal with macro-phenomena also are evident in the recent Michigan work reported in *Elections and the Political Order* (Campbell, et al., 1966) on such system regularities as the loss of Congressional seats by the presidential party in American midterm elections and the regular rise and fall of "flash" political parties in France. In this number the two concluding essays are by theorists, Smelser and Singer, who, building on their previous work (Singer, 1961; Smelser and Smelser, 1963, 1-21), advance general analytic statements about the relevance of psychological data to the analysis of systems.⁸

⁸I have elsewhere (Greenstein, 1967c) attempted to lay out a reasonably systematic series of propositions about specific problems of evidence, inference and conceptualization in aggregative, typological and individual analyses.

In Conclusion . . .

There is a need for systematic inquiry into personality and politics because politics abounds with instances in which political behavior can be explained only if we have an account of the personal psychological variables that mediate between the stimuli of politics and the resulting behavior. Putting it differently: if we control for political stimuli—for the situations, settings and roles within which political actors find themselves—we nevertheless find very great variations in the behavior of political actors. This leads us to the requirement of accounts of the actors' distinctive characteristics. And, as the example of the Cuban missile crisis grimly illustrates, such accounts may be of critical importance for political practice as well as for political analysis.

One source of discouragement to would-be investigators of personality and politics is the rather tatterdemalion nature of existing work in the field. This is a classically messy and controversial area of inquiry—criticism of personality and politics approaches is plentiful. More energy may, in fact, have gone into criticism than into constructive inquiry in recent years. Nevertheless, intellectually sophisticated approaches to the analysis of personality and politics gradually have been emerging. Standards have been coalescing for the satisfactory conduct of research that seeks to characterize the political psychology of single individuals and of types of individuals, and for dealing with the complex matter of how the individual parts of political systems contribute to the functioning of the whole system.

No one who reads the papers that follow will conclude that the standards for satisfactory analysis of personality and politics are now thoroughly cut and dried. But most readers will not fail to be impressed by the reflection and intellectual craftsmanship that now is being channeled into these problems. As investigators such as the contributors to this number demonstrate that it *should* be done and that it *can* be done, it may be that we will find a new wave of interest in psychological aspects of politics and a growing body of rigorous research that gradually erodes our massive ignorance about the human determinants of politics.

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A Map for the Analysis of Personality and Politics

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Progress in the social and behavioral sciences has in general not been marked by major theoretical "breakthroughs". As those of us who profess one or another of these disciplines look upon the succession of research and theoretical interests that capture the center of the stage, we may sometimes wonder if there is indeed any progress at all. Particularly if we are fixated on the physical sciences as models of what a good science should be,¹ we can easily become discouraged. As therapy for this depressive mood, however, one has only to scan the textbooks of former generations and some of the earlier landmark contributions to our fields: the fact of progress, of the cumulativeness of understanding that is the hallmark of science, is immediately apparent.

The progress that we see, however, is not on the pattern according to which Einstein included and supplanted Newton, or even on that by which the modern theory of the chemical valence bond makes sense of Mendeleev's descriptive table of elements. In addition to the development and refinement of research methods and the accretion of facts, our kind of progress has involved developing some more or less satisfactory "theories of the middle range" (Merton, 1957), and, especially, a steady increase in the sophisti-

¹Other than meteorology, which in some respects offers such an appropriate model that I am puzzled that social scientists have not picked it up.

cation of the questions that we ask and in our sensitivity to the variables that are likely to be relevant to them.

To modify this kind of process and to make our gains readily accessible as we face new problems of research and application we need something other than grand theory in the old sense. We are not ready for genuinely theoretical integration, and to proceed that we are is to hamper rather than to aid us in attacking new problems with an open mind. Rather it often seems most useful for particular purposes to attempt to link the islands of knowledge turned up in the pursuit of middle range theories and to sort out the kinds of variables that appear likely to be relevant by means of mapping operations that have only modest theoretical pretensions. When the variables are drawn from the home territories of different academic disciplines as is bound to be the case in the study of any concrete social problem and is also true of many facets of a subject defined field like political science, ventures in mapping become particularly important. They are the best we can do toward interdisciplinary integration which in these instances is required of us by the nature of the task.

This essay sketches such a map for the analysis of personality and politics—an integrat¹ion of my attempts to apply the approach developed in *Opinion and Personality*, South, Beamer and White (1958), Smith (1960) to the analysis of various social processes involving social attitudes and behavior, particularly McCloskey (1957), Beamer and Smith (1959). While it obviously leaves the bulk of the ocean I have had to go considerably beyond the scope of previous mainly psychological ones (cf. Beamer, White and I, 1960) dealing with:


A map of the existing theories that can be construed as fallible or as being substantiated against evidence, a collection of methods, a descriptive and normative strategy, that is to be judged in perspective somewhat other than at the outset. I have tried to present and to discuss the map with respect to topics that were new to me and in some cases even to me as well as my students in teaching. For a particular reason and somewhat paradoxically, I have chosen to focus on what may have the lesser social dimensions of personality, in order to stress the concrete importance of the variables. However, that is no longer to be regarded as correct. Many personality dimensions in the social sciences are like the sea-

¹ For the uses of this term and the like see I prepared an unpublished manuscript for the U.S. National Commission on Education for the 1960 meeting in which the term was used. The application of the term is considered in greatest detail in an article I have written on the same topic, with greatest of the like difficulties, longer of time. But the purpose is the purpose of which is open to question.

of the New Men and the Engaged. A good way to do so is by the elusive Engaged.

The Schematic Map

What would it be like if the map of the communication acts were to be drawn? Figure 1 presents the general structure that was chosen for this.



connected relationships. In Figures 2 and 3 we will mostly focus on this. In particular, we are interested in what can be seen in Figure 2 about how one can relate the initial state to the environment and vice versa. In addition, we are interested in what can be seen in Figure 3 about how one can relate the environment to the initial state. These parts of the schematic map are shown below.

The Map in its Component Parts

Figure 1 distinguishes the various components of a communication act. The analysis of communication acts is a matter of how exactly to relate to the world with the particularities that are the case. Figure 1 which indicates the various components relating to the environment and the environment to the particularities of the message, seems relevant, as well as relevant to the reverse. The arrows are the same as used in Figure 1, except that the position of the part of the map that relates

(Panel V) at the extreme right. This panel is concerned with personal political decisions as carried into action: voting, information-seeking, policy formation or implementation, influence attempts or—the source of much of our psychological data—question-answering. The data that come from our observations of people, what they say as well as what they do, belong here; only by reconstruction and inference do we arrive at the contents of the central personality panel.

Panel IV represents the person's behavioral situation as an immediate antecedent of action; Panel II includes features of the person's more enduring social environment to which we turn to explain how he has happened to become the sort of political actor that we find him to be; and Panel I represents the more remote or distal facts of politics, economics, history, etc., that contribute to the distinctive features of the environment in which he was socialized and of the immediate situations in which he acts. From the standpoint of the behaving individual, the contents of Panel I are conceptually distal but may be temporally contemporaneous: a political system, for example (Panel I), affects (Arrow D) the political norms about democracy, authority, legitimacy, etc., to which a person is socialized (Panel II); it also affects (Arrow E) the structure of the immediate situations of action that he is likely to encounter (Panel IV)—the alternatives offered on a ballot, the procedural rules in a legislative body, etc. Temporally distal determinants are also assigned to Panel I: thus the history of slavery, the plantation economy, the Civil War and Reconstruction as determinants of the politically relevant environments in which participants in Southern politics have been socialized, and of the immediate situations that comprise the stage on which they perform as political actors.

If we start with behavioral outcomes in Panel V, the arrows (marked A and B) that link them with Panels III and IV represent the methodological premise emphasized by the great psychologist Kurt Lewin: all social behavior is to be analyzed as a joint resultant of characteristics of the *person*, on the one hand, and of his *psychological situation*, on the other. The behavior of a single political actor may differ substantially as he faces differently structured situations; conversely, different persons who face the same situation will respond differently. Both the contribution of the person and that of his situation, in interaction, must be included in any adequate analysis.

For long, there was a disciplinary quarrel between psychologists and sociologists about the relevance and importance of personal dispositions (primarily *attitudes*) versus situations in determining social behavior. To take this feature of our map seriously is to regard the argument as silly and outmoded: both classes of determinants are

jointly indispensable. The study of "personality and politics" cannot afford to neglect situational factors, which must in principle be taken into account if we are to isolate the distinctive contributions of personality. In concrete cases in which analysis along these lines is undertaken so as to guide social action, one may ask, of course, whether the personal or the situational component is more *strategic* in terms of accessibility to major influence. It may be more feasible, for example, to influence the normative structure that pertains to interracial relations than to carry through the program of mass psychoanalysis that might be required in order to reverse authoritarian personality trends that predispose people toward prejudice and discriminatory behavior. The practical question of strategic importance and accessibility does not seem to be as charged with disciplinary *amour-propre* as are the theoretical issues that still tend to divide the proponents of personality-oriented and of situational approaches.


The dotted arrows of relationship that leave the behavioral panel require special mention. Political behavior has consequences as well as causes, and for the sake of formal completeness some of these are suggested by the dotted "feedback loops" in the map. As Leon Festinger has argued on the basis of considerable evidence, self-committing behavior may have effects in turn upon a person's attitudes (Arrow G) (Festinger, 1957, Brehm and Cohen, 1962). A political actor who adopts a position for expedient reasons may be convinced by his own rhetoric, or—similar in result though different in the process that is assumed—he may shift his attitudes to accord with his actions in order to reduce feelings of "dissonance". The dotted Arrows F, H and I merely recognize that individual behavior also has effects in the social world. What the person does in a situation may immediately change it (Arrow F); as we integrate across the behavior of many individuals, the joint consequences of the behavior of the many eventually alter the social environments that shape and support the attitudes of each (Arrow H). In the longer run (Arrow I), the behaviors of individuals constitute a society and its history.

To be sure, this is a psychologist's map that focuses on the attitudes and behavior of individual persons. A political sociologist would have to give explicit attention to matters that remain implicit in the feedback arrows—to the social structures according to which individual behaviors are integrated to have political effects. His map would necessarily be differently centered and elaborated than the present one.

Panels III and IV

With the broad framework laid out, we can now look at the details of Panels III and IV, still working from the proximal to the

FIGURE 2



distal determinants of behavior (see Figure 2). The contents of Panel IV (The Situation as Immediate Antecedent of Action) remind us that an important component of any behavioral situation is the set of norms or prescriptions for behavior that are consensually held to apply in it. Students of political behavior at the various levels of governmental organization are concerned with recurring types of situations that confront the citizen as constituent, voter or petitioner: the legislator, the executive, the administrative functionary, the party leader. Much of the variation in personal behavior, not only across types of situations but within the same type in different political structures and different historical periods, will be attributable to differences and changes in the norms that prevail. Apart from the norms, there are of course many other situational features that are also important as codeterminants of action—among them, the competitive or cooperative relations that hold with other actors who participate in the situation, the degree of urgency with which decision or action is required, the contingencies of cost and benefit that obtain

(see Thibaut and Kelley, 1959). Lore about the relevant features of political situations is a principal currency of political science.

Turn now to Panel III, Personality Processes and Dispositions. We are concerned here with inferred dispositions of the person that he brings to any situation he encounters, and with their basis in his experience and motivational processes. Social psychologists have come to use the term *attitudes* to refer to such dispositions, when they represent integrations of cognitive, emotional and conative tendencies around a psychological object such as a political figure or issue. Our problem is a dual one: to formulate how a person's attitudes come to bear on his political behavior and how these attitudes arise and are sustained in relation to their part in the ongoing operations of the person's psychological economy.

A first point suggested in Figure 2 is that we cannot take for granted just which of a person's attitudes will become engaged as a codeterminant of his behavior in a political situation. Political scientists are probably less naive than psychologists about this. A citizen's presidential vote for one or another candidate depends, as we know (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960), not only on his focal attitude toward that candidate, but also on attitudes toward the alternative candidates, toward party and toward issues. A legislator's vote on a bill will depend not only on situational factors (including whether or not a roll call is involved) and on his attitudes toward the focal issue but also on other relevant attitudes that become engaged—toward tangential issues, toward the party leadership, toward political survival or whatever. The situation plays a dual role here: both as a codeterminant, together with his engaged attitudes, of what he does (B) (the legislator may want to vote for a bill but not dare to), and as differentially activating certain of the actor's attitudes (M and N) while allowing or encouraging other potentially relevant attitudes to remain in abeyance (O). In recent years, issues concerning Negro civil rights have come to be posed in the Congress and elsewhere in such pointed terms that political actors probably find it less feasible than formerly to isolate their attitudes of democratic fair play from engagement—attitudes embodied in the American Creed (Myrdal, 1962) to which most citizens have been socialized to some degree.

Social psychological research may elect to measure and manipulate one attitude at a time for good analytic reasons, but people rarely behave in such a piecemeal fashion. What gets into the mix of a person's engaged attitudes, and with what weighting, makes a big difference. Given the complexity of these relationships, there is no reason to suppose that people's political behavior should uniformly correspond to their attitudes on the focal issue. It is surprising that some psychologists and sociologists have been surprised at the lack

of one-to-one correspondence between single attitudes and behavior and have questioned the validity of attitude measurement on these irrelevant grounds.

Moving toward the left of Panel III, we turn from the problem of how attitudes are differentially aroused to that of how they are formed and sustained. The approach taken here is the functional one which posits that a person acquires and maintains attitudes and other learned psychological structures to the extent that they are in some way useful to him in his inner economy of adjustment and his outer economy of adaptation. The scheme for classifying the functional basis of attitudes is one that I have discussed in greater detail elsewhere (Smith, Bruner and White, 1956; Smith, 1968). It answers the question, "Of what use to a man are his opinions??" under three rubrics: *object appraisal, mediation of self-other relationships and externalization and ego defense*.

Object Appraisal

Under object appraisal, we recognize the ways in which a person's attitudes serve him by "sizing up" significant aspects of the world in terms of their relevance to his motives, interests and values. As Walter Lippmann long ago (1922) made clear, all attitudes, not just "prejudice", involve an element of "prejudgment"; they are useful to the person in part because they prepare him for his encounters with reality enabling him to avoid the confusion and inefficiency of appraising each new situation afresh in all its complexity. In the most general way, holding *any* attitude brings a bit of order into the flux of a person's psychological world; the specific content of a person's attitudes reflects to varying degrees his appraisal of how the attitudinal object bears upon his interests and enterprises. This function involves reality testing and is likely to be involved to some minimal degree in even the least rational of attitudes—which on closer examination may turn out to be relatively reasonable within the person's own limited framework of appraisal.

Mediation of Self-Other Relationships

A person's attitudes not only embody a provisional appraisal of what for him is significant reality; they also serve to mediate the kind of relationships with others and the kind of conception of self that he is motivated to maintain. Is it important to the decision maker to think of himself as a liberal Democrat? Then his adopting a liberal stand on any of a variety of issues may contribute to his self regard. Does he rather set much stock in being right in the light of history? Such motivation, by orienting him toward an ideal reference group, may make him relatively independent of immediate

social pressures. To the extent that by self-selective recruitment politicians are disproportionately likely to be "other directed" in Riesman's sense (1950), however, they may be predisposed by personality to be especially vulnerable to such pressures.

Externalization and Ego Defense


Finally comes the class of functions to which psychoanalytic depth psychology has given the closest attention, here labelled externalization and ego defense. This is the functional basis to which Lasswell (1930) gave exclusive emphasis in his classic formula for the political man: private motives displaced onto public objects, rationalized in terms of the public interest. It also underlies the conception of the "authoritarian personality" (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford, 1950)—a posture in which an essentially weak ego puts up a facade of strength that requires bolstering through identification with the strong, the conventional and the in-group, and rejection of the weak, the immoral, the out-group. Given the appeal of depth interpretation in the study of personality and politics, there is little need to expand on these themes; it is more necessary to insist that externalization and ego defense are only part of the story.

The arrows P, Q and R raise the functional question about the motivational sources of any attitude that a person holds. Arrows S and T, near the bottom of the panel, reflect on their part a different kind of relationship. A person's attitudes and the way they engage with particular political situations bear the mark of his stylistic traits of personality as well as of the purposes that they serve for him. Intelligence or stupidity, Kennedy incisiveness or Eisenhower vagueness, zest or apathy, optimism or pessimism, decisiveness or hesitation—cognitive, temperamental and behavioral traits like these may have their own history in the residues of the person's previous motivational conflicts, but their immediate relevance for his political attitudes and behavior is hardly motivational. His attitudes and actions in the sphere of politics, as in other realms, inevitably reflect such pervasive personal qualities, which can have momentous behavioral consequences. A purely functional account is likely to neglect them.

Panel II


The foregoing analysis provides us with leverage for identifying aspects of the person's social environment that are relevant to the development, maintenance and change of his political attitudes and his stylistic personality traits, as we turn to Panel II at the left of our map (Figure 3). To the extent that a person's attitudes in a particular political context reflect processes of object appraisal, he

FIGURE 3



should be responsive to the information that his environment provides about the attitudinal object or issue (Arrow 1). The actual facts about it will be important in this connection only as they affect the information that is socially available to him, and as we know the quality and quantity of this information vary widely from issue to issue and across the various niches that people occupy in society.

The information on a topic that reaches a person through the channels of communication has a dual relevance, as the internal arrows in Panel II are intended to suggest—not only does it feed into his processes of object appraisal, but it carries further information—a second-order message, so to speak—about the social norms that prevail. When discussions of birth control begin to percolate through Catholic channels or debates about the pros and cons of China policy through American ones, not only is new grist provided for object appraisal, the important news is conveyed that these previously taboo topics have become more and discussable. As Arrow V indicates, the second motivational basis of attitudes—the mediation of self-other relations—then may lead to attitudinal consequences that



point to a different resultant in behavior. It becomes safe to think in new ways.

Besides providing the environmental data that the first two attitudinal functions can work with to generate new attitudes or to sustain or change established ones,³ the person's life situation and socialization experiences may predispose him—in general, or in a particular topical domain—toward one or another of the functional bases of attitudes (Arrows W, X and Y). What makes the rational man, in whom the first function predominates? The Utopia has not yet arrived in which we know the answer, but recent studies of socialization are beginning to become relevant to the question, and it is a good guess that part of the story is rearing by loving and confident parents who give reasons for their discipline. In the shorter run, environments that augment one's self esteem and allay one's anxiety should also favor object appraisal. Research in the wake of Riesman (1950), including the Witkin group's studies of field dependence-independence (Witkin *et al.*, 1962) and Miller and Swanson's (1958, 1960) work on child rearing and personality in entrepreneurial and bureaucratic families, contains suggestions about the sources of primary orientation to the second function, mediation of self-other relationships. As for externalization and ego defense, again the picture is not clear, but conditions that subject the developing person to arbitrary authority, that deflate self esteem, that arouse vague anxiety, that provoke hostility but block its relatively direct expression toward the source of the frustration, seem likely sources.

The final arrow Z is drawn not to complete the alphabet but to make place for the findings of personality research, as they emerge, concerning the determinants in socialization of personal stylistic traits.

The entire map can now be reassembled in Figure 4. Arrows U to Z, taken together, replace Arrow C in Figure 1.

Some Omissions and Simplifications

The usefulness of a map and its inherent limitations are two sides of the same coin: its status as a simplification and schematization of reality. There are many complexities that the present map does not attempt to handle. Some of the major omissions, which I note briefly here, arise from the fact that the role of the basic psychological apparatuses and processes of motivation, perception and learning is assumed implicitly rather than explicitly delineated.

³ Environment data play a much more incidental and erratic role in relation to the function of externalization and ego defense.

The triadic functional classification attempts to sort out the ways in which a person's attitudes are rooted in his underlying motives and their fusions and transformations, whatever they may be. It assumes but does not spell out a conception of human motivation.

As for perception, it would elaborate the map to an incomprehensible tangle to give due recognition to what we know about perceptual selectivity, the ways in which a person's existing expectations, motives and attitudes affect what he will attend to and how he will register and categorize it. A perceptual screening process intervenes between the environmental facts (Panel II) and what the person makes of them (Panel III); likewise between the immediate behavioral situation as it might appear to an objective observer (Panel IV) and how the person defines it for himself, which in the last analysis is the guise in which it affects his behavior.

In regard to learning, the present formulation makes the broad functionalist assumption that people in general acquire attitudes that are useful, that is, rewarding to them. But it ignores the details of the learning process, and such consequences of learning as the persistence of learned structures beyond their original point of usefulness. Much of the content of political attitudes, moreover, may be acquired by an individual quite incidentally, in his unfocused, only mildly attentive effort to make sense of his world. The culture says, in effect, "This is how things are with (Russia) (China) (Republicans) (Southerners) (Negroes) (socialized medicine)", and in the absence of better information, he takes note. Such incidentally learned, psychologically marginal "information" may at the time have little real payoff in object appraisal or social adjustment (the person may have no occasion for dealing with the object or issue, and it may not matter enough to his significant reference groups to become part of the currency of his self-other relationships), yet, should the occasion arise, the basis for resonance to certain political positions rather than others has been laid.

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Power As a Compensatory Value for Political Leaders

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Some years ago, Harold D. Lasswell drew upon the findings and theories of various schools of dynamic psychology in formulating a general hypothesis about the "power seeker" as a person who "pursues power as a means of compensation against deprivation. *Power is expected to overcome low estimates of the self, by changing either the traits of the self or the environment in which it functions*" (Lasswell, 1948, 39 and 53 [*underlining* in the original]). The pervasiveness of power strivings as compensation for organic or imagined defects was given early emphasis by Alfred Adler. The fruitfulness of Adler's theories for subsequent social psychological approaches to personality is now widely recognized (Murphy, 1947 ch. 24, "Compensation for Inferiority".)

Lasswell's Power Seeker

Lasswell deliberately formulated the hypothesis about the "power seeker" in such general terms in order to encompass a great

*This article draws on an unpublished paper given together with Juliette L. George at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in September 1956. Opportunity for additional research was provided by a research grant from the Foundations' Fund for Research in Psychiatry whose support is gratefully acknowledged.

variety of more detailed findings and hypotheses about such matters. As a result, his hypothesis provides a relatively "shallow" account of the origins of a need for power, foregoing explanations having greater depth. There are resulting advantages, however, that should not be minimized. The hypothesis provides an alternative explanation of the need for power in terms (i.e., compensation for low self-estimates) that are easier to establish than a more detailed account of its earlier and deeper origins. The problems of interest to the political scientist generally do not require the same level of explanation in matters of this kind that the psychoanalyst is interested in. Moreover, the political scientist lacks the data, observational opportunities and diagnostic skills for making fuller in-depth reconstructions. Under these circumstances, attempts to do so are likely to be difficult, frustrating and unduly speculative—as well as often being unnecessary.

By linking the emergence of an individual's high valuation of, or need for power to low self-estimates, Lasswell's hypothesis usefully orients research on "power-oriented" political leaders to findings emerging from research on childhood development and socialization and to ego psychology. Attention is directed to the development of the "self" component of the ego, beliefs about the self, the extent and quality of self-esteem and its implications for behavior. In this context, attention is also directed to the emergence of the individual's personal values. Thus, the hypothesis holds that some individuals develop an unusually strong need or striving for power (and/or for other personal values such as affection, deference, rectitude) as a means of seeking compensation for damaged or inadequate self-esteem. Personal "values" or needs of this kind—which may be regarded as "ego motives" since they are part of the ego subsystem of the personality—are an important part of the individual's motivational structure. The operation of these "values" in the individual's behavior can be related not merely to deeper unconscious motives but also to the sphere of the "autonomous" functioning of the ego. In addition to utilizing various devices for dealing with unconscious motives (the classical ego defenses), the ego is also capable of employing various adjustive and constructive strategies in efforts to secure satisfaction for personal "values" such as the need for power, affection, deference, etc., thereby maintaining personality equilibrium. The emergence of these adjustive and constructive strategies, and their operation in the individual's choice, definition and performance of political roles constitute a useful focus for studying the interaction of personality and political behavior in political leaders.

The "shallowness" of Lasswell's hypothesis—i.e., the fact that it refers only to that layer of unconscious needs present in the ego selfsystem (i.e., the personal "values" referred to), does not rule out

the possibility of exploring deeper levels of motivation and psycho-dynamic processes. Rather, far from cutting off this possibility, assessment of an individual's personal needs or values can provide a useful stepping stone to efforts to probe deeper, more complex dimensions of motivational structure and dynamics. Inferences can be made from the strength and operation of these personal needs to deeper levels of motivation. Psychoanalytic and related theories provide hypotheses linking personal needs that are part of the ego's selfsystem with the arcane recesses of motivation and its psychodynamics. These "ego motives" also have a linkage with psychogenetic, developmental hypotheses; many hypotheses of this kind are available concerning the origins of damaged selfesteem which, in turn, creates strong needs for power or other values.¹

Another merit of Lasswell's general hypothesis about the "power-seeker", or *homo politicus*, is that it encourages the political scientist to move beyond the question of the detailed psychogenetic origins of the need for power to focus on fuller study of the development of the power seeker's interest in politics. How does the individual who emerges from childhood and into adolescence with this kind of subjective need for power go about developing a knowledge of politics, selecting one or another political role, acquiring relevant political skills, creating or utilizing opportunities to become a leader of organized groups? There are central questions concerning the socialization of political leaders, and they have important linkages with the emphasis in Lasswell's hypothesis on the compensatory character of some leaders' interest in power.

Lasswell's Hypothesis in Political Biography . . .

This paper attempts to broaden the theoretical framework of Lasswell's general hypothesis and suggests a method for employing it in research on political leaders. It is hoped that this will encourage those who want to use Lasswell's hypothesis in psychological biography to pay greater attention to the data requirements implicit in the hypothesis and to employ more explicit standards of inference in such studies.

Additional research in this direction seems highly desirable. While it is by no means the case that all political leaders are "power seekers", those whose interest in politics is of the kind postulated in Lasswell's hypothesis are of particular interest to political scientists and historians. As in the case of Woodrow Wilson, political personalities of this kind often emerge as reformers and innovators if successful in obtaining political office. Once in power, they often

¹I plan to develop these observations more fully in work in progress.

attempt to reorient political institutions, reinterpret and expand the functions of existing political roles or create new ones which fit these needs, political style and aspirations. A better understanding of this kind of political personality therefore may throw light on the nature and psychodynamics of role determining as against role determined political leadership. Of course, the creation or reinterpretation of leadership roles can only be understood in the context of social-historical dynamics and the institutional setting. However, as Geth and Mills observe (1983: ch. 14, 'The Structure of Leadership'), the great leader 'has often been a man who successfully managed such institutional dynamics and created new roles of leadership.'

Lasswell's general hypothesis has had some influence on subsequent studies of political leadership and political behavior more seriously. Rader (1965), Edinger (1965), Hargrove (1966), Lane (1967). Some years ago I found it particularly valuable for understanding the development of Woodrow Wilson's interest in political power and some of the dynamics of his political behavior. In the belief that Lasswell's hypothesis is of wider application in the study of political leadership, I will try to show how it can be utilized in a relatively systematic manner for purposes of data collection and data interpretation. This requires that meaningful operational definitions be given to the key terms in the hypothesis—low self-estimates—power compensation. I will indicate some of the problems encountered in doing so, present a set of provisional operational definitions, and illustrate their application with materials available in the biography of Woodrow Wilson.¹

[Low Belltower](http://LowBelltower.com)

Let us begin with that portion of the hypothesis that postulates the presence of low self-esteem in the subject of study. Many life experiences can produce damaged self-esteem in the basic personality. We need now turn sharply here into the question of the particular genesis of low self-esteem either generative or for a specific pattern or the origins of later related personality dynamics.¹

It is now time to take a look at some of the more common types of
problems that you will encounter in your studies of chemistry.

For that purpose an answer to the next question, in which there are a variety of theories, would assist us in determining what these tend to be. The disagreement of the members of the nation perhaps. Whether there is a general agreement in the government induced by such an influence as that of the press or of that domination itself that it deserves the name of the government we want to get clear by means of evidence of how it has been working, John C. Calhoun had his own opinion on this.

The resource and labour of the community must be used well estimated ideas can be easily obtained of the kinds of labour necessary about a particular article - especially in calculating what are usually available in foreign parts by giving consideration to their local conditions for the need in the working power to see that nothing is left to foreigners who have been a loss.

The Case of Wilson

In Wilson's case the importance of the Moral Government of the world is fully recognized. He regards it as the highest power in existence, and the chief factor in the development of the world.

In August 1862 a man of German name, Peter Schaeffer, appeared at the camp of the 1st Regt., 10th Mass. Vol. Inf., at Camp Devens, Mass. He passed the evening before his arrival at the camp, in Boston, and was seen by many persons in the streets of Boston. He was dressed in a dark suit, and had a small pocket book and a pocket watch chain hanging from his neck. He was seen to go into the office of the Boston Evening Transcript, and to remain there about half an hour.

the first time in the history of the world, the
whole of the human race has been gathered
together in one place, and that is the
present meeting of the World's Fair.

The second stage of the process is the identification of the main components of the system. This stage involves the analysis of the system's structure and function to determine the key components that are responsible for its behavior.

polished phrase. His compositions had to be rewritten, sometimes four or five times, before the elder Wilson was satisfied. This instruction, continued over a period of years, was of the most intensive, exacting kind and demanded severe and conscientious application.

The father dealt with his son's imperfections with that caustic wit for which he was noted among all who knew him. In this tension-producing situation the child never openly rebelled. It is significant, however, that he was slow in achieving the usual intellectual skills. He did not learn his letters until he was nine. He could not read until he was eleven.⁵

"Low self-estimates" can be given detailed operational content for purposes of data collection by specifying some of the subjective feelings of which it may be comprised. For example: (a) feelings of unimportance; (b) feelings of moral inferiority; (c) feelings of weakness; (d) feelings of mediocrity; (e) feelings of intellectual inadequacy. Many of these, and others, were present in Wilson's case. He felt eternally inferior to his father, in appearance as well as in accomplishment. His own recollections of his youth indicate early fears that he was stupid, ugly, worthless and unlovable. These feelings apparently had rich opportunities for elaboration in his religious convictions concerning the fundamental wickedness of human nature. Data on subjective feelings of this kind, of course, may not always be available to the investigator. It would be useful, therefore, to supplement this operational definition of low self-estimates with items of behavior that are perhaps more easily observed.

The Power Motive

We turn now to the term "power" in Lasswell's general hypothesis. Several difficulties arise in attempting to give it a relevant operational definition. We must remind ourselves that "power" here is a value or need for the possession or exercise of sanctions or the means for influencing others. Accordingly, we do not seek to define "power" in order to measure objectively its presence or use. Rather, we define "power need" as the desire for and enjoyment of power, the high valuation or cathexis of power. And we want to find ways of identifying the presence of such a power need.

The character and content of an individual's "power" motive may be shaped by the conditions that gave rise to low self-estimates and its accompanying psychodynamics. One possibility is that the

⁵For a fuller account of this and other materials on Wilson, see George and George, 1956, ch. 1, which also indicates some of the father's positive contributions to the development of his son.

ensuing demand for power may be reactive-formative against the fear of passivity, of weakness, of being dominated. Another possibility is that the demand for power may be aggressive or destructive. Power, then, may be desired for various reasons in different power-demanding persons and perhaps at different times in the same individual. That is, power may be desired for one or more of these reasons: (a) so as to dominate and/or deprive others; (b) so as not to be dominated, or interfered with, by other political actors; (c) so as to produce political achievements. (It may be useful on future occasions to specify additional variants of the power need, or to restate these differently.)

As the third of these possible components of a "power need" implies, it may be *instrumental* at times rather than primary in persons who seek compensation thereby. Thus power may be desired and exercised in order to satisfy other personal needs, such as a need for achievement, for respect, for security, for rectitude. In some instances, one of the components of a power motive we have postulated—the desire not to be dominated by others—may seem to be an end in itself, more highly valued than other needs. In other cases, the desire for, pursuit and exercise of power may be clearly or predominantly instrumental for gaining satisfaction of other needs and values.

Two other conclusions about the status of the "power" motive have emerged from our effort to apply Lasswell's general hypothesis to Wilson. First, the demand or need for "power" in compensation-seeking political types does not operate uniformly in the subject's political motivation under all conditions. Rather, the presence and/or strength of the "power demand" (or of some components of it) in the individual's motivation varies, being subject to special arousal conditions (see page 41, this article). A second conclusion is that an individual's striving for "power" in the context of compensation may either be reinforced by, or in conflict with other strong needs—such as the need for affection, approval, respect, achievement, rectitude, etc.—that he may also be pursuing in the political arena.

In the case of a *multi-valued* political personality like Wilson, it is a complex task to establish the underlying motivational structure of different needs, and especially, to gauge the shifting inter-relationship and priority of these needs. In attempting to determine the role of personality in the subject's political behavior it becomes necessary, therefore, to assess not merely the relative strength of individual needs or motives in the personality system generally but, more important, the ways in which the subject reconciles competing or conflicting needs in choosing his goals, and the conditions under which one or another need or pattern of needs has primacy in his behavior. For the importance and operative role

of different needs in specific situations depends not only on their relative strength but may vary with the subject's shifting expectations as to the possibility of satisfying them in each situation. As the above suggests, I recognize that damaged self-esteem can create unusually strong needs for several values, not merely for power or another single value. In Wilson's case, we inferred a strong need also for affection, respect, rectitude and enlightenment. The interrelationship of these strong, at times competing values in Wilson's motivation and political behavior is depicted in *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House* (George and George, 1956; For a brief summary see 319-322). I should add that in my initial study of Wilson (unpublished paper, 1941), I attempted to estimate from available historical data Wilson's high or low demand for most of the eight values the Harold Lasswell has listed and described on a number of occasions, including his contribution to the present volume. I do indeed agree with his emphasis on the importance of characterizing the subject's position with respect to all eight values. In the present paper, however, I have focused more narrowly than in the full-length study on the need for power and the problems of operationalizing it.

Power-Striving for Compensation

Let us turn now to the compensatory process mentioned in Lasswell's formulation about the "power seeking" type. If this hypothesis is correct and applicable to political leaders like Wilson, we would expect that in acquiring and exercising power the subject experiences not merely reduction of tension but also euphoric feelings of a kind that serve to counter some of the low self-estimates from which he suffers. The problem of establishing and tracing such a compensatory process empirically requires close examination of the relationship between (a) low self-estimates, (b) specific items of behavior that express the individual's power demand and satisfy it to some extent, and (c) the substantive content of the ensuing compensatory gratifications, if any. In this respect, however, it is well to heed the warning of clinical psychologists who have observed that uniform regularities cannot be expected between particular items of manifest behavior and their tension-reducing, equilibrium-restoring functions for the personality. The complexity of the dynamics of behavior in this respect adds to the difficulty of devising operational indicators of manifest behavior that can be taken as giving expression to the demand for "power" in persons striving thereby for compensation. For, evidently, the same item of manifest behavior may fulfill different functions for different personalities and, at different times, for the same individual.

We must be satisfied for the time being, therefore, with cataloguing various items of political behavior that may or may not express an individual's striving to gratify one or another component of his power need. In constructing such a catalogue we have drawn upon the syndrome of behavior associated with the so-called "compulsive" character in Freudian psychoanalytic accounts (Freud, 1950, 45-50; and Fenichel, 1945, 278-284). We list six items of behavior that serve as possible indicators of a striving for power gratification on the part of a compensation-seeking personality:

- ... *Unwillingness to permit others to share* in his actual or assumed field of power.⁶
- ... *Unwillingness to take advice* regarding his proper functioning in his actual or assumed field of power.
- ... *Unwillingness to delegate* to others tasks that are believed to belong to his regularly constituted field of power.
- ... *Unwillingness to consult* with others, who have a claim to share power, regarding his functioning in the actual or assumed field of power.
- ... *Unwillingness to inform* others with respect to his functioning in his actual or assumed field of power.
- ... *Desire to devise and impose orderly systems* upon others in the political arena.

Before leaving this topic, we remind ourselves that these items are only *possible* indicators of a power need in the personality. Depending on the context, behavior of this kind may serve other functions for the personality as well as its power need; or it may be entirely divorced from the individual's striving for power gratification.

Occurrences of these items of behavior in the leader's political activity may indeed be solely role-determined, being called for by his assessment of the way in which role expectations should be interpreted in the light of the requirements of the situation. On the other hand, personality needs may reinforce or conflict with role requirements and may either improve or distort his assessment of the situation and his choice of action alternatives.

In more general terms we are asserting the possibility that personality needs and motives of an unconscious character may influence an individual's *selection* and *definition* of political roles for himself; further, these needs may infuse themselves into his *performance* of these roles and help account either for unusually skillful or inexpedient behavior on behalf of the policy objectives to which he has ostensibly committed himself in the political arena. The fact that a person's behavior *can* be interpreted in terms of role demands, therefore, does not relieve the investigator from con-

⁶What is meant by "actual or assumed field of power" will be clarified shortly.

sidering the possibility that aspects of basic personality are also expressing themselves and shaping such behavior. It is incorrect, therefore, to define the problem as some proponents of role theory tend to do in terms of "role versus personality". Rather, the interplay of role and personality needs to be considered.⁷

The Presence of Conflicting Evidence

There are many striking instances of these six items of behavior in Wilson's career. But, at the same time, there are also numerous examples and testimonials to the fact that in exercising the powers of his office Wilson did consult and inform others, took advice and delegated authority. Faced with apparently conflicting evidence of this kind, we found it fruitful to examine the behavior in question more closely. We found that different observers reporting on this aspect of his political behavior seemed to mean different things when asserting that he did or did not "consult". Some of the disagreement among observers on this score could be reduced to a language problem—that is, the absence of a rigorous standard language used scrupulously by all observers reporting on his behavior. (This can be dealt with by defining terms like "consultation" more precisely and translating reports by participant observers accordingly.)

The apparently conflicting evidence was reconciled also by analyzing the *conditions* under which Wilson did and did not consult, etc. This led to the formulation of a more selective statement of Lasswell's general hypothesis that has already been implied by including the phrase "in his actual or assumed field of power" in listing above the possible behavioral indicators of a power need. Let us clarify the phrase.

In order to overcome or compensate for low self-estimates, the power-seeking personality attempts to carve out a sphere of activity in which he can demonstrate his competence and worth. The importance of such a developmental process to a personality suffering from damaged selfesteem is obvious.⁸ Achievement of

⁷A particularly useful statement of this is provided by Daniel J. Levinson (1959). A fuller discussion of these points with reference to Wilson's interest in writing constitutions (interpreted as manifesting and satisfying a desire to devise and impose orderly systems on others) appears in my unpublished paper (1960).

⁸The present discussion of "compensation" as emerging from a developmental process in which the individual suffering from low self-estimates carves out a "sphere of competence" and a "field of power" can be usefully related to Eric Erikson's concept of the adolescent identity crisis. The fruitfulness of a synthesis of Lasswell's hypothesis about power as compensatory for low self-estimates with Erikson's model of adolescent identity crisis is demonstrated, I believe for the first time, in James D. Barber's paper in this issue.

competence in a given sphere of activity, however narrow or specialized it may be, provides the personality with a "field" in which it can function productively, possibly with considerable autonomy (freedom from "interference" from others), perhaps aggressively and self-righteously on occasion and more generally in a manner as to reach a personality equilibrium otherwise lacking for someone who suffers from low self-estimates.

Lasswell's general hypothesis is transformed in this way into a more selective one which helps to resolve the apparent inconsistency or contradictory behavior of the subject with regard to some of the six behavioral indicators listed above. Thus, the selective version of the hypothesis holds that manifestations of power-striving are not encountered throughout the entire range of the subject's political behavior but operate more selectively, that is, only when he is performing in his actual or assumed field of power. Even this formulation, we shall note shortly, does not sufficiently identify and restrict for a particular individual the conditions under which his power need manifests itself directly.

We may recall that Lasswell's general hypothesis about *homo politicus* confines itself to explaining a need for power in terms of compensation for low self-estimates, without venturing to push the explanation further in order to account also for the origins of low self-estimates. While the study of a power-oriented leader's career and political behavior may benefit from hypotheses as to the origins of his low self-estimates, the investigator need not feel hobbled by an inability to provide more specific, in-depth hypotheses of this kind (or to demonstrate such hypotheses). Rather, if he can demonstrate the applicability of Lasswell's general hypothesis to his subject, this should suffice by way of explaining his need for power. The investigator can then proceed to the essential, and more rewarding task of relating the subject's compensatory interest in power to his emerging expectations and orientations to the future, i.e., what he wants the state of affairs to be like in the near and more distant future, and how he proposes to help bring about these desired changes.

In Wilson's Case . . .

In Wilson's case, we find him engaged from early adolescence to early maturity in carving out or creating what we here have called a "field aim" and a "sphere of competence". An interest in poli-

Among ego psychologists, Robert W. White (1963) has particularly emphasized the importance of the emergence in the individual of a sense of competency and efficacy.

tics manifested itself early. In his fourteenth year, Wilson organized a group of boys into a club and composed a constitution for it. Two years later his political interests had become more sharply defined. We find him sitting at his desk under a picture of Gladstone. When his little cousin asked who it was, Wilson replied: "That is Gladstone, the greatest statesman that ever lived. I intend to be a statesman, too". He settled his ambition upon a political career in his sophomore year in college. Thereafter, we find him defining his political ambition in terms of available political roles and striving to acquire knowledge and skills relevant to successful performance of the preferred political roles selected for himself. Thus, in his sophomore year at Princeton, Wilson read a series of articles on the relationship between oratory and political leadership. These articles, the official biographer notes, were "the precipitate that clarified the mind of the eager youth. They discovered to him the field which he loved. They made him suddenly aware of his own powers *He could debate, he could lead!*"! Wilson sat down at once to write his father that he had discovered he had a mind. It is clear that oratory recommended itself to him as a means of achieving influence and control over others. At the close of his sophomore year, he wrote an article for the *Princetonian* which reveals his own ambitions: "What is the object of oratory? Its object is persuasion and conviction—the control of other minds by a strange personal influence and power".

Even before he became a teacher, Wilson had a clear idea of the use to which he would put his talent for oratory and a clear conception of the political role which he wished to play, should the opportunity arise. After the publication of his first book, *Congressional Government*, in 1885, he wrote his fiancée confessing that his heart's first ambition lay elsewhere:

. . . I have a strong instinct of leadership, an unmistakably oratorical temperament, and the keenest possible delight in affairs; and it has required very constant and stringent schooling to content me with the sober methods of the scholar and the man of letters. I have no patience for the tedious toil of what is known as 'research'; *I have a passion for interpreting great thoughts to the world; I should be complete if I could inspire a great movement of opinion*, if I could read the experiences of the past into the practical life of the men of today and so communicate the thought to the minds of the great mass of the people as to impel them to great political achievements My feeling has been that *my power to write was meant to be a handmaiden to my power to speak and to organize action* (italics supplied)⁹

⁹For documentation and elaboration see George and George, 1956, 23.

When Wilson Consulted . . .

Even within his "actual or assumed field of power" a leader who pursues power as a compensatory value does not invariably refuse to consult and take advice, to inform others and to delegate, etc. I will briefly summarize some of the more discriminating observations regarding Wilson's willingness or unwillingness to permit others to share in the powers of his office that emerged from an analysis of the conditions in which he acted one way or the other: (a) He typically consulted more readily in order to obtain facts rather than opinions; (b) he consulted and took advice more readily from those whose approval and affection he could count on;¹⁰ (c) he could delegate power in matters in which he was little interested, matters which did not engage his aspiration for great achievement.¹¹

When Wilson Cooperated . . .

Wilson's expressed willingness to consult and cooperate with legislators was always a complicated matter. We found it necessary to distinguish two types of situations in analyzing Wilson's relationship with legislative bodies.

First, as long as the possibility existed of getting what he wanted from the legislature, Wilson could operate with considerable skill in order to mobilize potential support. He could be, as in the first year of the Governorship and in the "honeymoon" period of the Presidency, extremely cordial, if firm; gracious, if determined; and generally willing to go through the motions of consulting and granting deference to legislators whose support he needed. It is this phase of his "party leadership" that excited the admiration of contemporaries and historians alike. However, these skillful tactics of leadership were predicated on the expectation that he would be able to push through his proposed legislation in essentially unadulterated form. As Wilson often put it, he was willing to accept

¹⁰ Persons like Senator Glass, Joseph Tumulty (his secretary), and especially Colonel House could serve Wilson as advisers either because they would not push their disagreements with him once they saw that his mind was made up, or because they were so deferential to him that they would accept his point of view when he finally formulated a position.

¹¹ Thus the official biographer, Baker (1927), could correctly observe that it was difficult for Wilson to delegate authority, "especially in matters which profoundly engaged his interest or awakened his emotions". And at the same time, Josephus Daniels, Wilson's Secretary of the Navy, could remark also with justice that "From the inception Mr. Wilson gave the members of his Cabinet free rein in the management of the affairs of their department. No President refrained so much from hampering them by naming their subordinates. Holding them responsible, he gave them liberty, confidence and cooperation".

alterations of "detail", but not of the "principles" of his legislative proposals.

Second, once opposition crystallized sufficiently to threaten the defeat or marked alteration of his legislative proposals, Wilson was faced with a different type of situation. Skillful political behavior—the logic of the situation—now demanded genuine consultation with opponents to explore the basis of disagreement and to arrive at mutual concessions, bargains and formulas to assure passage of needed legislation. In this type of situation Wilson was unable to function expediently and proved singularly gauche as a politician. Once faced with strong opposition to a legislative proposal to which he had committed his leadership aspirations, Wilson became rigidly stubborn and tried to force through his proposal without compromising it.

In these situations, the desire to succeed in achieving a worthwhile political objective, in part or in essence if not fully and exactly as he preferred, became of less importance than to maintain the equilibrium of his personality system. He seems to have experienced opposition to his will in such situations as an unbearable threat to his selfesteem. The ensuing struggle for his selfesteem led, on the political level, to stubborn self-defeating behavior on his part. For to compromise in such situations was to submit to domination in the very sphere of power which he had carved out for himself to repair his damaged selfesteem. Opposition to his will, therefore, set into motion disruptive anxieties and brought to the surface long-smouldering aggressive feelings which, as a child, he had not dared to express.

Thus, for example, when the possibility of rejection of the Treaty by the Senate was mentioned to him, Wilson snapped: "Anyone who opposes me in that, I'll crush"! When the French Ambassador told Wilson that the Allies would be glad to accept American membership in the League even with a set of reservations that would satisfy influential Republican Senators, Wilson curtly replied: "Mr. Ambassador, I shall consent to nothing. The Senate must take its medicine". When the acting Senate Democratic minority leader, Hitchcock, suggested concessions to win over enough Republican Senators, Wilson replied: "Let Lodge hold out the olive branch". Earlier, upon returning from the Paris Peace Conference in February 1919 Wilson publicly announced his determination to strike back at Senatorial critics of the Treaty: "I have fighting blood in me," he boasted, "and it is sometimes a delight to let it have scope . . ." (George and George, 1956, 235, 289, 301, 311).

We have noted a cyclical pattern of this kind in Wilson's career, a repetition of this maladaptive self-defeating behavior as President of Princeton, Governor of New Jersey and as President

of the United States. This was not an area in which he was able to learn from his earlier difficulties and failures, a fact which testifies indirectly to the presence and operation of strong unconscious motives.

Evidence of Compensation

Let us take up now another problem encountered in attempting to make relatively systematic applications of Lasswell's general hypothesis. The hypothesis requires evidence that the exercise of power over others does indeed yield the individual compensatory gratifications. For the hypothesis to hold, and to be applicable to a given individual, it is not sufficient that he find it generally pleasant to exercise power; its exercise must provide him with satisfactions of a special kind appropriate to his low self-estimates.

The prospect for obtaining systematic evidence of subjective feelings of this kind from materials conventionally available to the biographer or to the student of political leadership must be viewed soberly. Yet, even episodic and fragmentary evidence of this kind—and perhaps that is all that can be realistically expected—will serve to give insight into the compensatory dynamics of the subject's involvement in various areas of his political behavior.

The next step in operationalizing the general hypothesis is to formulate a catalogue, however tentative or incomplete, of the *types of euphoric feelings* a personality of this kind might be expected to experience if, indeed, the hypothesis is correct regarding the compensatory character of his interest in power.

A first approximation of this kind was derived from psychoanalytic literature in which several types of euphoric feelings associated with power-striving and gratification are described. The listing of these feelings was then elaborated and structured more systematically by identifying the logical counterparts to the low self-estimates identified and listed above. From this emerged the following list of five low self-estimates and the corresponding euphoric feelings to be expected in cases when power was exercised in a manner that the subject could represent to himself as being successful:

Low Estimates of Self

Feelings of unimportance:

Euphoric Feeling

(from successful functioning in actual or assumed sphere or power)

Sense of uniqueness, the subjective experiencing of which may be paraphrased as follows: "If what

should be done is to be accomplished, I must do it since no one else will undertake it or is in a position to do it". (Note the relation to the feeling that one is the "chosen instrument", the feeling of being "indispensable" for a certain task, the feeling of having a "mission".)

Feelings of moral inferiority:

Sense of superior virtue: "I know best what is right (moral) in this matter".

Feelings of weakness:

Sense of superior strength: "No one can tell me what to do in this sphere; others, not I, must yield".

Feelings of mediocrity:

Sense of superior ability: "No one else can do this (whatever the subject is doing in his field of power) so well".

Feelings of intellectual inadequacy: *Sense of intellectual superiority* (in sphere of competence and power functioning): "My judgment is infallible; I never make mistakes; I can rely upon my own reasoning".

Wilson's Euphoric Feelings . . .

We did not expect that euphoric feelings of the kind listed above would be explicitly and fully articulated very often in the kinds of historical materials available for the study. Perhaps the most that could be expected were occasional hints or expressions of such feelings. In the end, however, a surprising amount of relevant data of this kind was turned up indicating that Wilson had experienced many of these euphoric feelings from the exercise of his power. Some of this material has already been presented. A few additional examples of the kind of historical material we have regarded as evidence in this respect will be cited here.

After rewriting the constitution of the Johns Hopkins debating society, thereby transforming it into a "House of Commons", Wilson reported to his fiancée the great pleasure he had derived from the project:

It is characteristic of my whole self that I take so much pleasure in these proceedings of this society . . . I have a sense of power in dealing with men collectively which I do not feel always in dealing with them singly.

Indeed, all his life long, Wilson was rewriting constitutions, deriving satisfaction from reordering the relations of men along what he considered to be more fruitful lines. That constitution-writing had a deep personal meaning for Wilson is further suggested by the fact that such activities were always also instrumental to his desire to exercise strong leadership.

As a youth, he revamped the constitution of every club and organization to which he belonged in order to transform it into a miniature House of Commons. Indeed, he often renamed it thus. In these model Houses of Common in which Wilson, as the outstanding debater, usually became Prime Minister, independent leadership was possible and the orator could make his will prevail. Thus, rewriting constitutions was for Wilson a means of restructuring those institutional environments in which he wanted to exercise strong leadership by means of oratory, a skill in which he was already adept as an adolescent and to the perfection of which he assiduously labored for years. From an early age Wilson's scholarly interest in the workings of American political institutions was an adjunct of his ambition to become a great statesman.

When Wilson's career is studied from this standpoint considerable light is thrown on the intriguing question of the role of personal motivations in political inventiveness and creativity. (George and George, 1956, 144-148, 321-322) Political psychologists have hypothesized that a compulsive interest in order and power is often to be found in strong political leaders who were great institution-builders and who made it their task to transform society. The case study of Wilson lends support to this hypothesis.¹²

When Carving Out a Sphere of Competence . . .

The process of carving out a sphere of competence, already referred to, is marked by a tendency to shift from one extreme of subjective feelings to the other: that is, from lack of self-confidence to high self-estimates and self-assurance in the actual or assumed field of power. Wilson could establish a sphere of competence for himself only by meeting very high standards. He went through

¹²It should be noted, as James D. Barber has emphasized (1965, and in a personal communication), that political institutions also "compensate". In order to survive and to act, institutions also develop adaptive strategies and ways of handling conflict. It is the interplay of these institutional adaptive strategies and habits with those of individual incumbents that has important implications for the stability and effectiveness of government.

painstaking, conscientious study and practice in order to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills, and in order to legitimize in his own eyes his right to a sphere of competence in which to function autonomously and as a leader of other men. But once having established it, he could not permit himself or others to question it. Within this sphere of competence, he felt free—almost defiantly—to assert a sense of intellectual superiority.

One of his friends, Mrs. Edith G. Reid, cites a letter he wrote at the age of thirty to a former classmate:

Hiram, I have—as I hope you have not discovered, but as you doubtless have—an intellectual selfconfidence, possibly out of all proportion to my intellectual strength, which has made me feel that in matters in which I have qualified myself to speak I could never be any man's follower

To this Mrs. Reid comments:

Such confidence in himself might at this time seem merely youth's bravado, but it was part of the essence of his nature—the quality which made people so often exclaim, 'Do you never think yourself wrong'? And the answer would always be the same. 'Not in matters where I have qualified myself to speak'.

This type of see-saw process, from great uncertainty to extreme certainty, can be noted not only in Wilson's development but also in his decision process in specific situations. Many of his decisions reflect the characteristics of the compulsively conscientious person who passes from pronounced subjective doubt to extreme subjective certainty. Once Wilson emerged with a decision on an issue, especially one which mobilized his aspirations for high achievement, his mind snapped shut. He felt his decision was the only possible one morally as well as intellectually. Having conscientiously put himself through a laborious examination of relevant facts, he categorically identified his view of the matter with righteousness and would not permit himself or anyone else to question it. Thus, a dogmatic insistence on a particular viewpoint frequently followed a protracted period of indecision on the question. Once he had evolved his own position, he was typically impatient of any delay on the part of others, even those who might still be committed to ideas which he himself only shortly before had held with equal tenacity.

For years, for example, he opposed federal action to establish women's suffrage. When at last, during the war, he was converted to the cause, he began at once to deride Senators who did not instantly respond to his plea that the Senate concur in a constitutional amendment to enfranchise women:

'When my conversion to this idea came', he told a group of suffragettes on October 3, 1918, "it came with an overwhelming command that made it necessary that I should omit nothing and use the position I occupied to enforce it, if I could possibly do so. I pride myself on only one feature of it, that I did under-

stand when circumstances instructed me. There are some men who, I am sorry to say, have recently illustrated the fact that they would not learn. Their minds are provincial. They do not know a great influence when it is abroad . . . I have to restrain myself sometimes from intellectual contempt.

Unfortunately, this was a typical attitude, often openly expressed, toward those who also shared in the power of decision and who disagreed with him.

Again, after a period of agonized uncertainty about whether or not to lead the nation into World War I, he convinced himself of its necessity and ever afterwards vehemently denounced those whose doubts persisted. For, as he wrote Arthur Brisbane on September 4, 1917, the issues had assumed in his mind "a great simplicity". (George and George, 1956, 120-121.)

In Conclusion . . .

The provisional operationalization of the key terms in Lasswell's hypothesis that has been presented and illustrated in this paper with reference to Wilson may have to be revised or supplemented if other leaders are also studied in some detail. Hopefully, these operational definitions and lists of possible indicators will be useful even for those leaders who, as I would expect, express their power need in ways different from Wilson's. From this standpoint, the question is: Are the operational definitions sufficiently general and comprehensive to permit somewhat different findings for different leaders, i.e., different results expressed within the framework of a standardized set of operational definitions of "low self-estimates", "power need", "power striving", "compensation"?

It will be seen that I distinguish between the question of the "generality" of the operational definitions (which I hope can be obtained) and the question of the "generality" or uniformity of the *behavioral manifestations* of power-as-a-compensatory value (where I expect to find interesting variations among different leaders who fall under Lasswell's general hypothesis about the power-seeker but possess different kinds of multivalued personalities and/or operate in different political contexts).

Another problem can be anticipated if Lasswell's hypothesis is applied to a larger sample of political leaders. This concerns the matter of the observational approach the investigator needs to take in order to establish whether adult political leaders who apparently possess high selfesteem suffered earlier in life from low self-estimates and, hence, whether their selfesteem is importantly "compensatory". To employ or test Lasswell's hypothesis does require a *developmental* study of the individual. Cross-sectional observations and measurements of the selfesteem status of an adult

political leader may, if of a superficial character, fail to turn up indicators of the earlier low self-estimates problem experienced by the personality; hence, that individual may be incorrectly placed outside of Lasswell's hypothesis.

Operationalization of Lasswell's general hypothesis is, in any case, necessary if it is to be applied systematically in empirical research on political personality and behavior. These operational definitions must be valid, of course, from the standpoint of the findings and theory of dynamic psychology; but at the same time, they have been selected and formulated so as to provide links to the kind of empirical data about political behavior that is available to political scientists.

We are, as a result, in a better position to organize collection of relevant and critical data for application and assessment of the hypothesis. If these operational definitions are adequate and defensible, they provide specific links to relevant empirical data that is already available about the subject or that, possibly, can be acquired from him or from others who know him. The presence of behavioral data of this kind, properly analyzed and interpreted, provides a demonstrable basis for inferring the applicability of the general hypothesis to the political personality of the subject in question—i.e., his interest in power as a means of compensation for low self-estimates—and, of course, for additional analysis of the role this dynamism plays in his political behavior: in his choice of political roles, the character and skillfulness of his performance of those roles. Conversely, the absence of such behavioral data on low self-estimates, on a subjective interest in power, and on compensatory gratifications from its exercise can be taken as an empirical basis for rejecting the applicability of the general hypothesis to a given political leader.


The effort to apply Lasswell's hypothesis to Woodrow Wilson, it should be noted, led to the formulation of a more selective version of the hypothesis, one which identified the special conditions under which the kind of personal need for power postulated by the hypothesis was present in Wilson's political behavior. This highlights the importance in such studies of identifying the "field of power" within which the individual will strive for compensation and the types of situations in which the individual's power-need will be aroused.

If we may generalize provisionally from this one case, the demand or need for power in compensation-seeking personalities does not operate uniformly in the individual's political motivation under all conditions. The presence or strength of the power demand (or of some components of it) may be expected to vary, being subject to special arousal conditions. Finally, our study calls attention

to the fact that *homo politicus* is likely to be a multi-valued personality; his striving for power as compensation may be reinforced by, or conflict with strong personal needs for other values that he may also pursue in the political arena. It is a complex but necessary task to establish not only general motivational patterns in multi-valued leaders but also the conditions under which one or another need or pattern of needs has primacy in the subject's political behavior.

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Classifying and Predicting Presidential Styles: Two "Weak" Presidents

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In the United States, no one can be president but the President. If he withholds his energies or fritters them away ineffectively, we endure or enjoy a period of national stalemate. So we need to know as much about why some presidents fail to lead as about why others succeed. Indeed, it can be argued that our periods of political drift have been as fateful for the nation as our eras of New Freedom, New Deal and New Frontier.

But the dull presidents are a trial for the political analyst, particularly for the student of personality and political leadership. It is not just that they sap one's intellectual verve, but that their personality configurations are, on the surface, indistinct. They thus provide "hard-case" tests for the supposition that personality helps shape a president's politics. If a personality approach can work with Coolidge and Hoover, it can work with any chief executive. I mean to show here how these two men illustrate some recurrent dynamics of presidential style and how these dynamics can be caught in a theory with predictive possibilities.

The following pages take up these themes in order. First I shall set forth a scheme for classifying presidents according to the major dimensions of their political styles and demonstrate the applicability of the classification scheme to Coolidge and Hoover. The purpose of this section is to define and apply concepts potentially

useful for classifying political leaders in terms of patterned regularities in political styles, not simply to describe each president as a unique case. The data I shall use are biographical; their presentation in small space requires radical summarization.

The second section poses a theory, focusing primarily on the president's first independent political success, of the development of a political style. In brief, I argue that a president's style is a reflection of the ways of performing which brought him success at the time, usually in late adolescence or early adulthood, when he emerged as a personality distinctive from his family heritage, in a role involving relatively intensive participation in a socially organized setting. It is at this point that the argument moves from classification to prediction, from an emphasis on naming to an emphasis on explaining. Biographical materials are then treated in a more dynamic fashion, in an effort to reveal the psychological functioning which sustains an integrated pattern of behavior, that is, a distinctive and consistent political style.

"Style" . . .

"Style" in this context means a collection of habitual action patterns in meeting role demands. Viewed from outside, a man's style is the observed quality and character of his performance. Viewed from inside, it is his bundle of strategies for adapting, for protecting and enhancing selfesteem. The main outlines of a political style can be usefully delineated, I have argued, by the interaction of two main dimensions.¹ The first is *activity-passivity* in performing the role. Presidents have often been typed in this way. The question here is not one of effectiveness but of effort. Political roles, including the presidency, allow for wide variation in the amount of energy the person invests in his work. Such investment has a large voluntary component and typically reflects to a high degree the man's personal habits as these interact with the demands of the situation. The second dimension is *positive-negative affect* toward his activity. Action *per se* tells us nothing of affect. The way one feels about his work—specifically, whether he goes about his tasks reasonably happily or with an air of discouragement and sadness—tells much about the fit between his needs and his duties. His affect toward his work

¹See James David Barber, *The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life*, (1965) and "Leadership strategies for legislative party cohesion". David Shapiro's *Neurotic Styles* (1965) is helpful in understanding styles in general and several specific style patterns.

represents the self's way of registering that fit. Like activity-passivity, the affect dimension links personality with political leadership.

Put together, these two crude and simple variables delineate four political types. Briefly, the active-positive shows a style oriented primarily toward productiveness; the active-negative toward personal ambition; the passive-positive toward affection; and the passive-negative toward (minimal) performance of duty. Within these general nuclear types, a series of personality dynamics relate the self-system, reactions to political experience, strategies of adaptation to political roles, types of vulnerability to political persuasion and effectiveness in performing political tasks. In psychological terms, activity and affect interact to give, respectively, generally adjusted, compulsive, compliant and withdrawn types. There is no one "political man", no universal pattern of leadership performance.

For the analysis of political behavior in collegial bodies such as legislatures, this classificatory scheme may capture the main comparisons. For the Presidency, an office of immense individual power, we need more precise characterizations. I propose here to deepen the analysis within each category by elaborating three subcategories. These subcategories emerge when we ask (extending the major dimensions of activity and affect) to what extent and with what adjustive purpose the president takes advantage of the main opportunities the role affords him. Specifically, how does he integrate his personal style with the role's opportunities for:

Rhetoric: A leader may accentuate certain kinds of expressiveness to audiences, ranging from the world audience to his companions at dinner.

Business: He may or may not concentrate on managing the endless flow of details that flood onto his desk, the studying and budget calculations, the reviewing of memoranda, the personnel problems, etc.

Personal Relations: A president may concentrate in various ways on bargaining with, dominating, combatting and depending on the political elite close around him.

Obviously all presidents do all of these things. But equally obviously they vary in their devotion to each and in their style of performance in each. The first task in analyzing a presidential style, then, is to characterize, within the general framework of activity and affect, the way the man habitually meets the role's demands that he speak, that he manage ordinary business, and that he operate with others at close range. The examples presented—and they are only that—show how these style elements can be distinctive and habitual for the man and politically significant for the nation.

Once the styles are understood, we move to an even more difficult question: how might they have been predicted? How might we have supposed, on the basis of the man's known history, what he would do with the office?

The Coolidge Style

Calvin Coolidge as president fits the passive-negative, or withdrawn, type. Of the three main dimensions of style he emphasized rhetoric. His rhetorical style was sharply compartmentalized according to the audience: witty banter with reporters, highminded addresses to the nation, silence at social occasions. He avoided detailed work on presidential business. His personal relations were coolly detached. These patterns are evident as the main themes of the Coolidge presidency.²

Rhetoric

Coolidge complained that "One of the most appalling trials which confront a President is the perpetual clamor for public utterances". But this "foster-child of silence" was anything but quiet in public. In office 67 months, he held 520 press conferences, an average of 7.8 per month, compared with Franklin Roosevelt's 6.9. He gave radio addresses about once a month. He got off to an excellent start with the reporters, cracking jokes at this first conference; their "hearty applause" on that occasion made it "one of my most pleasant memories". They were "the boys" who came along on his vacations. Clearly he enjoyed their enjoyment, particularly when he could surprise or titillate them with Yankee humor. He carefully stage-managed his "I do not choose to run for President in nineteen twenty-eight" statement, releasing the news at noon on the fourth anniversary of taking office, grinning broadly. His wife was as surprised as the reporters were. He let himself be photographed in full Indian headdress, cowboy chaps and hat, overalls and any number of other outfits; there is a picture of him presenting a sap bucket to Henry Ford. When a friend protested that his antics made people laugh, Coolidge said, "Well, it's good for people to laugh".

His formal addresses had a completely different tone. They were sermons from the church of New England idealism. "When the President speaks", he wrote, "it ought to be an event", by which he meant a serious and dignified and uplifting event. He spoke on "Education: the Cornerstone of Self-Government", "The High Place of Labor", "Ordered Liberty and World Peace", "Authority and Religious Liberty", "Religion and the Republic", "The Genius of America". "Destiny is in you", "Do the day's work", "The things

²On Coolidge, I have found most useful the biographies by Fuess and White, and Coolidge's *Autobiography*. McCoy's new biography, which appeared as I finished this piece, seems to confirm its interpretation. The short quotations, too numerous to attribute individually here, are from the above three books and from Cornwell's, on which I have relied for much material on presidential rhetoric. Lowry (1921) is also helpful.

of the spirit come first", and "The chief ideal of the American people is idealism"—this was Coolidge in the presidential pulpit. And he was quite serious. When Will Rogers imitated his nasal twang and penchant for cliches, he was much offended and refused Roger's apology.

Business

Coolidge sincerely believed in hard work. He felt busy, even rushed, but his constant routine included a daily nap and often eleven hours of sleep in twenty-four. Often tired and bored, he gradually abandoned all physical exercise except for brief walks and spent much time in silent contemplation, gazing out his office window. His strength was not effort but patience. "Let well enough alone", was his motto. He was the "provincial who refuses to become excited over events for which he has no direct responsibility". He kept Harding's cabinet, let Daugherty hang on for a long time, tried to delay his friends' efforts to boost him in 1924. Asked how he kept fit he said, "By avoiding the big problems". Most of the time Coolidge simply did not want to be bothered.

Underneath these tactics, supporting and justifying them, was a strain of mystical resignation. "I am only in the clutch of forces that are greater than I am", he wrote, despite being "the most powerful man in the world". He bore his young son's death with Roman stoicism: "The ways of Providence are beyond our understanding". The dedicated man, he wrote in his newspaper column, "finds that in the time of need some power outside himself directs his course". Coolidge could wait, storing up his meager energies with a feeling of rightness in entrusting himself to fate. "Government is growth", he said, and added: "—slow growth". He and Providence presided while the rate slowed down.

Personal Relations

Coolidge got rid of much work by giving it to others, and he believed in doing just that. "One rule of action more important than all others consists in never doing anything that some one else can do for you". He appointed or retained "men of sufficient ability so that they can solve all the problems that arise under their jurisdiction". He rarely interfered and he resented others interfering with him. His loyal helper Frank Stearns got repeated rebuffs for his trouble. Coolidge seldom discussed political matters with his wife. He complained of Hoover as Secretary of Commerce (Coolidge called him "the wonder boy" or "the miracle worker"): "That man has offered me unsolicited advice for six years, all of it bad"!

Yet he was always surrounded by people. He and Grace entertained more than any previous family in the White House. Alone,

he said, he got "a sort of naked feeling". His poker face, his long impenetrable silences at social affairs were known to all Washington and gave rise to scores of anecdotes as matron after matron tried to pry a few words from him. Occasionally he could be induced to talk about Vermont. More often, he simply sat. This was "a form of defense", his biographer says. "Can't hang you for what you don't say", said Coolidge. "In order to function at all", he warned his successors, the President "has to be surrounded by many safeguards. If these were removed for only a short time, he would be overwhelmed by the people who would surge in upon him". He learned not to smile, as smiling encouraged longer office visits. He had very little interest in women and was, his biographer says, "embarrassed when left for even a short period in the company of the other sex". Undoubtedly much of Coolidge's acerbity at dinner parties was a reaction to intensified shyness at having to cope with the matron to his left and right. When he did speak, it was some tart, pithy puckishness, mildly aggressive, disconcerting, with a quality of surprise in a conventional conversational setting. In a rare and revealing confession, he once told Frank Stearns why:

Do you know, I've never really grown up? It's a hard thing for me to play this game. In politics, one must meet people, and that's not easy for me . . . When I was a little fellow, as long ago as I can remember, I would go into a panic if I heard strange voices in the kitchen. I felt I just couldn't meet the people and shake hands with them. Most of the visitors would sit with Father and Mother in the kitchen, and the hardest thing in the world was to have to go through the kitchen door and give them a greeting. I was almost ten before I realized I couldn't go on that way. And by fighting hard I used to manage to get through that door. I'm all right with old friends, but every time I meet a stranger, I've got to go through the old kitchen door, back home, and its not easy. (Fuess, 1965, 25).

Coolidge "tried deliberately to suppress 'aggressive wittiness'", but "it broke out repeatedly in quaint comments".

Even this brief account shows the main features of the Coolidge style. Clearly he belongs in the withdrawn type. Aside from his banter with reporters, he did not particularly enjoy being President, given all the demands that made on him, and he conserved his energies stingily. Many of his characteristics—his rural Yankee background; his persistent turning back to his past, his father, his homeplace; his avoidance of controversy and patient faith in Providence: his penchant for reverie and retreat; his sense of strangeness in a cosmopolitan environment ("Puritan in Babylon")—concord with empirical findings on this type in a very different environment. His style within that type is also clear. Words for Coolidge were shaped heavily by his relations to different audiences. The "serious" audience was the nation, to which he addressed sermons on common

virtue, purveying the illusion of specificity through epigram. In fact, his abstract pseudo-Hegelian fatalism had little clear connection with the political issues of the day. His humor at news conferences was badinage with the boys, a show with much audience participation, full of little surprises. There as in his dinner table silences and mild insults, the focus was on Coolidge as a clown, one who could touch the heart but leave the political brain and brawn of the nation relaxed.

His philosophy helped him rationalize his leisurely pace. His method was to concentrate on matters only the President had to decide, and to define that category as narrowly as possible. Most everything could wait. And Coolidge himself could wait, with utter, unflappable calm for longer than the last of his advisors. He also managed to rationalize his independence of others; clearly his style in close interpersonal relations cut him off effectively from much of the Washington conversational froth—but also from any effective political bargaining with administrative or legislative or party leaders. He was a loner who endured in order to serve, while the nation drifted.

The Hoover Style

Hoover belongs in the active-negative category, the compulsive type. He emphasized hard work on detail and endless conferences behind the scenes. He avoided and detested the rhetorical demands of the office. In personal relations, his was a stance of highly restrained aggression. Again, some illustrative evidence is necessary to make this pattern clear.³

Rhetoric

The rise of Herbert Hoover coincided with an immense expansion in the mass media, particularly newspapers and radio. Hoover was a genuine hero; his remarkable effectiveness in European relief activities cannot be seriously questioned. He was the subject, not the instigator, of a vast public relations build-up largely due to increased media demands for news and to the drama and success of his works. But Hoover in the presidency “transmuted all adventure into business”, as Arthur Schlesinger (1957) complains. He detested the office’s demands for dramatization. “The presidency is more than an executive responsibility”, he wrote; “it is an inspiring symbol of all that is highest in American purpose and ideals”. Yet he could not bring himself to practice the pretense such inspiration requires.

³On Hoover, the most useful sources are Irwin, Lyons and Hoover’s *Memoirs*. Here again Cornwell’s chapters have supplied much material. The short quotations are too numerous to attribute individually. They are taken from the above and from Liggett, 1932; Myers, 1934; Warren, 1967; Wolf, 1956; Wood, 1932; and Hinshaw, 1950.

"This is not a showman's job", he said, "I will not step out of character", and "You can't make a Teddy Roosevelt out of me". He felt uncomfortable when forced to perform in public: "I have never liked the clamor of crowds. I intensely dislike superficial social contacts. I made no pretensions to oratory and I was terrorized at the opening of every speech". The "miracle worker" disdained "the crowd" which "only feels: it has no mind of its own which can plan. The crowd is credulous, it destroys, it hates and it dreams—but it never builds".

Extremely sensitive to criticism, Hoover reacted to personal abuse with "hurt contempt". He was rarely aggressive, normally suffering in silence with only an occasional private complaint. He got off to a good start with the press, setting more liberal rules for the conference, but even before the stock market crash he began to restrict the reporters, became more secretive and admonished them for the error of their ways. Often he withdrew to his forest camp in Virginia without notice to the press; there he set up guards to keep the newsmen away. He began to play favorites among them and to go over their heads to editors and publishers. He cancelled conferences on short notice, ignored questions and took to reading prepared statements. Eventually, most of the White House reporters turned against him. He met them less and less frequently and virtually eliminated conferences near the end of his term.

Hoover's public addresses rarely discussed specific policies in detail. His twenty-one radio addresses were mainly "greetings" to specific groups, full of vague moral precepts. Speech-writing was as hard for him as speech-making. He drafted each one in longhand, went through a dozen or more drafts and heavily edited proofs to produce a labored and ordinary address. But perhaps the most peculiar feature of the tone of Hoover's presidential statements was their public optimism in the midst of social disaster. As the Depression deepened, again and again he found business fundamentally sound, the worst of the crisis over, employment gradually increasing, government efforts remarkably successful, no one actually starving—or so he said, giving rise to a 'credibility gap' of modern proportions. His pollyanna reassurances stand in stark relief against both the condition of the country and the character of the man. His secretary put it more kindly: "Figuratively, he was the father protecting his family against the troubles impending, shouldering their burdens for them, keeping the 'bad news' to himself, outwardly trying to be as smiling and cheerful as possible".

Business

Meanwhile, he slaved and suffered in silence. Long before the Depression Hoover was frequently discouraged. At the Paris Peace

Conference in 1919, Colonel House found him "simply reveling in gloom"; Ike Hoover remembered that in the White House he "never laughed aloud" and "always had a frown on his face", and his secretary recalls that "he worried as have few Presidents in our history, with discouragement at his lot most of the time". He was glad when it was all over: "All the money in the world could not induce me to live over the last nine months. The conditions we have experienced make this office a compound hell". He worked as hard as he worried. Even before the crash his routine was a rigorous one, beginning with an energetic medicine ball game first thing in the morning. After his inauguration he immediately set about a series of programs for change and reform. Then when the panic hit, "he began that grinding, brutal, self-lacerating labor, often eighteen or twenty hours a day or clear around the clock, which would continue unbroken until the blessed hour of release more than three years later. No galley slave of old was more firmly riveted to his drudgery, for he was chained by his surpassing sense of duty". "So tired that every bone in my body aches", Hoover trudged on. Near the close of his tenure he allowed himself one bitter outburst in public, significantly in reply to charges that he had "done nothing". In "the one harsh word that I have uttered in public office", he called such charges "deliberate, intolerable falsehoods".

And so they were. He had done plenty, but to little effect. Hoover was immersed in detail. As Bernard Baruch put it, "To Hoover's brain facts are as water to a sponge. They are absorbed into every tiny interstice". He had a "card index" mind which could grasp and retain details and figures without notes. He commissioned endless policy studies to produce the facts on which to base programs. His whole orientation, in other words, was away from the vagaries of opinion and toward the hard precision of fact.

Much of his energy went into an endless round of conferences. Hoover appeared to believe that if only he could bring the right people together and give them the right proposal, they would agree and march off to execute his plan. John Kenneth Galbraith called these "no-business meetings", designed to accomplish nothing, but there is little doubt Hoover had high hopes for this technique of "coordination". In almost all such encounters he had more pertinent information and had worried through a more thoroughly organized proposal than any other participant. And he was President of the United States. The others he expected to behave as had his subordinates in business, in the European relief organization, and in the Department of Commerce: as willing endorsers and enforcers. When cabinet members and congressmen failed to respond in this way, Hoover's gloom deepened. His personal discouragement proved

contagious; to Henry L. Stimson, his Secretary of State, a private conversation with Hoover was "like sitting in a bath of ink".

Personal Relations

Hoover kept his aggressive feelings tightly controlled in close relations as in public ones. At a time when, as he complained, "My men are dropping around me", when H. G. Wells found him a "sickly, overworked and overwhelmed man", Hoover was often tempted to lash out. Deep inside he may have been, as his apologist Lyons believed, "a sensitive, soft-hearted person who craves affection, enjoys congenial company, and suffers under the slings of malice", but he could also feel intense anger. "I'll rattle his bones" was his typical expression when thwarted by some obstructionist. In 1932 he meant to "carry the fight right to Roosevelt . . . We have got to crack him every time he opens his mouth". But he would quickly rein in these feelings:

He was almost always the master of his emotions, however provoked he might be. If something went wrong, if some individual really aroused him he would, in common parlance, "blow off steam". But it was only for a moment. The next minute he would be pressing his buzzer. When the stenographer was seated beside his desk, instead of telling Mr. Blank cryptically what he thought, he dictated a most diplomatic communication. There was never a barb in it. Rather, it represented earnest and skillful effort to induce that individual to see eye to eye with him. (Joslin, 1934, 19)

With his immediate staff "there were no cross words if a subordinate made an error". Nor would he "let himself be baited into a controversy if he could possibly avoid it". Many a time it was tried out on him. His usual comment, made with supreme contempt, was: "A man should not become embroiled with his inferior". His expression was one of "pained disbelief" when other political and congressional leaders failed to keep their commitments.

Of course his demeanor affected his political relations. His inability to enter into genuinely cooperative relations with others, relations involving compromise, an appreciation for the irrational in politics, a sense for the other man's position, meant that his endeavors to induce an enthusiastic response were doomed to failure. He could lead an organization of committed subordinates, but he could not create that commitment among leaders with their own bases of power and their own overriding purposes.

Hoover did accept renomination in 1932, but reluctantly. He "had no overpowering desire to run again", expressed his indifference to the subject, anticipated defeat, and found the campaign a "miserable experience". But he "felt that he must follow through to the end of the struggle. Be that as it may, he had a desperate desire for vindication of himself and his policies". The

purpose was defensive, not for any positive achievement. The expected defeat brought relief, not despair.

No brief account can do justice to a complex character, but it seems clear that Hoover belongs in the compulsive type of political leader, outlined by much activity and much unhappiness in the role. Many themes fit this pattern: his struggles with the 'exposure' element of the public figure role, resulting in the adoption of a propagandistic orientation; his history as a rapidly upward mobile young man whose links to politics developed out of his nonpolitical occupation; his feelings of frustration and powerlessness in the face of an unresponsive or hostile environment; his anxious, unremitting labor; his suffering and struggle to restrain his aggression. Deeper analysis, one would predict, would reveal a self dominated by the conflict between conscience and ambition, alternating between feelings of guilt and feelings of impotence.

The main distinctive elements in Hoover's style can also be readily summarized. Words were difficult for him; he resisted expression and fell back on a rhetoric of exaggeration when forced into the limelight. Work was his main strategy for success, intensely compulsive work on detail. And in his relations with others he stressed restraint of aggression, an anticipation that his plan would win and succeed in execution. These strategies failed. That Hoover sustained them in the face of repeated negative messages from the environment attests to their rootedness in his personality. The office no more made the man than it made his successor.

Toward a Predictive Theory

Where did these styles come from? Our problem is not to discover why Coolidge and Hoover became presidents while others with similar background took different paths, but to find out why, being presidents, they acted as they did. Furthermore, we want an *economical* method for answering that question, a method amenable to *generalization* to other cases, and a method which produces *predictive* statements. That requires a theory. Let me set mine out as starkly as I can.

First Independent Political Success

In the lives of most political leaders there is a clearly discernible period, usually in late adolescence or early adulthood, in which a style is adopted. Typically that period can be identified (a) by marked infusions of confidence from relative success, (b) by a relatively new and special relationship to group life, and (c) by a relatively sudden emergence from obscurity to wider attention. The way in which the man finds words to relate himself to an ex-

panded audience, the role of work in bringing him new success, and the mode of his more intimate links with others around him presage his style in the presidency. If we can discover how future presidents met and resolved these fundamental problems in their own critical periods, we should be able to predict how they are likely to attempt (not necessarily successfully) to solve similar problems as chief executives.⁴

Motives

How can one understand this formative period? First one must view it against the background of compensatory needs inherited from childhood. It is important to highlight the significance of change in the person's life situation. We want the meanings his new development had for him, and that requires knowledge of what he was before. A style's staying power, its persistence and resurgence, depends on its rootedness in strong motives. Viewed retrospectively, a style offers important compensations; viewed prospectively, it promises the continuation and extension of rewards. There is a turning away from an unsatisfactory prior condition to a possibly more satisfactory condition for the future. These satisfactions, and the anticipation of them, are the motive forces which energize the new system.

Resources

Second, the formative period can only be discerned in the light of the resources a man brings to it. The condition of one's body is a simple example of personal resource. The condition of one's mind is a subtler case, depending as it does on learning and on the collection of relevant experiences and perceptions a person brings to the formative period. These constitute a repertoire of potential style elements upon which he can draw when his time comes. His learning until then can be considered as a rehearsal, though rarely in any conscious sense, for a decisive commitment to a particular style. His experiments in self definition, real and vicarious, set out boundaries and pathways for his map of the future.

Opportunities

And last, a style is not formed in a vacuum but in a context of opportunities. Just as we do not expect a person who has always had all the affection he has wanted to seek an unending succession of affection in adulthood, and just as we do not expect an illiterate

⁴On the significance of compensation in political leadership, see Lasswell, 1930 and 1945. On the expansion of a potential leader's "field of power", see Alexander L. George's article in this issue and his works cited there.

to adopt an identity as a writer, so not every environment available at the time offers the same chances for personal development. These constraints and stimuli in the immediate culture may have a great deal to do with the kinds of strategies one translates into part of his personal identity.⁵

As a beginning test, then, the following pages examine Coolidge and Hoover at the time of their first independent political success, introduced in each case by a radically summarized account of the needs and resources brought from childhood. A final section draws together these themes with the conclusions derived from the material on their presidential styles.

Coolidge: Needs from Childhood

John Calvin Coolidge, Jr., was born in Plymouth, Vermont, on the Fourth of July, 1872, the first child, after four years of marriage, of John Calvin Coolidge and Victoria Josephine Coolidge, nephew of Julius Caesar Coolidge, grandson of Calvin Galusha Coolidge, descendent of five generations of his family in a Vermont village. His mother was a quiet, delicately beautiful person, a chronic invalid since shortly after her marriage. Coolidge remembered "a touch of mysticism and poetry in her nature". His father was a big, stern-visaged man, a storekeeper and pillar of the community who had held many town offices and went to the state legislature. His son admired him for "qualities that were greater than any I possess", and accepted much paternal admonition without complaint.

Calvin's early hero was his grandfather "Galoosh", tall, spare and handsome, an expert horseman and practical joker, said to have a trace of Indian blood, who raised colts and puppies and peacocks and taught the boy to ride standing up behind him. His grandmother ("The Puritan severity of her convictions was tempered by the sweetness of womanly charity") read the Bible to him and when he misbehaved shut him up in the dark, windowless attic, "dusty with cobwebs".

Calvin's younger sister Abbie, his constant playmate, was "a lively affectionate girl, with flaming red hair, who was full of energy and impressed everybody by her personality",—almost the exact opposite of her shy brother. Calvin himself was small and frail, with his mother's features, punctual and methodical, only occasionally joining in the schoolyard teasing.

So much for the cast of characters. Life began its hammer blows at this shy boy when he was six. His hero Galusha died as

⁵On the interactions of motivations, resources and opportunities in accounting for political action, see Barber (1965, 10-15, 217-240).

Calvin read him the Bible. Six years later his invalid mother, "who used what strength she had to lavish care upon me and my sister", died as a result of an accident with a runaway horse. Her passing left an indelible mark on him:

In an hour she was gone. It was her thirty-ninth birthday. I was twelve years old. We laid her away in the blustering snows of March. The greatest grief that can come to a boy came to me. Life was never to seem the same again.
(Coolidge, 1929, 13)

Calvin was despondent too long. His family became concerned; but he kept up his school work "with no tardy marks and good deportment".

Later at the nearby Black River Academy, where his parents and grandmother had gone to school, he was unhappy and homesick, though his father brought him home nearly every weekend. In his third year Abbie joined him there; Calvin had written he hoped she could come. A year and a half later, at age fifteen, she was dead of appendicitis. Calvin came home to be with her in her last hours.

There was another unsettled time for Calvin, like that following his mother's death. He failed the entrance examinations for Amherst College. He had caught cold and stayed home "for a considerable time". In late winter he went back to Black River Academy to get "certified" for Amherst. There he worked hard, "made almost no acquaintances", and in two months was approved for Amherst. In September his father married a Plymouth neighbor, a spinster Calvin had known all his life. "For thirty years", Coolidge wrote much later, "she watched over and loved me". They corresponded regularly until her death in 1920.

Amherst was an all-male place where three-quarters or more of the students belonged to fraternities, "the most unique feature of Amherst life . . . strongly recommended by the members of the faculty", as the *Students' Handbook* said. Calvin needed no urging. He had written his father from school that he and a friend should visit the college "to see about getting me into a society there". But the scheme did not work. Calvin moved into a boardinghouse. The others there were quickly pledged. He remained an "Ouden", an outsider in a small community of clans. "I don't seem to get acquainted very fast", he wrote home in October. After Christmas he wrote that "Every time I get home I hate to go away worse than before and I don't feel so well here now as the first day I came here last fall but suppose I will be all right in a day or two". Two days later: "I feel quite reconciled to being here tonight but felt awful mean yesterday and the day before. I don't know why, I never was homesick any before". In his first two years at Amherst

Coolidge was "to say the least, an inconspicuous member of the class". He faithfully attended class meetings, but did not join in the myriad activities, formal and informal, scholarly and athletic, religious and amorous, going on around him. He took long walks in the woods.

Nor was his social isolation balanced with scholarly achievement; his first term marks averaged 2 on a scale of 5. "The marks seem pretty low, don't they?" he wrote his father. He remembered much later that "It needed some encouragement from my father for me to continue". He had begun with the hope that he could do well in his courses with plenty of time to spare.

Thus at twenty-one Calvin Coolidge was an indistinct personality, inarticulate, ineffective, alone. Particularly in affection and achievement he stood on the threshold of adulthood much deprived.

Coolidge: Resources from Childhood

In his mind he had been gathering impressions and registering experiences which would later be useful. He had known his father and grandfather as political leaders in the community. He saw how his father made decisions—"painstaking, precise, and very accurate"—and came to understand government as "restraints which the people had imposed upon themselves in order to promote the common welfare". In the summer before he entered Amherst his father took him to a gathering in Bennington to hear President Benjamin Harrison; there he heard much high oratory about the "high consecration to liberty".

As a boy he had taken a minor part in speaking "pieces", acting in amateur plays, and was even an "end man" once in a local minstrel show. Cicero's orations stuck with him from Latin classes. At graduation from Black River Academy, in a class of five boys and four girls, he delivered an address on "Oratory in History", the newspaper called it "masterly" and his teacher said his speech was "the best one he had seen". After his freshman year at Amherst, at the Independence Day celebration in Plymouth—"Of course, the Fourth of July meant a good deal to me, because it was my birthday"—he delivered a speech on "Freedom", "burning with fervor, replete with denunciation of Proud Albion, and rich with the glorification of our Revolutionary heroes". Perhaps inspired by his freshman rhetoric teacher, this was his last experiment in the florid style of oratory.

Had Coolidge's life taken a different turn, other events, other impressions would have lasted into his autobiographical years. As it was, he had in his mind a number of important images: of small scale Yankee democracy, of his mother reading the romantic

poets, of his father succeeding by being careful, of the familial legitimacy of politics, and of himself surviving before audiences. So far he had made nothing of these resources. But they were waiting.

Coolidge: First Independent Political Success

Of the events in his first two years at Amherst, Coolidge wrote:

In the development of every boy who is going to amount to anything there comes a time when he emerges from his immature ways and by the greater precision of his thought and action realizes that he has begun to find himself. Such a transition finally came to me. It was not accidental but the result of hard work. If I had permitted my failure, or what seemed to me at the time a lack of success to discourage me, I cannot see any way in which I would ever have made progress. If we keep our faith in ourselves, and what is even more important, keep our faith in regular and persistent application to hard work, we need not worry about the outcome. (Coolidge, 1929, 60)

As a matter of fact, what he calls his "transition" was triggered by events nearly "accidental"; his success did not result primarily from "hard work"; and he was, as we have seen, "discouraged" by his earlier lack of success. (Perhaps every autobiography is a mixture of real memories and new meanings, a last attempt to join together life and belief.) In any case, Coolidge did begin his junior year an isolated boy with no real achievements and left Amherst as a young man with a distinctive style of action. In between the whole intensity of his experience, its pace and significance were revolutionalized.

Amherst upperclassmen could wear high derbies and carry canes. Each fall the members of the junior class raced from one end of the athletic field to the other, clad in "topper" and stick. The last seven across the line had to provide dinner and entertainment for the rest. Coolidge was not last, but was one of the losers. His assignment was a speech on "Why I Got Stuck". He began in silence by turning his pockets inside out to show that he had lost all his money on the race. Then: "You wouldn't expect a plow horse to make time on the race track or a follower of the plow to be a Mercury", he said. Pitching hay didn't fit one as a sprinter. And other such comments. Then, in conclusion: "Remember, boys, the Good Book says that the first shall be last and the last shall be first". The speech was a success—the whole class laughed and gave him an ovation. It was his first such appearance and it brought him more attention and notoriety than anything he had done at Amherst so far. He began to emerge as a character, although the incident is not mentioned in his *Autobiography*.

That same year he began to attract attention as a debater. Public speaking and debating were compulsory parts of the curriculum. One of his classmates wrote: "It was in his junior year that we discovered Coolidge. In that year we began debating, and in the debates we found that he could talk. It was as if a new and gifted man had joined the class". Coolidge now became more and more adept at brief and direct statement. He won frequently in debating, perhaps every time in the junior debates. In November of that year he wrote his father proudly: "In view of the fact that yesterday I put up a debate said to be the best heard on the floor of the chapel this term . . . can you send me \$25"? In January he wrote home another glowing report of a successful debate. At the end of his junior year the students in the public speaking class voted to split the prize between Coolidge and another speaker. He continued debating in his senior year. In September he was elected to present the "Grove Oration" at the graduation exercises the following June. This was meant to be a humorous speech following the ponderousness of more formal addresses. In June, after a long series of indoor sermons and addresses, the students went to the College Grove, lit up their corn cob pipes and settled back on the grass. Coolidge began this way: "The mantle of truth falls upon the Grove Orator on condition he wear it wrong side out", and went on through a series of in-house jokes, continually interrupted by hecklers and shouts of laughter. "The oration was packed with what today would be called 'wisecracks'", his biographer says, "many of them sarcastic observations on members of the faculty—remarks which, although good-natured in tone and intention, had nevertheless something of a bite". The speech was a smashing success.

In parallel with these oratorical victories, Coolidge achieved social ones. He was elected a member of Phi Gamma Delta on January 15th of his senior year. This began a life-long, active tie, his only fraternal connection. From the start he entered into the group's affairs; a classmate recalls that

He took a deep interest in the chapter, was most faithful in attending "goat" and committee meetings, and while he did not live at the house, he passed considerable time there. We soon began to rely upon his counsel and judgment, and he was a distinct help to us in many serious problems we had to meet at that time. (Fuess, 1965, 54)

He wrote his father that "being in a society" would cost a little more money. From that time on, Coolidge was a faithful "Fiji", raising money, acting as the chapter's lawyer, returning to inspect the house carefully from cellar to garret, organizing (while he was President) the "Fiji Sires and Sons". His role in his brief mem-

bership as a student was that of the faithful attender and business helper; he skipped the dances and card games and "wild parties". At long last he had found a band of brothers. He was not a central figure in this group, but it is obvious that his membership meant a great deal to him after years of being left out. The moral he draws from this in the *Autobiography* is touching: "It has been my observation in life that, if one will only exercise the patience to wait, his wants are likely to be filled".

Garman's Influence . . .

He had found a voice and developed a relationship to his audience; he had a club of friends. At the same time, Coolidge found a model, an idol with whom to identify and a set of philosophical beliefs to guide him. This was Charles E. Garman, professor of philosophy, whose course, as Coolidge took it, ran from the spring term of junior year through senior year, moving from psychology to philosophy to ethics. "It always seemed to me that all our other studies were in the nature of a preparation for the course in philosophy", Coolidge remembered. Garman, a tall, cadaverous man with piercing black eyes, was a dramatic character, "a middle-aged Hamlet", extremely popular among the students.

Garman was in reality "a devout and rather orthodox New England Congregationalist" with a strong neo-Hegelian bent. Our interest is less in what he taught than in what Coolidge carried away from him and retained for thirty-five years. Garman did not carry his question-raising method to the point of not providing answers. Coolidge recalled his emphasis on rational judgment in ethical matters, the existence of a personal God and of "the complete dependence of all the universe on Him", man as set "off in a separate kingdom from all other creatures", the "spiritual appeal" of art as Divine revelation, the essential quality of men, the dignity of work and industry's right to work's rewards, "that might does not make right, that the end does not justify the means, and that expediency as a working principle is bound to fail". All of this Coolidge lays out in an unusually lengthy passage of his memoirs. Garman posted aphorisms on the walls of his classroom—"Carry all questions back to fundamental principles", "Weigh the evidence", "The question *how* answers the question *what*", "Process not product", and so forth. But perhaps the key lesson Coolidge retained is found later in the *Autobiography* in the context of his early steps in politics, when he was elected Mayor of Northhampton, Massachusetts:

Ever since I was in Amherst College I have remembered how Garman told his class in philosophy that if they would go along with events and hold to the

main stream, without being washed ashore by the immaterial cross currents, they would some day be men of power. (Coolidge, 1929, 99-100)

Already the echoes of Coolidge as President are apparent.

Coolidge remembered that "We looked upon Garman as a man who walked with God", and that he was "one of the most remarkable men with whom I ever came in contact", a man who "was given a power which took his class up into a high mountain of spiritual life and left them alone with God", who had "no pride of opinion, no atom of selfishness", "a follower of the truth, a disciple of the Cross, who bore the infirmities of us all". Coolidge did not try to defend Garman's position theoretically. But

I knew that in experience it has worked. In time of crisis my belief that people can know the truth, that when it is presented to them they must accept it, has saved me from many of the counsels of expediency. (Coolidge, 1929, 67)

He had found a rule of life, and the words to express it with.

The Break with His Past . . .

Coolidge had written a romantic story for the Amherst *Literary Monthly* in the summer between his junior and senior years. In his senior year, he tried his hand at a very different literary task, undertaken in secret: an essay for a national contest on "The Principles Fought for in the War of the American Revolution". The Amherst History Department awarded his piece a silver medal; the following December when he was working in a law office in Northampton, Coolidge learned he was also the national winner. One of the partners asked him, "Have you told your father"? To which he replied, "No, do you think I'd better"? In his *Autobiography* Coolidge recalled that

I had a little vanity in wishing my father to learn about it first from the press, which he did. He had questioned some whether I was really making anything of my education, in pretense I now think, not because he doubted it but because he wished to impress me with the desirability of demonstrating it. (Coolidge, 1929, 74)

Coolidge had moved from an emotional psychology, a sentimental dramatism in his story ("Margaret's Mist") to the logic of principles, the metier of ethical philosophy which he would continue to emphasize all his life. But his "No, do you think I'd better"? also represented a change. Right after graduation he returned to the farm for a summer's work and then went to Northampton to learn law. As late as January of his senior year he had not yet decided whether the law or storekeeping would be his profession. He wrote his father then, "You will have to decide". He did know that he wanted "to live where I can be of some use to the world and not simple where I should get a few dollars together". By graduation he

had decided that the law was "the highest of the professions". On his own, Coolidge sought a place and in September 1895 he went to work in a law office in Northampton. When he joined the law office Coolidge made a break with his past. The boy whose name had been recorded in various forms now discarded the "John" and became plain Calvin Coolidge. And "during these first years he worked so hard that for three years he did not find time to go back to Plymouth". The distance was about a hundred miles.

"That I was now engaged in a serious enterprise of life I so fully realized that I went to the barber shop and divested myself of the college fashion of long hair". He who had so often written home of his successes kept the largest one a secret. He found a job without his father's help. None of the Coolidges had been lawyers. Calvin had formed his style and begun his own life. He had found a way to be; he was not entirely certain where he was going.

As we have seen, Coolidge himself attributed to his experience in the last two years at Amherst a shaping influence on his mind and heart. His biographers agree. Fuess is convinced that "he was, during his first two years at Amherst, acutely conscious of his slow progress. His ambitions had been thwarted; he had failed to make a fraternity, he was unnoticed by those around him, his marks were only mediocre, and he had no compensating successes". Then "perhaps his entire political philosophy" was shaped by his junior and senior teachers as he combined a spurt of learning with social success. William Allen White goes farther: his "spirit awoke in Amherst", Garman "unlocked for him the philosophic mysteries of life", he was "baptized for life", "this reborn spirit whom Garman begot", and "Body and mind and spirit were cast into the iron mold of a fate which guided him through life".

Clearly Coolidge had found at Amherst the major features of the style that served him as President. The similarity in his rhetoric, business management, and personal relations habits in these widely separate periods of his life are striking.

Hoover: Needs from Childhood

Five generations of Coolidges lived in the confining culture of a small New England town; five generations of Hoovers lived in the confining culture of Quakerism, moving about from time to time but retaining their religion and its peculiar community practices. Gentle and free in ideology, Quakerism was often harsh and repressive in practice. Quaker meetings left Hoover with a sense of "the intense repression upon a ten-year-old who might not even count his toes".

Herbert Clark Hoover was born on August 10, 1874 in West

Branch, Iowa, two and a half years after his brother Theodore and two years before his sister May, to Jesse Clark Hoover, a blacksmith and farm implement salesman of 27 and Huldah Minthorn Hoover, a seminary-educated lady of 26. An aunt present at his birth wrote that "Jesse and Huldah always made much of thee because thee represented the little girl they hoped soon to have". Hoover remembered his mother vaguely as "a sweet-faced woman". She was very religious, spoke often in meeting, an efficient and serious-minded person. His father had a teasing humor, but was capable of punishing Herbert severely.

A plump baby, Herbert nearly died of croup in his second winter and suffered many other illnesses and accidents. But as he grew stronger and older he became a healthy, outdoor-loving boy.

His father died suddenly in the summer of Herbert's sixth year. His mother became "less and less a creature of this world after her husband died", leaving the children for long periods while she travelled about preaching. Herbert was passed around from uncle to uncle, each of whom worked him hard but also let him play in the woods and fields. In the winter after his eighth birthday, his mother died of pneumonia. "Bereavement put a sudden end to his little-boyhood, as it had to his babyhood", Will Irwin writes.

Separated from his brother and sister and sent to an uncle's farm, Herbert "took it hard—but with his mouth shut and grief showing only in his eyes". At age ten, he was again uprooted and sent to Oregon to live with his mother's brother, Henry John Minthorn, whose only son had just died. "Thee is going to Oregon", he was told, and "his lips closed very tight". Minthorn put him to school and chores, for a time of "sober routine". His uncle was a severe taskmaster; once Herbert "stalked out in anger and boarded with other relatives". At fifteen he was taken with his uncle to open a "Quaker land-settlement business" in Salem. A visitor told him of opportunities for engineering education at the newly opening Stanford University. Over the family's objection—and this is the first report of Herbert arguing—he took the Stanford entrance examinations, failed them, but was admitted for special tutoring in the summer.

Hoover thus left home and childhood with understandable enthusiasm. The major deprivations are clear: he lost both his parents, suddenly and unexpectedly, by the age of eight, a severe loss of affection and stability, and he had been shuffled about, against his will, from one stern relative to another, separated from his brother and sister, powerless to shape any segment of his own life. He needed others, and he needed to get his own place in the world and hold it. All his work so far had brought him nothing but more

work. Words were not yet part of his equipment; he had kept a tight-lipped sense of humiliation as person after person he relied on had agreed to abandon him to others.

Hoover: Resources from Childhood

Neither the political nor the rhetorical emphasis in Coolidge's upbringing were there for Hoover. His uncle Laban was an Indian agent and his Uncle Henry Minthorn had been one; Hoover vaguely remembered the Garfield campaign of 1880 and the lone (and drunken) Democrat in West Branch. That appears to have been the extent of his political exposure. Nor is there any record of early appearances before an audience. He did not like school: years later, asked to name his favorite study, he replied "None. They were something to race through—so I could get out of doors". He remembered some of his teachers with affection, but their lessons appear to have made no substantive impression on him. At home there were no novels, "save those with Total Abstinence as hero and Rum as villain". He and his brother read—surreptitiously—"Youth's Companion", a mild thriller of the day, and, with their cousin George acted out the parts. At first "Bertie" acted as lookout in case someone should discover this sinful behavior; then he was promoted to "super parts":

When Tad commanded the Colonial army, Bertie was that army; he was also the white maiden bound to the stake, while George as the Indian Chief tortured her and Tad as the *Deerslayer* came to the rescue. (Irwin, 1928, 15)

Not even at play, then, did he take the lead.

But these indoor intellectual forays never compared in Hoover's experience or memory with the outdoors and the physical. The early pages of his *Memoirs* read like a nature book, full of owls and rabbits and fish. He and his cousins played with machinery and put an old thresher back together; in Oregon he and another office boy tried to repair sewing machines for sale. The heritage was much stronger from the males of his line—the farmers and blacksmith—than from his mother's religiousness. In the office he was efficient in detail, learned to run a typewriter, and spent as much time as he could in the hills. The focus was on things, not words. He recalls a kind teacher who got him started on *Ivanhoe*, an "opening of the door to a great imaginative world" which "led me promptly through much of Scott and Dickens, often at the cost of sleep", but "Oregon lives in my mind for its gleaming wheat fields, its abundant fruit, its luxuriant forest vegetation, and the fish in the mountain streams". On Sunday evening he was allowed to read "an improving book", but one wonders how much of that there was after the Sabbath routine:

On Sunday mornings, when work of necessity was done, came Sabbath school; then the long meeting; then dinner; then a period of sluggish rest followed by a Band of Hope meeting, where the lecturer or teacher displayed colored prints of the drunkard's dreadful interior on each stage of his downward path, with corresponding illustrations of his demeanor and conduct. (Irwin, 1928, 30)

Unlike most men who have become President, Hoover had in his background virtually nothing of legitimating family example, identification with political figures, or practice in expressing ideas to audiences.

Hoover: First Independent Political Success

The same September that Coolidge entered Amherst, Hoover entered Stanford. At seventeen he was the youngest and, reportedly, the youngest-looking student in the first class at that new university. Will Irwin describes the effect the next four years had on Herbert Hoover:

He had lived, so far as he was aware, a happy childhood. But after all, that sympathetic brooding which makes childhood supremely happy had been lacking to his life since he was nine (sic) years old; for the greater part of another seven years a repressed atmosphere, wherein his extraordinary intelligence had no proper soil for growth; and hard work at menial or mechanical tasks. The atmosphere of freedom, of high animal spirits, the intellectual stimulus of those original young professors who went adventuring to Stanford—these struck in. Here he knew his first joy of the intellect, here he felt the initial stirring of his higher powers, here he found his wife. Stanford became a kind of complex with Herbert Hoover. Within fifteen years his interests and his wanderings were to embrace the globe; but those golden hills above Palo Alto were always the pole to his compass. (Irwin, 1928, 33-34)

Hoover came to Stanford early in the summer of 1891 to be tutored. Still one subject short of the number required at the end of the summer, he studied a couple of physiology textbooks for two straight nights and passed an examination. He was admitted "conditioned in English"—the language came hard for him, "then and for many years he was impatient with words". He took English examinations twice a year for the next several years without success. In his senior year he failed German. The English "condition" was finally removed to allow him to graduate, when two of his engineering professors argued that his technical reports showed sufficient literary skill. In class and out of class he "said little and listened a lot; there was a wordless eagerness about him", as Lyons puts it. As a sophomore he was "shy to the point of timidity—rarely spoke unless spoken to", his classmate Lester Hinsdale recalled from their lunches together. Irwin remembers Hoover visiting him in the infirmary when Hoover was a senior.

He did not say a word of sympathy for me—in pain and forever out of football—but I felt it nevertheless. Then, at the door he turned for an instant and jerked out: "I'm sorry". Just that; but it was as though another man had burst into maudlin tears. (Irwin, 1928, 60)

When he met his future wife in geological laboratory—he was a senior, she a freshman—he was tongue-tied and red-faced. No other girls were among his close friends at Stanford, nor were there any "frivolous flirtations". It is important to note, then, that verbal expressiveness had no part in Hoover's success at Stanford. He never found there a way to attract attention or to achieve his goals through speechmaking or even facile conversation. That mouth so tightly shut at critical moments in his childhood symbolized his verbal restraint at Stanford and as President (though not as Secretary of Commerce). Typically Hoover talked haltingly, rarely looking the other in the eye, with one foot thrust forward as he jingled the keys in his pocket.

Success Came from Systematic and Ordered Work . . .

Hoover's success at Stanford came from work, not words, and from a way of relating to others. He began his extracurricular working career at college by hiring on as a clerk in the registration of the new class. The skill exercised was meticulous attention to detail. Later in his freshman year Professor Branner employed him to do typing, again a matter of careful mechanical work. Then he branched out; he and two partners established a newspaper route and a laundry service for the students. These were soon sublet to other students, providing a small but regular income for Hoover. His entrepreneurial talents were beginning to emerge. Later he sold out the laundry for \$40 and he and a new friend started a cooperative residence for students in Palo Alto, a project he dropped soon because it kept him away from the campus.

In the summer after Hoover's freshman year, Professor Branner got him a job with the Geological Survey of Arkansas, of which Branner had been State Geologist, at \$60 a month and expenses. In his two subsequent Stanford summers he worked for the United States Geological Survey in California and in Nevada. That first summer "I did my job on foot, mostly alone, stopping at nights at the nearest cabin" in the Ozarks, making systematic notes, gathering and filing away facts, observations. The mountainers were suspicious of travelling inquirers: "I finally gave up trying to explain". In the subsequent summers Hoover was "far happier", he writes. He worked as a "cub assistant" to Dr. Waldemar Lindgren, riding a horse all day and camping out with the survey team at night. Hoover very much wanted this job. At the first of the post-sophomore summer he was not yet employed, so he and a

friend canvassed San Francisco for contacts for putting up billboard advertising. They signed up "a few hundred dollars" worth of contracts and went to work. Then Hoover heard of the geological survey and that there was a place for him with it. He walked 80 miles in three days to take it on.

Hoover's exact role in these two latter summers needs specification. He was, "as the youngest member of the Geological party", the disbursing officer: "I had to buy supplies and keep the accounts according to an elaborate book of regulations which provided wondrous safeguards for the public treasury". Carefulness by the book again, combined with outdoor energy and listening to the experts around the campfire.

Hoover returned to Stanford and extended his business enterprises. For a brief time he was a shortstop on the baseball team but soon became manager, "arranging games, collecting the gate money and otherwise finding cash for equipment and uniforms". He did so well at that that he was advanced to manager of the football team. One game produced \$30,018. Hoover was acquiring a reputation for management. Operating in a new and developing environment without precedents he was under demand as the man who could—and would—take care of a wide variety of chores and enterprises for his fellows. Branner knew him for his efficiency; when other students complained that Hoover seemed to have too much pull with the famous geologist, he replied "But I can tell Hoover to do a thing and never think of it again". These talents also gave him his start in campus politics.

His Start in Campus Politics . . .

Like Coolidge, Hoover was a "Barbarian" at Stanford. Fraternities developed quickly among the richer students interested in social prominence. He was not one of those. Sam Collins, one of the oldest members of Hoover's class, had proposed the cooperative rooming house at the beginning of their sophomore year. Collins was impressed with Hoover's system and order in straightening out the finances. Under Collin's tutelage Hoover first got involved in college politics when he was brought in with a group of "Barbarians" that organized to overthrow fraternity control of the student offices and activities. A zealot names "Sosh" (for "socialist") Zion declared his candidacy for student body president; "Collins swung in behind him in this campaign, and Hoover followed". He was assigned to canvass the "camp", the students who lived in rough shacks left over by the workers constructing the new college. Still he was "rather inarticulate—this repressed boy of eighteen" but he did what he could and the Barbs won, in a close vote.

The next summer Hoover worked for Dr. Lindgren, but he

also thought about ways of organizing the many student activities at Stanford some of which had been very sloppily run and one of which had had a scandal. Hoover returned in the fall with a draft of a new constitution in which student activities would be brought together under the control of the student body. In addition to a president and a football manager, a treasurer, bonded and double-audited, would handle the finances. Hoover's plan was modified in some detail in bull sessions with Collins and others; they decided to put off a move for it until electing, under the existing rules, a student government sympathetic to the plan the following spring.

In the spring term, this group gathered again and developed a ticket, with Lester Hinsdale as candidate for president, Herbert Hicks for football manager, and Herbert Hoover for treasurer. Hoover was reluctant. He thought the treasurer, who would collect a salary, should be a graduate student.

"But there's the salary", they said: "you can drop your work for Doc Branner and your laundry agency. The job will support you".

"No, sir"! responded Hoover, emphatically. "If I accept this nomination and get elected, there's one thing sure. I take no salary. Otherwise, they'll say I'm backing the new constitution just to get a paid job" (Irwin, 1928, 54)!

The "3-H" ticket won. Sosh Zion opposed the salary. Hoover refused to take it, though he worked like a demon for the remaining two years at Stanford as treasurer. The new student government got the student body to pass the new constitution.

Hoover spent the following summer working again for Dr. Lindgren, who put Hoover's name with his own on the various maps and reports. "Years later, Hoover confessed to a friend that no subsequent honor had puffed him up so much as this".

The next autumn, Hoover's junior year, he was busy running a lecture series, keeping the records and accounts for athletic events, and generally making himself useful. As Will Irwin recalled.

In the conferences over this or that problem of our bijou party in a toy state he seemed hesitant of advancing an opinion. Then, when everyone else had expressed himself, he would come in with the final wise word . . . After all, ours was the world in miniature. I lived to see him in councils whose decisions meant life or death for millions; yet it was always the same mind and the same method (Irwin, 1928, 62).

Hoover, in other words, was one of the boys, but at the edges of the group in most of their activities. He was the reliable treasurer, the arranger of meetings, the hard-working but shy and restrained person. He was valued for his virtues, particularly his energy and carefulness, his thoroughgoing honesty. He was never a charismatic

leader at Stanford. In nearly all of his activities, someone else—usually someone older like Professor Branner or Professor Lindgren or Sam Collins or Lester Hinsdale took the lead, and Hoover followed and served. Things got solved at Stanford in the caucus and Hoover took his part there. But there is not, in all of this student political and business activity, any record of his ever having spoken to a large gathering of his classmates. He was the man behind the scenes. He made friends, but many were the sort of friends whose respect is stronger than their affection.

In words, then, Hoover was restrained and not very expressive. In work he devoted all his energies to concentrated effort. In his personal relations he was a quiet, behind-the-scenes coordinator, not a leader. And so he was as President of the United States.

A Summary of Main Themes

The links between each style at the time of first independent political success and in the presidency are clear in these two cases. Briefly put:

For Coolidge, *rhetoric* in the presidency consisted of (a) serious, abstract, epigrammatic addresses, full of themes from Garman, delivered much like his serious debates and speeches at Amherst and (b) witty banter with reporters, much like his funny speeches to his fellow undergraduates. As president he avoided as much of the *business* of the office as he could; work on detail had played little or no part in his Amherst success. As president he avoided close personal relationships, keeping others at a distance with mildly aggressive wit; at Amherst intimate friendship or close cooperation had never been his style.

For Hoover, *rhetoric* was impossibly hard, and he failed at it, as words had so often failed him at Stanford. Forced to speak, he fell back on his mother's Quaker mysticism and his uncle's phoney advertising. His whole soul was poured into the *business* of the office, meticulous attention to detail, and careful designs for the arrangement of things. At Stanford very similar efforts had brought him money, independence, respect and acceptance. In *personal relations*, President Hoover tried desperately, in conference after conference, to repeat his success at Stanford in gaining cooperation by mastering details and presenting his plan.

The similarities are evident. Analyzed retrospectively here, they seem amenable to discernment in their earlier forms by an analyst attuned to the role demands of the presidency.

Presidential Style and First Independent Political Success

There are fundamentally three steps in this argument. One is that there is such a thing as presidential style, in the sense of habitual patterns of performance in response to recurrent role demands. I have tried to illustrate how the flow of energy and affect in three channels captures, within a broader typological framework, the major dimensions of such styles. Presidents tend to solve their rhetorical problems, their problems of managing business, and their problems of adapting in close personal relations in characteristic, patterned ways, not randomly or simply as flexible, rational responses to historical events.

Second, there is an identifiable formative period, that of first independent political success, in which the major elements of presidential style are exhibited. Personality formation is a long, developmental process, subject to change before and after this period. But the *main, adaptively strategic, politically-relevant action patterns* are evidenced most clearly when a young man, drawing together themes from his past, present and anticipated future, answers for himself the question, "What works for me?" The fit between presidential style and the style of the formative period is not vague or mysterious, but direct: in rhetoric, business management, and personal relations presidents tend to behave as they did when they first found a way to succeed with these tools.

The third step in the argument is less clear. Why does this congruence occur? The answers are speculative. Most probably, the strength of the adaptive pattern derives from the confluence, in its original formation, of (a) satisfaction of strong needs for compensation for earlier deprivations, (b) at least some resources from the past applicable to present achievement, and (c) a favorable set of opportunities. At a deeper level of analysis, this pattern's staying power derives from a solution to the Eriksonian identity crisis; it may represent the behavioral manifestation of an intensely emotional late-adolescent trial and victory. The outward signs of the formative period are a new surge of success on one's own, a new way of linking oneself to others and a new fame. To the psychoanalyst, these may be signs only, referents to much deeper developments in the meanings of work and luck, love and hate, thought and word. Psychoanalytic data would reveal, one suspects, such factors contributing strongly to habit formation in this critical period.

At an even more speculative level, the analogy between being president and emerging as a successful young adult with an individual style can be posed. Both are in some sense culminations of preparatory stages, modes in the curve of life, high points of achieve-

ment beyond which one may never go. Both are unique experiences, in the double sense that neither ever happens twice in the same life and that no two persons work them out in the same ways. Both highlight the lone individual discovering what he can make of a situation in which a great deal depends on his personal choices. A new president, scanning (though seldom consciously) his life's repertoire of successful strategies, might well turn to those which had worked so well for him as he became a man.

A few cases plus speculation do not make a theory. Yet as these ideas are refined they may find application in stylistic analysis not only of past presidents but also of men yet to be presidents. At that point we may be able to move beyond some of the many uncertainties of prediction, to guess better than we have, and before the fact, what the most powerful politician in the world will do with that power.

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A Note on "Types" of Political Personality: Nuclear, Co-Relational, Developmental

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Even a cursory inspection of the literature of the behavioral and social sciences indicates that the term "type" has a less luminous halo than it had when Carl Jung, for instance, was writing about "Psychological Types". We shall, however, presume on the syntactic and semantic sophistication of the age and use the term as a convenient label for a pattern that is at once contextual and empirical. The pattern is contextual because it is defined as referring to significant features of the social process; it is empirical because it is expected to sum up findings and to point the way to further research.

A Three-fold Classification of Types

A "*nuclear*" type connects a political role with intense pre-dispositions of the total personality (See Lasswell, 1930, especially chapter 4). The man who succeeds to an office in which he has no interest is at one end of the scale; the one whose whole life is focused on reaching the Presidency is at the other. We might provisionally introduce the term "*politician*" to characterize the individual whose life is focused on gaining office. (Later in the paper I shall develop a fuller delineation of an equivalent conception designed to deal with power-centered individuals—the "*political personality*".) Paralleling the notion of the "*politician*" as one whose life revolves around the pursuit of one particular value—that of power—we can

functionally define other roles in terms of the pursuit of other values. Thus we might describe individuals whose lives are focused on the pursuit of enlightenment as "scientists", excluding from this classification those who happen merely conventionally to be called scientists, but who are primarily concerned with other values such as respect, well-being, power, etc.

A cross-sectional survey of those who play a particular role during a given period may show that "politicians" can be distinguished from "scientists", for example, in several ways. Thus "politicians" and "scientists" may come from different social strata and educational backgrounds, they may differ psychologically in a variety of ways—say, ability to tolerate ambiguity, cognitive style and willingness to engage in interpersonal relations. Such findings describe "*co-relational*" types; the data are not necessarily linked to an explanatory theory of how political personalities are formed. This is the province of "*developmental*" typologies. Thus we may find that the developmental experiences of "politicians" and "scientists" differ in distinctive ways. As political scientists our special responsibility is developmental, since political socialization, which is the transmitting and acquiring of political culture includes the formation of political types.

In order further to exhibit the defining characteristics of nuclear, co-relational and developmental types and to show how they relate to each other, it is useful to quote an earlier discussion (Lasswell, 1930, 49-61).

Political types may be set up on a three-fold basis: by specifying a nuclear relations, a co-relation, and a developmental relation.

What is meant by the choice of a nuclear relation may be illustrated by the concept of *Machtmensch* as elaborated by Eduard Spranger in his *Lebensformen* . . . The gist of Spranger's generalization of the political man [politician or political type in the usage of this paper] is schematically expressible in terms of desire-method-success. The political man desires to control the motives of others; his method may vary from violence to wheedling; his success in securing recognition in some community must be tangible. These are the nuclear relations which are essential to the type definition . . .

[Such a type is] distinguished according to some nuclear relation among a few variables. The characteristic mode of elaborating such a type is to imagine a host of situations in which the type may be found and to describe the resulting picture. For these impressionistic methods it is possible to substitute a more formal procedure. Having chosen a central primary relation, it is possible to find, by reference to specific instances, the relative frequency with which other traits are associated with the nuclear ones . . . The result . . . is to define "*co-relational*" (*correlational*) types . . .

Almost every nuclear and co-relational type carries developmental implications. The terms which are used to characterize motives have dynamic, genetic, formative coronas of meaning which, vaguely though they may be sketched, are emphatically present. When Michels says that a "Catonian strength of

"conviction" is one mark of the political leader, it is implied that if one pushed his inquiry into the adolescence, childhood and even infancy of the individual that this ruling characteristic would be visible. Of course, Michels does not himself develop these implications; it is doubtful if he has tried to find the early analogues of the trait which he called "Catonian strength of conviction" on the adult level. But the dynamic penumbra of the term can lead empirical investigators to scrutinize the behavior of children from a new point of view . . . Developmental types . . . describe a set of terminals, adult reaction and relate them to those critical experiences in the antecedent life of the individual which dispose him to set up such a mode of dealing with the world.

Models of the Political Order and of Political Personality

In order to guide the study of political types the scientific observer finds it essential to provide himself with a generalized scheme, a model, for use in searching out the "political" features in any social process, whether contemporary or historical, territorial or pluralistic. He also needs to use an exploratory scheme of "personality". I shall not elaborate the social process model in detail, since this has been done in other places.¹ The present focus is on "personality", particularly on the developmental study of political personality. It is, however, pertinent to recapitulate the principal contours of the social and political process.

A social process is characterized by mutual influencing: the *participants* are seeking to maximize² (optimalize) *values* (preferred outcomes) by using *institutions* affecting *resources*. The following eight terms are used to refer to values: power (P), the giving or receiving of support in the important decisions made in a social context; enlightenment (E), the giving or receiving of information; wealth (W), the giving or receiving of control over resources; well-being (B) similarly for access to safety, health and comfort; skill (S), similarly for opportunity to acquire and exercise talent; affection (A), similarly for love, friendship, loyalty; respect (R) similarly for recognition; rectitude (D), similarly for religion and ethics.

The conception of political personality that we suggest has the three major components shown in Table 1: a value focus, the patterning of behavior vis à vis the value the individual is focused on and, finally, psychological and somatic components. The table indicates that when a person is relatively centered on the power value, he fits the definition of political personality. This defines according

¹For the present model see Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950 and McDougal, Lasswell and Vlasic, 1963.

²The maximizing principle may be strictly defined as in traditional economics, or more loosely defined, as in Simon, to require "satisfaction". See Simon, 1955.

TABLE 1
POLITICAL PERSONALITY*

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- Political Personality = emphasizes the pursuit of power in preference to other values
 - = utilizes specialized patterns to specify values
 - = employs mechanisms to adapt internal perspectives and somatic operations.

*Compare with Lasswell, 1948, Chapters 2 and 3.

to nuclear type, since it presupposes knowledge of the behavior exhibited by the person in representative situations in the social process, plus understanding of his inner orientation. The simple fact that a role is performed that is conventionally perceived as political by the participants in the context does not warrant classifying a person among the political personalities. Nor, conversely, does failure to play a conventionally recognized political role necessarily imply that the person is not power oriented. Obviously the comprehensive appraisal of any social context must sample *all* value shaping and sharing processes, as they are *conventionally* understood, if the political personalities in the *functional* sense are to be identified. The point is implied when, as is sometimes the case, it is said that during the rapid growth phase of a private capitalistic economy the most power-centered persons engage in "business".

Thus, for analytic purposes, we may find ourselves categorizing as political types certain actors from a variety of conventionally designated institutions such as business, the church and the universities, and we may find ourselves excluding from the political type classification some bureaucrats, ward healers, elected officials and others who are usually thought of as political. For scientific purposes it is essential to use analytic tools that enable us to isolate functionally comparable types, since there is no reason to believe that the conventional classifications identify sufficiently comparable individuals for it to be possible *in principle* to find that the nuclear classification serves as an indicator of common co-relational, and developmental patterns.

In order to classify individuals functionally we need to employ a major distinction made in Table 1—the distinction between "values" and "specialized patterns". Individuals often use no such general categories of thought as power; they think in more concrete terms, such as wanting to be a senator, or to help their party win the election, or to win the war. The indispensable function of systematic categories is to provide the scientific observer with the tools necessary to make comparisons. They challenge the observer to discover the degree to which conventional perspectives and opera-

tions in one context have equivalents elsewhere. Hence it becomes possible to describe the value priorities from society to society, subgroup to subgroup, or from person to person. Thus, for example, Actor A, a medieval cleric, and Actor B, a nineteenth century American businessman, may exhibit similar "specialized patterns" focusing on the pursuit of power, even though A and B justify their behavior in quite different ways and neither employs a general category of thought referring explicitly to power. And in society A the institutions that are specialized to power may be commonly thought of as "churches", and in society B they may be thought of as "industries". In addition, contextual analysis may confirm the assertion that some societies give little encouragement to the pursuit of power in community decisions.

Principal "Mechanisms"

The reference in Table 1 to the "mechanisms" employed by the individual in internal adaptation covers all the modes by which "impulses" to complete an "act" are dealt with. One convenient scheme (presented in Table 2) underlines the principal mechanisms by which psychological conflicts are resolved. (All initiated acts are not conflicting; some are facilitative or uninvolved.) A brief consideration of typical mechanisms for dealing with psychic conflict and of the personality structures to which they are related will take us to a discussion of how to analyze intrapersonal and environmental determinants of the development and persistence of political personality.

TABLE 2
MECHANISMS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

a	→	Rejection
b	→	Suppression
c	→	Repression
d	↑	
e	→	
f	→	
g	↑	
h	→	Resistance

The break in each line in Table 2 indicates the passage from "unconscious" and "pre-conscious" events in the sequence to waking awareness (and somatic expression). Act *b* is shown as rejected, which means that a possible act completion (such as voting on a measure in which the individual has little interest) is overridden in favor of not voting. Act *d* is shown as suppressed. Suppression refers to the exclusion of an act from completion after an intense subjective

conflict, such as a conflict between loyalty to two candidates who are one's close friends. Repression (act *f*) results from an exceedingly acute conflict that ends by establishing an internal inhibition against allowing the alternatives to reach full waking awareness (such as an intense urge to kill). Once established the inhibition operates as a resistance prior to awareness. However, the extensive clinical literature on "the return of the repressed" suggests that resisted (act *h*) impulses may obtain partial completion in the form of somatic symptom behavior (such as "accidentally" hitting someone) or in the form of symbol behavior. Among the many mechanisms that operate on symbolic events (subjectivities) rather than somatic expressions are "condensation", "detachment", (and so on). These may manifest themselves not only in dreams, jokes and slips of the tongue, but also, for example, in a political actor's choice of metaphors and other figures of speech.

At the several phases of inter-act adaptation various personality structures take form. The psychoanalytic distinctions, for instance, are pertinent here: the "super-ego" refers to the inhibiting and facilitating patterns that function prior to full waking awareness; the "ego" covers the "aware" patterns; the "id" refers to the impulses which are denied full subjectivity and expression, save at the cost of vivid anxiety. If, for example, the super-ego is excessively strict, repression may take its toll by generating apathy or otherwise inhibiting the channeling of impulse energies into action.

Political personalities can be profitably examined to discover the extent to which the completion of power-oriented acts is able to mobilize the *potential intensities* available to the personality system as a whole. Similarly, it is feasible to discover which specific institutional outcomes are the objects of power perspectives and operations as well as the inner mechanisms by which various act potentials are adapted within the total system.

Fundamental to dynamic analysis (developmental study) is the conception of political personality at any given cross-section of the career line as established by a process of relative value indulgence. Table 3 suggests how stability and instability of political personality dynamics may be analyzed in terms of the consistency of the political actor's expectations of and experiences with relevant positive and negative sanctions. Table 4 suggests how the actor's environment contributes to the stability of political personality.

For an example of what is implied by Tables 3 and 4, we may consider various of the slow-changing village societies of the globe. In such societies most preadults are successfully socialized to play adult roles by passing through sequences of interaction with the environment in which the preadult eventually integrates a stable system of perspective and operation (Table 3), and the social environ-

TABLE 3
POLITICAL PERSONALITY DYNAMICS

Political perspectives and operations remain stable	→	when expected to yield net value advantages
	→	when net value advantages are realized
Political perspectives and operations are unstable	→	when expectations are confused or contradictory
	→	when realized net value advantages are confused or contradictory.

ment provides the requisite flow of net value advantages, thanks to its appropriate expectations and realizations (Table 4).

A formulation of this kind, simple and obvious as it may seem, has yet to be corroborated in detail by suitable research. An instant's reflection reminds us of the vast complexity of the process in any society, and the difficulty that lies in the way of attempting to mobilize research talent, without creating a new "Navajo plus an anthropologist" pattern of culture; or of discovering how to make proper allowance for the impact of the new social context itself.

In Illustration . . .

As an illustration of the analytic strategy proposed here of contextual analysis of value indulgences and deprivations in order to explain personality development, consider, for a moment, the significance of an infant to those immediately involved with it. These comments are a free transcript of actual observations:

Think first of the infant as a source of *value indulgence* for the

TABLE 4
POLITICAL PERSONALITY AND ENVIRONMENT*

A stable political personality depends on	<i>expectations in the environment of net advantage from providing the indulgences required to sustain stability.</i>
	<i>the realization permitted by the environment of the net indulgences required.</i>

mother. If the mother has been doubtful of her adequacy as a woman, conception and birth may be experiences of enormous importance to her image of herself. Using abbreviations to employ the value categories introduced above, she may enjoy a continuing quiet euphoria, which is a positive state of well-being (B) that overwhelms any physical inconvenience or pain. She loves herself and also the image and the body of the child (A). She respects (R) herself; and she may have surges of religious feeling (D) for the mystery of life. Perhaps she perceives that a son is likely to safeguard her position in family decisions (P), and in obtaining the income from an estate (W). Motherhood may open up access to new sources of knowledge (E) and skill (S).

It is also relevant to explore the significance of an infant as a source of *deprivation* to the *mother*. If the child is sickly or deformed the humiliation (-R) and guilt (-D) may actually disturb the mental and physical health of the mother (-B). It may cost the love of the husband (-A), and put an end to the prospect of exercising power (-P), obtaining wealth (-W), or acquiring access to privileged sources of knowledge (-E), and skill (-S).

What value *indulgences* does an *infant* obtain from the *mother*? In the favorable case, nurture (B) and love (A); and a variety of opportunities that gradually encourage curiosity (E) and the discovery of latent aptitudes (S). Toys are early forms of wealth (W), as are the excretions. An environment willing to encourage initiative is providing a basic form of respect (R); approval for conformity ("good") introduces rudimentary components of appraisal in rectitude (D) terms. The strong willed child may exert a major impact on family decision (P) long before any conscious programs take shape.

An inventory of value *deprivations* is also essential to any comprehensive empirical investigation of a child. (I am omitting examples). Moreover, the *timing* of value indulgences and deprivations must be clearly specified if their significance is to be brought out. And this makes it necessary to describe the *particular patterns* involved. To trace an interaction the observer must describe the initiator of an act and characterize the response of the environment in value terms. The scientific observer may say that *X* promises to support *Y*, noting that the promise of support is given according to the usual practice in the political culture of the relevant context. He goes on to recount that in response to this value indulgence, *Y* replies by granting *X* a value indulgence, perhaps in the form of a promise of support for his later candidacy. A more comprehensive examination may disclose many other value implications. *X* may be warmly greeted and applauded by party members who feared that he might be unwilling to go along with *Y*'s nomination. These affection and respect responses might be supplemented by economic

advantages (a contract for his construction company), disclosure of secret plans for development (enlightenment), opportunities to join a golf club (skill, etc.) and general commendation of his character (rectitude).

Confidential interviewing may indicate that, while the previous picture is correct as far as it goes, from *X*'s point of view it omits many dimensions of the context. It leaves out the attacks made on him privately by disappointed supporters and friends and many other negative experiences.

The foregoing analysis calls attention to the complex interplay between values and practices, and indicates why the means at our disposal for investigation have a limited capability to disclose these relationships. Plainly, the evaluation of specific practices is subject to *external* and *internal* factors. The external changes are the indulgences and deprivations actually supplied by the environment. Obviously these depend on many factors beyond the deliberate control of the actors in the situation. The internal factors are the ego-indulging or depriving evaluations by the ego and super-ego; these "self by self" appraisals may continue for years with no external support (in fact, with deprivations by an environment in conflict with the standards applied by the conscience and the ego). Consider, for example, political prisoners who fail to change their convictions in spite of facing extreme deprivations in the environment of the concentration camp.

The theory of dynamic personality change implied in the foregoing can be summed up in these terms: *specific practices* (perceived as expressing a principal value) *result in external and internal value indulgences and deprivations that coincide with, or deviate from, net expectations prior to the outcome phase of action; expectations are modified according to results, save when the intensity with which expectations are sustained inhibits recognition of what has occurred; the rank ordering of major value categories is ratified or altered as the practices attributed to major categories rise or fall in value realization.*

The mechanisms conform to the same principles. For example, if a mechanism of rejection is applied to a specific practice and results in less than anticipated net advantage, the rejection will itself be altered on behalf of acceptance and expression.

When mechanisms, specific practices and values are not objects of relatively deliberate strategies, evaluations may occur at "unconscious" or "pre-conscious" levels, with the result that *image* components are little involved; instead, *moods* dominate the process.³

³Dr. A. J. Brodbeck, with whom I am collaborating in a study of socialization, is especially concerned with the interplay of mood and image.

The overwhelming probability is that the most comprehensive and most effective outcome from any fully developed object of shared reference.

Questions Generated by the Frame of Reference

Imagine that we were omniscient, thanks to the observational methods of our designer, and to the elegance of our theoretical system. What kinds of questions could we answer about personality and politics?

It would be possible to describe the intensity with which various political perspectives and operational patterns are represented as opposed to the personality system of representation (or absence) across the entire the body politic. These groups could be selected for analysis, e.g., urban versus rural areas. In some cases, you could even see positions in terms of power or influence, such as those that affect foreign policy, trade, etc. In other cases, you might group them according culture and ethnicity, and then determine the effects of these categories. In general, one could look at specific and institutional practices and their outcomes.

These questions, patterns could be correctly predicted, even approximately, based upon and over several years. But imagine that we could have an image of the factors that condition the transfer of power from toward power in the personality, able to see what factors from family, from culture, from ethnicity, and so on, that are important, and in the power arena. Among the most important would be dependence of the personality on the political system, and the dependence of the political system on the personality. Factors in requiring police power, or in the transfer of power, would also be included in the transfer of power. As persons can be seen to tend along this dimension.

Knowing the nature of education and outcomes of the culture, the culture's values could be made of the culture measured the more precisely and directly.

On the basis of social goals for the body politic, goals of justice and morality could be derived to derive the patterns of behavior that are to change and contribute to the better society.


Knowing the goals, recommendations could be the basis for changes and new goals, and a regular meeting of the decision process, a process to examine where the degree to which existing conditions are being realized, namely, the basic elements of the culture, the nature of educational needs and processes, and the best learning outcomes.

The expansion of welfare and technology is such that the world has been taking giant strides toward democracy, international cooperation and understanding all along the line and the trend is upward. The scope of the analysis of research topics can be extended to include social and biological factors as well as economic ones. An illustration of continuing trends is the greater emphasis being given to people and in all other sectors of man's progress. The emphasis is shifting to introducing a data rich consideration equipped to provide more and more complete coverage.

Given the approximate character of the available methods for examining and expanding personnel it is especially important to consider the use of methods of approach that bring the developing content at the center of attention. By means of principles of the situation, changes in practice can be expected to contribute to an expanded program of "knowing" - increasing both descriptive information up to date. At present, Lewin and Vroom (1951) and others are at least some of the far reaching applications of configurative approach to the conceptualized personnel problem.

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The Interaction of Personality and Political System in Decisions to Run for Office: Some Data and a Simulation Technique*

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Efforts to ascertain the personality correlates of politicians' behavior have met with quite indifferent success. There are a number of reasons why there is so little empirical evidence of the impact of personality on the behavior of politicians. First of all it has been difficult to obtain measures of personality differences that are sufficiently sensitive to exhibit the connections between personal attributes of political actors and the actions they perform. Secondly, the impact of situations (e.g., role requirements and other restrictions that political systems place on actors) further reduces the observed correlations between personality and political behavior. Politicians with similar personality characteristics may behave differently from community to community or from role to role simply because the situation

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in each case imposes different pressures and incentives. Finally, we lack sufficiently well-defined and inclusive theories even to hypothesize precisely the relationships that we expect to find between personality and politicians' behavior under various circumstances.

The present paper, which is partly a report of empirical data and partly a discussion of method, suggests ways for mitigating all three of these difficulties. The paper summarizes a small but elegant body of data on individual personality motivations. It then proceeds to illustrate how one may construct a network of hypotheses which fit these data and which state precisely how an individual's motivational characteristics affect his behavior and aspirations in a political recruitment process—that is, in office-seeking, office-accepting and officeholding. These hypotheses from the data are then linked to a set of simple assumptions (not directly estimated from data) about how candidacies might be distributed to aspirants and offices to candidates.

The resulting extended set of hypotheses and assumptions is a model (in one version a program for computer simulation) of a political recruitment process. Given information on some characteristics of a group of potential officeholders, one can derive, with the hypotheses and assumptions in the model, statements as to which individuals are aspirants for nomination, which are candidates for election, which are officeholders and what behavior the officeholders adopt. Such outcome statements are the logical implications of the hypotheses and assumptions. If the assumptions in the model are more or less closely fitted to data about a particular political system, the outcome statements constitute predictions. If the model's assumptions are not closely tied to a particular set of data, the model can be used to explore the precise implications of variations in its hypotheses and assumptions.

This effort at model construction is designed to enhance future empirical work. First, the requirements of specificity and exhaustiveness implicit in model construction lead us to locate gaps in explanation that do not become evident in the customary verbal discussions of relationships among variables. We are then stimulated to introduce new explanatory variables, to formulate hypotheses that employ them, and to gather data that test the hypotheses. (It is not uncommon to introduce new variables and devise hypotheses, to be sure, but it is uncommon, in political science, to do so at the levels of specificity and integration contemplated here.)


Secondly, once hypothesized relationships have been used as the basis for computer simulation runs, a set of precise, testable predictions about the flow of office-seekers and officeholders over time will become available. But even short of a test of predictions against a particular set of data, running the model on the computer uncovers

anomalies (e.g., implausibly low turnover among officeholders) which suggest adjustments to the researcher. Thus both the building and the running of the model lead to improvements in its description of political recruitment processes and greatly sharpen requirements for future data collecting.

A Model of the Recruitment Process and Some Data

Figure 1 portrays a simplification of the two major paths that lead to political candidacy and officeholding—self-initiation and recruitment by political leaders (party chieftains, interest groups, etc.). The dash-lined arrows represent causal relationships among variables. The solid arrows show time sequence, as well as the sort of causal relationship which requires that officeholders may be selected only from the set of candidates. Thus political system characteristics (Box 1 in the figure) affect leaders' candidate recruiting practices (2) and also affect potential candidates' political perceptions (3). These perceptions interact with individual motivations to affect decisions to seek office (4), decisions to accept or reject offers of candidacy (5), and behavior in office (8). The two classes of would-be public officials (4 and 5), if they obtain nomination (6) and are elected (7), then face new decisions about candidacy in the next time period (as do defeated candidates for nomination and election).

FIGURE 1
CAUSAL INFLUENCES AND DECISION POINTS IN POLITICAL RECRUITMENT PROCESSES



Using this deliberate simplification of the events and variables in the political recruitment process,¹ we may now consider a body of data on decisions to seek candidacy (4), decisions to accept recruitment to candidacy (5), and choices of patterns of behavior in office (8).² The data are based on interviews with a random sample of businessmen who were active in politics in an eastern, industrial city here called Eastport ($N = 23$), and a matched (on religion, nationality background and specific business occupation) sample of non-politicians ($N = 18$).³ (In addition to the matching criteria, the two samples were almost identical in average age and education). The matching enables us to hold constant one of the stronger correlates of running for and holding office—socio-economic status (cf. Matthews, 1954, 23-33; Milbrath, 1965, ch. 5)—and to focus on relationships between personality characteristics and decisions to seek or accept candidacy.

In addition to extensive information on interviewees' political attitudes, contacts and careers (if any), responses were obtained to the well-known test of power, achievement and affiliation motivation developed by McClelland and others from the earlier Thematic Apperception Test (Atkinson, 1958; Atkinson, 1964; Atkinson and Feather, 1966; McClelland *et al.*, 1953). The test elicits the respondent's fantasy stories about a series of pictures. These stories are scored for manifestations of the need for power (indicated by references to efforts to influence others and to avoid their influence over oneself), the need for achievement (shown by emphasis on performing well in tasks), and need for affiliation (exhibited in the preoccupation with maintaining warm, friendly relationships with others).

Reports in the literature on associations between these motives and behavior suggest the motives as likely determinants of political behavior, including the aspects of political behavior of interest here—aspirations for office, willingness to accept recruitment and choice

¹The figure omits, for instance, the processes of negotiation for support between potential candidates, on the one hand, and organized interest groups and party leaders on the other, described by Seligman (1961). In broad outline, however, the work described in this paper follows and has been shaped by Seligman's conceptualization (1958, 1961). See (Barber, 1965) for an analysis of roughly similar data on state legislators which does much more with personality dynamics and less with direct measurement of motivation, and places less emphasis on precise statement of linked explanatory hypotheses than the work reported in this paper. For reviews of research on political participation see (Lane, 1959; and Milbrath, 1965).

²The analysis summarized here differs from but does not contradict any conclusions in the analysis reported in (Browning, 1960; and Browning and Jacob, 1964). A full report of this reanalysis is in preparation.

³Matches were not found for five politicians. Politicians were defined as holders of party offices, delegates to party conventions or candidates for public elective office. Businessmen were defined as managers and proprietors. See (Browning, 1960, ch. 1) for more detail on sampling and other methods in the collection of the data.

of behavior in office. For example, men with high levels of achievement motivation perform better and persist longer at various tasks. They take moderate risks rather than either extremely small or excessive risks. They try harder rather than give up when success is especially difficult to achieve (Atkinson, 1958, chs. 1, 18-23, 28-29, 31, 35; Atkinson and Feather, 1966). There is some evidence that men with strong power motivation argue more (in a classroom setting) and that they try to influence others more frequently than men who score low on the power motive dimension (Atkinson, 1958, chs. 6, 14).

High scorers on affiliative motivation tend to seek approval more than others and to be overcautious and dependent on others for decisions; they are rated as relatively unpopular. In contrast, men high in achievement but low in affiliative motivation are seen as socially poised and adept, self-possessed, consistent and strong in conversational facility and ability to communicate ideas (Atkinson, 1958, ch. 28). This suggests that high levels of affiliative concern inhibit extroverted sociability and that we should not expect either the vigorous leader or the stereotypical gladhanding politician to score high on this dimension.

Political Recruitment Behavior as a Function of Motivation and Expectations

The initial analysis of the data on motivation and on political careers and attitudes of politicians and nonpoliticians in Eastport yielded rather strong correlations between motivations and an interesting variety of behavior. Specifically, higher average achievement and power and lower average affiliative motive scores were found among men who:

- . . . initiated their own first political activity;
- . . . ran for offices with relatively high power and achievement opportunities;
- . . . reported vigorous policy-influencing behavior in office;
- . . . expressed explicit concern for achievement and power satisfactions in politics;
- . . . aspired to higher office.

These differences in motivation hold both when politicians with these distinctive characteristics are compared with matched nonpoliticians and when they are compared with other politicians lacking these characteristics. Politicians who entered politics by accepting the recruitment requests of party leaders are distinguished only by high levels of affiliative concern, as measured by scores on the test of motivation, when they are compared to the nonpoliticians matched to them.

A second interesting set of findings is on paternal political involvement. These findings bear upon a set of variables that interact with motivations—*viz.*, *expectations*. The fathers of about half of the politicians, but none of the fathers of the nonpoliticians, had been active in politics.⁴ In some cases, the father's political activity led to the son's entrance into politics by making him visible to party leaders and increasing the likelihood that they would recruit him when they needed a candidate. In other cases, the father's political activity seems to have left the son with generally favorable perceptions of politics. The son of a political activist is less likely to perceive politics as dirty or evil; he is more likely to consider political participation worthwhile and appropriate to his status. He develops expectations of achievement and power opportunities, either as chances to influence policy or as chances to advance to higher office where such influence would be possible.⁵

The impact of the father's political activity on cognition and on behavior is underlined by a result from a parallel study of businessmen active and inactive in urban renewal (Browning, 1960, chs. 1, 2), an area of public policy-making largely outside of party politics with its distinctive image and distinctive focus on nominations, elections and organizational control. Among the business leaders participating in urban renewal decisions were several who matched the most vigorous and aspiring party politicians in the configuration of their motives. The fathers of these men had not been politically active. Lacking the predisposing cognitions of the party politicians, these men pursued their power and achievement concerns through nonpolitical careers, approaching politics only as closely as the nonpartisan urban renewal problem, and even then only on the initiative of the mayor and when their business roles called for it.

In summary then, high levels of achievement and power motivation and low levels of affiliative concern appear in these data as a distinctive syndrome closely related to vigorous influencing and efforts to achieve success in whatever arena. The choice of partisan politics as the particular arena in which to seek power and achievement hinges on perceptions acquired during intensive and prolonged socialization (as from the father throughout childhood, or, in several cases, from vigorous and successful adult experience in such arenas of nonparty politics as unions and trade organizations).

⁴Similar findings have been reported in several studies (Milbrath, 1965; Prewitt, 1965; Prewitt *et al.*, 1966; Salisbury, 1965).

⁵It is possible, of course, that a father's political activity would leave the son with unfavorable perceptions of politics and low expectations of achievement and power satisfactions in politics. No such cases appeared among the politicians; and since none of the nonpoliticians had politically active fathers, no cases of this sort of negative socialization were found.

In attempting to explain behavior as a joint function of motivation and expectations, I am in accord with the theory of motivation developed by McClelland and his associates, and also with the theory of rational choice, both of which regard choice as a function of goals (or utility) and expectations (Atkinson, 1964, ch. 3). The motive scores in effect serve as measures of the utility to the individual of certain kinds of satisfactions, and family political interest and activity as an indicator of expectations of attaining these satisfactions in party politics.

In addition to this interaction between expectations and motivation, analysis revealed strong interactions among the three kinds of motivation. It is not just that each motive taken one at a time is related to behavior. More than that, certain configurations of scores on the three motives taken together are strictly associated with certain kinds of behavior, in the sense that every individual behaving in a particular way has the same distinctive profile of motive scores.

For instance, of the eleven men who have run for offices with relatively high achievement and power potential, the five who report aspirations for higher office *all* score high on achievement motivation (≥ 8), high on either power motivation (≥ 6) or status concern, and low on affiliative motivation (≤ 3).⁶ None of the other six men (reporting no aspiration for higher office) have this distinctive configuration of three motives, though some are similar to the five aspirants on one or two of the motives.

In the model, this syndrome of strong power and achievement motivation combined with weak affiliative needs is put into the form of a logical function, as follows. At a point in the model, the motivational characteristics of incumbent officeholders are evaluated. Each officeholder who meets all three of the above motive score criteria is assigned aspirations for an office at the next higher level than the office he currently holds.⁷ Officeholders who do not meet these criteria are assigned either aspirations for the same level office as they currently hold or negative aspirations (these will be dropouts in the next electoral period), again depending on a function of motivational characteristics, a function similarly fitting the data. At a

⁶For these eleven politicians, median motive scores are, for achievement, 7.5; power, 7; affiliation, 2.5. The attribute of status concern was assessed from respondents' references to position and deference in their descriptions of satisfactions and dissatisfactions in their own political activity.

⁷In symbols, using obvious mnemonics, the function for a particular individual is

$$[(\text{Ach} \geq 8) \wedge (\text{Pow} \geq 6 \vee \text{Sta}) \wedge (\text{Affil} \leq 3)] \rightarrow [\text{AspirLevel} = \text{OfficeLevel} + 1]$$

It was possible to specify this sort of function from the data in part because of the small number of observations. With more observations, an alternative approach is to estimate parameters for least-squares regression equations with interaction terms.

later stage in the model, the individual's level of aspiration determines whether he can appear on a list of potential candidates for a particular office.

Additional Evidence on Pervasive Effects of Motivation

Other data from the interviews reinforce this use of such configurations of motive scores and expectations in causal explanations of behavior. Two open-ended questions were especially fruitful:

I'd like you to think about something that happened to you in politics that you found particularly satisfying or pleasant—and tell me about it . . . I'd like you to think about something that happened to you in politics that you found particularly *dissatisfying* or *unpleasant* . . .

Both questions were followed by probes designed to elicit the precise emotion attached to the event (Merton *et al.*, 1956). Frequently respondents reported two or three events in each category.

The extent to which the motive test scores are paralleled in responses to these questions is quite astonishing.⁸ Men with high motive scores saturated their responses with references to the corresponding concern and activities; answers produced by low scorers contain no such references.

Two examples must suffice. The first is a politician with the highest affiliative motivation score in the entire sample. All of the six topics he mentions are filled with his concern for helping others, for avoiding any sort of abrasive contact with others and for maintaining a warm and protective circle of relationships. He is first brought into politics at the request of a friend. His principal activity with his fellow politicians is social—playing weekly pinochle, going to the theater in a group. He begins the account of his political activity with the comment, "In politics we have a club". He has run only for elective sinecures (offices without influence over policy), and that only when asked to do so by party leaders. He has no generalized aspirations for office. When he receives financial support during a campaign, what stays in his mind as important is that it signifies the giver's personal regard for him. "When this fellow gave me \$50 for my campaign, and he was in the other party, I knew he meant it". He refuses to accept a patronage job because, "I don't like to have to serve writs on people, it's not a friendly position". The dissatisfying thing about losing an election was "when our candidate for mayor ran so low. I especially like the guy".

The second illustration of the connection between motive scores and political attitudes and behavior is a politician who fits the pattern

⁸A fact which raises the as yet unexplored possibility of scoring responses to such questions rather than to the test pictures of the TAT.

of high achievement and power and low affiliative motive scores. A business executive from a nonpolitical family, he came to the attention of the local Republican leadership when he organized with great vigor a successful fight to protect his neighborhood from an unwanted city development in an adjacent park. The party asked him to run for state senate; he accepted and won. The two themes in his answers are the fascination of passing and defeating legislation (more specifically the satisfaction of playing the game successfully himself) and the satisfaction of doing a good job—that is, the pleasure of exercising influence and the feeling of doing so for a worthy purpose. "This pension bill I put through was very satisfying. It was satisfying when I brought up thirty business leaders to the capital to block the governor's attempt to veto it. Eighty per cent of the bills put in by me were passed. And I put in decent bills". Influence and achievement—the pattern of his motive scores is reflected in his answers to questions about satisfactions and dissatisfactions in politics, and these are the only themes that appear.⁹

These illustrations reinforce the view that the motive scores are measures of intense concerns that are directly engaged in political activity and causally related to several kinds of decisions in political recruitment and to behavior in office.

Representation of Individual and Political System Characteristics in the Model

The model defines an idealized hierarchical structure of electoral districts, for each of which there is a corresponding office. There are twenty basic districts, hence twenty offices at the lowest level of the recruitment structure. Corresponding to groups of five of these lowest-level offices are four middle-level offices and districts. At the top of the structure is the highest office, a single district containing all lower-level districts. The function of this structure of offices is to mirror the constraint placed on potential candidates by the common rule permitting candidacy only in the individual's district of residence.

For each office there are two candidacies, one for each of two parties. Individuals also are characterized by party, and may be assigned only to candidacies of the party to which they belong. For each candidacy there is a list of potential nominees, up to five in number. Potential nominees may be incumbents, nonincumbent aspirants or party recruits.

Individuals are represented in the model by two sets of character-

⁹Many additional illustrations of this phenomenon are presented and analyzed in (Browning, 1960, ch. 4).

istics. One set is determined by the researcher prior to running the model and consists of the following variables:

achievement motive score

affiliative motive score

power motive score

status concern (a (0,1) variable determined from interview responses)

political socialization (-1 negative, 0 none, 1 positive)

lowest-level district of residence (1 through 20)

party (0,1)

age

social status (an occupational prestige ranking)

None of these characteristics is changed by operations in the model except age, which is updated two years in each electoral period, and political socialization. Socialization is interpreted for the purposes of this recruitment model as an expectation of experiencing motive-related satisfactions (for achievement, power, affiliation or status) by running for and holding elective office. Thus individuals assigned a value of +1 on political socialization have had some experience (perhaps but not necessarily in childhood) that leads them to perceive opportunities for satisfying their motives in elective politics. A value of zero implies that the individual does not perceive opportunities for motive-related satisfaction in politics. A nonaspirant (0 on socialization) who accepts recruitment by his party in effect decides that motive-related satisfactions are available in running for or holding office; his socialization indicator is reset from 0 to +1. Likewise, an aspirant (+1) who has been repeatedly defeated in tries for office may decide that opportunities for motive satisfaction are not available to him in elective politics; his socialization indicator is reset to -1, and he drops out of politics.

The "behavior in office" variable requires explanation. On the basis of respondents' answers to the two questions discussed above about satisfying and dissatisfying experiences in politics, five patterns of behavior by office-holders were identified: passive, status-oriented, organization-oriented, policy-concerned and policy-influencing. In the data, these reported patterns of behavior correspond closely to particular, mutually exclusive motive patterns, as listed in Table 1.

Obviously these dimensions do not exhaust the set of interesting kinds of officeholder behavior, nor are they really firmly rooted in the data, relying as I am on small numbers of cases and on politicians' reports of their behavior rather than on some independent measure of behavior. Nevertheless, these categories of behavior do have face validity and relevance, and they were found to be directly associated with mutually exclusive configurations of motive scores.

TABLE 1

Kind of behavior ¹¹	Motive pattern ¹⁰	Reported interests and activities
passive	high Affil	none, or social only; candidate when requested; not eager to hold office.
status-oriented	high Sta, low Ach, low Pow, low or moderate Affil	vigorous activity when position is at stake, otherwise little interest in influencing or in policy; principal gratification from deference, recognition, position
organization-oriented	high Pow, low Ach, low Affil	little interest in policy but great interest and activity in organizational maintenance and control
policy-concerned	high Ach, low Pow, low Affil	attention focused on policy matters but unwilling to engage in prolonged, vigorous influencing; unwilling to attend to organizational maintenance and control
policy-influencing	high Ach, high Pow, low Affil	high levels of influencing activity and satisfaction, focused especially on policy but not avoiding organizational maintenance and control

Other individual decision functions in the model are similar in structure to the functions given above for selection of behavior in office and earlier in the paper for officeholders' levels of aspiration. The various functions differ in selection of explanatory motives and in the numerical values assigned to them.

Although these functions will not be described in more detail here, several consequences of the values of these other functions deserve comment. One function in the model evaluates motivations of non-aspirants in each time period and assigns aspirations for lowest-level offices to individuals with certain motive patterns. The set of motive patterns that meets the criteria of this function is large, however, because the function takes the form of an either-or criterion. The individual need not meet all of a set of motive score criteria, he need only meet any one of them in order to be assigned aspirations in the model. This corresponds to the hypothesis that an individual who has not yet had direct experience with various dimensions of political life may be attracted to politics and develop aspirations for office in response to expectations about only one dimension and to only the one motive engaged by these limited expectations. Thus a larger and more heterogeneous set of individuals develops aspira-

¹⁰Motive patterns are described in words here for simplicity of presentation; in the model, they are defined by numerical values. "Sta" means status concern.

¹¹Rather similar kinds of officeholder behavior are developed and analyzed by Barber (1966). Snowis's discussion of Chicago congressmen touches briefly on related dimensions (1966, esp. 637). See also (Prewitt *et al.*, 1966; Wahlke *et al.*, 1962).

tions in the model than is willing to stay in politics after experience as officeholders with the previously unperceived features of political life.

The difference is especially great between the function which determines whether officeholders will stay in politics and the function which determines an individual's acceptance or rejection of his party's effort to recruit him to a candidacy. Several individuals in the data were brought into politics and persuaded to run for office by friends. These men all scored high in affiliative concern, and they all seem to have felt at the time that when a friend asks you to do something, you really have no choice, you have to say yes. It appeared easier to these men to acquiesce at first and to ignore at the moment of acquiescence the possibility of painful interpersonal conflict and pressure, or even just of cold, unprotective relationships, in political activity and officeholding. It is an easier task to get these men into politics than to keep them in, however; they are prominent among the dropouts. For party leaders seeking candidates, these men would appear to have distinct value—they are easy marks at first and will not develop ambitions of their own after a taste of power. The phenomenon is realized in the model by requiring in one function that individuals with high affiliative motivation acquiesce if contacted by party recruiters, and by requiring in another function that officeholders with high affiliative motivation develop negative attitudes toward political activity (the socialization variable is set to -1) and refuse to run again for office.

Specifying Functions for Political System Characteristics

The steps in Figure 1 which are not estimated mainly from the data must nevertheless be specified in order to yield in the model a selection of candidates, then of officeholders, from the group of aspirants and recruits determined by the individual decision functions. Steps 2 (recruitment by leaders), 6 (nomination), and 7 (election) in Figure 1 must be accomplished somehow.

The functions for these steps in the model are not necessarily regarded as explanations of the phenomena. Explanatory functions may be devised or estimated from data and inserted into the model, but these functions may also be written with the less ambitious objective of producing a range of roughly plausible aggregate outcomes, e.g. rates of turnover in office, rates of accession from office to office, distribution of time periods in office to individuals, and the like (Schlesinger, 1966). Different versions of the model ought to produce statistics that vary widely within known ranges of these variables. If the model statistics do not vary sufficiently to cover the known ranges, or if they stray widely outside these ranges, adjustments to model functions are in order.

The functions for recruitment, nomination, and election are the principal direct representations in the model of political system characteristics, as distinguished from the model's representations of the behavior of individuals in a population. An important characteristic of recruitment in a political system, for example, is the extent to which the recruitment decisions of party leaders and their control over nominations determine the flow of officeholders and thus reduce a nonrecruited aspirant's expectations of winning office and therefore his willingness to develop aspirations for office. The existence of an actively used primary election system is an obvious example of the structural variables that can be relevant at this level.

Similarly, political system characteristics such as the distribution of party identification have rather stable influences in some cases on the chances that a candidate of a particular party will win election. A political system characteristic that systematically affects the distribution of offices to candidates, whether on the basis of party or other characteristics, can be represented by an appropriate function written into the election step of the model. Provision can be made for a range of levels of dominance by one of the parties. Incumbents can be given a probabilistic advantage over nonincumbents. Functions might be written to produce more or less large shifts in the proportion of offices won by each party from one election to the next, or more or less large differences among districts. The effects of each of these possibilities on model outcomes, such as turnover rates or the behavior patterns of officeholders, can be evaluated by running the model with different functions and comparing outcomes.

For the nomination function in the model, a similar set of possibilities comes to mind which appears to capture important features of real political systems. In addition, functions for recruitment of candidates by party leaders can be written so as to vary the proportion of nominations preempted by recruitment (i.e., the proportion of candidacies barred to self-starting aspirants). Or party recruits can be given a probabilistic advantage vis-a-vis aspirants who initiate their own candidacies. Consequences of these variations in the model can be evaluated by running it and comparing outcomes produced under each variation. Alternatively, if data are available to which some of the functions in the model can be fitted, a partial test of the descriptive accuracy of the unfitted portions of the model may be obtained by comparing predicted with actual outcomes.

Interaction Between System Characteristics and Individual Behavior

The functions for individual decisions in the present initial version of the model fit the data from the Eastport study. It is highly

likely that the values of these data and functions depend directly on the presence of certain political system characteristics in Eastport. In Eastport strongly power- and achievement-motivated men run only for those offices that they perceive will enable them to exercise influence over important policy or to move up to higher office. These perceptions and the facts they reflect vary not only among offices within a particular system but also between systems. In a study similar in part to the Eastport research, Herbert Jacob found that politicians in two parishes in Louisiana perceived local government policies to be rather unimportant and that there was a much lower likelihood of moving up to higher office in the Louisiana parishes than in Eastport. These differences in political system characteristics were reflected in higher levels of power and achievement motivation among officeholders in Eastport than in the two parishes (Browning and Jacob, 1964).

This interaction between political system opportunities and individual motives means that the variations in system functions in the simulation model must be accompanied by variations in functions which predict individuals' decisions from motive patterns. The values of the parameters for individuals' decisions must be altered as we shift in the model from a set of system characteristics like those of Eastport to different functions representing different political systems. If in a system with zero opportunities for advancement or policy influence strongly power- and achievement-motivated men will not be attracted to competition for elective public office, this hypothesis must be expressed in different parameters for achievement and power motivation in the statement that specifies an individual's decision to run for office as a joint function of his motives and his expectations.

Two questions arise:

How are relationships between system functions and individual decision functions to be specified? I am using three sources of data to make this specification: the findings from Eastport and Louisiana, data from the experimental studies relating motivation to behavior, and the extensive findings of a national survey which relates motivation to demographic variables and to occupational and family behavior and attitudes (Veroff and Feld, 1967; Veroff *et al.*, 1960; Atkinson and Feather, 1966, ch. 13).¹²

While these are not very secure or precise underpinnings, they

¹² The survey data provide information about the joint distributions of motivation and occupational status which will facilitate insertion of the status variable into functions in the model even though it is held constant in the Eastport data. In addition, the survey data guide the construction of a range of plausible populations for simulation runs.

do provide reasonably consistent and plausible directions, providing guidance that is quite specific in some cases.

What difference does it make to change individual decision functions when system functions are changed? In general, it affects outcomes. To continue an illustration introduced above, one consequence of setting lower values for achievement and power motive parameters in models of systems with very low probabilities of advancement and policy influence will be the prediction of lower levels of achievement and power motivation among aspirants for office in such systems. Lower achievement and power motivation among aspirants are likely to show up in lower levels of these motives among officeholders. This in turn will lead to different predictions about the distribution of patterns of officeholders' behavior. Probably there will be a lower incidence of policy-influencing behavior and a higher incidence of policy-concerned, organization-oriented and status-oriented behavior.

The opportunity to examine patterns of model outcomes under various hypotheses about values of functions is the principal reason for actually running versions of the model on the computer. This amounts to examining the implications of alternative assumptions about the world—to ascertaining the precise implications of a network of precise alternative assumptions.

As an illustration, suppose that the distributions of motives in the population fluctuate randomly over time as some members are removed and new members enter. This means that the number of individuals meeting the motivational criteria for aspiration to candidacy will fluctuate, too. What fluctuations does this produce in distributions of motive patterns among officeholders? How often will such random fluctuations produce officeholders with strong achievement and power concerns, the types of leaders we would expect to be vigorous and innovative? Reasonable answers to questions of this sort about the effects of natural fluctuations in the population are made possible by the model. Another benefit of running versions of the model on the computer will accrue from sensitivity analysis. In the present research, this means locating which functions have strong impacts on model outcomes and which have only weak effects under varying assumptions about the political system and about characteristics of the population. This procedure is certain to locate conditions under which for instance none of the functions based on motivation have major effects on outcomes, as well as circumstances under which the motivational variables are important. The identification of the conditions under which these possibilities occur will sharpen the preparation of alternative hypotheses, which will in turn sharpen specifications for future data collection.

In Conclusion . . .

Of the methods of empirical research and theoretical construction mentioned in this paper, several with especially clear advantages deserve special emphasis. With respect to the collection of data:

(a) There is a high payoff in studying politicians and non-politicians simultaneously. Strong inferences about why some people run for office and others do not are possible only if the others are scrutinized with the same measures as the politicians.

(b) There is a high payoff, especially if a research objective is to bring out effects of personality on behavior, in selecting observations in such a way as to be able to control (as in this research through matching) confounding social variables.

(c) There is a high payoff in searching for interactions in the effects of motivations and expectations on political behavior. These variables may have strong effects on behavior that are simply not captured in the sorts of statistical analysis researchers in this field are accustomed to. Bivariate correlations will not do, neither will multiple correlation and regression methods if only additive models are used.


(d) There is a high payoff in gathering data and performing the analysis with an explicit theory in mind.

So far as the model is concerned, most of the uses for it fall in the category of preparation for future empirical research, research which remains to be done. The empirical research need not cover the full range of situations outlined in the model. It is necessary only that the research test *some* hypotheses or *some* predictions laid out in some part of the model. The model provides hypotheses for verification (Naylor *et al.*, 1966, ch. 8) and, more likely, modification, and working mechanisms into which additional hypotheses and verified propositions can be inserted as knowledge grows.

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Personality and the Explanation of Political Phenomena at the Social-System Level: A Methodological Statement

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It is a commonplace that the personalities of individual actors are important determinants of political phenomena. Consider the following illustrations:

A discrete action of a single individual—for example, a vote—is evidently determined by the interaction of a number of psychological variables: his motives, his attitudes, the information he possesses, his conception of himself as citizen, and so on. In this example, personality factors are directly *causal*, even though they may have themselves been determined by the individual's past and present social involvements.

When many such actions are aggregated into a rate, and when we attempt to explain variations in this rate by factors that transcend the personalities of any single individual, personality factors still are part of the explanation. For example, if we wish to trace the influence of social class on voting patterns, we employ at least the implicit psychological assumption that people's class positions influence their attitudes, and that these attitudes—thus influenced—determine in part the way an individual decides to vote. In this example personality factors mediate between social determinants and behavioral outcomes.

When we move to a more general level and attempt to account

for certain features of a complex political structure (for example, a bureaucracy such as the State Department), personality factors operate in correspondingly more complex ways. Personality factors determine in part who is recruited into the organization; what kind of impact the structure has on these recruits; whether they do or do not conform to the normative expectations that are part of their roles; how they react to authorities in the structure; whether or not they decide to leave the structure; and so on. In this example personality factors *interact* with other types of determinants.

In this essay I do not intend to elaborate the commonplace that personality is an important determinant of political phenomena. Rather I intend to explore some of the problems that arise in conceptualizing how this influence operates. Thus it will be a methodological rather than a substantive essay. But it will be methodological in a theoretical rather than an empirical sense. It will not deal so much with the canons for verifying empirical propositions as with the canons for establishing conceptual relations among the ingredients of systematic explanations. I shall begin the essay by creating a simple hypothetical model of political behavior, indicating how personality variables contribute to the outcomes generated by the model. Next I shall review a number of fundamental theoretical problems involved in incorporating personality variables into the explanation of political—or more generally, social—phenomena, illustrating these problems by some references to “national character”. Finally, I shall attempt to draw a few lessons from the foregoing.

The Place of Psychological Factors in the Explanation of Political Phenomena:

The essential ingredients of an explanation of behavioral phenomena—whether these be political or some other kind of phenomena—are the following: (a) The statement of a problem, which involves specification of a range of behavior, variations in which we wish to explain. The statement of this problem identifies the *dependent variables*. (b) The identification of variables to account for variations in the dependent variables. These are commonly referred to as *independent variables*. (c) The organization of the several variables into some kind of conceptual framework. The simplest way to organize variables is to form *hypotheses*, which relate one variable to another in a causal way. More elaborate forms of conceptual organization are found in *models* or *theories*, which combine a number of variables and hypotheses into a system, on the basis of which various outcomes can be generated. The empirical testing of any explanation involves the identification of indices for each variable,

and the attempt to assess the empirical validity of the posited relations among variables. But in this essay I emphasize the conceptual relations among variables.

A Hypothetical Example


The ingredients of an explanatory system can be grasped by following a simple hypothetical example. Let us suppose that our field of interest is municipal politics, and we wish to explain variations in three variables—the level of political corruption, the average municipal tax rate, and the rate of turnover of elected municipal officials. Let us suppose further that the problems of establishing valid and measurable empirical indices for these three variables have been overcome more or less satisfactorily. According to the hypothetical model I am now advancing, the following relations hold among the three variables: When elected officials achieve a reasonably secure tenure through repeated re-election (that is, when there is low turnover) these officials will begin to feel free to dip into public funds to reward relatives, friends, cronies and political supporters. As these practices increase, pressures on public funds begin to accumulate, and the officials find it necessary to hike various municipal taxes to meet these pressures. The tax increases, however, infuriate those portions of the local populace that are not receiving the benefits of patronage. As a consequence, voters begin to turn against the local officials in succeeding elections, and the rate of turnover in office increases. As new officials are elected, they proceed to "clean up" corruption by a series of reforms and are thereby enabled to reduce taxes. In this way they gain the continued support of the electorate and are retained in office in succeeding elections. Having been granted this security in office, however, the new crop of officials begins to indulge once again in corrupt practices, and this initiates once again the complex sequence just described.

In this example the dependent variables are three well-known types of political phenomena—corruption, taxes and turnover. But these variables also turn out to be the independent variables, since each dependent variable is represented as a function of the others. The tax rate is at one time a direct function of the level of corruption, at a later time a direct function of the level of turnover of officials. The level of corruption is a direct function of the rate of turnover of officials. And the rate of turnover of officials is a direct function of the tax rate. In this particular model the distinction between independent and dependent variables becomes completely relative, since each variable is a function of the others. Each variable is assessed as independent or dependent, depending on the point entry is made

into the model; moreover, each variable may be considered independent or dependent, or simultaneously both.

I have organized the particular variables in this model so that they stand in *equilibrium* relation with one another; a change in any one variable initiates change in the others, and these changes in turn feed back and produce changes in the initiating variable.¹ These particular relations, moreover, produce a series of interrelated cyclical movements among the three variables. These movements can be represented graphically as follows:

FIGURE 1



The rate of turnover of officials is represented by the solid line; the level of corruption by the dashed line; and the average tax rate by the dotted line. Continued tenure in office (the level solid line) permits a rise in corruption. After a lag, the increase in the tax rate begins, and this in turn precipitates a turnover of officials at election time. Subsequently all three variables decrease sharply, but after a time the level of corruption begins to creep upward again, thus initiating the cyclical pattern for each variable. The contour of each cycle, however, varies because the units of each variable differ in their degree of divisibility. It is possible, for example, to represent corrup-

¹The choice of an equilibrium type of model does not make my arguments any less general in their applicability. The principle of equilibrium is not something different from other types of explanatory model, but is simply one alternative method of generating explanations and predictions about empirical phenomena.

tion as rising and falling smoothly, since it can be increased or decreased by very small increments. By contrast, the tax rate must be represented by a more irregular contour, since it can be changed only by discrete acts of legislation. The rate of turnover of officials shows an even more irregular course, since it can be changed only at election time (say, every two years). Despite these different contours, the cyclical movements are determined primarily by the functional relations among the three variables.

The Given Data—The Parameters . . .

Up to this point, personality variables have not appeared in the model. Indeed, the model is represented only as a series of interrelations among several behavioral indices. How do personality variables exercise their influence? To answer this question we must identify yet another ingredient of explanatory systems. Previously we have identified the *variables* themselves and the *relations* among the variables, from which were able to generate a number of predictions. But a third and very important ingredient of any explanatory system is the *given data* or *parameters*. These are phenomena that are known or suspected to influence the relations among the variables—and hence the outputs of the system—but variations in which are assumed to be frozen by analytic controls. In this way their influence on the variables is either held constant or otherwise neutralized. The given data, then, "lie beyond the analytical ambition of the model, in the sense that they are determining rather than determined" (Kuenne, 1963, 5). Furthermore, the nature and extent of their determining influence is controlled by conceptual manipulation.

The given data, or parameters, of an explanatory system may be broken down into several subclasses:

(a) Certain assumptions are made concerning the stability of the empirical world lying beyond the limits of the model. For example, the hypothetical model I have developed contains a great many unspoken but important assumptions—that no major economic depression hits the municipalities whose political behavior is being studied; that no major changes are made in criminal law affecting corrupt practices; that no major international war develops; and that the municipalities are free from natural catastrophes and famines. In addition, certain psychological "constants" are tacitly assumed—that the citizenry does not reject the constitutional framework of the municipality as illegitimate, that a majority of the electorate are not ignorant of the political phenomena, and so on.

Any explanatory model rests on an almost interminable list of assumptions about aspects of the "rest of the world" outside the model that do *not* vary. Some of these assumptions are psychological

in character. It would be pedantic to attempt to list all such assumptions for every model that is generated; but, notwithstanding, it should be remembered that significant variations in the phenomena ruled out by these assumptions would influence—if not overwhelm—the relations posited in the model.

(b) Certain determinants outside the system are assumed to influence the variables, but in an unvarying way. For example, as indicated, the fact that municipal elections are held only every two years makes for a very irregular rising and falling of the line representing turnover in office, though the cause of the rising and falling movements themselves is found in the interrelations among the primary variables. Or, to take a psychological example, it is assumed that an adequate supply of political motivation exists in the population of the municipality, so that there will be an available pool of motivated individuals to seek municipal offices. Such variables do intrude on the model—and thus differ from the first type of parameter, which is assumed not to influence the model—but this intrusion is of a constant, not a variable character.

(c) Explanatory models also incorporate assumptions that "intervene" between the primary variables. For example, one of the principal connections in the illustrative model is between length of tenure in office and level of corruption. This connection rests on certain psychological assumptions about political officials—namely, that in a secure position they come to feel that they can engage in quasilegitimate political activities. If this psychological assumption is modified, the relations among the primary variables is modified accordingly. For example, if it is postulated that position in office increases officials' sense of integrity and public obligation, the relation between tenure in office and level of corruption is reversed.

The assumptions that intervene between the primary variables "make sense" of the relations among the variables. If it is asked why tenure of office is positively correlated with increasing corruption, the answer is found in the psychology of the elected officials. In addition, these intervening assumptions provide at least a partial account of the *mechanisms* by which the primary variables influence one another. In the example I assumed that one primary variable (continuity in office) has certain psychological consequences for officials, that the officials will behave in accord with these consequences, and that their behavior will result in a change in another primary variable (corruption). Thus, even though the intervening assumptions do not vary—and thereby fall into the category of "given data"—they provide a service in linking the primary variables to one another.

The Choice of Parameters . . .

An explanatory model can be legitimately criticized on the basis of its choice of parameters as well as its choice of relations among primary variables. For example, in linking tenure of office directly with corruption, I introduced a psychological view of office holders as primarily opportunistic. On the other hand, in linking the tax rate directly to the rate of turnover of officials, I introduced a psychological view of the electorate as righteously indignant. A critic of my model might well ask whether I have adopted one psychological perspective for political leaders and another for political followers; and, if so, why; and, indeed, whether either perspective is justified. To choose another example: in characterizing the response of the electorate to increasing corruption and tax burdens, I assumed that they would choose to express their dissatisfaction only at the polls, and would not resort to violent assault on political officials or to attempt themselves to seize the reigns of municipal power. A critic might well ask why I chose to view the citizenry as so tame and respectful of law and order; he might suggest further that if I viewed it otherwise, I would be closer to the truth about human nature, and, in addition, would create a very different kind of model.

Having specified these ingredients of an explanatory system—variables, relations and several categories of given data—it is possible to indicate what is involved in the *derivation of hypotheses* from an explanatory model. Derivation consists of systematically and exhaustively specifying the implications of *both* the given data and the relations among variables for the variations in the dependent variables. A portion of a variable's variation can be predicted by virtue of the ways in which the parameters—some of which are psychological—constrict or intrude upon the model. Or to put it in other words, "the variables of the model . . . are determined . . . by the constraining interaction of the [given] data and the interrelations that exist among the [given] data and variables by virtue of the natural or behavioral assumptions of the model, or both" (Kuenne, 1963, 5).

Finally, it should be noted that the distinction between variables and parameters (given data) is a relative one, and that by relaxing the analytic assumptions that "freeze" the parameters, these may become operative variables, and considered in relation to the other operative variables in the explanatory system. Suppose, for example, I had wished to vary the heretofore constant assumption that the citizenry does not reject the constitutional framework as illegitimate. Having done so, I would have made the level of legitimization into an operative variable rather than a parametric

assumption, and could then have traced the influence of its variations on the other variables in the system. Alternatively, operative variables can be converted into parameters by changing the assumptions regarding them. The refinement of an explanatory model consists in part in the selective and systematic relaxation of assumptions—that is, treating new kinds of data as variables and adding to knowledge about the principles governing the working of the system. Furthermore, as is evident from my example, it is perfectly legitimate to convert parameters concerning psychological assumptions into operative variables, thus incorporating psychological factors into the model as primary variables. Of course, there is a limit to the operation of relaxing parametric assumptions; as more and more assumptions are relaxed, the explanatory system becomes conceptually more unwieldy because of the increasing numbers of uncontrolled variables.

Personality Variables . . .

From what has been said thus far, it would appear that there is no reason to suppose that personality variables cannot be incorporated systematically into the enterprise of explaining social—including political—phenomena. Yet on closer examination a number of difficulties arise. The statements concerning personality in the illustrative model are cast in a very simple form. Mainly they seem to be assumptions that "fit" conveniently between associated aggregated rates and render intelligible their association. In addition, they often seem questionable as empirical generalizations. Surely the assumption that tenure in office breeds personal corruptibility is not true of all office-holders; surely a variety of effects of tenure are empirically observable, and this variety depends in part on the personality differences of individuals in office. But if we allow for this diversity of psychological effects, the theoretical rationale for connecting time in office with corruption is weakened accordingly.

A paradox thus emerges from these observations. In explaining aggregated political phenomena it is convenient, even necessary to employ personality variables. Yet at the same time the investigator is apparently forced to rely on oversimple and empirically inadequate formulations of personality. This paradox traces in part to the fact that in constructing explanations the investigator frequently attempts to argue causally across several distinct levels—for example, from personality to aggregated social rate; from personality to social structure; from culture to personality; and so on. I now turn to a brief consideration of the problems involved in moving from one conceptual level to another in constructing systematic explanations.

Some Problems in Relating Psychological Variables to Other Variables

As the various natural and social sciences have developed, there have emerged several distinctive "levels of analysis" of behavioral data—for example, the physiological, the psychological, the economic, the political, the social and the cultural. These several levels represent aspects, or ways of looking at a common body of behavioral data. It should be stressed that the data of the empirical world do not belong inherently to any one of these conceptual systems. An outburst of anger, for example, may have a physiological aspect in that it is associated with various glandular and muscular reactions; it may have a psychological aspect in that it gives rise to recriminations of conscience; and it may have a social aspect in so far as it constitutes a strain on the relations among a group of friends. The conceptual status of an empirical datum, then, is determined by the conceptual system to which it is referred for assessment and explanation (Smelser and Smelser, 1963).

In the behavioral sciences the existing "levels of analysis" are very numerous, and, because these sciences are not adequately codified, they are frequently overlapping and cross-cutting. In this essay I intend neither to catalogue the existing conceptual levels in the behavioral sciences, nor to develop yet another version of my own. However, I shall distinguish among several conceptual levels, the relations among which are important for understanding the place of personality variables in explaining political and other social phenomena.

. . . The *personality* level focuses on the individual person as a system of needs, feelings, aptitudes, skills, defenses, or on one or more processes, such as the learning of skills, considered in detail. In all cases the organizing conceptual unit is the individual person.

. . . The *aggregated personality* level also involves characteristics of individuals, but treats these characteristics in terms of their multiple occurrence in many individuals or in a certain percentage of individuals out of a total. Thus, to say that 57 per cent of Americans favor the current conduct of foreign policy is to aggregate a number of individual personality characteristics (in this case attitudes) and to relate this number to a larger population of personalities.

. . . The *structural* level focuses on certain relations that emerge when two or more persons interact with one another. Here the basic units of analysis are not persons as such, but selected aspects of interaction among persons, such as roles (for example, husband, church-member, citizen) and social organization, which refers to patterned clusters of roles (for example, a clique, a political party). This level is similar to what Lazarsfeld and Menzel refer to as "structural properties" of collectives—those properties "which are ob-

tained by performing some operation on data about the relations of each member to some or all of the others" (Lazarsfeld and Menzel, 1961, 428). Structure is conceptualized on the basis of relational aspects of members of a population, not on some aggregated version of attributes of the individual members. Much of the literature on roles and social organization in the behavioral sciences is pitched at this structural level.

. . . The *cultural* level, which applies to the values, cosmologies, knowledge, expressive symbols, etc., of social units. The cultural level is an example of what Lazarsfeld and Menzel call "global" properties of collectives (Lazarsfeld and Menzel, 1961, 428-429). They are based neither on aggregated characteristics of individual members of a social unit nor on specific relations among the individuals. Being global, they characterize the social unit as a whole, and thus transcend the particular qualities of individual persons and specific structural relations.

Explanations in the social sciences are frequently characterized by the fact that independent variables are conceptualized at a different level of analysis from the dependent variable. The very phrase, "the impact of personality on the political system" suggests just such a transition—from the personality level (whether individual or aggregated) to a certain type of structural level. Or to choose another example, the attempt to explain the content of cultural productions, such as myths and folklore, by reference to personality dispositions laid down in childhood involves a transition from the personality to the cultural level (Kardiner, 1945). Explanatory models that incorporate a number of different variables often involve several such transitions. There is nothing illegitimate in building such transitions into explanatory models—indeed, they are necessary if we are to achieve adequate explanations. But such transitions involve a number of methodological problems, which, if not overcome, can detract from the adequacy of explanations. I shall illustrate some of these methodological problems by reference to some of the conceptions of "national character", as that term has been employed in the past several decades.

In Illustration . . .

Most conceptualizations of national character are of two types:

. . . A global concept characterizing an entire society or civilization (Benedict, 1946b). When national character is conceptualized in this way—as an attribute of an entire social unit—it is difficult to distinguish it analytically from descriptions of cultural patterns as such. Commenting on the literature on national character, Nett observed that

the reader of the materials on both value orientations and national character sometimes has difficulty observing the differences between the two; he is frequently confronted with lists of alleged personality traits ascribed to individ-

ual persons which coincide with lists of value-orientations of nation-societies (Nett, 1957, 297).

. . . An aggregated-personality concept, which refers to a statistical distribution of personality characteristics in a given social unit. This is the concept most closely associated with the term "modal personality", which was generated at least in part as an effort to avoid the confusion between the personality and the cultural levels, and to provide a distinctively psychological basis for defining and using a concept such as national character (Inkeles and Levinson, 1954, 979-983).

From the definitional standpoint, the second conceptualization is superior to the first, since its definitional units (personality variables) and its level of reference (individual persons) lie at the same conceptual level. Even if defined as modal personality, however, a number of difficulties arise when aggregated personality characteristics are incorporated into explanatory models. Consider the following illustrations:

. . . A conception of modal personality may be brought to bear on the explanation of a discrete historical phenomenon; an example would be the many efforts to attribute the rise of the Nazi movement to certain authoritarian features of Germans' personalities. Such explanations are necessarily subject to that kind of indeterminacy that arises when a disposition is called upon to explain an event. Most of the terms that enter into personality descriptions are dispositional—attitudes toward authority, submissiveness, and so on. Most of these terms have an extended time-reference; indeed, they are the kinds of dispositions that are transmitted over many generations of child-training. The difficulty that arises can be posed by the following question: "Even though the logic of the historical instance (e.g., the Nazi movement) corresponds in some way with the logic of the personality dispositions (authoritarianism), why did the historical movement occur at one rather than another historical point in time"? The implication of this query is that dispositional concepts should be conceptualized as parameters, which set limits within which other variables interact to determine the precise timing of the event.

. . . A conception of modal personality may be brought to bear on some other type of aggregated personality characteristic. Suppose, for example, the preference for Republican candidates is found to be positively correlated with authoritarianism in a given sample. Such a relationship avoids the dispositional fallacy—since both variables are dispositional—but, if interpreted in terms of a causal psychological connection between authoritarianism and Republican preference, may involve a statistical fallacy, namely reading from associations

among aggregated attributes to internal psychological associations. This statistical fallacy is a more general version of what Robinson calls the "ecological fallacy" of arguing directly from ecological distributions of data to individual personality states (Robinson, 1950). The implication of this fallacy is that associations between two sets of aggregated psychological data should be supplemented with research on individuals to establish the validity of the psychological connections that presumably would account for the association.

. . . A conception of modal personality may be brought to bear on the explanation of some sort of political structure or global political value. The typical argument is that certain personality dispositions, generated by childhood, act in some way to sustain a certain structure or set of policies at the national level. Consider two classic examples. Erikson, noting the relatively egalitarian structure of the American family, argues that certain accommodative dispositions regarding conflict and its resolution arise from such a family structure and argues further that political processes in Congress recapitulate the familial mode of problem-solving (Erikson, 1950, Chapter 8). Again, Benedict argues that Japanese attitudes toward hierarchy—themselves a product mainly of familial experiences—sustained the structure of Japanese foreign policy before and during World War II:

There was anarchy in the world as long as every nation had absolute sovereignty; it was necessary for [Japan] to fight to establish a hierarchy—under Japan, of course, since she alone represented a nation truly hierarchical from top to bottom and hence understood the necessity of taking "one's proper place" (Benedict, 1946a, 21).

To put these arguments in the methodological language employed in this essay, they constitute efforts to explain a structural or cultural characteristic (a characteristic of the social unit as a whole) by reference to some aggregation of personality variables (characteristics of the individual members of the social unit).

Such arguments bristle with methodological problems. First, in so far as they rest on loose analogies between, say, family structure and the political structure of the larger society, personality as an operative variable almost disappears, since it appears to be molded uniformly from the family structure and to feed uniformly into sustaining a political structure. In addition, a more subtle problem arises, because the variable to be explained (a political structure, a political value) is an attribute of the entire system—and described at that level—the investigator is tempted to universalize or otherwise oversimplify the impact of the psychological characteristics of the individual members on the structural or cultural characteristic. Even if he qualifies his argument by acknowledging that the personality

characteristics are only "modal" and that other personality types exist in the system, the problem is not overcome but rather is translated into a new version of the problem: How large does the "mode" have to be in order to sustain a structure in the social unit? And do the other personality types sustain this structure in different ways, or do they tend to subvert or change it? These problems arise—and cannot be dealt with effectively—because we do not at present have the methodological capacity to argue causally from a mixture of aggregated states of individual members of a system to a global characteristic of the system.

Some Conceptual Strategies Emerging from the Above Considerations

This essay has raised many more problems than it has resolved, and in the space that remains I cannot hope to do more than indicate a few directions for theoretical formulations and empirical research that might resolve these problems. I would suggest the following strategies:

(a) In any explanatory model it is essential to maintain the distinction between parameters (given data) and operative variables and to acknowledge the different explanatory work done by each. In the hypothetical model discussed above, it became apparent that parameters serve the following functions: to set limits on the explanatory ambition of the model by specifying what variables are *not* operative; to limit the range of outcomes of the model by ruling out many classes of outcomes; and to specify the intervening links among the associated operative variables in the model. Yet the parameters themselves, no matter how carefully formulated, do not determine specific outcomes and specific events. To do this it is necessary to introduce temporal variations of the variables that are conceived as operating within the framework established by the parametric assumptions.

This strategy has implications for incorporating personality variables into explanatory models. Since most personality variables—conceptions of the self, attitudes toward authority, and so on—are dispositional in nature, they cannot be employed effectively to predict the occurrences of specific behavioral outcomes. Accordingly, it would seem appropriate to formulate these variables as parameters in explanatory models, *within* which the interplay of specific events occurs. These personality variables are determinative in that they rule out certain classes of outcome and create a presumption in favor of other classes of outcome, but this determination is general rather than specific. Put another way, dispositional personality concepts

set limits and reduce the determinancy of outcomes, but they do not serve as causes in the usual sense of the term. (This reasoning applies to the role of dispositional concepts at the social level as well.)


(b) The preceding paragraphs have two further implications. The first is that whenever patterns of personality dispositions are used to explain social events and situations (for example, the foreign policy of a nation), they should not be treated as simple causes, but should be incorporated into explanatory models that are "open" and make use of conditional predictions. The modal personality pattern of a nation should be conceptualized as encouraging a range of structural or behavioral outcomes, not a specific outcome. If the investigator wishes to make the connection between a personality variable and a specific outcome more determinate, he should do so by attempting to specify *under what additional conditions* this connection is to be expected. This strategy preserves the necessarily indeterminate relation between dispositional personality variables and specific outcomes, but permits the investigator to reduce this indeterminacy by introducing new variables that progressively narrow the range of outcomes.

(c) The second implication is that in relating personality to social-system outcomes it is advisable to dispense with the conventional meaning of "cause"—i.e., one event as caused by another temporally prior event—in favor of some alternative conceptualization. Given the difficulties in establishing simple connections among variables that lie at different levels, it is preferable to rely on conceptions such as probability chains, interactive and feedback systems of variables, and the like.

(d) A final strategy arises in connection with the use of personality variables as intervening concepts that "make sense" of an association between aggregated, structural or cultural concepts. (An illustration is Benedict's notion that hierarchical attitudes toward authority intervene between family structure and foreign policy in Japan.) In assessing the validity of such assertions, the investigator must have available *three* distinct kinds of data—each established independently. The first is evidence establishing that hierarchical attitudes toward authority are in fact a product of experiences within a certain kind of family structure. The second is evidence establishing the intrapsychic connection between these general attitudinal dispositions toward authority and specifically political attitudes about national policy. The third is evidence establishing that such political attitudes are in fact important determinants of national policy. If these types of evidence are assembled, the investigator is able to fill in the imputed causal chain linking family structure and political phenomena. He is also more nearly able to avoid both loose arguments by analogy and statistical fallacies.

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Man and World Politics: The Psycho-Cultural Interface*

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In every discipline, the would-be theorizer must eventually come to grips with the age-old issue of the parts-versus-the-whole, or the components-versus-the-system. This issue divides, in turn, into two fairly distinguishable subissues. First, what is the relative importance of each for explanatory purposes? Can we develop a satisfactory general theory without any regard for the parts, the particles the particular? Is inclusion of them desirable, necessary, sufficient? How much attention can we pay to micro-level entities and phenomena without invading an unfamiliar discipline, without becoming extreme reductionists? These questions cannot, of course, be answered in even the most tentative fashion until we devise an acceptable solution to the second subissue: what sort of conceptual scheme permits us to embrace parts as well as whole, or allows us to explicitly ignore one or the other? Can we develop a paradigm which gets at the interplay between micro- and macro-level phenomena? How is the interface between them best formulated and described?

For the social scientist, the issue—in one way or another—is that of relating the individual to all those social groups of which he is a

*The organization of this paper and the development of its argument have benefited from the comments and criticism of Fred I. Greenstein, Karl W. Deutsch, Guy E. Swanson, Harry Gollob and Michael Wallace; the final revision is, of course, my responsibility and not theirs.

member, as well as understanding the relationship between the smaller of these groups and the larger. In sociology and psychology, the hybrid discipline of social psychology has largely emerged in response to this set of questions. In anthropology, the personality-and-culture approach represented a serious, if not fully successful, effort to cope with the matter (Cohen, 1961; Hsu, 1961; Kluckhohn and Murray, 1953). In economics, the impression is that all but a handful of brave, but nonempirical, theorists have preferred to ignore the problem for the present, with the consumer, the firm and the market generally serving to identify the separate fields of interest. In political science, it has indeed been a traditional preoccupation, with man-versus-the-state and individual freedom-versus-public order very much on our minds. But as we have shifted from prescientific to more rigorous methodologies, we seem to have suffered from the same sorts of separatist tendencies as the economists, even to the extent that the philosophical issues in the discipline have been defined in so irrelevant a fashion as that of the "behaviorists" (usually at the individual level) versus the "institutionalists".

In the world politics field, the picture is much the same. Some of us concentrate on individuals (or at least their attitudes and opinions) and others concentrate on the foreign policies of the nations, with a smaller third group focussing upon the international system.¹ Even the psychologists and sociologists who have lately ventured into the world politics field, despite their many valuable and promising contributions, have tended to shy away from any systematic effort to integrate psychological and societal phenomena.²

Rejoining Men with Their Political System

In order to get on with theory building and hypothesis testing it is necessary to bring the parts and the whole together, but in a more rigorous fashion than has been evident in the past. This need for rejoining men and their political systems is essential for at least two reasons. First, without paradigms that embrace both the micro- and macro-levels, we cannot advance very far in answering the question: how much latitude do individual citizens and decision making elites

¹ Among those who have concerned themselves with the micro-macro issue, either explicitly or implicitly, there seems to be the familiar division into two schools of thought; one might be called the ecological determinist school, exemplified in the thoughtful analysis developed by Waltz (1959), and the other might be called the individual autonomy viewpoint. Among the handful of explicit but pre-operational efforts to synthesize these viewpoints are Sprout and Sprout (1965), Wolfers (1959), and Singer (1961).

² Two exceptions come to mind. One is an early article by Angell (1955) and the other is the recent anthology edited by Kelman (1965), especially his own opening and closing chapters. See also Stratton (1929), Murphy (1945), and Klineberg (1964).

enjoy in world politics? Or to put it another way, what is the relative potency of men vis-a-vis their institutions?³ Second, we can seldom get very far in answering more specific theoretical and policy questions if we work with paradigms that leave out either the individual or the larger environment. By definition, any paradigm which ignores one or the other remains woefully incomplete.⁴

While the behavior of men or of social systems may be *described*, and perhaps even *predicted*, without recourse to such variables, no satisfactory *explanation* is possible until we understand the psychological link which joins man to his sociopolitical environment, and through which each impinges on the other. In the absence of a judicious and well-balanced conceptual scheme, moreover, we will continue to suffer from two extremes of misinterpretation. On the one hand, there is the traditional view which sees individuals—be they members of an elite or of a mass public—as more or less irrelevant to an understanding of world politics. On the other, there is the tendency to anthropomorphize and to describe nations in such personal terms as aggressive, intro-punitive, sadistic, narcissistic, ego-defensive and the like. Closely related to this is the tendency to assume that any character trait which is widely distributed within the population provides a sufficient basis for understanding that nation's foreign policies.

The purpose of this paper, then, is to examine the interface between individual man and the larger societal environment, from a world politics point of view, and at the same time avoid both types of pitfall. My intent is to do this via a concentration on those variables which join man to that environment: psychological variables. Given the centrality of this problem to any potential theory of world politics, and the relative inattention to it to date, my hope here is to address it in a fashion which may clarify some of the conceptual problems and at the same time increase our capacity to move toward such theory in a more operational and data-based fashion. With these objectives in mind, let me first outline a general taxonomy of world politics which hopefully is not only quite susceptible to operational treatment, but is also neutral regarding the inclusion of variables which would bias it toward either the individual autonomy or ecological determinist point of view.

³ An important study on this issue is Rosenau's research into the relative potency of role constraints versus "personal preference" in the foreign policy behavior of U.S. Senators in the Acheson and Dulles eras (1968).

⁴ I am certainly not urging that all research must come to a halt until we have solved these problems, or that inquiries which sidestep them are of no value. I am merely urging that anything approximating a coherent and complete theory must ultimately be sufficiently molecular to embrace the behavior of men and sufficiently molar to embrace their environment.

What is offered here is not a theory, but a taxonomy within which a range of theories might be developed. Moreover, it is only a static taxonomy, since space limitations preclude any attention to the dynamic interaction of the variables which are discussed. That is, all I can hope to do in this paper is describe certain components of the "global machine" in a state of rest; in a forthcoming study, I hope to describe what occurs when they are combined with other components and the entire apparatus is set in motion. As a further concession to spatial limitations, I summarize in only the briefest fashion those nonpsychological variables, which, while essential to the completeness of the scheme, have already been elaborated elsewhere (Singer, 1968).

A General Framework

In addition to the above specific requirements for any taxonomy which is addressed to the individual-versus-society issue, a framework for the understanding of global politics must also satisfy at least four other criteria: first, it must embrace both institutional and behavioral classes of variables; second, it must be a developmental scheme in the sense that it can handle a wide range of historical periods in the evolution of the global system; third, it must be sufficiently a-theoretical (or multi-theoretical) to permit the sort of integration and synthesis most appropriate to the present state of our discipline; and fourth, it must be stated in terms that permit operational definition and measurement. Elsewhere, I hope to spell out a fairly complete scheme (Singer, 1968) but here let me merely sketch in the outlines of that framework, and indicate that it relies heavily upon a general systems approach.⁵

Entities and Their Attributes

Whereas most laymen and most foreign policy practitioners tend to organize their ideas on world politics around a variety of social entities, many social scientists increasingly tend to build their schemes around *roles* and *relationships*.⁶ In my judgment, this rep-

⁵That approach is best exemplified in the articles found in the Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research, published annually since 1956, and the most integrated single effort is James Miller's forthcoming *Living Systems* (1968). In my judgment we have not yet developed a general systems theory; hence the word "approach".

⁶Perhaps most instrumental in this movement is Talcott Parsons, whose theoretical views are synthesized for a political science audience in Mitchell (1967). For those who think I misinterpret Parsons, there is this quote: "the unit of a partial social system is a role, and not the individual . . . A social system is a behavioral system. It is an organized set of behaviors of persons interacting with each other: a pattern of roles. The roles are the units of a social system" Grinker, (1956, 328). Two compelling discussions from the entity-oriented viewpoint are Cattell (1955) and Campbell (1958), both of which are reprinted in Singer (1965).

resents a regressive step, moving us away from conceptual clarity and operational measurement with no trade-off in the form of enhanced explanatory power. To the contrary, by subdividing an entity's roles into those appropriate to the economy, the polity or the society, we reduce the probability of ever seeing the entity in anything approximating its entirety. By focussing on only one portion of the relationships of these multipurpose entities, how can we expect to describe and understand their behavior in that isolated role, no less in their other roles? While many of the notions in common use are indeed theoretically misleading and scientifically non-operational, a fair number may easily be refined and salvaged; therefore, the burden of proof ought to be on those who would reject the more familiar concepts and intellectual frameworks.

Thus, let me begin by specifying the classes or levels of entity around which the present paradigm is organized. These are: (a) national states; (b) such subnational entities as: political parties, pressure groups (latent as well as manifest), labor and professional associations, and family, tribal, religious and ethnic groups; and (c) such extranational entities as associations of the above sorts of sub-national groups, international intergovernmental organizations, and international nongovernmental organizations.

Once the social entities are specified—and the paradigm permits selection of those most appropriate to a given researcher's theoretical interests—we find that all relevant entities may be identified, measured and compared according to three sets of attributes. First, there are the obvious *physical* attributes, including elements of geography, demography and technology; for the purposes of this paper, no further elaboration of these attributes is necessary. The second set of attributes falls into the *structural* class, and may be conventionally (if not readily) divided into the formal and the informal, or better still, placed on a formal-informal continuum. Toward the formal end are those attributes based on observation and description of what political scientists usually refer to as institutions, and would include such phenomena as the types and powers of legitimate political and economic institutions handling legislative, administrative, judicial, banking, commercial-industrial regulation, social welfare, military, information control and related functions. Toward the informal end are those structural attributes based on the observation of: urban-rural distribution; social mobility, kinship and marriage patterns; citizen access to and influence over the decision-making process; size, centralization and scope of political parties and other unofficial or quasiofficial associations (including pressure groups); number, power and role of religious, ethnic and linguistic groupings and the like. Also relevant as aspects of informal structure might be the extent of

pluralistic cross-cutting ties, and the general coalition configurations which develop among the system's many component subsystems.

The final attributes are what might be called the *cultural* ones; being central to this paper, they will be developed in more detail in later sections. Here, let me merely point out that I use culture in a much narrower sense than do those anthropologists who permit it to embrace everything from belief in an after-life to technological artifacts, often including social structure as well. The usage here is similar to that found in some of the recent comparative politics literature (Almond and Verba, 1963; Pye and Verba, 1965; Banks and Textor, 1963). Note further that these cultural attributes are all strictly nonbehavioral, or more accurately, both postbehavioral and prebehavioral in the sequential or causal sense. We will return to them in due course.

Relationships Among Entities

Before moving from the identification of entities and their attributes to their behavior and interaction, an intermediate set of variables needs to be delineated. Reference is to the relationships that exist between and among our relevant entities, and in addition to describing some illustrative types of relationships it is necessary to clarify two definitional points. First, relationships exist not only among entities at the *same* level of analysis (i.e., among pressure groups, among nations, among international organizations) but also among those at *different* levels of analysis. Second, relationships are of two types. One type deals with the *similarity* or *disimilarity* of attributes while the other deals with degrees of *interdependence* and connectedness. On the similarity side, we first decide on the attributes which interest us, next measure or scale each entity's rank or interval score on that attribute dimension, and then compute the discrepancy or "distance" between the two. And while such distances are usually measured on only one attribute dimension at a time, it is quite feasible to locate nations or other entities within a certain conceptual space on the basis of multidimensional distances, as in Rummel (1965). On the interdependence side, we are again concerned with the concept of closeness and distance, but in terms of interdependence, interpenetration, connectedness, dominance and the like. Needless to say, there is no necessary correlation between the similarity and the interdependence of a given pair of entities.

Behavior and Interaction Among Entities

A final aspect of our taxonomy is the distinction between relationship (in the sense of interdependence) and *interaction*. In

brief, whenever a nation⁷ behaves vis-a-vis another nation (or any other entity) and the second nation responds to that behavior, we may speak of an interaction. Of course, we require evidence that the two behavioral events or acts are somehow linked causally if we are to identify them as an interaction; if not, we merely have two isolated acts. When we observe a fairly long series of causally connected acts and responses, we may speak of an interaction sequence.

It should be noted, then, that two or more entities may display both relationships and interactions, and despite the tendency in our literature to use relationship and interaction interchangeably, it seems imperative to differentiate between an essentially static pairwise phenomenon and a highly dynamic one. To put it differently, relationships change slowly and are described in highly spatial terms, whereas interactions occur in a brief interval and are highly temporal in nature. Obviously, relationships affect interactions, and vice versa, and are causally quite connected; one often observes a sequence of interactions in order to infer a relationship. Thus, after observing a large number of behavioral events and interactions, such as the exchange of many threatening diplomatic messages, we may infer the existence of a hostile relationship.

Conversely, one may often predict an interaction sequence or a single behavioral event on the basis of a recognized relationship. For example, if we infer a relationship such as high economic interdependence, we may predict a continuing succession of direct or indirect cargo shipments between the two nations under consideration. But since all these export and import actions happen to leave a relatively reliable trace, via standard bookkeeping procedures, it is more efficient to measure the economic interdependence between these entities by examining periodic records of aggregate shipments and transfers; we need not dispatch research assistants to all the ports of entry and departure. On the other hand, there are a great many relationships which can be inferred only by direct observation of interaction sequences, especially interactions between individuals and between less formal social entities. And there are, likewise, many interactions which cannot be readily observed—especially in diplomacy—and these must be inferred by observing changes in relationship.

Psychological Attributes: The Individual Level

Given this fairly general framework, the next step in articulating the role of psychological variables in world politics is to direct our

⁷To keep an already complex paper somewhat simpler, I will often refer only to national entities from now on, but it is understood that the reference could always be to subnational and extranational ones as well.

attention to the individual level of analysis and to certain psychological attributes of the single human being, both normal and deviant. My effort here will be to impose some order on a bewildering melange of constructs such that the political scientist or other macro-social scientist can put them to greater use. I recognize that others, in and out of psychology (Smith *et al.*, 1956), have tried before with only moderate success, but the possible payoffs seem worth the effort, and I therefore trust that our behavioral science colleagues will be understanding in their appraisal, and if necessary, gentle in their disapproval of this intruder's temerity.

In the view outlined here, there are three basic and differentiable psychological properties of individuals which are of interest to the societal scientist. These properties or constructs may be labeled: (a) personality, (b) attitude and (c) opinion. Further, they may be roughly scaled on three different dimensions. First, there is the generality dimension; second, there is durability; and third, there is the observability dimension. In the verbal descriptions of these three types of psychological attribute, these ranges will become more apparent, but the ordering may be graphically summarized here.

FIGURE 1

POSTULATED ORDERING OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTITUDES ON THREE DESCRIPTIVE DIMENSIONS

Dimensions Attributes	Generality	Durability	Observability
Personality	High	High	Low
Attitude	Medium	Medium	Medium
Opinion	Low	Low	High

Perhaps more critical than the hypothesized ways in which personality, attitude and opinion may scale on the above dimensions is the nature of the subject matter with which all intra-psychic activities are concerned. There would seem to be three very general substantive areas. The first of these concerns beliefs about reality in the individual's life space: how he responds, cognitively and affectively, to the way "things *are done*" or used to be done. The second concerns the way things *should* be done, in both the present and future, as well as the way they should have been done in the past; this category is quite similar to what we often refer to as values. The third concerns the way things *will* be done in the future or *might* have been done in the past. These may be thought of as the perceptual, the preferential and the predictive dimensions. These three dimensions, it would seem, are largely undifferentiated at the personality level,

moderately differentiated at the attitudinal level, and rather clearly differentiated at the opinion level. Thus, if we treat personality as a reservoir of predispositions, we need not expect that any sharp distinctions between present and future, or between "is" and "ought", will be found. That is, we look to general personality traits and their configurations as a major source of (and perhaps predictor of) preconscious and unverbalized attitudes and opinions, rather than as the location of these more specific and differentiated psychic attributes. When we move to attitudes, the distinctions between and among what is, what ought, and what will, should be expected to take on greater clarity. And at the level of opinions, the distinctions may well be quite clear and perhaps might even become specific enough to be stated by the individual in relatively operational terms.

Given these general remarks on the relationships among personality, attitude and opinion, we may now turn to a more detailed consideration of each in turn. Note again that whereas most social psychologists tend to treat attitudes and/or opinions as components, aspects or levels of personality, the approach here is to treat all three as separate—but causally interdependent—psychological attributes of the individual.

Personality

Of all the terms used in the psychological literature, none causes more difficulty than personality, and at least two reasons come to mind. First, and on this there seems to be a strong consensus, personality is the most inclusive and all-embracing psychological property attributed to the human being.⁸ Second, there is an overwhelmingly long list of schemata and taxonomies by which an individual's personality may be compared with another's, or with itself over time.⁹ One's choice of scheme here is less important than the fact that these (and other) formulations are attempts to classify and measure fairly basic internal predispositions toward action of

⁸A useful compendium, albeit a decade in age, is McCary's *Psychology of Personality: Six Modern Approaches* (1956).

⁹Over thirty years ago, Allport and Odbert (1936) pointed out that over 17,000 personality trait names could be identified in western literature. A more recent scanning of the personality literature reveals such dimensions as: high or low on the need for achievement, affiliation or power (McClelland, 1958, and Atkinson, 1958); authoritarian (Adorno, et al., 1950); conservative (McCloskey, 1953); open- or closed-minded (Rokeach, 1960); misanthropic (Rosenberg, 1957); intolerant of ambiguity (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949); provincial or cosmopolitan (Levinson, 1957); introverted (Jung, 1923); narcissistic and/or egoistic (Freud, 1922); optimistic or pessimistic; altruistic; exhibitionist; apathetic; dominant; dependent; sadistic or masochistic; manic-depressive; inner-directed or other-directed; and so on.

normal, as well as mentally ill, people. As Cattell (1950, 2) puts it, "personality is that which permits a prediction of what a person will do in a given situation". And typically, these predispositions are thought of as a consequence of biological inheritance, the near-universal infancy experience, and the varying experiences of puberty and adulthood. A paraphrase of Allport's view is illustrative:

The newborn babe lacks the characteristic organization of psychological systems, and has a *potential* personality that develops within the skin. The givens of personality are an idiographic complex of physique, temperament and intelligence, motivated in infancy by essentially biological and nutritional drives. As the infant matures and interacts with the social and physical environment, he develops a personality. Once beyond the infantile stage, this personality cannot be understood in terms of biological motives alone (Bertocci, 1965, 302).

An equally important aspect of personality is that we generally see it as the organizing and integrating framework within which all other intrapsychic attributes are embraced. In addition to its generality, post-adolescent personality is thought of as showing only the most gradual change over time, at least in the "normal" individual who has essentially "normal" experiences during a lifetime. Finally, despite the availability, demonstrated reliability, and apparent validity of many of the tests (projective and otherwise) by which we observe and measure personality, the inferential leap between the measuring instrument and the intellectual construct is so great that personality must be treated as the least observable of our three psychological variables.¹⁰ In short, personality is defined here as a hypothetical construct embracing and structuring the individual's total reservoir of behavioral predispositions.

Attitudes

Shifting to a somewhat more restricted, malleable and observable cluster of individual attributes, we come next to what will be called *attitudes*.¹¹ While attitudes are largely shaped by the personality which organizes and embraces them, they are also seen as responsive to and modifiable by immediate (or even moderately distal) experience; more particularly, an individual's attitude on any matter may best be viewed as resulting from the interplay of personality and experience (Brim and Wheeler, 1966).

¹⁰ Two possible paths to improvement in the measurement of personality come to mind. First, the clinical psychology and psychiatry subcultures could profitably borrow and adapt the more rigorous and operational methods already in use in other social sciences; there seems to be room for considerable modification in coding, classifying and scaling procedures. Second, some tentative evidence seems to be emerging that we might find occasional correlations between mental state or personality and certain biochemical or electro-physiological indicators.

¹¹ A fairly complete survey of the measures for those which are most relevant to political science is in Rieselbach (1964).

In the taxonomy employed here, attitudes (as well as personality and opinion) fall into the three subclasses outlined earlier: the individual's perceptions of the way things *are* done in his "life space", his preferences for the way things *should* be done, and his predictions as to the way things probably *will* be done. Attitudes, then, are defined here in a literal—if broad—sense to mean the partially structured disposition to act in a certain way; the meaning is highly analogous to that used when we describe the attitude of an astronaut's capsule moving in space, or that of a dancer prior to or during a single routine or even that of the Leaning Tower of Pisa. The notion may be further conveyed by terms such as posture or stance. That is, an entity's attitude markedly affects its probability of acting or moving in a given, and—depending on the state of our theory—predictable direction.

An individual's attitudes may differ from his neighbor's not only in their content, but in their degree of generality, in their durability, in the amount of affective loading with which their holder invests them, and in the extent of their structure, integration and coherence (Converse, 1964). The interdependence between personality and attitudes will be explored further, but a more orderly procedure would be to move on next to our third and final set of psychological attributes: opinions.

Opinions

While much of the literature tends to treat opinions and attitudes as more or less interchangeable, it seems worthwhile to preserve the distinction, even at the risk of raising some difficult problems of operationalization. Thus, I would define opinions as considerably more specific than attitudes, markedly more transitory and appreciably more susceptible to systematic observation and measurement. At the same time, they may be divided into the same subclasses as attitudes: perceptions, preferences and predictions. To illustrate in regard to specificity (durability and observability will be discussed below), we can classify a person's *general* approval or disapproval of strong supranational organizations—for instance—as *attitudinal*. He may perceive those organizations now in existence as weak, may prefer that they become stronger and may (for example) predict that they will not become stronger in some relevant future. This attitudinal cluster should, of course, predict fairly well to his *opinions* on a particular aspect of the general problem. Thus, during the Congo crises of 1960, this individual might hold the opinions that the Secretary General was not exploiting the full latitude voted him by the General Assembly, that he should have assumed wider powers and that, if certain governments acquiesced in the original range of assumed authority, Mr. Hammarskjold would gradually

try to expand that range. Whether the problem was sufficiently salient to the individual to convert the general attitude into a specific set of opinions is, of course, in doubt, as is the extent to which the attitudinal and opinion clusters were each internally consistent as well as logically compatible with one another.¹²

The Interplay of Psychological Attributes

Let me now return to a somewhat more detailed consideration of the interplay between and among all three of these psychological attributes. More particularly, what are the ways in which personality relates to both attitude and opinion? There would seem to be two different types of relationship here. First, there is the generally understood notion that a certain personality type will hold attitudes and opinions whose content is largely predictable from, and shaped by, his personality. For example, the parochial or provincial *personality* is associated with negative *attitudes* toward outsiders and with *opinions* which favor policies designed to keep such groups in a distant, if not subordinate, position.

But there is a second type of interrelationship at work here, and it tends to get less attention. Reference is to the way in which personality affects the structuring and the durability of attitudes and opinions, regardless of their substantive *content*. Of course, the personality syndrome as defined here is such that its content will not be independent of its structure and durability, but these qualities may be, for analytical convenience, treated separately. At the attitudinal level, if we look at perceptions, preferences and predictions, it should immediately be evident that there is a fair degree of interdependence among them. Perceptions and preferences will both affect predictions, perceptions and predictions will affect preferences, and preferences and predictions will affect perceptions; all three attitudinal components are highly interconnected. Moreover, the way in which any two of these combine in order to affect the third is very much a function of the more fundamental personality traits.

Let me illustrate each of these three combinational effects. For example, a normal and concerned individual who perceives his nation to be following a given diplomatic strategy and who prefers that it be reversed, will—depending upon the strength of the preference—be more likely to predict such reversal than will his counter-

¹²It has become something of a ritual for political scientists to note how uninterested and/or uninformed the bulk of the world's citizens are in regard to politics, and while the evidence seems compelling, it may be somewhat beside the point for students of foreign policy. Overlooking, for the moment, the ways in which elite foreign policy articulations and arguments may easily lead to public cynicism and indifference, the fact is that those members of the public who are attentive and/or informed are generally those whose opinions do exercise some impact on the policy making process.

part who prefers continuation of the present strategy. But most of the variance in the prediction will probably be a function of the personality dimension which embraces optimism and pessimism. The optimistic personality might even be defined operationally by the extent to which his predictions coincide with his preferences; the extreme optimist might be called the "wishful thinker" and the person whose preferences and predictions are usually far apart appears in the role of Cassandra.

In the second and more interesting case, when perceptions and predictions combine to shape preferences, the effect of personality becomes more striking. The inner-directedness dimension or trait is central here, with strongly inner-directed personalities tending to hold onto their preferences even though they see little chance of those preferences being realized. To put it in different language, certain personality types can tolerate a much greater degree of dissonance or incongruence between the way they *expect* things to be and the way they *prefer* them to be. Those who are (a) less inner-directed, or (b) have a lower tolerance for such dissonance, find a fairly convenient solution; they tailor their preferences so as to make them more "realistic".¹³ Turning to the third case—preference and prediction combining to shape perceptions—this is probably the sector which most social psychologists have emphasized when examining international politics. They are, quite rightly, struck by the frequency with which citizens and elites either construct, or accept, the most outrageous distortions of past or present reality. Here, again, a personality typical of many societies takes its toll. Whether we call it other-directedness or something else, these attitudinal misperceptions just could not be so universal and so pronounced were it not for the prevalence in America and elsewhere of the socially acquiescent personality. While I know of no hard evidence to this effect, every indication is that—and this is almost definitional—very few citizens are deviant enough to resist the cumulative distortion of perception (Livant, 1963) and perpetuation of arbitrary judgments (Jacobs and Campbell, 1961) which social pressures are able to generate.¹⁴

¹³This normative flexibility—because it is a widespread personality trait in the industrial societies of today—may well account for (i.e., acquiesce in) a great deal of the incompetence and inhumanity found in modern foreign policies. Seeing no feasible way of changing things, many citizens merely revise their notions as to what constitutes acceptable (or justifiable) diplomacy or strategy.

¹⁴Such manipulability could be expected to vary from one society to another, and one study (Milgram, 1961) found that a French sample was significantly more resistant to such pressures than a matched Norwegian sample. We must be careful, however, not to confuse that "decent respect for the opinions of mankind" which might be more prevalent in a society characterized by high mutual trust, with high suggestibility; conversely, the distrust of others may not be equivalent to inner-directedness.

Personality may be thought of not only as a predictor of the way in which attitudes are structured and modified, but also as a predictor of the way in which opinions will combine and change. Again, we will merely scratch the surface here, as the intent is only to demonstrate that all three attributes are highly interdependent, and that from the observation of an individual's opinion, we may make some reasonable inferences about his personality. In the most obvious sense, we generally expect that a so-called authoritarian personality would tend to correlate with opinions that perceive relationships very much in terms of superior-subordinate, and that prefer clearcut lines of authority, well-defined roles and boundaries, and vigorous law enforcement, for example. Similarly, closed-minded personality types will find it difficult to change their opinions in the face of new evidence, but might nevertheless be expected to change such opinions when authority figures express an opinion contrary to the one originally held by the subject. To put it another way, many of the personality measures and classifications used today are based on the kind of opinions and attitudes expressed or admitted to by the respondent or subject, and we should therefore not be surprised that those constructs which we call personality traits would correlate strongly with opinions and attitudes. Further, the way in which an individual structures and integrates his opinions and attitudes will also provide important indicators of, and be responsive to, the basic personality traits.

Cultural Attributes: The Societal Level

Having summarized and/or hypothesized the general relationships among personality, attitude and opinion at the individual level, let me now shift to the societal level, be it a subnational, national, or extra-national entity which concerns us. The central thesis here is that, even though no social group can be properly thought of as having a personality, an attitude or an opinion, we may nevertheless attribute certain properties to a group on the basis of the distribution and configuration of these psychological properties. In other words, I would hold that the aggregation of individual *psychological* properties provides a quite sufficient base for describing the *cultural* properties of the larger social entity which is comprised of those individuals.

The Aggregative-Emergent Argument

This position brings me face to face with the ancient, and still open, issue of aggregative versus emergent properties. If the issue can still arouse controversy between the defenders of "organismic" and "mechanistic" approaches in disciplines ranging from biology to

astronomy, we need not be surprised by its durability in the social sciences.¹⁵ In my view, however, there is a relatively straightforward solution to the problem, such that the reductionist or aggregative position taken here need not appear as foolish and simplistic as it is often made out by advocates of the "emergent properties" school. That solution requires, however, a somewhat more refined taxonomy and more selfconscious epistemology than is often found among the occasionally mystical "gestaltists" in sociology, political science and anthropology.

First, it requires that we define levels of analysis along only one dimension, or at least, only one at a time. If we want to treat the economic, the political and the social *sectors* of society, and the cultural and the structural *attributes* of society as different "levels of analysis" (as does Smelser in this issue, for example) there may be no serious harm, but to shift from a horizontal back to a vertical axis and to also include the physiological and the psychological in the scheme (as do many, including Smelser) is to court conceptual chaos. It would seem more in keeping with the symbolism associated with "levels" and with conceptual clarity were we to adhere to the vertical axis alone and base our levels of analysis on the size and complexity of the entities which we are considering at the moment; e.g., from cell to organ to organism or individual to family to nation. This and closely related points are made succinctly by Coleman (1964, 84):

One important measurement problem in sociology concerns the two levels on which sociologists must work: the level of the individual and that of the group. We have observations at two levels, concepts at two levels, and relationships at two levels. Furthermore, it is necessary to shift back and forth: measuring group-level concepts from individual data; or inferring individual relationships from group-level relations.

A second distinction of importance in this epistemological issue is that between structure and culture. Even though the structure and the culture of a social system are causally linked in a most intimate fashion, they are by no means identical; nor does it enhance our clarity to ignore the boundary between them. In the taxonomy proposed here, the *structure* of a system is defined as that set of properties which we attribute to it on the basis of the observed *relationships* among the entities (individuals or groups) which comprise the system. *Culture*, on the other hand, is defined as the set of properties we attribute to the system by observing the distribution of *psychological attributes* among the individuals who comprise the system. The problem is one of distinguishing between the construct or verbal representation which we use for descriptive and explanatory purposes

¹⁶ Perhaps the most balanced and thorough treatment of the issue, from a physical science point of view, is in Nagel (1961) 336-397.

and the operations by which we ascertain that construct's presence or absence, strength or direction of change. While there are many exceptions, a large number of system properties can only be defined and measured by observing subsystem phenomena, and on that basis, the distinction between structure and culture should not be too difficult to observe.

The third and equally critical clarification that is required is that between behavioral phenomena and essentially static phenomena of a pre- or post-behavioral nature. For example, much of the social science literature concurs that the *structure* of a social system is a property we attribute to the system on the basis of observing relationships among its subsystems. But since little of the literature distinguishes between *relationship* (marital, friendly, heirarchical, alliance, etc.) and *interaction* (embrace, fight, speak, exchange, etc.) we end up by confusing the formal or informal *structure of a system* with the behavioral and interactional regularities which *occur within* that system. To be sure, we may infer relationships by observing interactions and we often predict interactions from known relationships, but they are—and deserve to be treated as—quite distinct classes of phenomena.

The Linkage Between Subsystems

A final distinction of importance, and one which appears to lie at the heart of the aggregative versus emergent confrontation is that between the procedures we use to *describe* a social system and those we use to *explain* how it "got that way". We may, quite legitimately, observe the distribution of subsystem attributes, the relationships among the subsystems, and the interactions among them, and on the basis of these offer a fairly full *description* of that system.¹⁶ But until we have observed and demonstrated the linkage between and among subsystem attributes, relationships, and interactions, we can not *explain* and account for the properties, behavior or relationships of the system itself. Admittedly the line between scientific explanation and description begins to blur as that description becomes more complete, but the intellectual operations are sufficiently different to merit explicit demarcation.

As one reads the philosophers of science as well as the critics of

¹⁶ My impression is that this view does not run afoul of the stricture which Wallace (1961, 43) and others keep returning to. He inveighs against the "statistical fallacy, which offers an enumeration of the properties of individual persons as if it were a description of a social or cultural system . . ." Given the context, he is presumably concerned about those "personality and culture" authors who treat psychological factors as all, and nearly ignore the structural attributes of the society. Nor do we seem to be committing Robinson's (1950) "ecological fallacy" in which one infers individual attributes from group attributes for which only the marginals are known.

the position taken here, it turns out that the ancient argument against reductionism and in favor of organic or holistic epistemologies rests largely on the inability of a reductionist model to account for the system's properties or behavior; we cannot, they remind us, explain or predict the behavior or future states of the system solely on the basis of the properties of its constituent elements. But even here, knowledge of the components' properties can carry us a fair part of the way from description to explanation. To illustrate, we can pour pellets of steel into a container until it is full, with little qualitative change in the aggregate; it merely becomes larger. But if we do the same thing with pellets of enriched uranium under appropriate conditions, we will eventually arrive at the "critical mass" threshold, with important qualitative change in the aggregate as a result. In such a case, the emergent properties of the system are largely explicable in terms of the properties of its component parts. In the same vein, observation of the placement or relationships among components may enhance our understanding of the system's behavior. For example, a society which becomes involved in a limited war and has a large number of citizens who are intolerant of ambiguity may move quickly into all-out war in the "drive for closure". The same result could come about, even if such a personality trait were infrequent in that society, but typical of its elites or only of its chief of state. My point, then, is that while knowledge of subsystem or component properties, or relations or interactions among these components may not always suffice for explanatory, or even predictive, purposes, such knowledge constitutes a major basis for describing the larger system. And while explanation and operational description must be distinguished, the latter is not so plentiful in social science that we can afford to dismiss it as trivial.

Once any of these four distinctions become blurred, we are much more likely to reject the view outlined here and retreat into some sort of metaphorical and pre-operational formulation. That is, unless levels are arranged on one set of dimensions only, unless structure and culture are distinguished, unless behavioral and nonbehavioral phenomena are differentiated and unless the needs of explanation kept distinct from those of description, we have almost no choice but to accept the organic-emergent position. By explicitly recognizing these distinctions, however, it becomes possible to devise social science taxonomies within which data may be gathered and the testing of alternative theories may go forward.

Having digressed for this unavoidable epistemological-ontological excursion, let me now return to the psycho-cultural interface by which we might better comprehend the relationships between man and world politics. To reiterate, the position taken here is that the cultural properties of any subnational, national or

extranational system may be described in a strictly aggregative fashion, by observing the distribution and configuration of individual psychological properties.¹⁷

National Character, Ideology and Climate of Opinion

The most straightforward, if not the only, way to convert the distribution of individual properties into social system properties is to let each of the three *psychological* variables serve as the basis for a distinct *cultural* variable. Choosing that path, let us treat *personality* as the basis for national (or any other social system's) *character*, *attitude* as the basis for *ideology*, and *opinion* as the basis for *climate*. That is, when we have ascertained which individuals score where on one or more personality, attitude or opinion scales, we have the basis for descriptive statements about the culture (or portions thereof) of the entity which they constitute. In this manner, then, the three societal "equivalents" would rank the same way as their psychological "counterparts" on the three dimensions used earlier. National character (or basic personality, as it is often called) would be the most general of the three cultural variables, most durable, and least accessible to direct observation and measurement.¹⁸ At the other end, climate of opinion would be most specific, most transitory, and most observable; ideology would fall in the middle range on all three dimensions. Let me now say a few words about each of these cultural attributes of national, sub-national, and extra-national entities and then go on to a discussion of their measurement and statistical description.

There are many approaches to the study of national character but two stand out in the literature; one tends toward the *organismic* and the other toward the aggregative and *statistical*. The former often attributes certain individual personality traits to the society as a whole, usually anthropomorphizing to some extent. This approach usually rests either on the assumption that there is near-uniformity of personalities within the social system or that the social structure impinges upon and molds diverse personalities in such a

¹⁷ As suggested earlier, my definition of cultural properties is considerably narrower than that used by most anthropologists, whose consensus is approximated in Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952); the classical and global definition is Taylor's: "That complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society".

¹⁸ It is certainly not my intention to suggest that ease of direct observation necessarily guarantees that our measures will be high on both reliability and validity. As Campbell and Fiske (1959) as well as others, have pointed out, it is difficult to actually achieve construct validity but easy to believe that it has been achieved. Reliability is, however, an essential precondition for validity and while it may often be necessary to make trade-offs between the two, our selection of variables cannot be insensitive to the observation and measurement problem. These issues are discussed more fully in the next section.

way as to produce highly uniform attitudes, opinions or behavior. The statistical approach is obviously the one taken here, and it coincides with the definition offered by Inkeles and Levinson (1954, 983): "national character refers to relatively enduring personality characteristics and patterns that are modal among the adult members of a society". Whether we speak of national character or of basic personality, the theme is almost always an aggregative and additive one, in which we look for the ways in which certain personality traits are distributed throughout a given population. There is, of course, no assurance that we will find only one modal personality in a given entity; the possibility of bi- or multi-modal types is always present (Levinson, 1957).

Moving from personality and national character to attitude and its societal counterpart, *ideology*, we come to that cultural attribute which is perhaps most central in understanding a nation's foreign policy. Neither as remote from policy concerns as personality, nor as evanescent as opinion, attitudinal configurations provide the most salient nonmaterial incentives and constraints within which nations decide upon their behavior in world politics. When we speak of ideology, it is important to distinguish among the various ways in which it is defined. A formal institution such as political party, pressure group or government usually has both an official or articulated ideology, as reflected in speeches and documents, and an operative ideology, which actually guides the group's behavior. The latter may not even be fully known to the group's own members, but it inevitably differs from the official ideology, especially as the time lag since the articulation or revision of the official ideology increases. There are few more serious errors in science, or in policy, than to assume that the official and the operative ideologies are identical; yet it occurs with alarming frequency.¹⁹ Not only is it crucial to distinguish between the formal and the operative ideology of an elite group, but to distinguish between both of these and the ideology of the larger social entity for which the elite claims to act. This distinction is often most evident when we contrast opinions to attitudes. That is, the elite may hold, or merely express, a given set of attitudes, and may try to bring the general public's attitudes into line with either of these. Unfortunately, there has been little research on the congruence between elite and mass ideology, but the impression is that the effort is not always successful. The several publics may well express, and even hold, *opinions* which

¹⁹ A particularly distressing example is Leites' *Operational Code of the Politburo* (1951) based largely on the "holy scriptures" of Marxism-Leninism. The saving grace of the study is its open-endedness, in which an extremely wide range of behavioral patterns is predicted from a given cluster of formal articulations.

coincide with those urged by the elite, but never internalize them sufficiently to qualify as attitudes.²⁰

Ideology is crucial in foreign policy not only because it provides the matrix within which the present is interpreted, the past recalled, and the future anticipated, but because it provides the boundaries within which the climate or distribution of opinion can range. Within that range, opinion distributions for given sectors of a society will respond to behavioral events and information about them.

On the basis of what we now know about the malleability of most people's *opinions*, it is safe to say that political elites and/or mass media can—if they have a fairly accurate picture of the attitudinal configuration or ideology within their society—generate an impressively wide range of opinion changes. There are important constraints on such manipulation, including the climate of opinion at the moment, the ideology of the period, and the more slow-moving national character, but the degree of malleability is remarkable as well as alarming. More specifically, the would-be engineer of opinion change needs to know how many individuals in what particular classes (from mass to elite, from indifferent to attentive, etc.) hold what attitudes and opinions with what tenacity on what issues. In other words, he must know in some detail what the ideology and the climate of opinion look like at some particular point in time. This consideration leads us, then, to the problems of observation, measurement and description by which such distributions and configurations may be ascertained.

The Observation and Description Problem

The statistical description of a nation's character, ideology, or climate of opinion—all combining to constitute its cultural attributes—are not only of interest to those who would modify or exploit that state of affairs. Until we have progressed further along this road, social scientists will also have a most incomplete understanding of the dynamic processes which occur within and between those en-

²⁰ Highly suggestive in this context is Kelman's "Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change" (1958). Despite the fact that he does not distinguish among attitude, opinion and behavior, his scheme meshes in a general way with the one proposed here. The "compliance" process may be thought of as producing opinion change but little more, with identification and internalization both affecting attitudes and internalization perhaps even impinging on personality.

ties, from small groups to the global system, which constitute our major theoretical focus.

In the sections above, I contended that opinions were most susceptible to observation, that personality traits were least susceptible, and that attitudes would fall somewhere between. Such a statement may misleadingly suggest that all three phenomena can—or must be—measured via direct observation alone. If we bear in mind that all psychological, and therefore, all cultural (in the restricted sense used here) phenomena are literally intrapsychic, it is evident that we must always make an inferential leap from those events which can be observed directly to the variable which we seek to measure. To return to an epistemological theme which is central to the whole scheme developed here, we need to be ingenious in looking for the traces and indicators of our variables, but we must remember that the traces, and the variables they reflect, are seldom the same thing. If this were not so, the problem of validity in social science measurement would be considerably less vexatious; that is we would be less concerned with the question of whether we are measuring that which we claim to be measuring. As difficult as the problem is in other sectors of social science, it is even more troubling at the intrapsychic level, where few of our observations are made in the natural setting and most occur in the artificial and contrived laboratory or interview setting. In addition to this type of danger, validity is also threatened by the rather standard practice whereby we not only observe such behavioral events as verbal response in order to tap opinion, for example, but move back and forth (or up and down) among all three variables by inferring attitudes from opinions and personality from attitudes, and by predicting opinions from attitudes and attitudes from personality.²¹

To continue at the individual level, it seems to me that social scientists have all too often tended to assume that directly elicited verbal behavior represents the major—or even the only—avenue to understanding and measuring individual traits. Thus, in order to get at personality, we generally ask for written or oral responses to such stimuli as Rorshach blots, TAT pictures or incompleted sentences. To get at attitudes, we present our subjects with rather lengthy questionnaires, many of whose items seem to have little face validity, and then tote up the responses. To get at opinions, we usually organize a survey, replete with its myriad costs and prob-

²¹This inferential strategy is particularly risky in a cross-cultural research setting, inasmuch as variations in social structure—or differential rates of change therein—may impinge upon essentially similar modal personalities and “produce” appreciably different ideologies.

lems of sampling, fielding an interview team, and then laboriously coding the alleged responses.²²

It is certainly not my intention to reject these observational methods, but it is worth emphasizing their several shortcomings and suggesting the availability of alternative strategies. First of all, it cannot be emphasized too often that the assumed directness of these methods is generally overstated. The inferential leap from verbal response back to imputed trait is a long and elusive one at best. As to projective tests, there is the subjectivity of the coding criteria, illustrated by the amount of training and experience required before the interpreter is considered qualified and before we get any satisfactory degree of inter-coder agreement. Whereas a cardinal rule in the search for reliability is to reduce coding procedures to a highly routinized algorithm, the projective tests are of limited value except in the hands of an insightful, artistic and trained expert. And even as the personality scales gradually reach satisfactory levels of reliability across time and across subjects, they still leave unanswered a number of serious questions on the validity side. On too many occasions we hear the assertion of the hyper-operationalist: "The _____ syndrome is what this scale is designed to measure, and what it measures is, therefore, the _____ syndrome"! Worth consideration, too, in both the paper-and-pencil and the face-to-face situations are the dangers of systematic error resulting from interviewer or experimenter induced bias, the unnatural setting, the low salience of the questions, respondent indifference and faulty recording (Remmers, 1954). Whether we are interrogating publics or elites, whether we seek to measure something as deep and general as a personality trait or as close to the surface and specific as an opinion, the inferential leap is a long one, marked by a variety of hurdles, only some of which we fully understand.

An Alternative . . .

Are there any alternatives to the direct verbal expression route, and are they any less problematical? One option which political scientists are now using with some regularity is the search for behavioral rather than prebehavioral or merely verbal indicators. Thus, we ask respondents—or find out through informants or public records—which political party they belong to, how they have voted or plan to vote, which pressure groups and professional associations they belong to and in what capacity, whether they write to their newspapers or legislators, and so forth. By and large, these provide

²²For a valuable discussion of the many problems involved in the opinion survey approach, see Kahn and Cannell (1957), Kish (1965), and Maccoby (1954). An early study which concentrates on the sources of error is Hyman *et al.* (1954).

somewhat more reliable information, but they too pose certain problems of validity. If we want to tap psychological attributes it is usually in order to use such data for predicting to behavior, and it may be risky to observe behavior, infer back to alleged psychological predispositions and then predict to the very behavior which has been observed. The danger of tautological explanations is very much with us in this sort of research design, but as more varied psychological and behavioral data become available, the opportunities for cross-validation will inevitably increase. The same problems remain even if we shift from interrogation to behavior-inducing experiments, or if we observe more natural or field-setting behavior, since we must still infer personality, attitude and opinion phenomena from the more directly observable—but not easily codeable—behavioral phenomena.

Having emphasized the pitfalls, let me now retreat somewhat and recognize that often we have no alternative other than direct interrogation or experimentally induced behavior, and that social scientists have shown remarkable ingenuity and rigor in seeking to minimize the misleading effects of these methods. Moreover, it is worth reiterating that there really is no such thing as a *directly observable* variable in social science; we always have an inferential leap of some magnitude between the event or condition on the one hand and the repertorial representation on the other. Thus, despite the danger to validity and reliability, any serious research on personality, attitude and opinion will continue to depend on the resourcefulness and precision with which we apply and develop the basic research strategies already in use. The only place where dramatic improvement seems both necessary and possible is at the personality level, where much of our knowledge depends upon the psychiatrist's protocols and reports, and the clinical psychologist's investigations. The consensus, which I largely share, is that the intra-psychic probings of these researchers (especially the former) leave a great deal to be desired when it comes to the operationalization of their variables; intuition is absolutely essential to scientific discovery, but is is seldom sufficient.²³

Despite the central argument here—that we can and should employ the distribution and aggregation of individual attributes in order to measure certain social attributes—it does not necessarily follow that we can *only* do so by *observing* individual responses. That is, we seem to have underestimated the extent to which the

²³ Interestingly enough, some of the most rigorous research on personality variables is that of the anthropologists. Some imaginative and persuasive methods of data-acquisition and analysis via Rorschach blots are reported in Wallace (1952) and in the anthology compiled by Kaplan (1961). On the cross-cultural use of Rorschach see Adcock and Ritchie (1958).

distribution of intrapsychic phenomena within a population may be inferred via observation of *collective phenomena*.²⁴ Not only does this strategy avoid the artificialities of many interview and experimental situations, but it even provides an economical route for getting at macrophenomena in a more direct fashion. Thus, we may follow the anthropological approach and merely observe a great deal of social interaction, and on the basis of the way things are done and discussed, infer the nature of the personalities, attitudes and opinions of those who constitute the entity under investigation. Another tack widely used in anthropology is to examine the physical or artistic artifacts of the entity and treat them as indicators of these same phenomena; whether pottery or poetry, conference chambers or constitutions, and whether recent or ancient, these products may serve as manifestations or traces of the way in which a population views or did view many phenomena of interest to us.²⁵ Likewise, such phenomena as elections, mass movements, migration, market behavior, social mobility, and so forth, may all provide the empirical base from which we might infer back to the underlying culture.

When we observe societal and collective phenomena in order to tap the distribution of individual psychological attributes, however, there is again the danger of circularity in our reasoning. Thus, unless we have sufficient understanding of the social structure (roles and relationships) within which these interactions occur, and unless the state of our theory is relatively advanced, inferences about national character, ideology and opinion distributions can be quite wide of the mark. Another way to avoid unwitting circularity is to opt, quite consciously, for the cyclical model in which feedback is explicitly introduced; in such models, each set of variables serves the dependent, the independent, and the intervening role, in turn. Moreover, with some of the more recent tools of path analysis, and causal inference (Blalock, 1964), we can discover which particular sequence offers the most powerful explanation in the process, thus settling many of the old issues as to which is cause and which is consequence in sequences that can only be understood within a feedback framework (Deutsch, 1963).

Turning from problems of observation to the ways in which we might report and describe our observations, the standard tools of

²⁴ An excellent discussion, with examples, of alternative methods for getting at such social phenomena is in the volume of *Unobtrusive Measures* (Webb et al., 1966).

²⁵ One approach is represented in the McGranahan and Wayne (1948) analysis comparing popular drama in Germany and the United States during the late 1920's. And despite certain acknowledged inadequacies in his methods, David McClelland has demonstrated the possibilities of systematic examination of such cultural artifacts as textbooks and tapestry for generating politically relevant data (1961).

descriptive statistics seem quite appropriate to the task at hand. What are the familiar ways in which a frequency (or probability) distribution is portrayed, so that the dominant characteristics of the configuration are best illuminated? First of all, we generally want to know something about the central tendency of a set of observed frequencies, and the median, mode and mean all have their uses in this regard. Beyond these, important aspects of an aggregate can be graphically portrayed via the histogram (bar graph), the frequency polygon (line graph), or the cumulative frequency curve, especially if individual scores on a given psychological dimension are collapsed into grouped frequency distributions. Nor should the factor analysis approach be overlooked (Cattell, 1955). While these graphic representations offer an economical overall picture of the dispersion, as well as the central tendency, of an aggregative distribution, we can get a more precise indication of the former by computing the variance or the standard deviation. Going a step further, the asymmetry of the distribution is precisely measured by computing the magnitude and direction of its skewness, and another measure of the curve's deviation from normality is found in its kurtosis (peakedness). To demonstrate the application of these familiar statistical descriptors is neither necessary nor appropriate here, but their relevance to the many empirical studies (many of which are cross-cultural) of personality, attitude, and opinion distributions should be selfevident. Nor is this the place to suggest the theoretical purposes to which such descriptions might be put.²⁶

The Individual . . .

Up to this point, I have tended to treat every individual's personality traits, attitudes and opinions in an undifferentiated fashion, ignoring the obvious fact that some individuals exercise a far greater impact on world politics than others. Let me now recognize, if not rectify, that omission by way of a brief digression. While research on the strength and direction of differences between elites and others has not yet led to many universal generalizations, the evidence does point to the regular existence of certain mass-versus-elite discrepancies. In the work of Lasswell (1948), Dicks (1950), and others, we find suggestions of data which would permit the construction of

²⁶ A few possibilities, might, however, merit a footnote. We could, for example, search for the amount of symmetry in the way two populations perceive one another as well as themselves, in order to ascertain which of the many combinations of these four attitude configurations best predicts the relations and interactions between the entities which they comprise. Some basic data can be found in Cantril and Buchanan (1953) and in Singer (1964). Another possibility might be a longitudinal analysis, in which any observed convergence or divergence in cultural profile could be examined to ascertain whether cultural differences and similarities associate with various types of interdependence, friendly or hostile, in any regular fashion.

cultural profiles which take explicit account of such discrepancies.²⁷ One might, for example, superimpose on the histogram for some trait or cluster of traits in the general population, similar profiles of the groups from which foreign policy or military elites are drawn. It might well turn out that the isomorphism or lack thereof between the two configurations would predict to that nation's behavioral tendencies or correlate strongly with the types of relationships it forms. Or, in line with the "two-step flow" hypothesis (Katz, 1957), a useful inquiry into the identity and potency of community influentials could be mounted. That is, if the foreign policy opinion profile for a general population sample and for several alternative reference groups could be ascertained on perhaps a weekly basis, and the various media could be content analyzed, one might be able to trace the path along which information and influence tend to move. Space limitations preclude further pursuit of these research possibilities, but the options are many and the need is great.

In Conclusion . . .

Between the familiar regions of individual behavior and the dimly perceived ones of world politics lies a *terra incognita* into which few social scientists have yet begun to venture. Given the inadequacy of our maps, it is little wonder that we have given those regions a wide berth. My purpose here was to draw up a tentative map, preliminary to more thorough exploration. The map is largely conjectural, but may possibly have profited from the missteps and false starts of those who have explored comparable regions in other disciplines.

On the basis of those not dissimilar experiences, certain caveats seem justified. First, the map should identify the entities which exist in the region, and next, provide operational descriptions of their major attributes. Once these entities are recognized and described, we may safely inquire into their various roles and relationships vis-a-vis one another. Then, if we can resist the temptation to assign them all sorts of goals, purposes and functions, and treat the whole matter as an empirical question, we might get on to the next item on our agenda. That item, of course, is not explanation, but description. Until we have described a range of phenomena, we cannot explain it, and the main purpose of the map drawn here is to help us describe and measure now that which we hope to explain later.

Leaving the map-making metaphor behind, the scheme proposed explicitly rejects the need for an "emergent properties" con-

²⁷ A systematic and carefully coded survey of much of the literature on the social background and personality traits of modern political elites is in Raser (1966).

cept when the description of social entities is the matter at hand. Conversely, it urges that we can be both operational and relevant by defining and measuring the *cultural* properties of a subnational, national, or extranational entity strictly in terms of the *psychological* properties of those individuals who constitute that particular system. It does not deny the possibility that the interaction of individual properties (both within and among single humans) may produce emergent effects, but it insists that: (a) those effects are either structural or behavioral, and (b) if they are not in either of these two classes, but are indeed themselves cultural, then the effects can be observed in the form of individual psychological properties.

In sum, while the nature of the man-society conjunction has been debated and discussed for years, no satisfactory formulation has yet emerged. I have, therefore, taken not only a very explicit, but fairly extreme, aggregative position here, in the hope that if it accomplishes little more, this paper will have served to clarify and sharpen the methodological and theoretical issues. In the interim, I should like to believe that this type of formulation will carry us some distance toward a fuller understanding of the psychocultural interface by which man's role in world politics might be more fully comprehended.

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Biographical Sketches

JAMES D. BARBER is Professor of Political Science at Yale University. He is author of *The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life* and *Power in Committees: An Experiment in the Governmental Process*, and editor of *Political Leadership in American Government*. His work in progress includes a study of American presidential political styles, based on biographical sources. He is director of the Yale Office for Advanced Political Studies.

RUFUS P. BROWNING, now Associate Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University, was a 1960-61 SSRC postdoctoral fellow at Carnegie Institute of Technology and on the faculty of the University of Wisconsin until this year. He has written on computer simulation of political phenomena, political recruitment, organizational innovation and transportation regulation, and is currently working on simulation models of bargaining processes.

ALEXANDER L. GEORGE, Professor of Political Science, Stanford University, was for many years a member of the Social Science Department, The RAND Corporation. In addition to research on national security affairs, he has long been interested in political leadership. He is co-author with his wife, Juliette L. George, of *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study*. In 1956-57, he was a fellow at The Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

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sonality and politics begun during his 1964-65 year at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

HAROLD D. LASSWELL is the Edward J. Phelps Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale University. From 1939-1945 he was Director of War Communications Research at the Library of Congress. He was elected President of the American Political Science Association in 1955. His many, many books include *Psychopathology and Politics*, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*, *Power and Personality*, and most recently, *The Sharing of Power in a Psychiatric Hospital* (with Robert Rubenstein).

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NEIL J. SMELSER is a Professor of Sociology at the University of California at Berkeley. From 1961-1965 he was a member of the Committee on Economic Growth of the Social Science Research Council, and was appointed editor of the American Sociological Review in 1962. His publications include: *Personality and Social Systems* (with W. T. Smelser), *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution*, *The Sociology of Economic Life*, and *Economy and Society* (with Talcott Parsons).

M. BREWSTER SMITH is Professor of Psychology and Chairman of the department at the University of Chicago. He served as General Editor of this Journal from 1951-55, and was president of SPSSI in 1958-59. In the area dealt with in his article, he is co-author with J. S. Bruner and R. W. White of *Opinions and Personality*. Recently he has been involved in research on anti-semitism, on performance in the Peace Corps and on moral orientations of student activists.

GREENSTEIN, FRED I. The Need for Systematic Inquiry Into Personality and Politics: Introduction and Overview. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, 3, 1-14.


Since politics abounds with instances in which political behavior can be explained only if we have an account of the personal psychological variables that mediate between the stimuli of politics and the resulting political behavior, the need exists for systematic inquiry into personality and politics. Considerable theoretical and methodological clarification is needed, if empirical advances are to be made. Some of the leading efforts in this direction are reported in this number.

SMITH, M. BREWSTER, A Map for the Analysis of Personality and Politics. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, 3, 15-27.

A scheme is presented for the analysis of relationships in the sphere of personality and politics. The scheme places psychological determinants of political action in the context of other classes of determinants. It further exemplifies a "functional" approach to the roots of political action in personality. The contributions of psychological, sociological, political-economic and historical perspectives to the explanation of political behavior are seen as complementary, not competitive.

GEORGE, ALEXANDER L., Power as a Compensatory Value for Political Leaders. *Journal of Social Issues*, XXIV, 3, 29-49.

This paper attempts to show how Harold D. Lasswell's general hypothesis about the "power-seeking" personality can be utilized in a relatively systematic manner in studies of political leaders. To this end, provisional operational definitions are provided for each of the key terms in the hypothesis, which holds that "power" is sought as a means of "compensation" for "low self-estimates". The possibilities and problems of applying the hypothesis, thus operationalized, are discussed and illustrated with reference to the author's earlier biography of Woodrow Wilson.



BARBER, JAMES D. Classifying and Predicting Presidential Styles: Two "Weak" Presidents. *Journal of Social Issues*, XXIV, 3, 51-80.


It is important to study "weak" presidents; what the incumbent of that office does not do has profound social effects. For the "weak" incumbent as for the "strong" presidents, analysis of habitual behavior in meeting role demands reveals four types broadly delineated by activity-passivity and a positive-negative (affective) dimension. Within these types, styles in rhetoric, the management of ordinary business and personal relations are discernible. These rubrics are applied to Coolidge and Hoover as presidents. A theory with predictive possibilities is developed, based on the person's first independent political success as a time when a distinctive rhetorical, business-management, and personal relations style is adopted. The motives, resources and opportunities which shape this habit pattern are analyzed.

LASSWELL, HAROLD D. A Note on "Types" of Political Personality: Nuclear, Co-Relational Developmental. *Journal of Social Issues*, XXIV, 3, 81-91.

A power-oriented type of personality called "the political type" is defined and three means of classifying such personalities—in nuclear terms, in "co-relational" terms and in developmental terms—are illustrated. The nuclear classification distinguishes power-centered actors from others in terms of their need for power and their utilization of various practices to obtain power; the co-relational classification identifies patterns of additional attributes that distinguish power seekers from others; the developmental classification seeks to characterize the different patterns of indulgences and deprivations at various life cycle stages that produce the first two patterns. A frame of reference appropriate for observing stability and change in political personality is presented and several questions generated by the frame of reference are raised.

BROWNING, RUFUS P. The Interaction of Personality and Political System in Decisions to Run for Office: Some Data and a Simulation Technique. *Journal of Social Issues*, XXIV, 3, 93-109.

A discussion of opportunities, problems and choices (a) in the analysis of data on the achievement, affiliation and power motivations and related expectations of a matched sample of politicians and nonpoliticians in an eastern city, and (b) the construction and anticipated use of a set of models for computer simulation designed to represent processes of political recruitment and officeholder-selection in a range of political systems and a range of populations of potential officeholders.




SMELSER, NEIL J., Personality and the Explanation of Political Phenomena at the Social-System Level: A Methodological Statement, *Journal of Social Issues*, XXIV, 3, 111-125.

This essay concerns a number of theoretical and methodological issues that arise in assessing the impact of personality variables on social—including political—phenomena. First, a simple hypothetical model of political process is created, and the importance of personality variables in this model is illustrated. Next, some conceptual problems are reviewed—problems that appear when variables at one conceptual level (for example, personality) are used to explain variations at another conceptual level (for example, social structure). Finally, a few conceptual strategies are suggested on the basis of the foregoing arguments.

SINGER, J. DAVID. Man and World Politics: The Psycho-cultural Interface. *Journal of Social Issues*, XXIV, 3, 127-156.

An exposition of a conceptual framework designed to relate aspects of individual behavior to the functioning of world politics. It is argued that cultural properties of subnational, national, and extranational entities can be operationally assessed in terms of psychological properties of those individuals who constitute the particular system. The formulation advanced does not deny the possibility that the interaction of individual properties (both within and among single humans) may produce emergent effects, but it insists that: (a) those effects are either structural or behavioral, and (b) if they are not in either of these two classes, but are indeed themselves cultural, then the effects can be observed in the form of individual psychological properties.



The Activists' Corner

Nevitt Sanford

Institute for Study of Human Problems

David Krech

University of California, Berkeley

In our opening statement Krech and I argued that social scientists not only can do more about applying the knowledge we have but can do a better job of producing knowledge of a sort that *can* be applied. Concerning this last, I have been urging for some years (1) (2) (3) that there be set up within universities multidisciplinary, problem-centered institutes that worked on more than one problem at a time, and I have had some experience in such an institute. Without taking back anything I have said about such institutes and without denying that they can be reasonably effective if their staffs work hard enough, I now want to suggest that what this country needs is a new kind of agency for research and action, one that is independent of but closely related to the university and other institutions of our society.

Guiding Principles . . .

The guiding principles of this new agency should be, in the main, the same as those I have tried to state for the university-based human problems institute. Most essentially:

. . . Action and inquiry must be viewed as *mutually related*; not only must action be based in knowledge but we may acquire further knowledge by taking action and studying its effects. It is only when efforts are made to change a social situation or institution that its underlying structure is revealed, making it possible to develop ideas that are useful in practice.

. . . Problems that arise as a result of social changes constitute new ranges of empirical phenomena; they cannot be attacked by conventional research designs but instead call for exploratory or qualitative study, study directed to their proper definition, to this understanding of their connections with other problems, and to the generation of new concepts and methods.

. . . Since knowledge of how things cling together is as important a part of science as is knowledge of how things may be isolated, social scientists must be willing—some of the time—to adopt holistic and comprehensive approaches to complex and wide ranging social phenomena; they will be forced to do this if they are practical, for those who take responsibility for action must see things in context in order to gauge the various consequences of a particular action. It is thus that social scientists who become motivated in action-oriented research come to realize that this is the most intellectually demanding work they can do, and they will overcome any contempt they might have had for "applied science".

. . . Social scientists who work on social problems must participate in setting the goals of action. It is not only that individuals or organizations that look to science for help often have narrow or short-run view conceptions of what they desire but the social scientist cannot avoid acting in accord with his own value orientation.

. . . The human problems institute must work on several different problems at the same time. It is just this kind of exposure to a variety of problems and the accompanying association with colleagues from different disciplines that serves to educate the staff in a generalist orientation. Little would be gained if a scientist gave up a disciplinary specialty only to become a specialist in some applied area. Work on different problems at the same time also leads the staff to look for underlying affinities among them—a style of thought often leading to advances on the conceptual and theoretical front.

Within The University? . .

It would be highly desirable if institutes of this kind could be established within universities, but the very circumstances that make it desirable also make it extremely difficult or impossible. Obstacles arise from the position of the university in society, from the university's organizational structure of departments, schools and

specialized institutes, and from the attitudes and values of faculty members. The university is a conservative institution—more a reflection of society than an instrument of social change.

While the new institute obviously is not conceived of as a center for social revolution, it must be free to advocate policies and to initiate actions that are called for on the basis of its research programs and findings. Recommendations or actions would not need to be very radical in order to threaten the interests of at least some organized groups in society who would then find it easy to put the university in an embarrassing position.

Work on problems of the kind being discussed here is not excluded from the university; indeed, there are university institutes devoted to the study of one or another of them. The university must be prepared, however, should controversy arise, to take up a position of neutrality, which it may do by stressing its role as a center for pure inquiry. It thus loses the benefits to be gained from a combination of inquiry and action without achieving true neutrality either, for in a rapidly changing society neutrality is conservatism.

To be exact, it must be said that the university does not completely avoid involvement in practical affairs. It can and it does work, certainly not inappropriately, to further practical objectives which are understood and approved of by the man in the street such as the improvement of agriculture, the building of armaments and the advancement of technology generally. Government support for work of this kind constitutes a substantial proportion of the budget of large and prominent universities; and, accordingly, these institutions act in such a way as to protect their sources of funds. Usually, therefore, arrangements are made for funneling through a central university agency proposals originating with individual faculty members. It is a reasonable presumption that the university's central agency will in the long run tend to favor projects that either represent specialized pure science (promising to support or challenge theories in the forefront of professional concern), or in the case of human problems research, are safe and sound from the point of view of the conventional wisdom. From the point of view of the university's survival and growth this may be wise policy, but it does mean that not all applications are considered solely on their merits and that fund-granting agencies do not see all the proposals that faculty members might want to direct to them.

It might be supposed that private universities would be free of some of the constraints upon state institutions and could afford to be more daring. In practice, however, this does not seem to be the case. Prominent private universities, always short of funds, are also heavily dependent upon government funds; and they also have large and di-

versified constituencies who can be counted on to make trouble when the university engages in controversial activities.

An independent institute would be able to take "far out" or otherwise controversial proposals directly to foundations or private donors without fear that a university's reputation would be damaged. It would also avoid the numerous small frustrations, and the expense, of working within and through a large bureaucracy that contributes nothing to the success of the work itself.

An Independent Institute?

At the same time an independent institute located near a university and having various kinds of relationships with it, and with some of its parts, would have positive advantages.

Universities have sometimes found it wise to encourage and assist the setting up within their environs of independent institutes that worked on problems which, though of interest to the university, did not fit their programs or policies. Most characteristically, perhaps, the problems worked on at such institutes have been brought to them by private organizations or individuals. It seems reasonable to expect that university officials or faculty members might wish to pass along to a nearby independent institute projects bearing on public issues too controversial to be addressed from within the university itself. (Before 1960 very little research on race relations or the effects of segregation was done in prominent universities, nor were government agencies or large foundations supporting research on these controversial subjects, but there was no shortage of concerned university men who would have liked to see such research done.) Should this happen in the case of an institute of the kind proposed here, we should expect that these officials and faculty members would be available for consultation on these projects, and even that some of them might join the institute as staff members on some temporary or part-time basis.

An independent institute might serve a university by studying some of its processes. For technical reasons alone, such studies were best carried out by an agency outside the university, e.g., if students were interviewed they would find it easier to express themselves if they felt sure that what they said could in no way affect their fate as students. More than this, such a study would be carried out in accord with the general principles set forth above. This would mean, in the first place, recognition of the fact that the carrying out of the proposed study was itself an intervention in the university's processes, as well as a way of improving the lives of the students studied, and thus that the effects of such intervention would have to be studied and that the whole undertaking, including techniques of data gathering, would have to be guided by considerations of value. The research

function would by definition include the "feeding back" of information, consultation on what innovations in practice might be undertaken, and even assistance in the carrying out of new educational procedures. This would help to lift educational research out of the depths of triviality into which it has been sinking—mainly through an insistence upon a narrow conception of science.

The Process of Specialization

Enormous interest is vested in the maintenance of the university's present structure. University men are expected to define themselves primarily in terms of their discipline, or in terms of their speciality within a discipline, and to be loyal to their departments or schools.

The process of specialization begins early. A graduate student is given so much work within his own department that he has little chance of finding out what other departments are up to. He is rarely able to work on problems that interest him deeply because he must restrict himself to methods that are approved by departmental committees, and this, in the social sciences today, almost always means methods for demonstrating hypotheses rather than methods that could lead to discovery. Such a student tells himself that once he has his Ph.D. he will be free to go where his curiosity leads him; but he soon discovers that promotion in his university depends upon the same considerations as the acceptance of his thesis did and after not many years he is sitting on a grants committee making sure that applicants follow the rules he himself was forced to learn.

And the pressure on a scholar to remain a specialist is continuous. It is applied at a place where it is felt most keenly—upon his need to find a relatively secure position. One might suppose that human problem institutes within universities would be natural academic homes for generalist scholars; and so they are as far as various kinds of "psychic income" are concerned; but the hard fact is that tenure appointments in universities can, except in very rare instances, be made only through departments and schools. Such appointments must, of course, be reserved for men who are loyal and who represent specialities that departments and schools must include among their offerings if they are to keep pace with developments in their disciplines. This means that the generalist, if he does not already have academic tenure, must live precariously from grant to grant.

The professional schools of a university would appear at first glance to be natural places for multi-disciplinary, problem-centered work, and, indeed, some of them in recent years have been innovating, along these lines. Unfortunately, however, the applied work to which these schools are committed does not usually have status as high as that enjoyed by the sciences and humanities, so that members

of these schools are drawn to imitate the established sciences, and instead of addressing themselves directly to the human problems their schools were set up to cope with, they go in for research which in its "purity" often outdoes that of the admired older disciplines. Sadly enough, this does not improve the status of the applied field. The educational psychologist who does work that psychologists generally approve will be called a psychologist, and the fact that he is in a school of education will not be held against him, but psychologists will still disclaim any knowledge of education, lest they be suspected of association with education men.

Finally, problem-centered institutes in universities tend to be transformed into centers for specialized inquiry.

The above considerations do not lead inescapably to the conclusion that it is impossible to establish and to maintain a human problems institute within the university. Probably it could be done with enough money and persuasiveness, particularly if these were applied at a time when graduate students were in open rebellion against "the system" and when there were public demands for greater attention to pressing problems.

An Independent Institute for the Study of Human Problems

It is conceivable that the kind of independent institute being proposed here would have some impact upon the departments and schools of the university. If it became known as a good place to work, a place where interesting and important things were done, and done well, individuals and groups within the university might be challenged to undertake a similar adventure themselves.

Such an outcome would, of course, be highly desirable. But even if many human problems institutes were established within universities, there would probably still be need of independent institutes that were free not only to advocate policies but to become involved in their implementation.

In any case, the proposed institute would cultivate relationships that began with the institute's study of some of a department's students, or with an arrangement by which the institute undertook to assist in the training of such students, might blossom into collaborations on research projects—perhaps ones in which the institute became the "action arm" of an action research project that was carried out mainly by the department. Another kind of mutually beneficial arrangement would be one in which a university institute undertook to collect and to process data in connection with a project initiated by the independent institute.

The faculty member's outlook is largely determined by the general situation in which he works. His attitudes and values become, in time, deeply ingrained, and are not likely to change as soon as he attains academic tenure or moves to a university whose formal organization is different. Typically, he becomes committed to a line of specialized inquiry, in whose terms he tends to define his academic self and to be defined by his colleagues; and, typically, his major values are purity, objectivity and ethical neutrality. He becomes a bit nervous if a colleague publishes something that is interesting enough to appear in the newspapers, he takes a dim view of a teacher whose course is popular with students, and he looks askance at a colleague who writes for a general audience. In his professional role, therefore, he could hardly be expected to support a human problems institute of the sort proposed here.

At the same time, however, there are ways in which an independent institute and the individual faculty member might develop mutually beneficial relationships. In the above references to the faculty member's disciplinary purity, narrow research focus and ethical neutrality, he was being considered as an occupant of a set of roles within the university structure. Few university men are fully identified with their roles or totally embraced by them. A man whose professional behavior had the characteristics just listed might, as an *individual*, be broadly intellectual and generalist, ethically highly sensitive, and deeply concerned about social problems. But in this case, he might have difficulty finding, within the university structure opportunities for the expression of these aspects of himself—least of all, opportunities for their concerted or integrated expression. The proposed institute, in contrast, could offer the university faculty member just such opportunities; at the least it would be a place where on weekends he could take part in intellectual activities that contrasted with his every-day work, and at the most he might be a part-time staff member who embraced the institute's orientation to problems and assumed a major role in its activities. The institute would seek to develop various kinds of formal and informal relationships with members of the university, not neglecting to make use of their specialized knowledge (they could be lecturers, discussion leaders, consultants and members of research teams) while offering them a new pattern of intellectual companionship.

I can think of several ways in which such an institute might be established and made to operate: (a) A large foundation could do it at once, using such funds as were necessary to attract generalist social scientists. If its actions involved efforts to influence legislation, e.g., that governing drugs, alcohol, abortion or the behavior of the police, it could set up a taxable corporation in the same building. (b) a group of social scientists who knew how to make a

lot of money, e.g., by rendering services to industry, could use their profits to set up the institute as a nonprofit corporation in which they would invite likeminded colleagues to work, probably this is the way for social scientists to gain the most complete freedom. (c) A group of social scientists could seek a founding endowment for, say, a 5 year period during which the institute proved the validity of its approach. It could also make use of program funds during this period, and after it got going it should have no difficulty in attracting funds of various kinds. It could if the need arose set up one or more taxable agencies or it could develop close relations with agencies, such as churches, that were already free to advocate policies.

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Nevitt Sanford

Both Nevitt and I have promised you that we would—from time to time—disagree with each other in public. But the time is not now (it will come, it will come). I quite agree with Nevitt that what this country needs is a new kind of agency for research and action. And what this country needs, the SPSSI should help come to pass.

If such agencies or institutions as Nevitt describes should come to pass and if in that event a brain-drain of social scientists from the universities to these institutions should result—then so be it. For I suspect that what this country needs is not only a new kind of agency for research and action but, perhaps, what this country needs (and this old world of ours, too) is a new kind of university, or a new concept of a university, or a new concept of education or a new concept of research—or a whole flock of such new concepts.

David Krech

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
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Editorial Notes

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES WILL ACCEPT "SINGLES"

The J.W. Edwards Board plans to depart immediately from the current policy of organizing and expanding its business of the J.W. Edwards products by manufacturing these machines. In the future, instead of continuing to expand its business of the J.W. Edwards products, the company will focus on other products and services, such as software development, consulting services, and training programs. The company has also decided to restructure its organization, addressing the following areas:

- Product Development: The company will invest more resources in developing new products and improving existing ones.
- Manufacturing: The company will continue to manufacture its products in-house, but will explore opportunities for outsourcing certain components or sub-assemblies to reduce costs and improve efficiency.
- Marketing: The company will focus on building a strong brand presence and expanding its market reach through various channels, including digital marketing, trade shows, and partnerships with industry leaders.
- Customer Support: The company will enhance its customer support services, providing faster response times and more comprehensive support packages.

The J.W. Edwards Board believes that these changes will position the company for continued success and growth in the future.

COMMENTS AND REJOINDERS

Bacillus growing - due to an increase in the number of cells per unit volume of culture.

Upcoming issues

[View all posts by George Frank Newell](#)

Advanced Text Analytics Techniques, 2nd Edition

The New Standardized Test of English Language Proficiency

[View Details](#)

Stress Management and Teacher Performance (Figure 1, Figure 1 from Edmon)

Tradition and Modernity: Conflict and Congruence

Joseph Gusfield

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In the decades following World War II, Social Science has recaptured an interest in the study of social changes affecting total societies. The emergence of new nations and their quickened aspirations toward economic betterment and equality of citizenship have confronted scholars with the task of understanding the past and the present and foretelling the future of the non-European countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Near East. The seven papers that make up this issue are illustrative of the kinds of work and the intellectual issues which this interest has developed in the late 1960's.

The study of social change cannot avoid some variant of a "before and after" sequence in which institutions and cultural attributes characterizing a past are seen as being replaced or modified during the present and in motion toward new relationships and values that will be realized in the future. The concept of "modernity" has emerged in recent years in an effort to summarize the effects of multiple political, social and economic change that have been evident with the development of new nations and the concern for economic development since World War II. A distinction between "tradition" and "modernity" has been at the center of the analytical models that have attempted to describe and understand these changes (Pye, 1965; Eisenstadt, 1966). What gives unity to this collection of papers is the concern

they demonstrate for the various uses and meanings of this conceptual duality as it is used to illuminate the significance of processes of social change.

This distinction represents an old stream of thinking in social science. It was influential in the nineteenth century and has left its residue in the perspectives of many social analysts. Theories of social evolution had wide influence in the history of thinking about social change and have been represented by descriptions of the "great transformation" from pre-industrial to industrial society in the Western world. The works of several major sociological theorists, such as Durkheim, Tocqueville and Weber, have been influential in the development of a perspective which has stressed the discontinuity between old and new social institutions in the West (Bendix, 1961). The disruption of the rural, pre-industrial and simple community and its replacement by the urban, industrial and highly differentiated society is a major theme in the contemporary sociology of Western societies.

William Friedland's Paper . . .

This heritage of social theory has had its impact on the study of non-Western societies as well, as the papers in this volume attest. One variant of the evolutionary perspective involved in the tradition-modernity distinction is represented here by William Friedland's paper on ideologies and movements in East Africa. Friedland describes the "cargo cults" and analogous movements as responses to the disruptive effects of colonialism on traditional on-going African societies. Though the cults are themselves religious in their origin, they tend to change by incorporating political and nationalistic goals. Seeing them as precursors and as forms of independence movements, Friedland suggests stages of development through which both movements and incipient nations move as they shift from disparate, local communities toward more definitive and unified nations. The ideologies and the movements which Friedland describes are therefore points along a continuum in which change moves us away from a set of past conditions and values towards something new—national political institutions and national integration. While that point of stable and centralized states has not yet been reached in the African societies he describes, the utility of Friedland's analysis is not destroyed. In this sense the religious base of the "cargo cults" and other movements was a part of an older and traditional society. It was not adapted to a newer situation which the events of conquest contained within them but was replaced by new aspirations and definitions.

In this analysis of changing social movements the passage

from tradition to modernity is relatively clear, and the two concepts appear as opposites to each other points of contrast which can be located at different periods in the historical modernization of the African communities. The case of Japan is far more complicated and perhaps far more beguiling. There is much consensus among scholars that the replacement of "feudal" institutions by "industrial" ones that seems to have occurred in Europe has by no means been the case in Japan (Abegglen, 1958; Smith, 1961; Vogel, 1965). In fact, the feudal-like relationships of personal fealty between a subordinate and a superior appear to have been a basis which aided the Japanese transformation and enabled the Meiji Restoration (1868) to be a uniquely successful instance of a non-Western nation transforming its economy. This seeming inconsistency has been the focus of a great deal of the discussion of Japan among students of modernization (Levy, 1954; Scalapino, 1965; Bendix, 1964). The side-by-side existence and even mutual support which premodern, traditional institutions displayed alongside modern ones has troubled those who tended to see social change as a directed or linear movement from one form to another.

John Bennett's Views . . .

This problem is the focus for two papers on Japan in our issue. John Bennett approaches it by an analysis of how scholars have tended to describe or depict Japanese society in studies during the past two generations. An influential book such as Ruth Benedict's *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946) placed a great deal of emphasis on Japan as a traditional society in which elements of pre-industrial institutions—especially in family, state and personal relationships—have directed and molded the uses of a contemporary technology. Bennett points out that this conception of Japan as a traditional society gave way during the fifties to one that emphasized that a more modernistic structure was replacing an older one. This view in turn has given way again in recent years, according to Bennett, to a partial return to the view of Japan as a traditional society. Bennett suggests that this division among scholars may only reflect the issues and struggles that have continuously affected Japan since 1868: there have been a continuous set of issues in which the variables of tradition and modernity have neither reached a clear-cut *status quo* nor a situation in which one can be said to have replaced the other. Japan then appears, to Bennett, as neither a traditional nor a modern society in the terms suggested by the evolutionary theorists. Instead it is a society reflecting both the capacity to utilize seemingly opposites to help and support each other and

the ability to exist and prosper with the continued reality of opposing forms of culture and social structure.

This point of view with its emphasis on paradox and on conflict must be contrasted with the prevalent conception of social change as moving towards the unity of a system of interrelated variables (Deutsch 1964). The strain towards consistency, an idea which William Graham Sumner expounded about 60 years ago, has found considerable scope in recent social science thinking. While systems analysis has itself placed a great deal of emphasis on integration, students of industrialization and industrialism have perhaps given it a clearer focus in the case of countries like Japan. The conception of industrialism as a social system bringing about forms of family, of industrial relations, of political institutions has found its most explicit expression in the theory of convergence expounded by Clark Kerr, John Dunlop, Frederick Harbison and Charles Myers in their influential book *Industrialism and Industrial Man* (1960). This theory suggests that the technology and organizational culture of industrialization is diffusable to many parts of the world and to many cultures. As it diffuses it transforms social structures and cultural values in a similar fashion. A new and common social system, industrialism, is thus coming into being throughout the world today as it accepts Western technology and industrial organization.

Karsh, Cole and The Problem of Convergence . . .

It is just this problem of convergence, especially in industrial relations, with which Bernard Karsh and Robert Cole are concerned in their paper, *Industrialization and the Convergence Hypothesis*. The Japanese industrial relations scheme with its emphasis on lifelong employment, wages based on seniority and patrimonial benefits seems so at variance with the performance based market oriented structure of other industrialized societies that its origin and future constitute a central problem for comparative industrial sociology. The possibility that this system is now breaking up constitutes the subject matter of the Karsh-Cole paper. Their observations of Japanese factors do however illustrate the ambiguities between form and content in Japanese life that makes it so difficult for the observer to find a clear-cut solution to this intellectual problem. That there are trends towards convergence does indeed seem clear. But that there are also considerable continuities with the past is also reflected in their paper. Just such ambiguities have led to a critical appraisal of the tradition-modernity contrast (Gutkind 1967).

Marc Galanter and Indian Legal System . . .

Two papers on change in specific Indian institutions reveal again the complexities of the distinction between a traditional past and a modern present as necessarily in conflict with each other. In his analysis of how British legal systems were introduced and assimilated into Indian life Marc Galanter presents an intricate picture of the replacement of a traditional system of unwritten judgments by a recorded and uniform structure based on courts and a highly trained legal profession. The impact of British law on Indian institutions was considerable, not only replacing specific regulations by new ones but creating whole areas of the society under the regulation of law and adding to the many crucial roles played by new institutions of the courts and legal professions. The transformation has been discontinuous and irreversible; past legal procedures have been replaced and are not revived even under national independence.

Galanter does not maintain that this replacement of past by the present is necessarily a general process to be found in all areas of Indian life. Language, for example, is far more reversible and even additive. Both the British and indigenous languages can continue and indeed the revitalisation of native languages since independence is indicative of a kind of movement which has not been seen for law. The disruption of the past by the present is by no means quite the same when one examines political institutions in India. The fusion of tradition and modernity is much more evident in the analysis of the political adaptations of the Indian caste of Rajputs to the acts of the state under British rule and to the political apparatus of democratic institutions.

The Rudolphs and The Politics of Rajasthan

In their analysis of politics in the Indian state of Rajasthan Lloyd and Suzanne Rudolph modify the general picture of disruption and transition in two important ways. First, they indicate that the conception of a uniform ideal of the characteristics of a state was by no means the case in the traditional past. Among the Rajputs they can identify two very contrasting cultures — one supportive of a heretic and renunciant style and the other of a more peasant and constituted set of norms and values. It is this fact that makes the second point significant. In relation to the series of land reform measures under independence the Rajputs had available to them ideologies and identities which were diverse and which made possible differential reactions. The cleavages within the caste were not creations of modernists but were brought into organised forms by the potentiatars and opponents.

which resulted both from the older conflicts of culture within the caste and from the possibilities of political influence and power which the modern institutions entail.

Donald Levine and The Nature of the Concept of Culture . . .

The final two papers are less specific to particular societies, although one utilizes data and observations entirely from Ethiopia and the other from contemporary India. The theme of Donald Levine's paper on Ethiopian culture is less the specific character of Ethiopia than the general nature of the concept of culture. As Bennett, and also Karsh and Cole, found dual strains existing side by side in Japan, and the Rudolph's found in Rajput past conflicts in values, Levine's analysis of Ethiopian culture also finds that the assumption of a uniform traditional culture is quite misleading. ". . . Even to a dull outsider, areas of considerable cultural variation become manifest once the stereotype of uniformity has been cracked" (see page 132 of this issue). Conflict and consistency have existed within what would be called traditional Amhara culture and many aspects of it have changed within the past, well before the society can be said to have come under the influence of Western sources.

The Useems and The Third Culture . . .

The last paper, by John and Ruth Useem, reminds us that in many ways the current changes affecting the developing nations are distinctively different from that of the Western societies during their period of industrial growth. We have already seen, both in Friedland's and in Galanter's papers, the enormous impact which colonial conquest has had on African and Indian societies. The Useems, in studying the American educated Indian, point to the extent to which there has come into being a third culture—a world, international culture in which men quite quickly assimilate values that are transnational and are available for all rather than rediscovering and recreating the technological and ideological history of the advanced nations. Thus, the technology, the ideologies, and the vocabulary of action of the advanced, industrialized societies is available and quickly becomes the property of large numbers of elites in new and developing nations. The traffic between the modernized and the traditional society is a distinctive process from that by which the earlier industrializing nations made their way into modernity. There are concrete models available and considerable interaction between these two

forms of society. This is quite similar to what Thorsten Veblen noted much earlier in the 20th century when he referred to the fact that the nations that industrialize later can look to the earlier ones for knowledge and experience which are positive values. He referred to this, from the standpoint of those earlier nations, as "the penalty for taking the lead" (Veblen, 1948). The Useems sensitize us to the fact that the modernizing role is already there and need not be newly created by each society in their quest to be modern.

As we have come to study more societies, to deepen our understanding of the histories of each and to broaden our awareness of diverse areas of social life within them, the relationships between past and present have taken on a more complex appearance than our earlier sociological theories had suggested. While we have been able to look to the Western experience for some guides, these have been perhaps more heuristic than conclusive. Even here, recent investigations of industrialization in the West suggest that the earlier conceptions of disruptions of institutions such as the family and their replacement by new forms adapted to industrialization were by no means correct for Western history (Goode, 1963). In examining the developing areas and new nations, social scientists have begun to suggest the rich diversity separating one context from another and one society from another. While the contributors to this issue by no means share a common theoretical perspective, their papers do lead us to conclude that there is no royal road to the study of social change; no single set of generalizations of transition, of conflict and disruption, or even of continuity will suffice. What does unify this collection of writings, however, is the sense that the relations between tradition and modernity must be studied anew within each context of change.

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Traditionalism and Modernization: Movements and Ideologies*

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In the contact between the Western and nonWestern worlds over the period of the past three hundred years, complex technological societies have come into contact with a variety of simple social systems whose technological organization did not permit effective resistance to external control. The establishment of control by foreign authorities initiated a vast transition from traditionalism to modernity whose impact is still being felt on a world-wide basis.

The present paper examines this transition in terms of movements and ideologies generated as a result of such contact. Its approach is inductive; from a single case, that of Tanganyika which will be described in some detail, a model will be formulated. Although a general model can be constructed, there are a number of limitations in its applicability. Socially, the model is most applicable to those situations of contact where the indigenous societies were relatively simple, small in scale and locally-based. The model is less applicable to indigenous societies of considerable complexity. Spatially, this means that the model is most applicable in Africa and Oceania and most, but not all, of Asia. The model is least applicable in contact circumstances

*I am indebted to Dorothy Nelkin for research assistance in the preparation of this paper.

such as those of China and the West or in Latin America where wholesale transplantation displaced entire indigenous social systems. Finally, it should be noted that the model is not applicable to circumstances where the transition to modernism is the result of internal dynamics rather than culture contact and the establishment of a dominating foreign political system.

The paper begins with an examination of a single case in detail, proceeds to a model of transition, and concludes with the consideration of several empirical cases in an attempt to assess the validity of the model in diverse circumstances.

Movements and Ideologies: The Case of Tanganyika¹

Tanganyika represents the situation of an undefined geographical area moving over a period of eighty years into the condition of becoming a nation-state. Prior to the arrival of Europeans in eastern Africa, Tanganyika was an undifferentiated land mass ostensibly ruled by the Sultan of Zanzibar but in fact utilized only for purposes of travel to and from slave regions and as a source of slaves. During the period of Zanzibar suzerainty little control was exercised over the indigenous population which was distributed very unevenly over the area which is now Tanganyika.² Indigenous societies were relatively heterogeneous; their descent systems varied from patri- to matrilineal, their economies varied from nomadism and pastoralism to settled agriculture. Several indigenous societies were developing and, indeed, some primitive "empires" were in the process of formation. However, the indigenous polities were mainly small in scale with few differentiated political roles. They were relatively undifferentiated in their divisions of labor with subsistence economies and little or no internal trade.

Traditionalistic Rebellion

No significant European penetration of the area occurred until 1885 when, in the typical politics of the time, the Germans "convinced" the Sultan of Zanzibar to turn over control of the mainland ports through a show of force in the Zanzibar harbor. German penetration began in May 1887 and was accelerated in 1888. The reaction of the local population was immediate and hostile. Led by local Arab notables on the coast, an insurrection

¹This section is based on Friedland (1962). The present paper, while using some of the same material has a distinctly different focus. For discussions of political development of Tanganyika see also Bates (1962) and Taylor (1963).

²In current political terminology Tanganyika constitutes the mainland part of the United Republic of Tanzania having formed a tenuous connection with the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba in 1964. The present paper is concerned solely with the mainland and the name "Tanganyika" will be used throughout.

began which forced the Germans to import sizeable numbers of troops. It required over a year of military activity to put down this coastal rebellion. As the Germans pushed further inland a series of minor rebellions occurred each of which was suppressed as a result of superior German military technology. Reaction inland to German hegemony occurred intermittently between 1891 and 1898. Mkwawa, the chief of the Hehe, a tribe moving toward the development of a small-scale empire when the Germans arrived, led a rebellion that caused considerable difficulty before it could be suppressed. It was not until 1898, or almost ten years following the beginning of establishment of German control, that the initial indigenous reactions to external control were suppressed.

These early rebellions were all *traditionalist* in orientation and action. In all cases, their leadership was vested in existing authority figures and their goals were concerned with the maintenance of the status quo. Furthermore, each rebellion independently utilized existing forms of social organization, and there was no unified indigenous reaction to the Germans. In effect, each indigenous society sought to solve its own problems *vis-a-vis* the Germans with no regard to the same problems being experienced by other indigenous societies.

Maji-Maji Rebellion

It was not until 1905 that a new type of reaction developed. The Maji-maji rebellion (Bates, 1957; Bell, 1950; Hille, 1962),¹ began in the coastal area of southern Tanganyika in July 1905. By September the entire southeastern portion of the country was in active rebellion and, ultimately, all of the southern portions of Tanganyika from the Indian Ocean to Lake Nyasa joined the revolt. It took the Germans over a year to suppress the revolt which involved major military actions.

Maji-maji constitutes a qualitatively different response from the earlier reactions to the Germans. For one thing, it was marked by the introduction of a widely-held belief in the magical powers of certain waters (maji means water in Swahili) which prior to the rebellion conveyed upon its users good health, abundant crops and immunity against witchcraft. The water later was believed to convey immunity against Europeans and their illnesses as well. Thus, one characteristic of the rebellion was the extensive use of water in ritual fashion. While the utilization of water for magical purposes fitted into traditional religious beliefs, it incor-

¹Detailed historical materials on Maji-maji are still unavailable. The best sources are Bates (1957) and Bell (1950). Also see Hille (1962).

porated the new belief that its immunity could now protect against Europeans.

More significant, however, was the widespread character of the rebellion socially and spatially. The revolt encompassed pagans, Muslims and Christians from a wide variety of different indigenous societies. They shared a common focus of hostility against the Germans and those associated with them. Thus, making few distinctions, the rebels massacred Germans, Arabs, Swahilis, Indians and Africans working for the Germans. The significant dividing line in the rebellion was between the Germans and their associates on the one hand, and the indigenous population on the other. Indigenous groups previously hostile or anti-pathetic to one another joined in the effort against the common external enemy.

No Common Action . . .

While the rebellion was widespread, there is no indication of the existence of either a central organization or some form of directorate. Instead a series of local actions occurred concurrently, news of each fresh reaction stimulating new reactions in adjoining areas. Maji-maji is thus a manifestation of collective behavior rather than an organized movement. Organization was precluded both by the lack of communications, the enormous distances involved, as well as lack of understanding or knowledge of the consequences of a unified action. In addition, the leadership of local manifestations of the movement was rarely held by established authorities. To the extent that knowledge of leadership is available, it appears that most leaders were local notables or magical practitioners although in some situations local chiefs did lead attacks on German settlements.

The Maji-maji rebellion differs qualitatively from the initial reactions to the establishment of German control in that it manifests a new level of consciousness of the indigenous population. Although no common effort against the Germans was organized, a wide variety of indigenous groups engaged in individual efforts directed against a common enemy. In this respect, the Maji-maji rebellion can be characterized as *proto-nationalist* in contrast to the earlier traditionalist rebellions. Although its goals were the same as the earlier actions, that is, the restoration of the *status quo ante*, it marked a new level of consciousness and action.

120,000 Lives Lost

The German response to the Maji-maji uprising was to intensify their established policy of *shrecklichkeit* which marked the early years of their colonial empire. As a result, the population

of southern Tanganyika was decimated with an estimated 120,000 lives lost, a loss which permanently affected the character of social structure in the area of the revolt. The end of Maji-maji marked the effective end of protonationalist reaction. German administration became more widespread and changes in colonial policy led to a diminution in the harsher aspects of colonial control. Before any new responses could be formulated, Tanganyika became the locus of the major fighting in Eastern Africa between the British and the Germans during the First World War. The war seriously dislocated the social structure of the country, almost destroyed the substantial economic development which had been wrought, and brought about substantial changes in the colony as the British took over control.

The period immediately following the war saw little response from the indigenous population other than passive acceptance. The reconstitution of the economy, however, particularly the introduction of coffee-growing, was to bring increasing numbers of Africans into the cash economy and to crystallize a series of localized dissatisfactions. British policy was to channel protest into locally-based modern associations primarily oriented toward economic activities. Thus, the earliest association was formed among the Chagga people in 1932. It was followed by another association among the Haya people in 1937. Still later, the Meru Association was formed by indigenous elements and, indeed, in opposition to the British. A host of other tribally-based associations were also to be formed (Bennett, 1935; Tanganyika, 1945; Chidzero, 1961).⁴

Prenationalist Response

The increasingly politicalized nature of the responses, which can be called *prenationalist*, appear in the development of the Chagga, Haya and Meru associations. The initial reaction among the Chagga began with dissatisfaction about government policies concerning their rights to grow and market coffee on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. Coffee growing had been encouraged by the first British district commissioner but Chagga involvement in the growth of a market crop was opposed by European settlers. Confusion about government policies gave rise to a localized crisis

⁴No attempt is being undertaken to enumerate all of the localized associations that were formed under the impetus of the British. The three examples are cited only to provide an indication of the kinds of change which occurred over time as modern associations were adopted by Africans. While no detailed overall studies have been conducted to date of these associations, there are some descriptions of their operations. For the development of the KNCU, see Bennett (1935, 169-74). The Bahaya Association is discussed in Tanganyika (1945) and the Meru Association in Chidzero (1961, 236-45).

in October 1928 which was resolved by opening channels of communication and encouraging the Chagga to create their own marketing organization. This later evolved in 1932 in the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU), an over-arching organization integrating the activities of many local primary cooperative societies. While the KNCU was to continue largely as an economic organization, it constituted one of the first attempts to unite the activities of the Chagga tribe as a whole. It also provided a significant training ground in modern organizational skills.

The Bahaya Association, formed in 1937 among the Haya people west of Lake Victoria in northwestern Tanganyika, also developed in response to government regulations limiting coffee growing. Centered on the developing town of Bukoba, the association became concerned not only with economic questions but with "semi-political" problems including the reputation of the tribe. At various times, the association moved into areas ostensibly within the jurisdiction of the British-supported Native Authority and thus took on an increasingly political complexion.

The Meru Association formed in 1947 was the most politicized of the three tribally-based associations. It was formed without British support (indeed with British opposition) as a result of a land alienation case. Politically hostile to the British, the Association raised funds to send representatives to the United Nations to protest the alienation of Meru lands. Although close to the nationalist phase, the Meru organization was still tribally-based and primarily concerned with tribal problems.

All three associations, and others that were formed on an ethnic basis after 1947, were characterized by having a modernized and western educated leadership. All were formal organizations with written constitutions, offices, and procedures for the accomplishment of business. While all were tribally based, all were concerned with the broader world beyond the tribe and each dealt regularly with the British colonial government on an increasingly hostile basis.

The period of prenationalism was perforce a lengthly and irregular one. It was marked by occasional, localized protests but rarely by riots or other public disturbances for the British sought to "manage" the associations by close supervision and succeeded to a considerable degree. Thus, the forms of protest tended to be peaceful. These movements of the prenationalist phase were localized, tribally based, but formally organized and with a modernized leadership. Ideologies, to the extent they developed, were concerned with the integrity of the tribe *vis-a-vis* the broader world and its economic, political and social well-being. The government was recognized as a crucial source of

political decision-making and became the focus for the action of the prenationalist associations.

Nationalism

The last phase, that of *nationalism*, began in the 1920's but remained insignificant until after the Second World War. The organized expression of nationalism was the Tanganyika African Association (TAA) founded in 1929 by African civil servants and, indeed, encouraged by the colonial government (Kasindi, 1964). TAA grew slowly and mainly provided a meeting ground for educated, urban Africans. After the Second World War, the TAA began to change drastically in its orientation. This became evident in the increasingly critical reports presented every three years to United Nations Visiting Missions. The tone of TAA representations to the U.N. became increasingly strident and nationalist. Initially complaining about the conditions of the African population and ill-treatment (and neglect) by the colonial administration, TAA testimony soon began to sound of modern nationalism. In 1954, after Julius Nyerere became its president, TAA was converted into a full-fledged nationalist party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). With the formation of TANU, Tanganyika entered fully into its nationalist phase. The pre-nationalist organizations which existed were still encouraged by the British, frequently in the hope of providing local counter-movements to TANU. But they were co-opted into TANU as the party rapidly became a mass movement between 1955-57.

In its nationalist phase, a fully developed ideology was formed which argued that the indigenous population of *Africans* were being exploited politically by a colonial oppressor (the British) and economically by expatriates (Asians, Europeans, Arabs and other non-indigenes). The solution to exploitation was the formation of a new nation, Tanganyika, in which all citizens would exercise equal political rights. The key slogan was "uhuru" or freedom—*independence*.

TANU constituted the movement. It was a modernized, formal political party, complete with the accoutrements of modern political organization, from organizing secretaries and a press secretary to mass meetings and involvement in elections. Dues paying was regularized; officials were paid regular salaries (although frequently in arrears). While the organization suffered from numerous administrative defects because of lack of experience, this was a modern political structure familiar to Western experience.

TANU's leadership was composed almost entirely of Westernized and educated Africans. Significantly, most of its leaders

were Christian rather than Muslim; of Muslims in the top leadership, all had been educated in Western rather than in Koranic schools. Its approach to action was legal, constitutional and peaceful; as long as the British were prepared to make continual concessions, the movement was prepared to "play the game" through a series of stages until independence was won. The membership was vast but concentrated in the towns and in rural centers of population where, most often, the influence of the modern economy was felt most strongly. Among nomadic tribes, TANU influence was much less significant.

Stages of Transition: The Model

The stages of transition of movements and ideologies from traditionalism to modernism can be subsumed under headings which designate phases in a continuous but irregular process (Smelser, 1959).⁵ The stages are the traditionalist, the protonationalist, the prenationalist and the nationalist. Movements in each stage are characterized by differences in ideology, organization, *modus operandi*, leadership and participation. These differences can, of course, be related to the character of the social structure at the time.

Traditionalism

The initial reaction to the establishment of contact (and control) is simplistically traditional. The purpose of reaction is to retain (rather than restore) the *status quo ante* and to expel foreign influence. Leadership remains with traditional authorities and the forms of reaction are traditional.

Protonationalism

The first significant change in the development of new movements and ideologies is characterized by heavy emphasis on traditionalist beliefs; indeed, responses during this phase, unless carefully examined, tend to be regarded as traditionalist. Where protonationalism differs from traditionalism, however, is in a broader level of social and political consciousness and cohesion; that is, where social units which previously identified only with themselves begin to identify with other social units which are undergoing a similar process of contact with an external force. In the protonationalist phase, social cohesion begins to expand. Groups formerly in conflict with each other begin to see common

⁵No attempt is made to argue for smooth, fixed transitions from one phase to the next. Orderly sequences exist only in analyses and ideal types. For a discussion of irregularity in sequence and regressions see Smelser (1959, 30-32).

elements with respect to a more esoteric and differentially defined social unit. While a traditional response would define all outside groups as threatening, a protonationalist response differentiates the external social force and distinct social units act together (although not necessarily in coordination) against a mutual external threat. Ideology in this phase is very thinly developed. Some attempt may be made to define the need for united action. In all other respects, protonationalist ideologies are traditionalist, being oriented toward the re-establishment of the *status quo ante*, and emphasizing traditional religious elements. No construction of a new world/society/ideology is in any way considered significant.

In terms of the development of organization, emphasis is placed on spontaneity. A new leadership emerges, often with little or no traditional base, but it does not differ substantially from the traditional leadership in its orientations toward the world. The *modus operandi* of protonationalist movements consist largely of traditional forms of violence. Violence may be organized using traditional forms in which tribes fight separately against a newly defined enemy, or some new forms may evolve in which jointly organized units fight together. What is significant here is that neither the leadership nor the followers have any grasp of the technology of modern violence. As a consequence, irrational beliefs develop to provide immunity from the recognized superior technology of the Western powers. These beliefs are essentially supernatural in character and are not themselves traditional (in the sense that they were not found to exist in the same form in the past). However, they fit more coherently into a traditionalist than a modern frame of reference.

Prenationalism

Prenationalism constitutes a more advanced state of transition both in ideology and in character of the developing movements. This phase is characteristic where traditional and protonational responses to the establishment of control have been defeated by superior technologies of violence. Prenationalist ideologies acknowledge the ultimate authority of colonial power but begin to challenge it in new respects.

The social structures generating prenationalist movements are already transitional in that (a) colonial administration is well-established; (b) inroads have been made into the subsistence economy and the society is increasingly involved in the cash nexus; (c) stratification of the indigenous population is beginning, particularly as some autochthones are educated along Western

lines. However, (d) the bulk of the population continues to be only marginally involved in the cash economy and is primarily rural and traditionalist in most behavior.

Prenationalist ideologies are far more coherent than those in protonationalist phases. For one thing, the existence of an educated social stratum which has absorbed the dominant values of the colonial power provides the basis for the formulation of an ideology which will be palatable to the occupying colonial power. The ideology of prenationalism therefore can be formulated in terms which are meaningful to the occupying power and is marginally acceptable (that is, it does not challenge the fundamental fact of political domination). At the same time, the appeals of prenationalist leaders contain traditional elements, and ideology is frequently couched in traditionalist terms.

Structurally, prenationalist organizations are based in part on traditional social organization, the primary unit of concern often being the tribe. However, they contain many of the aspects of modern formal associations such as a constitution, a hierarchy of offices, and a commitment to "legal" forms of expression of dissatisfaction (such as petitioning the constituted authority). Organizations are not specialized, being concerned often with broad economic, cultural, reputational, educational and political questions as they relate to the tribe. Thus, they exhibit a mixture of characteristics, some traditionally diffuse, others modern-bureaucratic in origin. This reflects the disparity between the leadership and the membership. The leadership is largely a Westernized and educated group with little traditional basis of authority. The membership is mainly traditionalist because of early socialization but is heavily involved in the cash economy. Leaders are oriented mainly toward the creation of a new social order based upon the modern economy created by the colonial power; members are frequently oriented towards maintaining the status quo. Structurally, the goals of the organizations hold different meanings for the different social strata involved and this is frequently a source of strain.

Nationalism

In the final phase of transition, the social structure is characterized by the heavy inroads which have been made by the cash economy so that most strata of society are affected to some degree (although this involvement can vary considerably among different strata or in geographic regions). Education has become a widespread and important influence. Considerable internal differentiation of the population exists although this

is less significant than the aggregated distinction made between the indigenous population and various external social groups. Urbanization is increasing. Part of the population is committed to urban existence and communication between urban centers is well-developed.

In this phase the ideology which emerges is that of nationalism. The people identify with a geographic entity and with a nation-state. Appeals are now overwhelmingly modernist with little reference to traditionalist social units. Where traditional appeals occur, these are in fact largely neotraditional in that they project an ostensible past which is largely mythical. Most significantly, however, appeals are made to the unity and the identity of the indigenous population, particularly with respect to external social units resident in the country.

The form of the movement is typically modern being based upon a formally constituted political party characterized by a hierarchy of offices, complete with the accoutrements of modern political organization: constitutions, conferences, systems for dues collection and mobilization. Inadequate experience with modern organizational forms creates some structural strains but broad involvement of the population in the modern society permits the continuity of formal organization.

The *modus operandi* of such movements is political competition. That is, the movements operate within the "rules of the political game" of the occupying colonial power as long as that power permits some elements of a game to be played. In those cases where no games are permitted, that is where settler population exists—Algeria, Kenya—or where the occupying power refuses to recognize the need for some sharing of power, the movement shifts to a modern political form found in underground movements (e.g., the Mau Mau in Kenya or the FLN in Algeria).

The Model Applied

Like all models, the present attempt is intended for heuristic purposes and application will show no straight line relationships between the various stages. The degree to which any stage is present in the transition in colonial and ex-colonial societies is a function of the character of indigenous social structure and the colonial response to indigenous organization. A consideration of several cases from different continents and at different times may provide some notion of the validity of the model.

Malawi

Formerly known as Nyasaland, Malawi was (like Tanganyika) an undifferentiated land mass adjoining Lake Nyasa until

the arrival of the British. The Arabs had created a number of bases on the lake which served as center of the slave trade. The initial reaction to the British presence came primarily from the Arabs who sought to expel the invader in a traditionalist response. Protonationalist responses were relatively insignificant. The first important indigenous reaction was the prenationalist rebellion of John Chilembwe and his followers in 1915. Chilembwe, Westernized and trained by missionaries for missionary work, formed a church but soon began leading a movement which became increasingly critical of British control. The war provided what was seen as an opportunity to expel the British and an attempt was made through violence directed at Europeans. The movement was suppressed, Chilembwe was hung, and his church destroyed. Following the suppression of this movement, nationalist experimentation began but this remained insignificant until the mid-1950's when the modern nationalist movement was formed.⁶

Cargo Cults

These consist of localized movements found widely dispersed throughout Melanesia, with many manifestations in New Guinea and Fiji beginning in the last decades of the 19th century and continuing to the present time. Cargo cults are protonationalist in that they constitute attempts by the indigenous population to restore the *status quo ante* in neo-traditionalist fashion (through the use of magical rituals and, occasionally, with violence). The cults represent a broader level of consciousness in that each movement, while localized, is oriented against European control rather than against traditional enemies who are physically proximate. The cults are the product of transition and are found almost entirely in rural areas where transition has not yet deeply affected all aspects of life. Thus, while the cults developed rapidly in New Guinea, the response of more urbanized natives in Rabaul was to organize a general strike in 1929. Similarly, while cargo cults continue to develop in places such as New Hanover Island, in more modernized Fiji a nationalist movement has developed.⁷

⁶For the Arab reaction to the arrival of the British, see Perham (1960, I); the authoritative study of the Chilembwe movement is Shepperson (1958); for early experiments in nationalism and the later development of the nationalist movement see Rotberg (1965).

⁷The best summaries, although presenting diversely different interpretations, of cargo cults are Worsley (1957) and Lawrence (1964). For recent information of the cults in New Hanover, see the *New York Times*, April 4, 1965, and February 20, 1966.

The Handsome Lake Cult

The Handsome Lake Cult, developing around 1799, in New York State assumed the form of an evangelical reaction to the deterioration that was taking place within the Seneca and Iroquois population. A protonationalist response, the cult incorporated Quaker beliefs into the aboriginal cosmology. Handsome Lake, himself, had been brought up with a knowledge of Quaker practices which he absorbed as a form of spiritual rather than rational behavior. He sought to re-establish the cultural integrity of the Indian population by accommodating aspects of a new culture within the framework. The cult enjoyed a significant vogue for 16 years, but passed into decline with the death of Handsome Lake in 1815 (Wallace, 1952).

Kimbangism

This interesting movement developed in the Congo during the period of Belgian control. Initially going through a protonationalist phase in which a modernized African, Simon Kimbangu, led a syncretic religious movement that became increasingly anti-Belgian. Suppressed and forced underground by the Belgians, the movement went through several additional protonationalist manifestations. Subsequently, as prenationalist organizations began to develop, Kimbanguist elements played significant roles. The formation of nationalist organizations was long delayed by Belgian policies but Kimbanguist remnants continue to have significance in modern Congolese political life (Andersson, 1958; Young, 1965; LeMarchand, 1964).

In Conclusion . . .

Emphasis has been placed here on the transition which occurs when societies shift from traditionalism to modernism in movements and ideologies. This emphasis is not intended to obscure the fact that elements of tradition continue to be manifested in ideologies and movements as the transition to modernism becomes more advanced. In fact, neotraditionalism may become increasingly important; but as an *orientation toward an ostensible rather than a real past*. The phenomenon of neo-traditionalism became increasingly manifest in Africa, for example, in the period immediately following independence (Friedland, 1964). There was a resuscitation in some countries of traditional clothing and where (as in Tanganyika) genuinely traditional clothing was inappropriate, a neotraditionalist costume was invented or borrowed from other parts of Africa.

Similarly, in the formulation of current ideologies emphasis has been placed on their traditional component. Thus, in arguing the basis for *ujamaa* or African socialism, Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika contended that its roots lay in the traditional communitarianism of indigenous society which had broken down with contact with the West. Similar arguments were made by other African socialists (Burke, 1964).

It is nevertheless significant that, even during a nationalist phase, transitional movements and ideologies continue to manifest aspects of the past—even if these are largely fictive. The pull of the past, in other words, continues to have significance for modernized nationalist leaders and movements.

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Tradition, Modernity and Communalism in Japan's Modernization¹

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The terms, "tradition", and "modernity", like "modernization" and "Westernization", are bound up with value preferences and social ideology, and are consequently less than useful as analytical concepts in social science. R. P. Dore (1965) has counselled against a special theory of modernization, and advises a study of the processes on the basis of standard concepts pertaining to social change in any historical context. He also advocates close attention to the goals and ideologies of national leaders, since many of the changes associated with modernization are planned and engineered events. Not all, of course—there are many unanticipated consequences in the modernization process, but Dore is right in urging close attention to conscious objectives.

This approach is especially appropriate in the case of Japan. Perhaps no other society modernized so effectively on the basis of deliberate effort, planned and carried out by sophisticated elites. The process was not an invention of the late 19th century, but represented an old Japanese proclivity. There were earlier examples in the 5th and 7th centuries, concerning the importation

¹This paper was written during the author's tenure as a visiting professor at Waseda University, Tokyo. Part of its content is based on a series of lectures on the topic, "Communal Societies", delivered at Waseda University during the Fall of 1966. The paper has benefitted from a critical reading by Herbert Passin.

of Chinese institutions; —Japan has been a "borrowing culture" in the sense of repeatedly selecting foreign ideas for institutionalization in the home society. Moreover, Japan was never colonialized and consequently never had to struggle with an imposed culture; her institutions have always been in her own hands.

This has meant also that attitudes toward change have been articulate, or at least relatively so when compared with other societies undergoing change by adventitious impact or imposition. Japanese intellectuals have had the opportunity to formulate opinions on change and to justify or criticize elite policy. Criticism often has been less evident than rationalized defense, although there are plenty of examples of the opposite.

Japanese intellectuals, like the planners, have approached the change process with perspectives derived from a variety of past and present cultural sources: Buddhist, Shinto, Chinese, Japanese, Western, Asian. This has led, in recent times to views approximating those of Western scholars, as well as disagreements with them. The Japanese, like Western students of Japan, can think in terms of "Westernization", "modernization", "tradition" and "modernity"—and some of the same distortions of our understanding of the change process are as visible in Japanese writings as in the Western.

Equally important to our understanding of the modernization process in the case of Japan is its timing. The assumption made by many Western scholars is that Japan emerged late and fast: the *sine qua non* of the "nonWestern nation" proceeding under successful but forced-draft modernization.

But This Does Not Square with the Facts . . .

This conception is not entirely square with the facts, for several reasons. First, there is general consensus that Japan's modernization is really a process spanning several centuries, as is the case for Western countries (e.g., see the summary in Ward, 1968). Secondly, the period of effective modernization of many Japanese institutions is shared with several Western nations, including the United States. An example or two: true political centralization is achieved at the same time or even ahead of Germany; large-scale industrialization appears 20 years after it did in the U.S.; many of the academic disciplines are institutionalized in Japan about the same time as in the U.S. (1890's-early 20th century). Japanese travellers in Europe in the 1870's did not feel their country to be significantly behind their hosts in social development, and in many technical spheres as well.

Thus one can hold that the study of change in Japanese society be regarded not entirely as an instance of the emergence

of an exotic "nonWestern" nation into Western-type nationhood—but as a case broadly comparable to, say, Germany and England;—that is, in terms of the gradual emergence of a modern nation from a premodern, feudal base. Her changes are then similar to those undergone by many Western nations, and largely for the same reasons. The dynamics of power, the clash of economic interests, the emergence of a bourgeoisie, the mercantile policies—all these and many more bring Japan into familiar social and historical territory, and distinguish her from the history and experience of China, India or Thailand. If Japan has "modernized" and "Westernized", so have, in effect, Germany or the United States.

While "modernization" is thus a questionable term, we shall use it in this paper because there is no other single word in common use that summarizes processes of change affecting all nations. We refer to the development of certain key institutions in the frame of an industrial market economy: centralized government with a degree of popular representation; an attempt at public education; a high degree of occupational specialization; rationally organized economic institutions; and some others. Thus we use the term purely descriptively, in order to avoid some of the implicit value judgments.

Objectives and Ideals

We shall begin with a description of the intellectual defenses of social change and development in Japan's modern historical period—from 1868 to the present. The attitudes summarized here reached their fullest expression in this period, but their antecedents stretch back into the 18th century (see Jansen 1965a).

The most fundamental observation one can make of the Japanese modernizing outlook is that while a culturally-conservative position has generally dominated—i.e., Japan will accept whatever she wants, but will transform it into distinctive or traditional Japanese institutions—there also has existed an important liberal position throughout the history of the modern era: i.e., Japan should accept the Western system of institutions and revise all or most of her own institutions in the process.² In

²See Bennett and McKnight, 1956 for an account of these positions, and bibliography. In that paper, the authors also added a third: the "pragmatic" or engineering view of modernization in which changes were made without regard for their social consequences. Perhaps the best portrait of the "conservative" position in its heyday can be found in Okuma, 1909. Useful material is also found in various articles in Jansen, 1965, especially those by Webb, Shively and Hackett.

the Meiji era, advocates of both positions were agreed on the desirability of industrialization, public education, a bureaucracy and governmental apparatus and a Western-style military force. They disagreed on the role of the individual in society and various democratic or participative measures, the content of education, details of the structure of government and power and the standard of living. The liberals thus have wanted Japan to become great, but in the sense of an open, prosperous, democratic-mass society, with an expanding standard and level of living and an enhanced role for the individual. Social change and reform was to become conscious and objective, on the basis of a free criticism of society. The conservatives were opposed to these liberal objectives; modernization to them was simply a way of extending the strength and power of Japan as a finished society and nation.

Principal Slogans . . .

Marius Jansen (1965b) has discussed the principal slogans used by Japanese governing elites during various periods of the modern era. In order: for late Tokugawa times: *fukoku kyohei* ("enrich the country; strengthen its armies"); for the early Meiji period: *bummei kaika* ("civilization and enlightenment"); and for the late Meiji era: *risskin shusse* ("make something of yourself"). These slogans mark the progress of thinking about national aims, or at least the nature of domestic propaganda concerning the national transformation in the early modern period. The first stressed the glory of feudal military virtues and the need to defend Japan against foreign imperialism; the second advocated the adoption of the civilization of the West, felt to be superior to that of China, the previous model; and the third urged the individual to innovate and succeed, since that would serve Japan's aims. Jansen notes that all three of these slogans were dropped by the late 1880's, for different reasons. *Risskin shusse*, in particular, was perceived by the elite as leading toward too much individualism and personal autonomy, and hence to too much change in the existing social system.

However, the abandonment of patriotic sloganeering is immaterial, because the ideas represented by the slogans have continued to characterize the Japanese ideological scene. The modern liberals in a general way stand for *risskin shusse* and *bummei kaika*, and these terms have actually been used in contemporary discussions. The conservatives stay with *fukoku kyōhei* (in a modified, less militant sense, of course), and may also define *bummei kaika* in terms of traditional Japanese cultural values. But even more important is the fact that in a broad sense all three slogans said and continued to say the same thing: Japan and Japanese character should be strong and should prevail.

Hence whatever the disagreements over specific modernizing objectives, all parties were agreed on one basic goal: to make Japan strong and important. There is no reason to assume that this objective has changed. Currently the means used to make Japan prevail are economic, brought about partly by expediency (one finds the least amount of political or ideological disagreement over economic growth), and partly by the desire of business to realize its war-delayed objectives. However, behind the high annual growth rate and the powerful push into foreign aid and trade is the feeling that the Japanese must demonstrate their superiority, or at least their ability to equal the best. "Best in the world" is a slogan one encounters constantly in the current Japanese atmosphere; the fact that most of the "best" happens to be materialistic disturbs many critics both from liberal and conservative sides of the fence. But there is also a healthy and fervent interest in high culture: the output of important domestic novelists, artists and musicians is followed closely, and foreign reactions to their work are carefully studied. Traditional folk elements in the culture have been revived; social rituals like shrine pilgrimages have been intensified—although typically expressed in means provided by the mass culture, which implies a change in function and meaning, if not form.

The Concept of Tradition

In the light of the foregoing, what can we say about the concept of tradition in the course of Japan's modernization? First, what was seen as traditional differed from liberal and conservative viewpoints. The conservatives viewed the orderly Japanese social system which they utilized as a means to modernize with obedience and speed, as an immanent, unchanging phenomenon. That is, "traditional" in the sense of being continuous with past experience, but not in the sense of being antique or backward. The conservatives defined society or social relations as outside of the realm of change: society does not change or evolve, only its ephemeral content. Radical social reform or full democratic planning and institutions were opposed by conservatives, since like 19th century Tories, they could not or did not want to conceive of a wholesale remodelling of society on liberal-democratic lines.

The proWestern liberals, on the other hand, viewed the Japanese feudal society as backward, "traditional" in the negative sense, and hence in need of extensive change. The dignity of the individual and other Western values appeared to them as "modern"; hence they desired a renovation of the social system as well as the material and instrumental apparatus of the society. They

welcomed the liberal winds blowing through Japan in the Meiji era; in the 1920's; and again in the Occupation. These people thus had a concept of tradition which resembled, on the whole, the idea of "backwardness" which has so heavily influenced contemporary Western theories of the modernization process.

At the same time, we have noted that both conservatives and liberals subscribed to the same basic objective of making Japan into a strong "modern" nation among nations. Both agreed that Japanese character and culture had the resources for this task, although they differed on which features of the culture were critical for the transformation; —and in addition, the liberals were inclined to accept more need for alteration of old social forms. However, the confrontation of liberals and conservatives was not a matter of black and white: there was agreement on certain overall national goals and on the ability of the Japanese to achieve these goals. The tendency of the liberals to follow or at least not oppose the conservatives on issues of national power, and to be continually compromised in the process, helped delay the development of full democratic institutions, and eventually opened the door to a militarist takeover in the 1930's.

Communal Structure . . .

However, ideological perspectives are not the whole story. The communal nature of the Japanese social structure is also responsible for the tendency to blur ideological affiliations and political controversy. Loyalty to particular groups, and the making of deals and compromises to protect the interests of groups, has been more typical of Japanese social action than true interest groups or open social classes with individual mobility and aspiration. Thus, political parties and struggle groups like labor unions have tended to be coalitions of groups with their own connections and agreements with power centers. Often ideological manifestations are complex disguises for subtle compromises. Therefore, obligations and other particularistic considerations are often more important than ideology or socioeconomic interests in determining outcomes, and individuals tend to be drawn into positions in conformity to the particular interests of their groups. Hierarchical arrangements are sanctioned by obligatory relationships with carefully-calibrated *noblesse oblige*. This system tends to make American-style indices of socioeconomic class and mobility difficult of application, although there is no doubt that Japanese society has changed toward the open-class system in recent years, as Prof. Ken'chi Tominaga has shown in his studies of occupational mobility (1968).

In any case, the governmental process in Japan often requires

authoritarian leadership to establish clear goals and trans-group objectives. Social rationality, defined in the Western sense as public means efficiently adjusted to public ends, often must be imposed by groups high in the hierarchy when the situation under consideration is impeded by diverse private group aims. The Meiji Restoration modernizers of Japan behaved in this manner; the program was conceived and administered from above, by mobilizing the entire national network of groups as a kind of "client" to the elite "patrons". Liberals had difficulty remaining outside of the system since to do so was to relinquish most opportunities for influence.

However, while the Japanese social system thus had its effects on ideological perspective, it also served the modernization process. The Japanese elite have made good use of the elements of hierarchy and consensus in organizing the society for planned change. The rapidity and efficiency of the transformation, as in the case of Germany, were in large part due to an obedient population and an effective system of group communication and solidarity. Thus one cannot consider the Japanese communal social system completely as a "traditional" element, because it has been part and parcel of Japanese modern institutional structure.

Tendency to Assimilate . . .

Still another meaning of the concept of "tradition" in Japanese modernization is the tendency to assimilate all ideas and procedures of foreign origin into the Japanese entity. Japan's geographical position had cut her off from the circulation of ideas between the great civilizations; in order to share in these cultures, it was necessary for her to make conscious borrowings. Given the activist power structure which had developed within feudalism, her people were ambitious and eager to acquire the tools and ideas of advanced societies. However, since these had to be imported, a high level of conscious planning became part of the pattern of change from the 7th century or earlier, when Japan began her first era of borrowing from China. The procedure was followed again in later centuries when Japan sought Western ideas.³

³One contemporary Japanese historian has drawn a parallel between the rapid modernization of Japan and the "return to the spiritual motivating power of all religious reforms in the history of the Christian church" (Yanaihara, 1966). He refers here to the Japanese habit of borrowing foreign culture without prejudice whenever native institutions require renewal. There is an analogy insofar as sociocultural change in Japan has occurred in intense spurts, separated by periods of conservative assimilation—a pattern which was characteristic of change in Christianity as well. However, Yanaihara ignores an important difference: the renewal movements in Christianity were usually led from below, and were genuine social protests; the renovations in Japan were usually planned and carried out by the elite, in the national interest.

Once a thing was borrowed, it became Japanese, and hence part of the traditional culture in the sense that the Japanese, while acknowledging its origin, nevertheless accepted it as their own. There was little feeling that foreign things were bad *per se* and must be rejected, although this idea has not been entirely absent. But even during culturally chauvinistic periods—like the present—the substantial body of Western ideas and objects has been accepted as part of Japanese culture without question. Instead of a rejection of things of external origin, cultural chauvinism has usually meant a revival of colorful customs and costumes of the feudal past, or even (as currently) the revival of late Victorian styles associated with the Meiji era. In any case, the assimilationist element in Japanese modernization means that many "Western" things are now "traditional Japanese"—there is no simple identification of Western with "modern". The same mechanism was at work in earlier eras, with respect to Chinese elements.

Technical Reproducibility . . .

Embedded in this mechanism of ready assimilation is the famous Japanese propensity toward imitation or copying, which we may call *technical reproducibility* in order to remove some of the triteness. This technique is necessary anywhere in order to speed up desired technological and organizational change; but in addition, in a culture without strong feelings about the origins of its borrowings, reproducibility becomes a fine art. Many of the things reproduced are improved in the process; and thus their identification as "Japanese" facilitated. Skill in reproducibility also makes up for certain losses in innovative facility brought about by the tendency in a communal social system to play down individual initiative and exploratory ability in the interests of group solidarity. Materialistic manipulation is also socially neutral; it need not involve change in a communal social network.⁴

In general, given the hierachal system of social relations, the Japanese modernization procedure worked toward rapid technological and organizational change, but controlled or deliberately retarded social change. That is, while the social system has undergone change, much has been episodic, and due to imposition from above (by *samurai* leadership in the Meiji period; by

⁴It should be noted that Americans also imitated technology and institutional forms in the 19th century, and for similar reasons: the need to step up the rate of development, and also because innovativeness, while generally highly rewarded, set up strains in the social fabric. In some respects, "communal" tendencies are visible in American society as well as in Japan (they are found to a degree in all societies), but in this case they arise as a reaction to the excessive individualism and competitiveness of American life.

the American Occupation after World War II). Japan has had few popular reform movements, and few social reformers in the Western sense of individuals who organize public support for social change against official opposition. There have also been many inevitable social adjustments due to the secondary influences of economic development. But the "immanence" of the Japanese system of social relations—the tendency to consider portions of it as a vehicle for action but not the object of action—has often worked against the type of democratic, public, rational social planning and spontaneous social reform familiar in the Western countries.

The Dual Image . . .

To many Western and Japanese social analysts, the structure of Japanese society therefore consists of two main elements: (a) the Oriental, communal system of social relations and authority; and (b) the modern, Western-type organizational structure developed since 1868. The latter represents modernization and/or Westernization, depending on how one defines these terms. This dual image has tended to eliminate many analyses by social scientists, and most interpretations of Japanese change are based on it.

However, the dual image—traditional Japan and modern Western institutions—is far too simple, for several reasons.

First, the traditional web of social relations and the values which sanction it has affected the modern institutions and organizations in differing ways and degrees, making generalization and separation of the two sides to the social structure extremely difficult in some cases; relatively easy in others. Second, and as noted earlier, is the fact that the traditional system of social relations have played a positive or facilitating role in modernization—in contrast to the earlier expectations of social theorists who thought that a group-oriented social system, or an "Oriental" society, would not take to Western institutional forms so readily.

For example, the Japanese family although organized along Confucian lines, did not lead to Chinese-style social atomism, because families were linked by a network of obligations with ultimate authority vested in the paternal prestige of the Emperor or State (Nakayama, 1962). Moreover, as George de Vos has recently emphasized (1965), the Japanese family became a powerful source of achievement motivation for the individual, as in the Western case, although the Japanese form of this motivation differed from the classical Western type in that the guilt at failure was perceived by the individual as a failure to fulfill the expecta-

tions of his peers, rather than as a personal failing. Japanese liberals as well as conservatives functioned in these "traditional" contexts of group-centeredness and group-oriented motivation, and it was their incorporation in the system which often blunted their effectiveness as social critics or reformers.

On the other hand, group communalism as a form of social organization—like local government in the United States—can become dysfunctional in the presence of new goals and problems. For example, in contemporary Japan certain features of the political system are currently receiving heavy criticism on such grounds. The political parties are composed of many distinct factions or groups, each with personal loyalties instead of issues or ideals as the cement. This creates parliamentary irresponsibility and substitutes personal deals for constructive action. Voting is characterized by similar phenomena: many members of the Diet organize committees (*koenkai*) to mobilize their constituencies, on the proposition that voting for the candidate becomes an act of personal loyalty and has nothing to do with social issues. According to critics, it is as if the ward-boss system of American politics were extended to the whole United States political system. "Corruption" has become a popular term with liberal critics in Japan, who recently have attacked the Socialists for their hesitance to criticize the Zaibatsu, and their acceptance of donations from them. (But communalism and ideological irresponsibility are not the only faults of the parties; equally, they can be indicted for over-ideological conceptions of the world and Japan's international relations: see Hayashi, 1964 on the Socialist dilemma.)

The Perspectives of Social Science

The dual conception of Japanese change has been present in the entire history of disciplined observation by Western and Japanese scholars. The basic facts in the picture are that in most of the modern era—and even in earlier centuries—Japan borrowed what she wanted and preserved much of her traditional social organization and cultural values; and that there is contrast between ultra-modern technology and instrumental organization on the one hand and the colorful feudal customs and social rituals on the other. These have been the points of departure of most students of Japan's transformation since the end of the 19th century, however they may have modified their views in the process of research.

Second, from time to time quite different facets of the Japanese scene have become the focus of analysis, especially among the Western students. Here the problem is often phrased

in terms of a comparison between Japan and the West—or specific Western countries, which latter is of course more meaningful.⁶ When Japan was in one of her pronouncedly conservative eras, a sense of difference would pervade the literature; the persistence of exotic cultural and social phenomena would become the focus of interest. Benedict's *Chrysanthemum and the Sword* is in a sense such a document: her problem was the persisting Japanese-ness of the culture and society—not the evident Westernized modernity. And her book was written during a period when Japan presented a traditionalized and militarized "samurai" face to the world. The basic criticism of Benedict's analysis by both Western and Japanese scholars has concerned its excessive traditionalism: its tendency to accept the *samurai* definition of the Japanese reality as the definition of the whole (Bennett and Nagai, 1953).

After World War II

After World War II, as Japan turned a different face to the world—a rejection of the militaristic and straight-laced recent past—a different mood developed in some of the Western analyses. One influential current is represented by the studies of the Tokugawa feudal system with regard to its service in preparing Japan for her modern era. Here the emphasis—in such books as Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion*—lay more on the similarities of Japan and the West than on the differences. The rapidity of Japan's modern transformation was explained by the observation that the sense of honor and accomplishment which arises in a feudal polity is the best possible preparation for modernity; hence Japan and Europe share a common structural heritage. Japanese "traditions" thus were seen to be already partly "modern".

In addition, most studies of Japan's modernization which laid particular emphasis on economic institutions have tended to emphasize the similarity of Japan and the West since it has been these institutions which have undoubtedly moved faster and farther toward Western patterns. On the other hand, studies of folk culture, politics, the family, rural society and social relations in general have tended to show greater concern with difference. But the historical position of the Japanese with reference to their own culture has also influenced the character of the analyses.

⁶Specific inter-nation comparisons are more profitable than generalized comparisons of Japan and the "West" since the latter is not a nation, but a multivariate system evolved out of the interaction of the several Western nations. This system of alternatives which makes up Western civilization did not develop in the Orient, due to the prevailing isolation of the major nations. The comparison of Japan with specific Western countries is beginning: see Landes, 1965 for an illuminating example (Germany).

A Shift to the Awareness of Differences

In the mid-1950's the inclination of social scientists to perceive similarity began to shift toward an awareness of differences. This was in part due, as already suggested, to a greater concern for institutions that were less influenced by Western perspectives, but it was also the result of a growing process of reaffirmation in certain spheres of Japanese society and culture. Japan, in a mood of national reinvigoration, began consciously reviving earlier forms—while her general macrosociety began showing the consequences of a hyperdeveloped consumer economy and mass culture. The apparent duality of the image became very sharp to theorists of modernization who assume unidirectional change along Western lines.

A pioneer in this later approach was R. P. Dore, who, in his study of Tokyo (published 1959, done 1952), stressed change but cautioned against assuming drastic alterations in social relations, noting how certain traditional mechanisms of status in Japanese society have a habit of asserting themselves. A decade later, Ezra Vogel, in his study of the new middle class (1962), devoted much of his treatment of the role of women, the employer-employee relationship, and the channels of job-getting to a similar and more detailed demonstration of social conservatism in the midst of economic change. Michio Nagai, in his studies of the Japanese university (1964), has shown how master-apprentice and hierarchical relationships among faculty, and faculty and students, have persisted to the detriment of the university as a center of teaching and learning in a mass society.⁶

Seiyo Munakata (1966) sees Japan's modern institutions threatened by a resurgence of nationalistic authoritarianism. Takechi Ishida (1965) notes that while "interest groups" of a generally Western type have emerged since the war, the older pattern of authoritarian political leadership or these groups remains, vitiating their role in the democratic process. Bennett-Ishino, in their volume of studies of hierarchical relationships in the economy (1963), observed that these "familial-feudal" relationships diminish in periods of prosperity, but could be expected to return if economic conditions took a turn for the worse, since such relationships flourish in a low-wage and labor-surplus economy. A number of studies of rural society have commented on the slowness of rural community authority hierarchies to change, despite a general loosening of the family system and

⁶Although he also shows how certain well-meaning "democratic" reforms in higher education, engineered by the Occupation, have fed into communal organizational patterns to intensify obsolescence and decline.

extensive economic rationalization of agriculture (Fukutake, 1961).⁷

How to Theorize About "Traditional" Features

The important question is how to theorize about these so-called "traditional" features of the Japanese social system, which many analysts, especially Japanese, also appear to deplore. There are at least two approaches: one, associated with contemporary social anthropologists and sociologists (Hamajima, 1960; Vogel, 1962 are examples) recognizes structural changes (*e.g.*, urban population now exceeds rural; the emergence of consumer culture), but holds that such changes are relatively insignificant because social relations have undergone no functional alteration (*e.g.*, group communal features persist). This position is sometimes underlain by ideological beliefs; namely, that Japan cannot become "truly democratic" unless her society undergoes functional social change (Fukutake, 1962). Without ideology, the position is simply pluralistic: it holds that modernization can take place in the context of a variety of social adaptations—not only the Western.⁸

The second position perceives both structural and functional change, though may acknowledge lag in the latter. Basically it holds that structural changes of the type Japan has experienced in the past 15 years are having their functional consequences in the social system, and will continue to do so. Thus Hazama (1960), in a study of "familial management" recognizes the persistence of certain segmental features of this "feudal" mode of organization, but states that the overall pattern of management in business and industry is becoming rationalized. The surviving elements of familism do not, in his view, constitute the "survival" of the system of familial organization. That is, while some aspects of familism persist, these are set within a different structure and hence have changed or must change their functional meaning.⁹

Scholars attentive to the second position cite a variety of

⁷For summaries of patterns of change in postwar Japan, see UNESCO, 1961 and JSPIJ, 1965. On the issue of rural society, a contrast in views as cited in the Hamajima and Hazama references is to be found in Japanese rural sociology: compare Fukutake, 1961 with Namiki, 1960—the latter believes rural communities "are changing". Ishino, 1962 offers a perceptive analysis of the paradoxes and perspectives of change in rural life.

⁸See Odaka, 1964 for further exposition of these various viewpoints on the issue of paternalism in Japanese industrial relations.

⁹In a recent paper, this author has taken the second position (Bennett, 1967) in specific opposition to the first, represented by other papers in the same volume. (See, also, Broadbridge, 1966 for a study of "dualism" in Japanese industry, which forecasts the demise of many small, family-owned enterprises.)

statistically-documented current changes: urban population has come to exceed rural, and does so to an increasing extent; occupational mobility and the generally competitive position of labor is increasing; egalitarian and individual hedonistic emphases are increasing along with a consumer culture; rationalization of business management is more strongly developed, modifying old preferential policies based on personal obligations and concepts of restricted growth; small, family-owned enterprises are disappearing as production is rationalized; the family system is loosening and the role of women freed of formal restrictions; young people show increasing independence and freedom of self-expression. All of these developments can be seen as movements in the direction of the open Western society, and can be taken as such by theorists who stress ideologically progressive change, or functional change which is a necessary consequence of structural change—granted some lag.¹⁰

However, regardless of which position one may take, there is broad agreement on an underlying communalism that continues to characterize Japanese society. Many liberal Japanese critics thus define contemporary social problems as the consequences of change in the macrostructure but persistence of traditional social forms in the infrastructure (Eto, 1965). The conventional term for the area of change is "mass society", and this concept is currently receiving a good deal of attention by Japanese commentators. The mass society is defined as one emphasizing individual pursuit of fortune, and one in which the mass cultural media and paraphernalia are made universally

¹⁰The tendency to mix ideological criteria with social analysis is especially marked in the case of research on the Japanese family structure, and in the conception of culture lag related to this. For example, Vogel (1962) notes that the attempts of the Government to propagandize the Japanese with respect to the classic *ie* or *dozoku* hierachal extended family system were "amazingly successful" in the sense that many families actually attempted to mold their behavior on this model. Thus he would hold that what he calls the "decline of the *ie* ideal" resulting from the legal changes in the Family Code after the war represents a considerable social change. That is, that the legal changes definitely represented a major social and ideological change. On the other hand, Koyama (1962) argues that the changes of the type represented by Vogel's "decline of the *ie*" are simply projections of trends begun a long time ago, in which case the postwar legal changes are simply formal recognition of existing social trends, which were taking place despite Vogel's "amazingly successful" authoritarian direction of family structure. Matsumoto (1962), in the third variant interpretation, presents information to show that at least in many social sectors the old *ie*-*dozoku* model continues to be the favored one, at least with respect to primogeniture. Matsumoto therefore believes that culture lag is most noticeable in the sphere of "social relatives and behavioral patterns", which "lag behind the new legal codes"; whereas Koyama sees the legal codes lagging behind the existing and prewar social trends in family structure!

available to all. From a conservative viewpoint the mass society can be deplored (Suzuki, 1964-65), since it destroys the soul of Japan, and permits the direction of change to be released from traditional ideological control, and new religious cults feed on the alienation produced by mass society (Nakamura, 1966). Liberals may have related criticisms, but on the whole mass conditions are accepted and even welcomed, especially since they imply a release from old conformities. More important, liberals feel that further social change is necessary in order to complete the revolution, to accommodate its effects, or to "forge . . . a new stability as a people" (E. Ishida 1964, 282).

Among the contemporary social problems which have been attributed by liberal critics to the duality or imbalance of Japanese modernization are the following: urbanization is uncontrolled, and is creating difficulties in the countryside and in the cities; higher education is traditionally organized and perpetuates mediocrity in many fields; the university organization is inflexible and unable to meet the challenge of mass education; politics (as noted previously) is communally organized and consequently government is unable to deal effectively and openly with social reform; the bureaucracy adheres to the old *ringisei* system of responsibility, in which all innovation must come from the lower ranks, in the form of humble petitions to superiors; social welfare and security, while greatly improved, is still inadequate; hospitals are dilapidated and poorly-equipped; mental illness is inadequately treated; an important segment of the population is deprived of the benefits of an expanding economy and occupational achievement; labor may be more mobile, but many industries still hoard it and attempt to indenture their employees by stressing loyalty and conformity. In these situations, communal social structure is blamed for creating a condition in which a direct practical attack on the relevant issues is made very difficult; Japan is said by liberal critics to lack a clear-cut sense of national rationality in the social and decision-making spheres.

In the last analysis, social problems are a matter of degree, ideological perspective, and level of awareness. The conservative view, while recognizing certain difficulties, is inclined to see the solution in a fostering of communalism and the cultivation of fortitude and obedience—in other words, to counteract the influences of the mass society although at the same time supporting "modernization" on the usual grounds of efficiency and progress. Civil disturbances, like the student riots and protest movements against university administrations are seen by the conservatives as the product of disobedience and left-wing agitation. The liberals may agree in part, but are more inclined to attribute the

trouble to a feeling on the part of students that they are not receiving the kind of higher education they need to get along in the New Japan. Some recent public attitude studies provide an interesting note in that they show that parents of college and high-school age young people are concerned equally with the disobedience and independence of their offspring, and also the inadequacies of their education—a grass-roots combination of elements from both conservative and liberal perspectives.

These contrasting and confusing perspectives have close resemblances to the ideological scene of any western nation. The conservatives want progress and economic growth, but deplore some of its hedonistic and libertarian consequences. The liberals want growth also, but feel it may be impeded or distorted by continued adherence to old conformities. Conservatives want order; liberals want order too, but a popular democratic order—yet its emergence is accompanied by political disorder. Both want planning, but with different objectives and means, and both deplore the lack of it, but for different reasons. The rise of a vigorous social and political analysis in Japan of the 1960's is a symptom of the conditions which breed this kind of openness in expression—and therefore the perspectival confusion is itself a sign of the continuing movement in Japan toward a more open society.

What many of the liberal Japanese critics may forget is that processes in the macrosociety may not necessarily be related to phenomena in the microsocial level. That is, one can take the view that Japan is moving steadily in the direction of an open society while retaining many of her microsocial forms, simply because these forms either have no bearing on macrosocial processes, or in fact make them more palatable. The attack on communalism by liberal analysts often ignores the very real accommodation these social forms make possible to a mass society. Insofar as they do, they acquire instrumental significance over and above whatever cultural end-value they may continue to possess.

Moreover, it should be remembered that communal-type features of social organization are not only *not* unknown in Western society, but in some cases, as in the United States, are actually emerging, as a protection against the alienating effects of mass society. While many Japanese liberal critics condemn communalism, their American analogs are coming to approve it, in their search for identification and solidarity. The difference is simply that in Japan, communalism is conceived as "traditional", hence often identified with conservative ideology. Yet the processes of change may be identical, despite the ideological differences: communalism helps to counteract the disorienting effects of massness in both Japan and the West.

This writer is inclined to feel that (a) the contemporary social changes in the macrosociety are real and irreversible; (b) in some social sectors Japan is failing to provide the rewards and facilities which the mass culture promises or requires; (c) that public expression of discontent is likely to increase; and (d) that government will be forced to institute more direct public management of these issues. This will require further changes in certain features of the communal social system and the adoption of a more objective concept of objective social manipulation or reform. On the other hand, many of the "traditional" elements of social communalism will persist because they are effective on handling some of the disabilities of a mass society—just as similar forms in American society persist or revive, for similar reasons.

In the Midst of Heightened Nationalistic Feeling

Meanwhile, and regardless of developments in social organization, the Japanese are in the midst of heightened nationalistic feeling and cultural revival. The old customs, though often modified by mass-cultural takeover, are followed more fervently than ever; internal tourism and shrine pilgrimages are booming; the traditional pursuits of the woman and the arts are intensified;—only the older drama—*kabuki* and *noh*—show signs of decline. It is perhaps stretching the analysis to see all this as "nationalism", since much of it is simply a matter of a more prosperous population enjoying itself. Moreover, as noted previously, the Japanese have a habit of accepting the new while revering and cultivating the old—like, perhaps, Americans.

The Pattern of Modernization

In conclusion, let us summarize the course of Japanese social change. Japan entered her modern phase with a well-developed national-feudal social system, containing many of the social patterns and attitudes necessary for a modern society. On the whole, the innovations were planned and carried out by leaders dedicated to the principle of maximum conservation of social and cultural patterns. This policy was opposed by people of more liberal inclinations who, for various reasons, preferred a more open society with greater stress on individuality and rationality. During Japan's modern era, liberal tendencies also sometimes appeared as the secondary consequence of political developments, labor organization, and expanding business enterprise. However, the militarist intervention of the 1930's curtailed these movements and a conservative policy endured until the Occupation, when outsiders compelled a series of changes in the liberal direction—once again freeing the economic community to pursue its objec-

tives. The triumph of postwar Japanese capitalism, coupled with the Occupation social reforms, has led to a general social loosening and strong developments in the direction of a mass society—trends begun in the 1920's and now reaching fruition. These trends introduce ideological confusion but also vigorous social analysis.

However, the pattern of modernization retains some of its segmental character. In sectors of the society where Occupation reforms were confused or less effective, such as political and governmental structure, rural society, higher education and the ambiguous but pervasive sphere of social relations, older social patterns persist, along with economic rationalization. In some of these sectors, continuing traditionalism—empirically, communal group organization and its consequences—are seen by liberal critics to impede the solution of serious social problems, brought about by the emerging mass society and culture. The severity and nature of these problems is a matter of perspective and debate.

We have also suggested that conventional concepts of modernization or Westernization are not especially relevant as a frame of reference for the study of change in Japan. The history, circumstances, and problems of change, as Reischauer observed some years ago (1950), are essentially similar to those found in the highly-developed Western countries. Familiar sociological frames derived from the study of social mobility, social problems, migration, welfare, urbanization, alienation and mass culture are as meaningful and applicable as tools of analysis for Japan as in the West. This suggests that research on Japanese social change will benefit greatly from systematic comparisons with specific Western countries undergoing analogous experiences. This work has already begun.

The traditional Japanese cultural pursuits—religious customs, aesthetics, costumes, and the like may flourish, but their mode of expression is conditioned by the mass media and they are coming to occupy, on the whole, a position similar to that of nostalgic folk cultural phenomena in the U.S. It must be remembered also that much of what modern Japanese feel is "traditional" like Meiji-Victorian architecture and clothing styles, or the "bicycle age" is actually of Western origin.

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Industrialization and the Convergence Hypothesis: Some Aspects of Contemporary Japan

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Writing in 1915, Thorstein Veblen saw Japan as a nation whose productive technology was modern but whose institutions of social control were feudal. So far, he said, it is ". . . only in respect of its material ways and means, its technological equipment and information, that the 'New Japan' differs from the old" (Veblen, 1934a, 251). Contrasting England and Japan, Veblen declared that like the Japanese, the English had been a nation of borrowers, particularly borrowers of technology. But unlike the Japanese, the English borrowed over an incomparably longer historical interval and in no sense involved so abrupt a break with the past.

This paper examines some of the aspects of change in Japan since the end of the Pacific War, specifically, changes associated with the way(s) men are managed in the modern sector of the Japanese economy. The perspective examined here is essentially that of Veblen whose interest in the relationships between technology and social change permeated much of his writing (Veblen, 1934a, 1934b, 1914). Technical exigencies were for

Veblen an essential element in social change. He persistently labored the theme that the social superstructure—politics, religion, morals and general habits of thought—derives its characteristics from prevailing technology and techniques of production, and changes as the technology changes. Though Sombart and Alvin Hansen before him had stressed technology as a causative factor in social change, Veblen's interests here were major. His short essay, one of two he wrote on Japan, was remarkable for the insight it demonstrated at a time when almost nothing was known in Western social science of Japanese developments following the Meiji Restoration.

More Recently . . .

More recently, other writers have again developed the relationship between technology and change, most notably, for our purpose here, Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison and Myers (1964). Their examination of the problems of labor and management in economic growth is rooted in the relatively common effects of common technologies in all developing economies. They emerge with a "convergence hypothesis" which argues that almost everywhere the world is in the grip of industrialization. Surely, however unevenly, every nation is compelled to undertake industrial growth and, once the process is begun, the growth continues ineluctably. And always at its base is the employment of common technologies. Eventually, each society becomes industrial, at least in the statistical sense, when half of its working population is engaged in nonagricultural occupations, divided into secondary and tertiary production or service sectors. Thus far, only a handful of nations have achieved this outcome. Yet, industrialization has become a pervasive national objective throughout the world.¹

If this is the case, then the implications of industrialization for human relationships requires intensive examination. Both science and technology, however they might be changing, imply a level of standardization far more universal than the technical arrangements which existed in the pre-industrial society. In general terms, a critical problem for social science research is whether the relationships that define industrial work tend inevitably to take on the same characteristics regardless of the setting and the way. Implicit in Veblen's work, and explicit in the more recent work of Kerr and his colleagues, is the notion that the "logic of industrialism" inevitably leads to a convergence which cuts

¹For a critique of the "convergence" view, see Bendix, *Nation Building and Citizenship* (1964, 5-15).

through and undermines "tradition" irrespective of the main features of culture, history and values with which the industrializing society began.

In terms of the idea of work, the end results expected are a commonality of such phenomena as (a) work specialization for which scientific training and education is all important, (b) occupational professionalism, (c) flexibility and mobility of the labor force in its allocation to industrial processes, (d) a reward or compensation system geared to rational economic contributions, (e) the proliferation of economic bargaining between occupational or professional groups on a collective basis, (f) an all-pervasive ethic of the value of science and scientific innovation, (g) a diffusion of political power throughout the society, and (h) the release of the individual from personalized or subjective controls over his behavior both at work and outside of work. One way to characterize this evolution is the transformation of the society from one based on status relationships to one based on contract, or from particularistic to universalistic relationships. Still another way, to utilize Weberian terminology, is the replacement of substantive with formal rationality (Parsons, 1947, 50-51 and 185).

In This Paper . . .

This paper reports on only some aspects of a considerably larger research project which is designed to learn whether uniformity, cross-nationally, emerges at all and, if so, within what range of variability in the social outcomes that accompany, or may result from, industrialization. The parent study takes technology as central in industrialization. We begin with the hypothesis that technology is the central part of the general process of differentiation since it implies the structural independence of production functions and exchange. At the same time it requires high levels of integration of separate functions. Industrialization approaches social change from the base of technology. Technological change is not neutral; as it progresses, it generates new values and relationships in the society. Sooner or later the accumulation of technological change will make it necessary to abandon even those traditional relationships that were instrumental or permissive for the changes to occur in the first place. Though the traditions of agrarianism may persist for a time, sooner or later they are subverted. As industrialism carries its own special set of values and institutions, convergence occurs when industrialization becomes "full blown". Though the processes of transformation may differ from one national setting to another, the outcome is much the same.

We shall here report generally on some Japanese empirics,

carefully noting, however, that the data are by no means all in and that those discussed here must be viewed as tentative. Many of the propositions dealt with here come from data gathered over the past seven years and most intensively over the past two years.²

Post-War Changes

Japan remains the only non-Western nation which can be said to be industrialized. In this sense, Veblen's 1915 observations were indeed prophetic. Japan's recovery from the devastation of the Pacific War has been at least as dramatic as the so-called "miracle of West Germany". With a real annual growth rate averaging about 10 per cent since 1955, Japan has joined the ranks of the world's leading industrial nations. In terms of gross national product, Japan ranks fourth in the world; however, she now ranks third after the United States and the Soviet Union in steel production, second in the production of automobiles and trucks, and first in the production of ships. Real wages in all industries rose more than 54 per cent from 1955 to 1965 (Minobe, 1966, 534). Employment in the agricultural sector dropped dramatically from 40 per cent of the labor force in 1955 to 22.5 per cent in 1966. The striking urbanization of Japan, though certainly part of a long historical process, is now marked by nearly 50 per cent of the nation's population of 98,000,000 living in 1.25 per cent of the country's area (Statistical Bureau, May, 1966). Though partly attributable to the increase in the number of employees, labor's distributive share of national income reached 53.27 per cent in 1962, considerably above the 40 per cent which was the highest achieved in the prewar period.

The visible signs of all of this are quick to strike the observer. The streets of Japan's major cities are almost as choked with motor traffic as any American city of comparable size. Television antennas obstruct and mar the beauty of Japanese architecture. The problems of air pollution in Tokyo and Osaka compete on equal terms with Chicago, Detroit or New York. The annual May Day "We Want Food" demonstrations of early post-war years have been replaced by well-dressed workers marching down the street with a child on one arm and a new camera on the other. One young man expressed his idea of May Day, 1966, with a placard which translated something like "May Day is swinging, baby, when I walk with you". Virtually everyone is eating better, living better and has more leisure. Statistics on the spread of household appliances become outdated almost as soon as they are

²One of the authors, Robert E. Cole, was employed as a production worker in three different Japanese factories during 1966.

published. In 1966, 94 per cent of urban area households had television; almost 62 per cent, refrigerators; 75.5 per cent, electric washing machines; and almost 77 per cent, electric sewing machines (Economic Planning Agency, 1966).

Yet, by no means can it be said that Japan is a western nation since many vestiges of pre-industrial Japan are readily apparent. Japanese tend to view themselves and their institutions as unique, a view which appears to be shared by many western scholars.³ Japanese scholars often assume that Japan's "dual economy" is unique. They tend to overlook the fact that to one degree or another all advanced countries are marked by a limited number of large scale enterprises characterized by very modern and efficient technology, paying relatively high wages and providing relatively good working conditions and at the same time, a mass of small and medium sized enterprises, often family owned, undercapitalized, employing relatively primitive labor intensive technology, subsidizing the major enterprises by low wages, long hours and poor working conditions. Though Japan is by no means unique in this respect, it may be true that the differences between the "modern" and the "pre-modern" sectors are more marked than in other advanced countries. Even so, recently the differences between these two sectors has been diminishing. While in 1956, 16 per cent of all workers in manufacturing industry were in firms employing 1-9 workers, this had dropped to 9 per cent by 1965. At the same time, 37 per cent of manufacturing workers were in firms employing 500 or more in 1965, an increase of more than 7 per cent over 1956. Wages in small and medium firms employing 10-99 persons have risen from 59 per cent of those in firms of over 100 employees in 1954 to 80 percent in 1964 (Economic Planning Agency, 1965, 47 and 96).

And Yet Feudal Social Relations Remain . . .

Yet, aspects of so-called feudal social relations remain in modern industry. Employer-provided welfare programs and facilities probably present a far greater burden on total wage costs than would be the case in the United States or Western European countries. Company-provided housing and housing allowances are usually associated with the early stages of industrialization (Dunlop, 1958, 365). But in Japan, one of the leading industrial nations, 13 per cent of the more than 11 million employ-

³Lafcadio Hearn, one of the earliest Americans drawn to Japan because of its "uniqueness" was deeply impressed when his best Japanese friend said, ". . . when you find, in four or five years more, that you cannot understand the Japanese at all, then you will begin to know something about them" (Hearn, 1955, 6). This observation may be no less relevant today.

ees in the manufacturing sector benefited from some form of company housing in 1964 (Ministry of Labor, 1964, 258-59). In addition, countless others received some form of allowance for rental of privately owned dwellings.

Family allowances and extensive benefits paid by the enterprise for transportation, medical and health facilities, food services, facilities for the purchase of a wide variety of consumer soft and hard goods, and extensive cultural and recreational programs and facilities are also practices associated with undeveloped nations (Dunlop, 1958, 357-58). Japanese employers in modern large-scale undertakings commonly pay workers semi-annual cash bonuses accounting for nearly 30 per cent of all regular wages. This practice has no counterpart in any other industrially advanced nation.

Training within the firm is ordinarily most pronounced in the early stages of industrialization where there is a shortage of skilled workers (Dunlop, 1958, 351-52). Yet, training within the firm remains a distinctive feature of Japanese industrial relations despite a sophisticated educational system. Further, the practice of employment for life and the commitment of the "regular" worker for life is usually thought of as incompatible with the requirements of mobility (Kerr, 1964, 17-18). Still other "feudal remnants" may be noted: the pervasive relevance of the Japanese concepts of duty or obligation (*giri*), favor or benefice (*on*), and human kindness (*ninjo*) (Benedict, 1946). All of these and others are pointed to as indications of Japan's less than fully modern industrial social relations despite modern technology. One additional, notable aspect of contemporary Japanese industrial relations is the wage system and it is on the convergence of this so-called "feudal vestige" with which the remainder of this paper primarily deals.

Wages and the Japanese Worker: The *Nenkō* System

Few labor economists would disagree with Dunlop's proposition that in the process of economic development explicit wage-rate structures based upon classified jobs or occupations are created in the enterprise (Dunlop, 1958, 365). Similarly, sociologists, we think, quite readily accept the proposition that modern capitalism requires the kind of formal rationality, i.e., precise calculability, which concerned Weber.

By these criteria, the wage-rate structure of a Japanese firm in many respects suggests an industrially undeveloped country. Wages in Japan are determined by the length of service, age and educational attainment of the employee and typically have little

or nothing to do with any job related criteria. Despite this apparent "backward" feature, as well as others noted above, Japan has been one of the most remarkable examples of rapid industrialization, particularly during the past decade. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that Japan's wage system has not inhibited economic growth and, indeed, that the wage system may have been highly functional in the achievement of this growth. Furthermore, payment by age, length of service and educational attainment may itself have been adopted between 1910 and 1935, during a period of rapid growth, or may be an adaptation of an earlier existing reward system. The evidence is not clear.

Nenkō Joretsu Chingin

Whatever the origin, polar explanations may be offered for the apparent contradiction between a "pre-modern" reward system and high growth. It is suggested that the *nenkō joretsu chingin* (age-grade wage) has operated as a transitional mechanism between the pre-modern and the modern, and that as increasing growth is achieved, the wage system will be increasingly transformed into one based upon job or occupationally related attributes (Nakayama, 1965, 85-96). Many leading Japanese employers hold that with increasing competition, particularly in the international market, and because of rising wages and growing long-term labor shortage, the luxury of "traditional practices" must yield to a more rational wage structure.

Another possibility is that the *nenko* wage system is not a vestige of feudal social relations, but may be viewed as a functional equivalent of a classified job system implicated in different institutional arrangements. If, for example, there is a high correlation between age and length of service on the one hand and skill on the other, what may be regarded as a feudal vestige (Abegglen, 1958) may in its outcome be functional to a modern economy, and this appears to be the case (Ministry of Labor, 1964, 163, 171). Casual observation of the Japanese wage system leads to the conclusion that the unskilled laborer and the skilled die maker receive the same wage since they entered the firm at the same time and are the same age. Such a case, however, would be most exceptional. Commonly, the unskilled worker will have the status of "temporary" employee (*rinjiko*) or "out-side contract" worker (*shagaiko*), rather than "regular" worker (*honko*) and in the status of temporary or outside worker his wages are likely to be substantially below the die maker who will inevitably enjoy the *honko* status.

Permanent Employment

A Japanese firm does not leave to chance the young worker's acquisition of skill and productive capacity. If a newly hired, untrained high school graduate shows promise, he will be led through "stages of difficulty"—he will be assigned to easy jobs at the beginning and gradually introduced to increasingly difficult jobs over the years. Close examination, though difficult, will show that there is a high correlation between wage and performance on the job though the fit is not as tight as would be the case in a comparable American factory. Tightness of fit is itself less necessary because the practice of so-called permanent employment (*shushin kōyo*) makes it less necessary. Where there is a life-time commitment to a single employer, another practice often referred to as vestige of feudal social relations, it is not necessary that an employee be rewarded exactly either temporally or in money amounts during the time he is making his most productive contribution. In an American firm, where an employee may quit at any moment, both he and his employer expect payment for every hour he works. But the Japanese, assuming that the worker will continue with the firm until retirement, may spread his total reward over a much longer time span and cap it off with a lump sum retirement allowance which commonly amounts to a sum equal to the cumulative total of the last five years of his monthly pay.

When viewed in connection with the "permanent employment system", the *nenkō* system thus takes on a degree of economic rationality which could be defended by marginal analysts. Assuming that the employee's marginal value productivity rises rapidly until somewhere between age 30 and 40, after which it gradually declines, then it seems that the *nenkō* wage underpays youth and over-pays older workers relative to their marginal productivity. The element of rationality is introduced because management seeks to cancel out the over-payment of older workers by under-paying them when they are young. This is possible so long as the worker spends his entire career in the company. Thus, building a life-time attachment to the firm has the function of permitting the company to collect on its large investment in training costs. Separation from the company at an early age is expensive for both the employer and the worker: it denies the former the opportunity to recover training costs and makes it more difficult for the worker to find another job at an equivalent wage at a later age, since his marginal productivity does not justify the relative high wage he had been receiving. Only if the worker remains at the same company throughout his career will

his high wages in later years find economic justification in the underpayment of his youth.

Changes and Tensions for Change

Clearly, the extent to which increasing length of service and age correspond to increased skill has always depended on the nature of the industry, the particular company and the age distribution of the employees in the firm. In firms where the technology is labor intensive (i.e., a firm in which there is a greater proportional input of labor over capital), where highly skilled workers and a long apprenticeship are necessary, the fit is very tight. But in firms where the technology is relatively capital intensive (i.e., a firm in which there is a greater proportional input of capital over labor) and where unskilled and semi-skilled jobs predominate, young workers soon learn to out-produce older workers. Consequently, the relation between increasing length of service, acquisition of skills and factory performance (or, the stated relationship between age and marginal productivity) breaks down. And this is precisely what appears to be occurring in Japan's very modern mass-production industries.

Rapid Technological Change Generates Tensions

In two automobile plants studied, one a very modern assembly plant and the other a modern parts-producing plant, job simplification has resulted in the leveling of skills. And although the system of wage distribution has not been fundamentally changed, clearly the *nenkō* system is under substantial tension.

The new technology and its high cost has led to increasing management concern with using it as efficiently as possible. The practice of gradually introducing workers to more and more difficult jobs over the course of many years is less relevant and too expensive. This is clearly seen in insurance companies and banks which have introduced large-scale computers. Far more strikingly than in American counterpart situations, the design rationality of the computer requires the Japanese firm to reorganize whole departments and drastically rationalize training programs. The relationship between the acquisition of skills and on-the-job experience is severely jolted. And with this, the young workers trained by IBM to operate the computer systems become increasingly dissatisfied with having to wait until a relatively old age to receive rewards which they consider should be theirs. A very similar outcome is observed in the steel industry with the introduction of highly automated rolling mills, continuous casting

and automatically controlled oxygen converters. These technologies are among the most advanced in the world and the new young workers who operate them are increasingly less willing to settle for wages which are substantially below those paid to older workers who operate the now obsolete technologies.

Rapid technological change generates other tensions. Much of the new, complex technology is imported from Western countries and operator and maintenance manuals are printed in English. Young high school graduates, the products of post-war educational reforms, are more likely to read English and it is they who from this point of view are better equipped to operate the new technology. Indeed, one hears fathers relate how their sons or daughters are teaching them to read English so they might have some chance at operating imported machines. Such a development is a far cry from the traditional agricultural society where the father over the course of many years trains his sons in the skills necessary to care for the rice fields.

The new modern technology has upset status relations in the shop. The prestige of older workers declines relative to the younger. Our data suggests clearly that age and length of service are not sufficient criteria for high prestige among ones fellows. And with skill increasingly less an attribute of age, the relative status of older workers declines. Thus, it is precisely the advantage in productive ability and skills which is being undermined by the new technology. Further, it has long been management's strategy to rely on older workers as one of the key elements in labor control over younger workers and the shift in status relations severely shakes the foundation of this strategy. If there is any place in the world where it can be said that parents have difficulty in communication with children, it can be said in Japan. The formal organization of youth sections, common in Japanese factories, is a clear indication of the cleavage between young and older workers.

As these changes occur, one of the main justifications for the *nenko* wage system disappears, that is, the correlation between length of service and skill. Increasing skill becomes less assured with advancing age and at the same time workers gain access to skills at a younger age.

Other Tension-Producing Factors

In addition to the large-scale introduction of the most modern technologies, there are other pressures compelling Japanese managers to reappraise wage structures in the direction of modifying the *nenko* wage. The average age of all workers in all

Japanese industry was 31.7 years in 1965. But as these vast numbers of young workers grow older and their wages increase under the *nenko* system, a serious cost problem is being created for management further, in the auto parts plant studied, *nenko* wages were rigidly structured not only according to length of service and age but, as in most Japanese firms, according to amount of education. There are commonly three different wage curves based upon educational attainment (middle school, high school and university graduation). The relevance of amount of formal education to wages has been subjected to increasing pressure in recent years because of the growing labor shortage. And one reason that young blue-collar workers are in short supply is the increase in the number of middle school graduates who continue through high school. It is expected that the number of middle school graduates available to enter the labor force will decline from 960,000 in 1964 to 720,000 in 1968 (Nakamura, 1965).

The Recruiting of Blue-Collar Workers . . .

As a result many firms have been forced to recruit blue-collar workers from among high school graduates rather than middle school. It is estimated that high school graduates comprised 16.7 per cent of all blue-collar workers in 1965 compared to 13.4 per cent in 1958. This percentage is rising rapidly and the increase is most noticeable in firms employing over 500 workers, that is, in large-scale firms in the most modern sector of the economy (Ministry of Labor, 1958, 1964). High school graduates are reluctant to accept factory employment since one reason they continued beyond middle school was precisely to escape that status by obtaining higher paying more prestigious white-collar jobs. As long as employers continue to reward status rather than job, recruitment of blue-collar workers will continue to be more difficult and will again re-inforce dispositions to reduce man-power requirements by employing more labor saving technologies. While no set pattern seems to have yet emerged on how firms like auto manufacturers or steel producers will handle this matter, it seems inevitable that it will contribute toward diluting if not breaking down wage distinctions based upon differences between white-collar and blue-collar status, which is another distinctive feature of the *nenko* wage system.

The pressure on the *nenko* wage arising from labor market developments comes not only from a decline in the supply of middle school graduates but also from other shifts in labor force composition. The supply of all new school graduates, including high school graduates, is expected to slacken in the decade from 1965-1975 compared to the 1955-1965 supply. At the same time,

and as result of the expected increase in annual growth, there is expected to be an average annual increase in the demand for workers at the rate of one million. This increase plus the need to replace retiring workers will substantially tighten the labor market. Statistics on future labor trends show that the increase in the productive age population (15 years and over) will decline by 50 per cent between 1965 and 1975. Japan's low birth rate is the main factor accounting for this change, a factor which itself is certainly bound up with dissemination of birth control information and the availability of the technology of birth control itself (Japan Times, April 21, 1967).

Pressure is put on the *nenkō* wage system because such developments force upward the wages of young workers. A compression of the wage structure has already begun to take place with the tightening labor market. The starting wage for new middle school graduates (destined for blue-collar jobs) has more than tripled between 1955 and 1965; for high school graduates, the starting rate has increased over two and a half times (Japan Institute of Labor, 1967, 82). As a result, older workers are finding their wage advantage disappearing. For example, in the manufacturing sector male blue-collar workers in the 40-49 age category saw their wage advantage over younger workers under 18 diminish from slightly less than four times in 1954 to slightly less than three times in 1965 (Hakusho, 1965, 203).

Workers' Views of *Nenkō* Wages

Though the roots of the *nenkō* wage system may be traced to the early period of Japan's industrialization, the system became firmly established after World War II. Union demands, for the "livelihood wage" (*Seikatsukyu*), reflecting worker views, encouraged the diffusion of the *nenkō* system. The livelihood wage was paid according to the needs of workers, which meant in effect that older workers with larger families and greater costs-needs were paid more according to age and length of service. But currently, the *nenko* system has become a source of friction and cleavage among workers.

In one of the plants studied, a die casting company, each year's wage bargaining is preceded by an internal union discussion over what proportion of the wage should be paid equally to all workers and what proportion should be divided according to a formula which yields older workers greater amounts. The workers split according to age. Young unskilled workers who still look forward to acquiring skills as they get older will support the older workers who demand a larger proportion by age and

length of service. But increasingly the younger workers believe that the new machines being brought into the plant give them an opportunity to acquire new skills quickly so as to match the productive performance of older workers and they develop doubts about paying older workers more.

Older workers, as might be expected, usually support the *nenkō* wage out of self-interest. This is particularly true of those who see no chance of moving up in the skill hierarchy of the firm. Furthermore, when the older workers are skilled and the younger unskilled, the split between them is legitimated and diluted. But when this is not the case, as is increasingly true, the split along the age continuum is intensified and the legitimacy of the *nenkō* wage is questioned.

The dissatisfaction of young workers with the *nenkō* wage is further intensified as Japan moves from a production to a consumption oriented society. For above all, it is the young workers who want their money here and now to cash in on the good life so attractively described and portrayed in the mass media. The *nenkō* wage combined with the "permanent employment" system, whatever else it may be, is a system of deferred rewards and this does not sit well with young workers.

Yet, to note all this is not to say that the *nenkō* wage is about to disappear. Even though a 1962 survey of the Ministry of Labour reported that 53.2 per cent of sampled workers under 30 favored a wage system based upon job or ability and only 26.1 per cent over 45 favored such a system (Hakusho, 1961, 213), with few exceptions Japanese firms have not decided to fully go this route and workers are as yet unclear exactly how they ought to get paid. For the most part, the demands of young workers studied took the form of reducing wage differentials based on age and length of service rather than outright demands for pay according to job related criteria.

Management and *Nenkō*

Managers would also like to introduce pay-by-work-ability in order to more accurately calculate variable wage costs and thus control for greater efficiency. There is considerable concern regarding rising wages as the large proportion of young workers advance in age. But managers also regard the introduction of a pay-by-work system as an opening of floodgates to changes of all kinds which might undermine existing social relations and methods of labor control in the plants. Many are also fearful that a rapid switchover might result in unbearably high costs which could not be deferred.

In a Die Casting Plant . . .

Some of these considerations are reflected by the managers of the die casting plant who, like others in many companies, have been experimenting with ways to modify the *nenko* system. In 1966 the company suggested to the union at their new suburban Tokyo plant that the work allowance be replaced by a new achievement allowance. The union leadership agreed to accept it. Essentially, the achievement allowance is distributed on the basis of a sliding scale according to the output of the plant. As far as the company was concerned, the plan was an attempt to get workers accustomed to thinking more in terms of being paid by production as a forerunner to other far reaching changes to come. In a major steel plant studied, one-quarter of the wages a worker receives is based upon measures relating to production efficiencies, and another 25 per cent depends in part upon which of five occupational skill categories the worker is classified. It should be noted that both of these changes were introduced in the newest and most technologically advanced plants operated by these firms. One of Japan's leading manufacturers of radio, television and other electronic equipment has recently negotiated with the union a wage system based essentially on classified and evaluated jobs, though "job qualification" elements in the scheme still weigh non-job related criteria far more heavily than would be true in a comparable American firm.

Pay-by-Work Formula

These experiments with pay formulas different from the established pay-by-age-and-length-of-service began on a modest scale in the 1950's when a number of companies introduced pay-by-work (*shokumukyu*) formulas, that is, job classified wage-rate structures. But the experience led to numerous difficulties since this approach clashed sharply with existing practices. As an alternative, companies have turned to establishing payment by ability (*shokunokyu*, formulas (Keizaishi, 1966). Many firms view payment by ability as a compromise between the existing *nengo* system and the more radical departure represented by a job classified wage. Payment by ability rewards a worker not only for doing a given task but also for having the ability to do it even if at the time he is not doing it. Though this may appear to be an unnecessary complication, it serves to maintain the continuity of the reward system while at the same time opening greater possibilities for rewarding achievement. A Japanese manager explained it this way: If there are 13 workers all of whom have the same number of years of seniority and the same ability (skill) to operate only 10 machines, the American employer will

lay off three workers. But in the Japanese case, the essence of the *ninkō* wage coupled with the permanent employment practice is, the three otherwise redundant workers will be retained and will also be paid the same wages as the 10 who are actually doing the job, since they have been employed the same number of years and also have the ability to do the job.⁴

The way in which payment by ability actually operates in each firm varies. In some firms it may be merely window-dressing for existing practices. Such firms may make the "ability" portion of the wage a percentage actually based on age and length of service. In some cases workers who may be paid according to some job related attribute may be selected and trained according to age, length of service and education criteria. Under such conditions there is little substantive change from the *ninkō* concept.

The emphasis on ability and technical qualifications is one step closer to directly rewarding achievement. It moves the wage-rate structure in the direction of a closer fit between skill level and rewards regardless of age. As such, payment by ability is a formula which permits movement away from *ninkō* at a pace that does not directly disrupt existing social relations. In all of the plans studied, managers were conscious of a change in recent years whereby placement, training opportunities and promotions were increasingly awarded on the basis of ability rather than age and length of service.⁵

"The right man in the right place" (*tekiyai tekiyaku*) is a slogan which one hears more and more in Japanese firms. And the ability wage may be an important device for achieving the transition to an outright job classified wage system. This formula also illustrates the talent of Japanese managers to devise mechanisms which maintain important elements of continuity in the social structure of the firm and yet permit them to move forward in adapting to new social and economic requirements.

Other Applications of *Ninkō*

Though our principal focus has been on tensions leading to change in the wage system, the "age-grade" concept is also applied to promotions and employment tenure. We shall here

⁴The American practice of measuring seniority according to minute time dimensions is not followed by the Japanese who use year of entry to the firm.

⁵In the Western context, payment by ability presumes some effective job evaluation scheme. A 1964 Japanese government survey of manufacturing firms shows that 4.4 per cent had some form of job evaluation system for blue-collar workers but that among firms employing 500 or more, that is large-scale firms with presumably advanced technology, 31.4 per cent had such systems (Keizai-shi, 1966, 298-99).

touch upon these to examine tensions which may underlie changes in the offing.

Basic to the *nenkō* concept is promotion on the basis of age and length of service. However, rapid technological change has subjected this application to increasing pressures. In the various industries and firms studied, older foremen find it increasingly difficult to cope with new technology and this makes it difficult for them to be effective leaders. Managers tend to hold the view that the supervision of the increasingly complex and expensive machines by supervisors who may qualify by age and length of service is too costly. If one company studied intensively, several first-line supervisors (*kakaricho*) had been recently demoted because of alleged lack of ability to effectively manage the operation of new processes. Some of these men supervised younger, better educated workers who were better able to handle the new complex machines and the older supervisors were not always unhappy about being relieved of this duty. Others could not suffer the loss of prestige and authority and, accordingly, they quit. One device used to handle the demotions was to reorganize the particular production section so as to abolish the foreman's position and thereby conceal the stigma of demotion. But this strategy could be used only infrequently. Moreover, workers still commonly maintain traditional aspirations for *nenkō* promotion. One consequence has been the spread of status ranking systems in Japanese firms. These systems are known by various terms in different companies but most commonly as *shikkaku seido* or *mibun seido*—qualification system or status system.

The Status Ranking System

The operation of the status ranking system in the die casting plant is illustrative of this development and demonstrates the resolution of a conflict between existing worker expectations of promotion based upon age and length of service and management's need to adapt to new technical exigencies. Fundamentally, the new structure establishes ranks according to technical criteria and differentially rewards them with money. The ranks of "councilor", "engineer", "assistant engineer", "technician" and "assistant technician" were established for blue-collar workers and additional monthly allowances paid ranging from 6,000 yen for councilor to 500 yen for assistant technician. These ranks and their attached allowances in no way entitled the recipients to line authority. Ostensibly, they were intended to give recognition according to skill. But in some companies, such as a major chemical producer, the ranks were tied in with classifying accord-

ing to skill and paying according to ability. Further, by awarding workers a status ranking they are given an allowance which increases their monthly pay to roughly correspond with that of supervisors. The object is to give status to those who cannot qualify for promotion according to the new system and to do so in a way which does not interfere with the business of production. This is characteristic of the ability of Japanese managers to devise new practices which meet new requirements but to do it within the framework of existing values.

The Remaining Pillar . . .

The remaining pillar in the *nenkō* system is the practice of so-called permanent employment, that is, the system whereby an employee enters the firm after school graduation and remains as an employee in the same firm until retirement at age 55. There has been considerable discussion of its operation among westerners and reaction to the western interpretation among Japanese scholars (Abegglen, 1958; Taira, 1962; Tsuda, 1965; Shirai, 1967). Probably no more than 35 per cent of all workers enjoy the protection of permanent employment. While western observers are prone to see the permanent employment system as an extension of feudal reciprocal duties and obligations, Japanese scholars have been quick to point out that it was institutionalized only during and after World War I and became widespread following World War II. The desire of employers to commit skilled workers in very short supply is given as the reason for its development, and its widespread adoption is attributed to the demands of unions seeking to protect the employment security of members during the chaos following the close of the Pacific War.

Though the permanent employment system may be seen as consistent with a traditional aspect of *oyabun-kobun* (roughly "master-servant") relations, it more nearly represents another instance of Japanese adaptation to a new practical situation by drawing upon existing values rather than abandoning them. Moreover, it should be noted that this practice was developed in large-scale modern undertakings and has never been a formal characteristic of small-sized firms. Though the statistics on separation rates for wage and salary employees are difficult to interpret and even more difficult for making cross-national comparisons, it seems clear that the average annual monthly separation rates for wage and salary employees in Japanese large-scale firms has been increasing in recent years (2.0 in 1959 and 2.6 in 1964). Certainly this increase reflects a tight labor market. But it probably also reflects the increasing use of standardized criteria in hiring workers and job assignment. And at least within the

same industry, it probably reflects the increasing standardization of technologies. However, considerably more study of this aspect of the *nenkō* system is required before more than crude hunches can be made respecting the viability of permanent employment.

In Conclusion . . .

Nenkō wages, *nenkō* promotion and permanent employment have been three pillars of the Japanese system of rewarding workers. Together they operate to integrate the worker into the firm with the expectation that increased length of service will result not only in higher wages but also in promotion and greater job security. Taken together they lead to the worker viewing his job as a stage in a career, which strengthens work motivation and attachment to the firm.

Recent developments, however, have shaken the foundation of this system. The increasing installation of the most modern technology undermines *nenkō* promotion and favors the granting of immediate rewards to young workers who are quick to master the new technology. In the firms studied, it was not uncommon to find workers under 30 who had been promoted to positions of authority. Also, recent labor market changes further weaken the present arrangements. The compression of the wage-rate-structure deprives older workers of their wage advantages and makes less tenable the practice of deferring rewards until near-retirement age. The tightening labor market increases inter-firm mobility and makes the protection offered by permanent employment less important.

The kinds of accommodations and adaptations that are possible within the *nenkō* framework suggest that the *nenkō* system might better be viewed as an abstract type which is present in firms in varying degrees rather than as a rigid structure representing Japanese tradition. For example, the presence of the *nenkō* payment system in larger firms is only made possible by its absence in small firms, and its application to regular employees in larger firms is only because of the existence of large numbers of temporary and sub-contract workers for whom the *nenkō* wage does not apply (Levine, 1965). Furthermore, since fringe benefits are paid according to age-grade formulas, the abandonment of a *nenkō* wage would require a major shift from private to public welfare. This kind of decision involves political, perhaps even more than economic, consideration.

Depending upon one's point of view, the data presented here and the logic of the argument may be interpreted as supporting those who hold for the hypothesis that industrial societies are

inexorably becoming more similar. Or, it may also support those who opt for the view that cultural differences will be preserved. Specifically, is Japan's case some kind of an aberration on a model of industrial relationships and economic development, an aberration that eventually gets corrected by the ineluctable force of technology; or does Japan represent a major model on its own terms? We don't know; that is the quest. Clearly, considerably more work needs to be done before these options are narrowed, at least with respect to reward systems. Yet, the evidence now available suggests that in the areas discussed here, convergence is occurring. But the data suggests even more than framing the issue in terms of polar opposites, however relevant for theory construction or hypothesis testing, may obscure the very interesting questions of the complex relations between universal tendencies and national cultural differences, and the way in which change occurs.

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The Displacement of Traditional Law in Modern India*

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Contemporary Indian law is, for the most part, palpably foreign in origin or inspiration and it is notoriously incongruent with the attitudes and concerns of much of the population which lives under it. However, the present legal system is firmly established and the likelihood of its replacement by a revived "indigenous" system is extremely small. The modern Indian legal system, then, presents an instance of the apparent displacement of a major intellectual and institutional complex within a highly developed civilization by one largely of foreign inspiration. This paper attempts to trace the process by which the modern system introduced by the British transformed and supplanted the indigenous legal systems—in particular that system known as Hindu law.

The Foundation of the Modern Legal System

One of the outstanding achievements of British rule in India was the formation of a unified nationwide modern legal system. The word "modern" is used here to refer to a cluster of features which characterize, to a greater or lesser extent, the legal systems

* This paper is part of a larger study of the development of the modern Indian legal system.

of the industrial societies of the past century. Many of these features have appeared and do appear elsewhere; some of them may be absent to some degree in one or another industrial society. The salient features of a modern legal system include uniform territorial rules, based on universalistic norms, which apportion rights and obligations as incidents of specific transactions, rather than of fixed statuses. These rules are administered by a hierarchy of courts, staffed by professionals, organized bureaucratically and employing rational procedures. The system contains regular and avowed methods for explicitly revising its rules and procedures. It is differentiated in tasks and personnel from other governmental functions; yet it enjoys a governmentally-enforced monopoly over disputes within its cognizance, permitting other tribunals to operate only in its interstices and subject to its supervision. The system requires (and is supported by) specialized professionals who serve as intermediaries between the courts and those who deal with them (Galanter, 1966b).¹

In PreBritish India . . .

In preBritish India there were innumerable, overlapping local jurisdictions and many groups enjoyed one or another degree of autonomy in administering law to themselves (on this period see Altekar, 1958; Cohn, 1961; Derrett, 1965, 1961a, 1964a; Gune, 1953; Kane, 1930-1941, 1950; Mookerji, 1958; Sarkar, 1958). The existence of *Dharmasastra*, a refined and respected system of written law, did not serve to unify the system in the way that national law did in the West. In Europe, local law was absorbed into, and gradually displaced by law promulgated by state authorities. Hindu law did not enjoy the political conditions for unification. But it was not only the fragmentation of jurisdictions and the extensive delegation to local authorities that obstructed development of a modern legal system. The relative absence of written records, of professional pleaders and of appeals made even local unification difficult. Furthermore, the respective

¹"Modernization" here refers only to the development of the features mentioned above or the sustained movement toward these features. Although, in many cases, the importation of "Western" law seems to serve as the stimulus for such development, it does not imply "Westernization". Nor do I mean to imply that the processes of modernization proceed relentlessly until they produce a legal system which corresponds to the model in every detail. As society becomes modernized in other spheres, new kinds of diversity and complexity generate pressures for differentiation and flexibility in the law. Modern societies develop new methods of making law flexible and responsive—e.g., administrative agencies, arbitration, juvenile courts. Modern law as depicted here is not a destination, but a focus or vector toward which societies move. But the very forces which support this movement and which are released by it deflect it from its apparent destination.

authoritativeness of governmental, *sastric*, and local components was not visualized in a way to provide either the techniques or the ideology for the ruthless supersEDURE of local law. The system allowed for change, but did not impose it; it allowed the old to remain alongside the new. The relation of the "highest" and most authoritative parts of the legal system to the "lower" end of the system was not that of superior to subordinate in a bureaucratic hierarchy. It was perhaps closer to the relations that obtain between Paris designers and American department store fashions or between our most prestigious universities and our smaller colleges than to anything in our own legal experience. Instead of systematic imposition, of "higher" law on lesser tribunals, there was a general diffusion by the filtering down (and occasionally up) of ideas and techniques, by conscious imitation and by movement of personnel.

The Moghuls and other Muslim rulers had, in cities and administrative centers, royal courts which exercised a general criminal (and sometimes commercial) jurisdiction and also decided civil and family matters among the Muslim population (on this period, see Ahmed, 1941; Sarkar, 1958). These courts operated according to Muslim law—at least in theory, for the application of *Shari 'ah* was qualified by custom and royal decree, by corruption and lack of professionalism, and by arrangements allowing considerable discretion to the courts of first instance. While a hierarchy of courts and a right of appeal existed, it seems that the activity of these higher courts fell short of any sustained and systematic supervision of the lower courts. Hindus were generally allowed their own tribunals in civil matters. Where these matters came before royal courts, the Hindu law was applied. The government's courts did not extend very deep into the countryside; there was no attempt to control the administration of law in the villages. Presumably, the Hindu tribunals proceeded as before Muslim rule, except that whatever ties had bound these tribunals to governmental authority were weakened; there was no appeal to the royal courts.

The "Expropriation" of Law . . .

In undertaking to administer the law in the government's courts, staffed with government servants (rather than to exercise a merely supervisory control over administration of law by non-governmental bodies), the British took the decisive step toward a modern legal system,² initiating a process that might be called

²The alternative is exemplified not only by earlier Indian Law, but by such arrangements as the *millet* system of the Ottoman empire, under which each religious community was required to administer its own law to itself—a system which continues in some degree in parts of the Middle East today.

the "expropriation" of law (Weber, 1958, 83). This expropriation, which made the power to find, declare and apply law a monopoly of government, came about in slightly different ways and at different times in different places. But the general movement was the same. Three distinctive, if overlapping, stages can be discerned in the development of the modern Indian legal system. The first, the period of initial expropriation, can conveniently be dated from Warren Hastings' organization in 1772 of a system of courts for the hinterland of Bengal (Misra, 1961, 1959, ch. 5, 6; Patra, 1961). This period was marked by the general expansion of government's judicial functions and the attrition of other tribunals, while the authoritative sources of law to be used in governmental courts were isolated and legislation initiated. The second period, which began about 1860, was a period of extensive codification of the law and of rationalization of the system of courts, while the sources of law became more fixed and legislation became the dominant mode of modifying the law. This period lasted until Independence, after which there was a further consolidation and rationalization of the law and the development of a unified judicial system over the whole of India.

The Law Before 1860 . . .

The law applied in the courts before 1860 was extremely varied. Parliamentary charters and acts, Indian legislation (after 1833), Company Regulations, English common law and ecclesiastical and admiralty law, Hindu law, Muslim law, and many bodies of customary law were combined in a bewildering array (Morley, 1850, Vol. I, lxii, xcvi; Rankin, 1946, ch. 10, 11; Patra, 1961, ch. 8; Ilbert, 1907, ch. 3). It was a fundamental and persisting British policy that, in matters of family law, inheritance, caste and religion, Indians were not to be subjected to a single general territorial law. Hindus and Muslims were to be governed by their personal law, i.e., the law of their religious group. In other cases, the judges were instructed to decide "according to justice, equity and good conscience". This puzzling formula, whatever its original meaning (Derrett, 1963a) was the medium for the uneven application of some indigenous law and for the importation, sometimes uncritical, of a great deal of English law.

There were, prior to 1860, numerous attempts to reorganize and reform the courts and to systematize and reform the law (Morley, 1850, vol. I, intro.; E. Stokes, 1959, ch. 3; Desika Char, 1963, 278-92) including some reforms which changed Hindu law. However, there was no major progress toward simplifying and systematizing the law until the Crown took over the governing of India from the East India Company in 1858. The quarter of a

century following the takeover by the Crown was the major period of codification of law and consolidation of the court system. During this period a series of Codes, based more or less on English law and applicable, with minor exceptions, throughout British India, were enacted. By 1882, there was virtually complete codification of all fields of commercial, criminal and procedural law (W. Stokes, 1887-88; Acharyya, 1914). Only the personal laws of Hindus and Muslims were exempted. While Hindu and Muslim laws previously had been applied to a variety of topics besides the listed ones, they were now confined (with minor exceptions) to the personal law matters (family law, inheritance, succession, caste, religious endowments). The Codes themselves do not represent any fusion with indigenous law (Bryce, 1901, 107, 117); there is no borrowing from Hindu, Muslim or customary law, although there is occasional accommodation of local rules and there are adjustments and elaborations of the common law to deal with kinds of persons and situations and conditions found in India (Lipstein, 1957, 92ff).

The Transformation of Indigenous Law

What happened to indigenous law as a result of the formation of the modern legal system? First, its administration moved from "informal" tribunals into the government's courts; second, the applicability of indigenous law was curtailed; third, the indigenous law was transformed in the course of being administered by the government's courts.

The most striking impact of the provision of governmental courts was the shift of dispute-settlement from local tribunals (and local notables) to the government's courts. Nineteenth-century (and later) observers speak of a flood of litigation, sometimes with the implication that these disputes would have been peaceably settled or indeed would never have arisen without the availability of official courts. In the absence of information about the quantity of disputes and litigation in traditional India, it seems reasonable to regard most of this litigation as the mere transfer of old disputes to new tribunals.³ These new tribunals and their strange methods had a powerful allure. Maine speaks of the "revolution of legal ideas" inadvertently produced in the very course of attempting to enforce the usages of the country. This revolution, he found, proceeded from a single innovation—"the mere establishment of local courts of lowest jurisdiction" in

³This supposition is compatible with observations of more recent instances of disputes moving from traditional to governmental tribunals. See Cohn, 1955; Beals, 1955. Cf. the observations of Frederick John Shore, that in fact British rule decreased the number of tribunals available (1837, Vol. II, 189).

every administrative district (Maine, 1895, 70-71). The availability of these courts, with their power to compel the attendance of parties and witnesses, and, above all, with their compulsory execution of decrees, opened the way for "the contagion . . . of the English system of law (Maine, 1895, 74; Cf. Derrett, 1961a, 18).

The common law courts undertook to deal with the merits of a single transaction or offense, isolated from the related disputes among the parties and their supporters. The "fireside equities" and qualifying circumstances known to the indigenous tribunal were excluded from the court's consideration. In accordance with the precept of "equality before the law", the status and ties of the parties, matters of moment to an indigenous tribunal, were deliberately ignored. And, unlike the indigenous tribunals which sought compromise or face-saving solutions acceptable to all parties, the government's courts dispensed clear-cut "all or none" decisions. Decrees were enforced by extra-local force and were not subject to the delays and protracted negotiations which abounded when decisions were enforced by informal pressures. Thus "larger prizes" were available to successful litigants and these winnings might be grasped independently of the assent of local opinion. The new courts not only created new opportunities for intimidation and harassment and new means for carrying on old disputes, but they also gave rise to a sense of individual right not dependent on opinion or usage and capable of being actively enforced by government, even in opposition to community opinion (Cohn, 1959; Rudolph and Rudolph, 1965).

Traditional Tribunals

Traditional tribunals still functioned, though certain subjects (e.g., criminal law) were withdrawn from their purview. On the whole, these tribunals lost whatever governmental enforcement their decisions had previously enjoyed. The caste group was now treated as a private association. While it thus enjoyed an area of autonomy, it no longer could invoke governmental enforcement of its decrees. At the same time, the sanctions available to the indigenous tribunals declined in force. The new opportunities for mobility, spatial and social, provided by British rule not only increased transactions between parties beyond the reach of traditional sanctions, but also made outcasting and boycott less fearsome. With their own sanctions diminished, their ability to invoke governmental support limited and the social relations necessary for their effectiveness disrupted, the indigenous tribunals declined as the government courts flourished.

The movement of disputes into the government courts in India has not been definitely charted. We might visualize it, borrowing Bailey's term, as a "moving legal frontier" (1957, 4-5). At first the village lay beyond the reach of the modern legal system, ruled by its traditional tribunals according to its customary rules (Marriott, 1955, 186ff). With the impingement of new regulations and the arrival of new forms of wealth and power from the outside, sooner or later some party in the village found it both feasible and advantageous to resort to the government's courts for what it could not obtain from village justice (Bailey, 1957, 262ff; Cohn, 1955, 66; Beals, 1955, 90; Woodruff, 1953, 298). Other parties were obliged to defend themselves in court. As more learned to use the official courts, the authority of village tribunals was displaced. Over time the modern system encroached on the traditional system: court law replaced village law on more topics of law for more groups over more territory.⁴ With this "expropriation" of independent legal "estates", the government's monopoly on making, finding and applying the law was extended.

The Search for Indigenous Law . . .

It was early acknowledged that Indians should be ruled by their own laws. Hastings' plan, which provided the model for the other *mofussil* systems, set out to apply indigenous law. The British assumed that there was some body of law somehow comparable to their own, based on authoritative textual materials to be applied by officials according to specified procedures to reach unambiguous results. However, there was no single system in use, but a multiplicity of systems; and within these there was often no fixed authoritative body of law, no set of binding precedents, no single legitimate way of applying or changing the law. Yet these British assumptions and expectations about Hindu law had a powerful effect upon it and ultimately proved to be self-fulfilling prophecies.

The "Sastra", Custom and British Law

In their search for authoritative bodies of law, the British made collections and translations of ancient texts and recent commentaries. However, Indian law proved strangely elusive (Hunter, 1897, 371). Maine speaks of the "vast gaps and inter-spaces in the Substantive Law of India" (Maine, 1890, 209,

⁴This does not imply that traditional norms and concerns are displaced by official ones. On the contrary, it appears that these traditional attitudes outlast traditional legal practice and are responsible for the inspired manipulation of "modern" law for purposes foreign to the law. Cf. the observation that most Indian court cases are "fabrications to cover the real disputes" (Cohn, 1959, 90).

"Minute of 1st October, 1868"). India was "a country singularly empty of law" (Maine, 1890, 225, "Note of 17th July, 1879"). In the written *sashtra* "large departments of law were scarcely represented" (Maine, 1895, 51; Derrett, 1959a, 48ff, and 1964a, 109-10). It was soon recognized that *sashtra* was only part of the law and that in many matters Indians were regulated by less formal bodies of customary law. But even the customary law was not sufficient. For when custom was recorded and the quasi-legislative innovative role of the tribunals that administered it was restricted, it did not supply "express rules in nearly sufficient number to settle the disputes occasioned by the increased activity of life and the multiplied wants which result[ed] from . . . peace and plenty. . . ." (Maine, 1895, 75). The need to fill the felt gaps was ultimately to lead to statutory codification on the basis of English law. But, in the meantime, courts, empowered to decide cases in accordance with "justice, equity and good conscience", filled the interstices of *sashtra* and custom with "unamalgamated masses of foreign law" (Maine, 1895, 76). Although there was some attempt to draw the most suitable rule from other sources (Derrett, 1959b), in most cases the judges were inclined to assume that English law was most suitable (Legal Cases, 16; Twining, 1964).

Even where Indian rules were available, their application by the British transformed them (Derrett, 1961a, 20, 21-22). Mere restatement in English legal terminology distorted the Hindu and customary rules (Derrett, 1961a, 41). English procedure curtailed some substantive rights and amplified others (Derrett, 1961a, 40). The British insisted upon clarity, certainty and definiteness of a kind foreign to Hindu tradition (Derrett, 1961b, 112). Neither the written nor the customary law was "of a nature to bear the strict criteria applied by English lawyers." (Maine, 1895, 37). Rules seemed vague and requiring of definition, and this was accomplished by English methods. The mere process of definition had the effect of creating rights of a kind that did not previously exist (Maine, 1895, 167). Comparing the effect of English legal method in the Supreme Courts and the Sudder Courts, Maine observed that:

At the touch of the Judge of the Supreme Court, who had been trained in the English school of special pleading, and had probably come to the East in the maturity of life, the rule of native law dissolved and, with or without his intention, was to a great extent replaced by rules having their origin in English law-books. Under the hand of the judges of the Sudder Courts, who had lived since their boyhood among the people of the country, the native rules hardened and contracted a rigidity which they never had in real native practice (Maine, 1895, 45).

Elevation of Textual Law over Customary Law

One of the remarkable and unanticipated results of the British administration of Hindu law was the elevation of the textual law over lesser bodies of customary law. The sources of personal law were assumed to be not the customary law that prevailed among most Hindus (and Muslims) on most matters, but the highest and most authoritative bodies of textual law. It was assumed that the Hindu law could be ascertained from sacred books. Hastings' plan "took Orthodox Brahmanic learning as the standard of Hindu law" (Derrett, 1961b, 80). It was later acknowledged that according to the Hindu law, where there was a conflict between custom and *sashtra*, the custom overrode the written text (Legal Cases, 17); nevertheless, the texts were elevated to a new supremacy over custom. While some more widespread and longstanding customs gained recognition, "the most distinct effect of continued judicial construction . . . has been . . . greatly to extend the operation of semi-sacred collections of written rules . . . at the expense of local customs which had been practiced over small territorial areas" (Maine, 1895, 208; Derrett, 1961b, 101; Gledhill, 1954, 578).

While the British courts may have strengthened some customs by impeding the traditional methods by which orthodox standards spread to new groups (Derrett, 1956, 237), the rules of evidence provided the mechanism for the disappearance of legal effectiveness of much customary law. Custom was unwritten and therefore difficult to prove in court. Yet the British courts, with their heritage of common-law hostility to local customs, applied requirements for proving the existence of a custom that were onerous to Indian litigants. To prevail over the written law a custom must be "proved to be immemorial or ancient, uniform, unvariable, continuous, certain, notorious, reasonable (or not unreasonable), peaceful, obligatory and it must not be immoral nor opposed to an express enactment . . . or to public policy" (Kane, 1950, 44; For the courts' treatment of custom see Kane, 1950, 22-26; Roy, 1911; Jain, 1963). The difficulties in meeting these requirements combined with the general assumption that Hindus were ruled by *dharmaśastra* to extend the *sāstric* rules to many groups which had previously been ruled by their own customs.⁵

⁵The most striking elaboration of this view is found in the works of J. H. Nelson (1877; 1880; 1886). See also J. D. M. Derrett, 1961c. Similar developments in the elevation of Roman over customary law in Europe are described in Smith, 1927, 35; on the similar role played there by rules of evidence, see Bryce, 1901, 106. While the number of topics ruled by Hindu Law has been restricted, the portion of the population ruled by it continues to increase even today under the rubric of "Hinduization of tribals" (Legal Case 3).

Even where an explicit attempt was made to preserve customary law, the *sastric* law advanced over it (Derrett, 1961a, 29). Custom recorded for the purpose of applying it in the courts, was changed in the process of recording it.⁶ From a body of orally transmitted percepts and precedents, subject to variable interpretation and quasi-legislative innovation at the discretion of village notables or elders, it became a body of fixed law to be construed by a professional court. Variable sanctions, imposed with an eye to the total situation of the parties, were replaced by the compulsory and drastic execution of the court's decrees. Judicial enforcement of custom rigidified it and stripped it of its quasi-legislative character (Lawson, 1953, 19); official courts were and are reluctant to permit the creation of new binding custom (E.g., Legal Cases, 4, 12).

Sastric Law was Rigidified

Customary law then, was rigidified, restricted in scope and replaced by *dharmaśastra*.⁷ What was the effect of the courts on *sastric* law? To ascertain the Hindu and Muslim law, the courts appointed law officers—Muslim *moulavis* and Brahmin *pundits*—to select and interpret the relevant portions of the Hindu and Muslim law for the English judges. At the same time, the British set about collecting and translating authoritative books in the hope of making the Hindu law more accessible and certain. Dissatisfaction with the work of the law officers, the growth of a body of translated texts, digests and manuals prepared by the British, as well as a growing body of precedent from the courts themselves, led eventually to the elimination of the law officers as intermediaries between the courts and the Hindu law. With the general reorganization of the legal system in the 1860's, the posts of the law officers were abolished and the common-law judges undertook to administer the law directly from the existing corpus of materials. Derrett observes that "the *dharmaśastra*, as a living and responsible science died when the courts assumed full judicial knowledge of the Hindu law in 1865 . . ." (Derrett, 1961b, 94).

Derrett tells us that the "death-sickness" began when, in their quest for "clarity, certainty and finality in terms foreign

⁶In the Punjab, custom was regarded as the primary rule of decision on certain specific matters (Rattigan, 1953). But even here, custom was recorded and its administration becomes almost indistinguishable from statute and case law (Legal Case 8). On the method and impact of recording, see Alan Gledhill, 1960.

⁷For an account of parallel development within Muslim personal law, Rankin, 1940; Ali, 1938. The elevation of textual law over custom culminated in the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 (Act XXVI of 1937), which abrogated custom with specified exceptions (Fyzee, 1955).

to Hindu tradition", (*ibid.*, 112) the British attempted to treat Hindu law as if it could be made to assume a fixed form. They insisted on a certainty and consistency alien to Hindu jurisprudence, which depended on expansive judicial discretion.

"... [T]he *sutra* . . . offered the judge discretion, not only in choice of a rule of law from permissible alternatives, but also in manipulating the judicial procedure, e.g., in the admission of witnesses, etc." (*ibid.*, 76). But while such discretion and flexibility were necessary to the working of the traditional system, they constituted an intolerable deficiency to the British, who "had no means of inserting themselves into the tradition which would have enabled sound discretion to be exercised" (Derrett, 1961b, 76; Derrett, 1961a, 33; Morley, 1850, clxxvii ff).

In their effort to make Hindu law more uniform, certain and accessible to British judges and to check the discretion of the *pandits*, the courts relied increasingly on translations of texts, on digests and manuals, and on their own precedents. Regard for precedent as such was foreign to the Hindu system (Derrett, 1961b, 83). Introduction of the rule of *stare decisis* diminished the flexibility of Hindu law by ruling out innovations to meet changes in community sentiment (Derrett, 1961a, 48).

Earlier, *sutra* had changed and developed by successive commentaries and had maintained its flexibility by its complex and discretionary techniques of interpretation. British administration not only dissipated these techniques but also narrowed the selection of authoritative texts. Courts were not to consult the whole of *sastric* science, but only those commentators accepted in the locality, a view which led to the elaboration of partially artificial "schools" of Hindu law. Any further development by commentary and reaction was impeded (Maine, 1895, 46-7).

[A]s the influence of the *pandit* gradually wanes in the courts we see the latter coming to rely more and more on the older, more narrowly defined *dharma-sutra* works and less and less on the miscellaneous and more recent works which the good *pandit* would frequently rely upon. The *pandit* as a professor of a living science was rejected for the more or less dead treatises which would head the *pandits'* list of references (Derrett, 1961b, 99).

With its innovative technique stripped away, *sastric* law, like customary law, became more rigid and archaic⁸ as well as

⁸A striking instance of this is to be found in the increased emphasis on the *varnas*, or four great classes into which Hindu society is theoretically divided by the *sastric* texts. *Varna* distinctions received scant attention from the courts during the early years of British rule, but became a major factor in the administration of Hindu law after the courts undertook to administer it without intermediaries and directly from the texts.

more uniform and certain. Yet judicial precedent and legislation provided new means of growth and development (Sarkar, 1958, 366-90; Gledhill, 1954).

The Impact of the Modern Legal System

Let us consider some of the effects on Indian society of the modern legal system with its regular hierarchies of courts applying codified English law and rationalized indigenous law. We noted before the spread of a sense of individual right independent of local usage or opinion and enforceable by reference to standards and agencies beyond the locality of the group. The new system provided new avenues of mobility and advancement within Indian society (Kumar, 1965; Cohn, 1960). On speculation in lawsuits see Report 1925, ch. 43). There were new methods for conflict, acquisition and pursuit of status (Legal Case 15). Powerful persons and groups on the local scene possessed new weapons for intimidating and harassing their opponents. But the local underdogs could now carry the fight outside the local arena by enlisting powerful allies elsewhere. Persons and property were freed from hereditary prescriptions, making possible a wider range of "market" transactions.

The legal system also provides new channels for the dissemination of norms and values from governmental centers to towns and out to villages. The legal system is a hierarchical network, which radiates out from the cities and through which authoritative doctrine flows outward from governmental centers. By the prestige of urban and official centers, and by the disposition of governmental power in their enforcement, elements of this doctrine might be powerfully recommended. New methods of group activity and new images of social formation are presented (McCormack, 1963, 1966; Conlon, 1963; Maine, 1895, 9, 38).

Modern Law: A Unifying Element

The modern legal system may be viewed as an important unifying element. While previously there were wider networks of marriage, ritual activity, pilgrimage and economic and military activity, until the advent of the modern system, law and justice were in good part purely local concerns (Cohn, 1959, 88). Today, while India has no single nationwide system of caste, kinship, religion or land-tenure, there is an all-India legal system which handles local disputes in accordance with uniform national standards. This legal system provides not only a common textual tradition but also a machinery for insuring that this tradition is applied in all localities in accordance with nationally pre-

scribed rules and procedures rather than dissolved into local interpretations.

With this system goes what we might call an all-India legal culture. Its carriers are all persons who are connected with the courts, but primarily the numerous lawyers.⁹ With their skills in manipulating the legal system, they serve as links or middlemen between official centers and rural places, disseminating official norms, rephrasing local concerns in acceptable legal garb, playing important roles in devising new organizational forms for forwarding local interests (e.g., caste associations, political parties, economic interest groups).¹⁰ In spite of differences of region,

⁹(Report of the All-India Bar Committee, 1953; Cohn, 1961, 625ff). Lawyers are not the only intermediaries who carry official law to the wider society; there are also social workers, administrators, police, etc. And, of course, the petition-writers, clerks and touts, who often act as intermediaries between villagers and urban lawyers (Mack, 1955; Srinivas, 1964, 94; Chattopadhyay, 1964, 81ff; Law Commission of India, 1958, Vol. I, 577ff; Cohn, 1965, 103).

In absolute numbers, India has the second largest legal profession in the world (after the United States). In proportion to its population, there are fewer lawyers in India than in Western common-law countries, but many more than in other new states. The Indian figures are in the same range as many continental civil-law countries. (In these comparisons the Indian figures are somewhat understated, since the proportion of children is higher in the population of India than in those of the wealthier countries.) But a rough idea may be gathered from the following figures, which represent the number of persons per lawyer in selected countries:

United States (1960)	728
Canada (1961)	1,366
Italy (1957)	1,601
Great Britain (1959)	2,105
West Germany (1958)	3,012
India (1952)	4,920
Egypt (1964)	5,768
France (1958)	5,769
Japan (1960)	14,354
Nigeria (1964)	22,765
Indonesia (c.1960)	c.100,000

The figures for the United States, Canada, Italy, Great Britain, West Germany, France and Japan are taken from T. Hattori (1963). The Indian figures are based upon the Report of the All-India Bar Committee (1953). Figures for Egypt and Nigeria were supplied by the Commonwealth Library of the American Bar Foundation. The Indonesian figure is a calculation based upon Lev (1965, 183, 189).

¹⁰Sir Ivor Jennings, observing that the Constituent Assembly was dominated by lawyers, contends that "the lawyer-politician has . . . played a more important part in Indian politics than in the politics of any country in the world" (Jennings, 1955, 24). In 1953, lawyers comprised 26 per cent of the Lok Sabha (Lower House) and 29 per cent of the Rajya Sabha (Upper House.) Cf. approximately 60 per cent of the U.S. Congress (85th Congress); 20 per cent of the British House of Commons (1955); 14 per cent of the French National Assembly (1951); 11 per cent of the West German Bundestag (1957) (McCloy, 1958, 5-6).

language, caste and religion, they share a common legal culture and they are able to put this culture at the service of a wide variety of local interests. In a situation where local concerns and interests get expression by representation at centers of power, rather than in the traditional way of enjoying a sphere of autonomy, the lawyers are crucial agents for the expression of local and parochial interests at the same time that they rephrase these interests in terms of official norms. Thus the modern legal system provides both the personnel and the techniques for carrying on public business in a way that is nationally intelligible and free of dependence on particular religious or local authority. It thus provides one requisite for organizing Indian society into a modern nation-state.

Constitutionalism

The formation of an independent Indian nation provided a basis for further integration and consolidation of the modern legal system. With the coming of Independence, enclaves previously outside the legal system were integrated into it. A layer of constitutionalism was superimposed on the existing legal system and structure of government. The Constitution (1950) established India as a secular federal republic with a parliamentary system in the British style and a strong central government. The framers of the Constitution rejected the various proposals to construct a government along "indigenous" lines.¹¹ The Constitution established powerful legislatures at the center and in the states. It also established a unified judiciary covering the whole of India under a Supreme Court as a court of final appeal in all cases.

The Constitution includes a bill of Fundamental Rights, which are enforceable by the judiciary (Constitution of India, Part III; Cf. Art. 32 and 226 on the wide judicial powers in this area) and to which all governmental regulation and all laws in every part of India must conform. Government is enjoined by

¹¹The proponents of "indigenous" systems of government (of both orthodox and Gandhian persuasions) were severely disappointed with the Constitution, which did little to dismantle complex bureaucratic government, to re-assert the virtues of village autonomy or to express dedication to a life of purity in Hindu terms. The whole effort managed to deposit only three provisions in the Constitution, all in the chapter on Directive Principles: prohibition, an item of uplift with religious overtones that had long absorbed social reformers (Art. 47); a commitment to laws abolishing cow-slaughter (Art. 48); and, most important, a promise to organize self-governing village panchayats (Art. 40). On the constituent assembly's choice, generally, see Granville Austin, *The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation* (1966). On schemes and pleas for "indigenous" alternatives, see *Panchayat Raj as the Basis of Indian Polity*, 1962; Agarwal, 1946; Sharma, 1951.

these provisions to be indifferent to particularistic and ascriptive characteristics (e.g., race, religion, caste, place of birth, and sex) in its dealings with citizens, whether as electors, employees or subjects (Constitution of India, Part III, Cf. Art. 325; Legal Cases, 14, 11, 9). A wide range of private conduct, involving the assertion of precedence or the imposition of disabilities—including venerable usages which had previously enjoyed religious and sometimes legal sanction are outlawed (Constitution, Arts. 17, 15[2], 23[1]). Governmental enforcement of rights based on caste position, heredity, vicinage and the like is forbidden (Legal Cases 5, 2, 1; Constitution Arts. 25, 26; Subramanian, 1961).

To serve as a guide to the legislatures, the Constitution contains a set of non-justiciable "Directive Principles of State Policy" (Constitution of India, Part IV), which call for the reconstruction of Indian society and government along the lines of a modern welfare state. Accordingly, the central legislature and the legislatures of the several states have released a flood of legislation aimed at economic development and social reform, extending governmental regulation to many areas of life previously immune from official control.¹² Extensive regulation of landholding, religious endowments, caste practices and family law by central and state governments has supplanted governmental recognition of local rules of unofficial or parochial provenance.

The Hindu Code

The extension and consolidation of the modern features of the legal system can be observed in the treatment of two basic institutions of Hindu society—the family and the caste. Among the Directive Principles is a commitment that the State "secure to the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India" (Constitution, Art. 44), which contemplates the complete abandonment of the personal-law system. Although no such unification of the laws of Hindus and Muslims has yet been undertaken, the Parliament in 1955–56 passed a series of Acts known collectively as the Hindu Code, which effect a wholesale and drastic reform of Hindu law (Derrett, 1963b, 1957, 1958; Levy, 1961). Where earlier legislation introduced specific modifications into the framework of *sastric* law, the Code entirely supplants the *sastra* as the source of Hindu law. Hindu social

¹²In the Constitution's first eight years, some 600 Acts were passed by the Central Parliament (in addition to 89 Ordinances, 21 Regulations and 62 Presidential Acts). During the four years 1953–56, the State Legislatures passed 2,527 Acts, of which 275 dealt with land reform (Law Commission of India, 1958, note 114 at Vol. I, 30).

arrangements are for the first time moved entirely within the ambit of legislative regulation; appeal to the *sastric* tradition is almost entirely dispensed with. The Code turns away from the *sastra* by abandoning *varna* distinctions and indissoluble marriage, the preference for the extended joint family and for inheritance by males only and by those who can confer spiritual benefit. It favors instead greater individualism, emphasis on the nuclear family, divorce and equality of *varnas* and sexes. Very few rules remain with a specifically religious foundation.

The Code marks the acceptance of Parliament as a kind of central legislative body for Hindus in matters of family and social life. The earlier notion that government had no mandate or competence to redesign Hindu society has been discarded. For the first time, the bulk of the world's Hindus live under a single central authority that has both the desire and the power to enforce changes in their social arrangements. It has been pointed out that, throughout the history of Hinduism, no general and sweeping reforms were possible, just because of the absence of centralized governmental or ecclesiastical institutions (Pannikar, 1961, 72, 79ff). Reformers might persuade others and they might gain acceptance as a sect; but there was no way for them to win the power to enforce changes on others. They could supplement existing practice but they could not supplant it, because there were no levers which could be grasped to accomplish across-the-board changes. The modern legal system has made possible enforcement of changes among all Hindus by a powerful central authority.

The Code subjects Hindus to a degree of uniformity unprecedented in Hindu legal history. Regional differences; the schools of commentators; differences according to *varna*; customs of locality, caste and family; many special statuses and estates, and (largely) distinctions of sex have all fallen by the wayside. Some narrow scope is allowed for custom, but for the first time a single set of rules is applicable to Hindus of every caste, sect and region.

Reform and Unification

Much the same might be said of constitutional provisions and legislative enactments regarding caste (Galanter, 1961, 1963, 1966a). Here, too, there is the assertion of broad regulative power by the government and curtailment of the autonomy of the component groups within Hinduism. This power is exercised to eliminate disparities of law and custom and to impose uniformity of rights and equality of opportunities. *Sastric* notions and legal categories (*varna*, pollution) are discarded and Western or modern

categories substituted. In both instances emphasis falls on eradicating the barriers within Hinduism and promoting an integrated Hindu community—and eventually a non-communal society. Finally, in both instances, we have the Western-educated elite using the law to impose its notions. As in many areas of Indian life, the law in regard to the family and caste does not represent a response to the felt needs of its clientele or an accommodation of conflicting interests and pressures. Rather the law is the expression of the aspirations of the most articulate and "advanced" groups, which hope to use its educational as well as its coercive powers to improve the unenlightened. Deliberate social change was not unknown before the coming of the British. On the contrary, Hindu law contained its own techniques for deliberate and obligatory innovation and these continued to be used into the early part of the British period. The revolutionary principle fostered by British rule was not the notion of deliberate social change, but rather the notion of the unit which might legitimately introduce and be the subject of such changes. The recent legislation visualizes a single national community—or at least a community embracing all Hindus, transcending divisions of region, caste and sect.

Thus the present legal system provides a unifying element in India in a way that neither Hindu nor Muslim law ever did. Muslim law never went deep enough; it was never applied to disputes among Hindus. *Dharmashastra* tolerated diversity, preferring unification by example, instruction and slow absorption rather than by imperative imposition. Change was piecemeal rather than comprehensive. In contrast, the new legal system provides machinery (and the ideology) for legislation to be enforced throughout the society. Such a system, along with mass communications, makes possible unprecedented consolidation and standardization of Hinduism, as well as of Indian society generally.

Traditional Law in the Modern System

What, then, is the role of Hindu law in the Indian legal system today? The *dharmaśāstra* component is almost completely obliterated. While it is the original source of various rules on matters of personal law, the *sāstra* itself is no longer a living source of law; these rules are intermixed with rules from other sources and are administered in the common-law style, isolated from *sāstric* techniques of interpretation and procedure. In other fields of law, *sāstra* is not used as a source of precedent, analogy or inspiration. As a procedural-technical system of law—a cor-

pus of norms, techniques and institutions—it is not longer functioning. There seems to be little nostalgia to revive particular *sastric* rules.¹³ (which would, in any event, be administered in the common-law style); the pleas for an “indigenous system” are for the directness, cheapness and simplicity of local law, not for the complexities of *dharmaśastra*.

The local customary component of Hindu law is also a source of rules at a few isolated points, but it, too, has been abandoned as a living source of law. There is but one significant attempt to promote such indigenous law, by devolving certain judicial responsibilities to the local elective village *panchayats* (Law Commission, 1958, Vol. II, 874–925; Malaviya, 1956; *Report*, 1962). But these elective *panchayats* are quite a different sort of body than the traditional *panchayat* (Retzlaff, 1962, 23ff; Luchinsky, 1963a, 73; Robins, 1962). It is suggested that rather than inspiring a resurgence of local law, they may instead effect a further displacement of local law by official law within the village (Legal Cases 7, 9, 11).

The traditional method of relating the authoritative “official” law to local customary law has definitely been supplanted. The Indian legal system is now equipped with machinery for bringing local law into line with national standards.¹⁴ Once such a mechanism is present, local law can survive only by taking on the character of modern law—it must become certain, definite, consistent, obligatory rather than discretionary or circumstantial.

The Gap Between “Higher Law” and Local Practice

Every legal system faces the problem of bridging the gap between its most authoritative and technically elaborate literary products at the “upper” end of the system and the varying patterns of local practice at the “lower” end. It must decide on allowable leeway—how much localism to accommodate, how to deflect local to general standards. Hindu law solved these problems by willingly accommodating almost unlimited localism; it was willing to rely on acceptance and absorption through per-

¹³Very considerable portions of *sāstra*, with their emphasis on graded inequality, would fail to meet present constitutional requirements—and would hardly be likely to appeal to India’s present rulers.

¹⁴It should be noted that this machinery is more insistent in India than in, say, the United States, where juries and locally elected prosecutors and judges introduce a check on uniformity and provide enclaves for localism. Again, the unified judiciary, the competence of the Indian Supreme Court in matters of state law, the high estimation put on its *dicta* as well as its holdings, litigants’ direct access to higher courts, the frequency of appeals, and the practice of higher courts entering their own orders instead of remanding—all of these incline the system to a high degree of centralization.

suation and example. These methods are too slow and irregular to appeal to a ruling group which aspires to transform the society radically and to build a powerful and unified nation. Even where specifically Hindu norms are made the basis of legislation—e.g., in prohibition and anti-cow slaughter laws—these norms are not implemented by the old techniques. Enforcing these matters by legislation, courts and the police stands in striking contrast to allowing them simply to be adopted gradually by various groups in the society. Such change still takes place, but it operates outside the legal system. While the harsher British methods have displaced the methods of persuasion and example from the legal system itself, they persist alongside it in the form of propaganda, education and the widespread tendency to imitate urban and official ways (Marriott, 1955, 72).

But the demise of traditional law does not mean the demise of traditional society. Traditional notions of legality and methods of change still persist at a sub-legal level—e.g., in the area of activities protected by the doctrine of "caste autonomy", in the form of accepted deviance, and in arrangements to evade or ignore the law. The modern legal system may provide new possibilities for operating within traditional society. Official law can be used not only to evade traditional restrictions, but to enforce them (Srinivas, 1964, 90; Siegal and Beals, 1960, 408; Cohn, 1965, 98–99, 101). Traditional society is not passively regulated by the modern system; it uses the system for its own ends. Traditional interests and groupings now find expression in litigation, in pressure-group activity and through voluntary organization.

Two Political Idioms . . .

Morris-Jones (1963) speaks of two contrasting political idioms or styles in contemporary India: the modern idiom of national politics with its plans and policies and the traditional idiom of social status, customary respect and communal ties, ambitions and obligations. He notes that "Indian political life becomes explicit and self-conscious only through the 'Western' [modern] idiom. . . . But this does not prevent actual behavior from following a different path" (*Ibid.*, 142). Similarly, all contact with the legal system involves the translation of traditional interests and concerns into modern terms in order to get legal effectiveness. For example, at the touch of the official law, a caste's prerogatives become the constitutionally protected rights of a religious denomination (Legal Case 13); a lower caste's ambitions become its constitutional right to equality; property can be made to devolve along traditional lines, and land-reforms can be frustrated by transactions in good legal form (Derrett, 1964b;

Luchinsky, 1963b; Ishwaran, 1964). Traditional interests and expectations are thus translated into suitable legal garb, into nationally intelligible terms.¹⁵ But the process of translation opens new possibilities for affiliation and alignment, new modes of action. If we regard tradition not as a stationary point, a way of remaining unchanged, but as a method of introducing and legitimating change, we can say that the modern legal system has displaced traditional methods within the legal system itself while it has supplemented them outside it.

A Dualistic Legal System

India has what we might call a dualistic or colonial-style legal system—one in which the official law embodies norms and procedures congenial to the governing classes and remote from the attitudes and concerns of its clientele. Such systems are typical of areas in which a colonizing power superimposes uniform law over a population governed by a diversity of local traditions. However, legal colonization may occur from within as well as from without, as in Turkey ("The Reception . . .," 1957), Japan (Takayanagi, 1963) and in India since the departure of the British. The colonial legal situation prevails wherever there is unresolved tension between national and local, formal and popular law.¹⁶ In a relatively homogeneous society, the law can be visualized as the expression of widely shared social norms. In a heterogeneous society (differentiated horizontally by culture, or vertically by caste or class), the law expresses not primarily the aspirations and concerns of the society, but those of the groups that formulate, promulgate and apply the law. A gap between the official law and popular or local law is probably typical of most large political entities with intensive social differentiation. To some extent this colonial legal situation obtains in most

¹⁵"The use of the courts for settlement of local disputes seems in most villages almost a minor use of the courts. In Senapur, courts were and are used as an arena in the competition for social status, political and economic dominance in the village. Cases are brought to harass one's opponents, as a punishment, as a form of land speculation and profit making, to satisfy insulted pride and to maintain local political dominance over one's followers. The litigants do not expect a settlement which will end the dispute to eventuate from recourse to the State Courts" (Cohn, 1965, 105).

¹⁶The colonial legal situation then stands midway between those systems where official law is reflective of, and well integrated with, popular law because it has been precipitated out of that law (or because it has completely absorbed and digested local law); and those where it is reflective of a well integrated with folkways because no remote official law has ever differentiated itself institutionally from folk or popular law.

modern societies (Priestly, 1962, 196-97; Dewey, 1946, 116-117; Maine, 1895, 59-60). But it is present with special force in the so-called new states. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the poorer parts of the earth were the scene of a reception of foreign law unprecedented in scope (even by the reception of Roman law in medieval Europe). In India, the incorporation of large blocs of common law and civil law in the nineteenth century was followed by the reception of new constitutional models in the twentieth century and by a post-Independence wave of reform and rationalization. This process of borrowing, consolidating and modernizing national legal systems seems to involve certain common trends: application of laws over wider spatial, ethnic and class areas; replacement of personal by territorial law; the breakdown of corporate responsibility and the growth of individual rights; increasing generality and abstraction; greater specialization and professionalism, secularization, bureaucratization and replacement of moral intuition by technical expertise. In almost all of the newer countries, the legal system is comprised of these modern elements in uneven mixtures with traditional ones and the discrepancy between the different components of the legal system is strongly felt. This multi-layered legal situation involves common processes of the displacement of local by official law and seems to be accompanied by common discomforts (Smith, 1927, 35-6).

Failure of Revivalism

A certain irreversibility in this process of forming a modern legal system, even where it is based upon foreign sources (at least as long as a unified political power retains control of the law), seems indicated by other instances of the reception of complex law based upon foreign sources, as in the reception of Roman law in Western Europe or the massive borrowing of civil law in nineteenth-century Japan. This irreversibility is confirmed by the very limited success of revivalist movements. Attempts to purify and reconstruct Irish law (Moran, 1960, 31-35, esp. 33; Takayanagi, 1963, 31) fared no better than present attempts in Pakistan (Maududi, 1960, esp. Part I; Coulson, 1963) and Israel (Kahana, 1960; H. Cohn, 1958; Yadin, 1962) which have so far not succeeded in bringing about any fundamental changes in their respective legal systems. In Ireland, Israel and Pakistan, there is, if anything, more common law in the broad sense, i.e., law of the modern type, than before independence. In India, where the proponents of indigenous law are less attached to *dharmaśāstra* than nostalgic for the "simplicity" of local-customary law—and where they tend to be persons who find detailed consideration

of the law uncongenial—any change in this direction is even more unlikely.¹⁷

One may compare the fate of British law with that of the English language as a medium of public business and civil life. In general, colonial languages appear to recede from their former preeminence, while the tide of law continues to advance. Strangely, the law seems more separable from its origin, relatively easy to borrow and hard to discard. Bryce found in the spread of Roman and British law “a remarkable instance of the tendency of strong types to supplant and extinguish weak types in the domain of social development” (Bryce, 1901, 122). But what made British law a “strong type” was not the superiority of the norms it embodied or the elegance with which the system was elaborated. It should be noted that, unlike the civil law which spread widely by voluntary adoption, common law spread only by settlement or political dominion.

“. . . the spirit of English law which settled down on our legislative centres [in India] was that of a period when the law itself was the most technical, the least systematic and the least founded on general, equitable and coherent principles, that the world has ever seen” (Baden-Powell, 1886, 372).

The “strength” of British law lay in its techniques for the relentless replacement of local law by official law, techniques by which it accomplished its own imposition half inadvertently. And this imposition seems to be enduring in a way that language is not. An official language does not become a household language; each generation must recapitulate the painful process of estrangement. The official language does not necessarily gain at the expense of the household languages; on the contrary, we find in India an enrichment and development of indigenous languages during British rule. However, official law of the modern type does not promote the enrichment and development of indigenous legal systems: it tolerates no rivals; it dissolves away that which cannot be transformed into modern law and absorbs the remainder; it creates a numerous class of professionals who form the connecting links of the nation-state and a vast array of vested rights and defined expectations which disincline those holding them to support or even conceive drastic changes.

¹⁷It should be recalled that the similar distaste for the law of former colonial rulers found in the early history of the United States is not to be observed in more recent American evaluations of our common law heritage. As India feels safely distant from her colonial past, a similar embrace of her legal heritage is at least a possibility.

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The Political Modernization of an Indian Feudal Order; An Analysis of Rajput Adaptation in Rajasthan

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In the effort to understand the nature of modernization in new nations, considerable stress has been laid on the discontinuities which separate and distinguish traditional from modern societies. Much has been learned from the determined effort to identify what is modern and what is traditional and to examine processes of political modernization in such terms. Yet a price has been paid for the theoretical and empirical knowledge gained in this way; the homogeneity of particular traditional societies has been exaggerated; models of traditional society have been made overly simple or spuriously closed; and the role of social, cultural and political continuities in the process of modernization have been undervalued.¹

Traditional complex societies, particularly those with a civilizational dimension such as India's, are strongly differentiated. Synchronically and diachronically, they contain a broad range of norms, cultural orientations, character types and structural forms and linkages. Within this range there are some features that may "belong" more with a model of modern than a model

¹For an extended discussion of these points see our *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India* (1967).

of traditional society. Depending upon time and circumstances, certain norms, cultural orientations, character types and structures arranged in particular configurations have been dominant. It is the persistent domination of particular characteristics and capabilities that makes it possible to speak as though particular complex societies are homogeneous and integrated and to classify them as traditional (or modern).

What is dominant does not, however, exhaust the meaning and potentialities of complex societies. Because they are not in fact homogeneous or fully integrated, latent, deviant and minority norms, structures and social characters may fit better the characteristics and capabilities associated with a model of society different from the one in which they in fact function. More important, the causes of imperfect integration can, given certain alterations in the political environment, provide the sources and the means for social change and political modernization.

Social and Political Change in Rajasthan

The radical change in Rajasthan's political environment brought about by the shift from British paramountcy over its princely states to their integration in an independent and democratic India dramatically altered the terms in which political power was generated, distributed, legitimized and utilized.² Because the traditional order was neither static nor homogeneous, elements of it were permeable by changed circumstances and opportunities and ready to respond to them. It is to this dimension of social and political change that the analysis which follows is addressed.

Rajasthan was not ready for political modernization and democratic rule in terms of objective conditions frequently associated with their realization. Yet with some alteration in historical circumstances, latent, deviant and minority alternatives within its traditional society provided the sources and means for the establishment of new identities, structures and norms capable of fostering and sustaining a modern democratic polity. Because norms and cultural orientations were not homogeneous or monolithic, because socialization was varied and imperfect and because the distribution of power, status and resources was incompletely legitimized and integrated, non-compliance and conflict at a critical historical moment became the sources of change. Change

²The shift from princely to democratic rule will be the subject of our forthcoming book, *From Princes to Politicians in Rajasthan: The Political in Social Change*, forthcoming.

in the short run was incremental but over the decade examined here its cumulative effect was fundamental.

The Rajput Caste

The Rajput caste had dominated the social and political systems of the princely states that were joined together to form the state of Rajasthan soon after Indian Independence in 1947. Princes and the feudal³ nobility had been predominantly members of this caste. The cultural norms and political traditions of the *Kshatriya* (warrior-ruler) caste of Hindu civilization socialized Rajputs within a distinct social character and political culture. In 1948 and 1949, princely rule was replaced by republican and democratic, and, in 1951, the first wave of land reform deprived the nobility of their formal political authority and substantially reduced their economic power.

These events placed severe stress on the internal structure of the Rajput order. They also raised the question whether and how the Rajput ethic, which had set the ideal standard for conduct and helped define Rajput identity, could serve Rajputs under conditions of competitive democratic politics. Status and economic differences within the order, which had been recessive in the old society and polity, assumed new meanings and functions. Rajputs divided on the question of whether they should repair to the ethic or to a more practical norm of conduct, two alternatives which historically had provided competing standards for action. It is these strains that shaped the processes of change and defined Rajput political modernization.

The First General Election

The first great test of Rajput adaptability came with the general election of 1952. In it, the feudal opposition to the Congress party very nearly succeeded in winning enough seats to form a government. Having narrowly failed, the Rajputs were severely tested in the course of the negotiations with the newly formed Congress government over the terms of the land reform that had

³The proposition that Rajput institutions were feudal was defended by their most conspicuous English chronicler, Colonel James Tod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan, or the Central and Western States of India*. The book was originally published between 1829 and 1832. Our references are to the 1950 reprint by Routledge and Kegan Paul, two volumes in one. The view has been challenged by William Crooke in the introduction to his edition of Tod's work; published in three volumes at London in 1920; by Alfred Lyall (1881, 213); by Daniel Thorner (1956).

Our view is developed in *From Princes to Politicians*, ch. I. Basically, clan and feudal structures, roles and relationships existed simultaneously, more often than not complementing rather than conflicting with each other.

already been enacted. Because land was (and still is) Rajasthan's single most important economic resource, these negotiations vitally affected not only the Rajputs' economic well-being but also their political and social status. The outcome of the negotiations on the terms under which *Jagirdari* (feudal land holding) was to be abolished touched the core of Rajput identity and interest. The analysis which follows examines the Rajputs' response to this second great test of their adaptability to new circumstances and the effect it had on their ideological and structural differentiation and modernization.

The Rajput Ethic

The dominant ethic of the Rajput warrior-ruler caste and class stressed feudal honor and valor without regard to consequences. Heroism was valued over prudence, action over thought. Intellect and calculations of utility and advantage were disparaged. Although the significance of this code of ideal conduct has been exaggerated by Rajput control of "historical" writing by court chroniclers, bards and genealogists (Qanungo, 1960, ch. 6) and by its romanticization in Colonel James Tod's *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, after one hundred thirty five years still the single most important work on Rajput history, Rajput historiography itself shaped consciousness and helped sustain the rhetorical dominance of the Rajput ethic.

The princely states of Rajputana remained bastions of Hindu and *Kshatriya* political power and religious and cultural independence during the centuries in which *Kshatriyas* throughout the rest of northern India were invaded and subjected by the powerful alien cultures of Islam and Britain. The result was that although the Rajput ethic and *Kshatriya* caste culture existed across northern India, in Rajasthan their expression remained more central to Rajput identity, more elegant, more literary than it did among those who had lost much of their economic means, social standing and public authority. Rajputs in Rajasthan more than Rajputs elsewhere were reared to cherish the virtues of valor and honor of a warrior ruler aristocracy and to disdain political, economic and intellectual skills. To live otherwise, to engage, for example, in the mundane pursuits of government, commerce or agriculture was thought degrading. To cultivate the intellect would weaken the spirit. "The Rajput disdains the plow", was the common observation of the ethnographers. "A Rajput who reads will never ride a horse", says a proverb. Rajput caste culture, like that of other castes, was so resolutely transmitted that both English and Indian observers in an era that did not

distinguish cultural and biological traits mistook Rajput martial virtues for a biological inheritance.

Valor Without Regard to Consequences

Valor without regard to consequences was the keynote of traditional ideals. As an ethical norm, it was untinged by considerations of utility. Rajputs lost crucial battles against the Moghuls because they valued personal bravura over shrewd generalship (Sharma, 1962, 25 and 93). The favored tales even today are not stories of great military victories, but of disasters, and Udaipur, which frequently sacrificed its nobility and prosperity to the chivalric ideal, is still greatly admired even in sober history. Colonel Tod's account of the third sack of Chittor, a magnificent, three mile long hill top fortress, is redolent with romantic nostalgia:

When Saloombra fell at the gate of the sun, the command devolved on the Putta of Kailwa. He was only 16; his father had fallen in the last shock, and his mother had survived but to rear this the sole heir of the house. Like the spartan mother of old, she commanded him to put on the saffron robe, and to die for Cheetore, but surpassing the Grecian dame, she illustrated her precept by example; and lest any soft "compunctionous visiting" for one dearer than herself might dim the lustre of Kailwa, she armed the young bride with a lance, with her descended the rock, and the defenders of Cheetore saw her fall, fighting by the side of her Amazonian mother . . . the fatal *johur* [self-immolation of the women in the fire] was commanded, while 8000 Rajputs ate the last *berra* [aromatic pan-leaf] together, and put on their saffron robes; the gates were thrown open, the work of destruction commenced, and few survived to "stain the yellow mantle" by inglorious surrender. All the heads of clan, both home and foreign, fell, and 1700 of the immediate kin of the prince sealed their duty to the country with their lives . . . Nine queens, five princesses, their daughters, with two infant sons, and the families of all the chieftains not at their estates, perished in the flames or in the assault on this ever memorable day. . . . (Tod, 1950, Vol. 1, 261).⁴

The ethical and sentimental appeal of these exploits lies in their utter hopelessness, their tragic ending. Without death, a hero's commitment to valor rather than victory, honor rather than utility, would not be clear.

Chivalric romanticism and an ethic of absolute ends was not hospitable to statesmanship at home or abroad. Jaipur, which produced a series of maharajas capable of worldly success in war, politics and administration and a few apt in science and literature, stands low in the esteem of the bards (except for those in Jaipur)

⁴The romanticization of the Chittor battles is challenged by M. M. Gauri-shankar Ojha (1927-1941, Vol. II, 495-6) and Qanungo (1960).

while Udaipur, which lay wasted and depopulated as a result of its maharanas' unwillingness to accommodate themselves to the realities of Moghul power, constitutes the ideal (Sharma, 1962, 106).

Colonel Tod, the British political agent to the western Rajput states, lived at Udaipur where he began to write his celebrated history of Rajasthan. He identified himself with the Udaipur statement of the Rajput ethic. His sympathetic treatment of it not only fortified its hold on Rajput consciousness but also brought its message to a receptive public in India and Britain. For Indians who suffered from the subjection and loss of self esteem which they associated with Moghul and British imperialism, the glories of Rajput history provided a statement of Indian independence and courage. For Britons who rejected the selfishness and destruction of community which early industrialism bred, Tod offered a vision of a class of men willing to pursue their duty regardless of the effects on their personal fortunes. This was the age of Carlyle, Scott and Ruskin, an age in which some were willing to romanticize the feudal past in their effort to mount a meaningful alternative to the on-rush of industrial society.

Tod's preference for feudal romance over utility and success is best expressed in his differential treatment of Jaipur and Udaipur. He refers again and again to the Jaipur house as the *Jutah durbar*, the lying court. Its great princes such as the Mirza Raja and Sawai Man Singh, who in their time made great contributions on the all-India stage, receive scant credit from his hand. Of Sawai Jai Singh he wrote:

His reputation as a soldier would never have handed down his name with honor to posterity; on the contrary, his courage had none of the fire which is requisite to make a Rajput hero; though his talents for civil government and court intrigue, in which he was the Machiavelli of his day, were at that period far more notable auxiliaries (Tod, 1950, Vol. II, 288).

Tod, sharing in the feudal romanticism of his day, reflected the chivalric norms which dominated Rajput consciousness.

The glories of Chittor, the romanticization of the battle of Haldighat (Sharma, 1962, 93) and admiration for the long and imprudent resistance of Udaipur to Moghul power may not survive a revisionist history less concerned with valor than with the human and economic costs of its pursuit. But the hold of the Udaipur statement of the Rajput ethic on Rajput consciousness and ideals persisted through the British era. Rana Pratap, because of his defense of the homeland against an "alien" power, became a cultural hero not only for Rajputs but also for the incipient Indian nation. The fact that the Udaipur Rana was

the first among the major Rajput princes to accede to the Indian union soon after independence strongly influenced the others to follow suit; when he did not stand out against integration it made it more difficult for the others not to do so since his house symbolized Rajput resistance and independence.

The Practical Norm of Conduct

There is, however, a second theme, most closely associated with Jaipur but also important for Jodhpur, that runs through Rajput history. It is a practical norm of conduct that ignores or circumvents the Rajput ethic in order to achieve results and be creative, to succeed in the domains of war, statesmanship and commerce and to innovate in those of science and art. This practical norm of conduct is associated with those princes who became more powerful in history than celebrated in ballads; who calculated political and economic advantages in their time and expanded their states. Between the battle of Khanua in 1527 and Udaipur's reluctant agreement in 1615 to pay homage at the Moghul court, that state declined in wealth, power and influence while Jaipur and Jodhpur prospered and expanded (Sarkar, 1964, Vol. I, 145). Udaipur pursued an isolationist policy even after the treaty of 1615, her princes and princesses remaining at home while those of her two powerful neighbors led Moghul armies abroad to Gujarat, central India and the Deccan and became the mothers of Moghul emperors. Jaipur and Jodhpur responding to new political opportunities and cultural influences deviated from the Rajput ethic in order to strengthen their dynastic interest. By cooperating with the Moghul power in war and civil administration and mixing their blood with that of an "alien" people and religion, they established a powerful alternative to the Rajput ethic.

Deviations from Rajput cultural norms and failures to comply with them have been evident over the centuries among ordinary men as well as among statesmen. Rajput social character has been far from homogeneous. The homogeneity and severity of neither socialization nor circumstance were sufficient to produce full compliance or uniform character. Under the pressure of adverse economic circumstances the *bhumias* of Udaipur took to the plow and married girls from other or lower castes (Tod, Vol. I, 36). A recent anthropological study found that half the Rajputs of an Udaipur village personally cultivated the soil and there is no reason to think that this is a recent innovation (Chauhan, 1967). Some Rajputs, attracted by the Jain message of harmlessness, abandoned the Rajput warrior ideal by converting

to that faith.⁵ Other Rajputs took to the life of the mind. Responding to the stimulation of Moghul culture and science, they ignored the dangers which the Rajput ethic held out to those who engaged in thought. Sawai Man Singh's interest in and contributions to mathematics and astronomy, Savant Singh Kishengarh's poetry and patronage of painting⁶ and the strong interest in history of other rajas (Tod, Vol. I, 515-16, 562) make clear that Rajput behaviour encompassed more than fierce and unthinking courage.

The Rajput ethic then constituted an ideal not often or fully realized in historical and behavioral terms. It established a standard by which Rajputs judged themselves and others and legitimized their dominance. Paralleling it were deviant forms of behavior and practical norms of conduct. The society produced social characters capable of achievements outside the realms of military valor and chivalric honor. Both the dominant ethic and the latent, minority or deviant alternatives were available to the Rajput caste community and feudal order if and when it was confronted with new forces and challenges.

Structural Integration Through Clan and Feudal Relationships

The structural integration of the Rajput caste as a community and an order within particular princely states was achieved primarily through clan and feudal relationships. Among the states common ritual rank, social status, caste culture, economic interest and political functions produced a high level of common consciousness and social and cultural coherence but only infrequent, limited and erratic political cooperation.

Most states were dominated by one clan, in Jaipur the Kachwahas, in Jodhpur the Rathors, in Udaipur the Sesodias. The clan chief ruled as a maharaja. His closest kinsmen, descended like himself from the lineage which originally had established dominance in the area, usually held the largest and most productive estates on military tenures which required them to supply horse and foot to the maharaja in time of war. Larger nobles

⁵K. R. Qanungo (1960, 53-55) summarizes Ojha's findings in *Rajputane-ka-Itihas*. The family of Singhy Dayaldas, an Udaipur Jain, descended from the Deora sept of Sirohi Chauhans; Seth Jorwar mal Bapna descended from Parihar Rajputs. One must entertain the possibilities that Ojha was taken in by synthetic genealogies provided by merchants who wished for a more "distinguished" i.e. Rajput descent, but this seems unlikely since some conversions—that of Agarchand in Akbar's time, for example—were recent.

⁶Savant Singh of Kishengarh (born 1699) wrote poetry under the *nom-de-plume* Nagari Das, and provided the climate in which the Kishengarh School of Painting flourished. Eric Dickinson and Karl Khandalwala (1959).

often supported kinsmen either from their own revenues or by granting them revenue rights from lands under their charge. Succession to feudal estates was regulated through the *nazarana* ceremony in which the maharaja recognized an heir's right to inherit upon his taking an oath of loyalty and offering tribute. At the same time, it was recognized, more by the noblemen than by the maharaja, that because it was the lineage, not merely the direct ancestors of the maharaja, who had conquered the state, those descended from it had independent claims to power and status. Differences on this point often reenforced those arising from disputes between the *durbar* court and its feudal nobility concerning the payment of tribute and the range and scope of administrative and judicial jurisdiction to create perennial sources of strain and conflict.

Integration and Cleavage among Rajputs

The Rajput states were more often than not in conflict with each other; dynastic interests and ambitions spurred their political and military rivalry. Yet the elements of cohesion embedded in Rajput social arrangements and cultural norms provided a countervailing force. Clan ties sometimes crossed state boundaries. Lineage secession had led to Rathor rule in Bikaner and Kishengarh as well as in Jodhpur and to Sesodia rule in Banswara and Dungarpur as well as in Udaipur. And clan differences united Rajputs as well as divided them; their rules of exogamy required them to seek brides from clans other than their own. The result was to foster marriages across state boundaries and, in consequence to build important inter-clan and inter-state links of an affective, interest and even political kind by uniting families, property and dynastic interests. Thus while Rajputs were divided from each other by clan and political structures and, within states, by differences over tribute and authority and the differential distribution of status and income, they were integrated as a community by ritual rank, caste culture and blood and as an order by common political functions, economic interests and social status.

Differences in Wealth, Power and Status

Within the Rajput order of particular states marked differences of wealth, power and status existed among the various ranks of the nobility and within the family associated with particular *jagirs*. *Jagirs* varied in extent from large areas approximating those of minor states—encompassing as many as two hundred villages and capable of supporting their own *durbars* and fielding battalions—to small farms on which the Rajput head of the house-

hold tilled the land. One account describes a considerable range even within one village. The small *thikana* (*jagir*) of Ranawatoni-Sadri supported seventeen family members from its control of 606 bighas of village land. One hundred five other Rajputs in the same village were of the same lineage but separated from the branch that controlled the *thikana*; they controlled only 591 bighas of village land. At 1.6 bighas per capita the holdings of the small Rajputs did not differ markedly from those of other villagers whose holdings came to 1.1 per capita (Chauhan, 1967, 150-51).

Similar variations are suggested by several larger territorial units. In the Panchpana Singhana area of former Jaipur state the breakdown of primogeniture in most Rajput families led to a situation in which seventeen estates covered seventy-six per cent of the *jagir* land (*Report of the Rajasthan—Madhya Bharat Jagir Enquiry Committee*, 1950, 21), while 541 estates held only twenty-four per cent. In former Jodhpur state one-fifth of the *jagir* lands were held on *bhomuchar* tenure; in these again the absence of primogeniture had created conditions in which Rajput economic circumstances closely resembled those of propertied peasants (Sudhalkar, 1944, 46-47). Finally, a recent sample survey of 216 ex-*jagirdars* shows that in 1953-54, just before *jagirdari* abolition, fifty per cent of *jagirdars* held eight per cent of the land controlled by the sample population while ten per cent of the ex-*jagirdars* held thirty-three per cent of the land (D. Singh, 1964, 319). Within a *thikana* too wide discrepancies existed among family members. "In an estate of sixty to eighty thousand rupees of annual rent", Tod wrote, "the second brother might have a village of three to five thousand of rent. . . . Juniors shared in proportion . . ." (Tod, 1950, Vol. I, 140).

The objective economic and status differences that existed within the Rajput community and order in particular states were accommodated, legitimized and integrated by clan, lineage and feudal relations. Common lineage lent an aura of peership. "The poorest raja of his day", Tod observes, "retains all the pride of his ancestry, often his sole inheritance . . . in these aristocratic ideas he is supported by his reception among his superiors and the respect paid to him by his inferiors" (Tod, 1950, Vol. I, 115). Adoption upon failure to produce an heir was another practical and symbolic source for the feeling of equality among Rajputs. The late and the present maharajas of Jaipur, for example, were adopted from the minor estate of Isarda.⁷ The latter's good fortune was described by the Jaipur Album for 1935:

⁷On his deathbed, Maharaja Ram Singh nominated as his successor to the throne Qayam Singh, the brother of the Thakur of Isarda. This was in 1880. Qayam Singh, who as maharaja was styled Maharaja Sawai Madho Singh,

The element of romance which is so characteristic a feature of the history of the Rajputs was fully present in the adoption of our ruler who was utterly unconscious of the great and marvelous change which providence had brought about in his fortunes (K. Jain and J. Jain, 1935, Chapter II, 2).

Loyalty, Subordination and Submission

Oaths of loyalty were sworn at the time of a new lord and chief's installation by those who were at once feudal subordinates and inferior kinsmen. Such oaths were due not only to the maharaja, who was also chief of the clan dominating a particular state, but also to *jagirdars* (feudal lords) who stood at the head of the lineages in possession of particular *jagirs*. "I am your child, my head and sword are yours, my service is at your command" (Tod, 1950, Vol. I, 139). Feudal and clan loyalty was praised in bardic tales and literature which extolled the virtues of *dharma*, duty to one's chief and lord.

Rajput manners, ceremony and psychology expressed the importance of subordination and submission. The remarks of a superior during polite conversation were and are responded to by the expression *Hukum*, meaning "I obey your order". An inferior coming into the presence of a superior, for example a *Thakur* coming into the presence of his maharaja, was expected to touch his feet. Among Rajputs in contemporary Rajasthan such manners can still be observed although the superior will ordinarily catch the inferior under the arms on the way down a gracious gesture often having affectionate overtones. Expressions of submission often went beyond ceremony and manner by reaching a deeper psychological level which valued and welcomed them.¹

Superiors and inferiors were bound by ties of mutual obligation. At the succession of a new maharaja, *Jagirdars* offered tribute and pledged to provide horse and foot soldiers. The maharaja confirmed them in their estates and took their counsel in affairs of state. Major nobles might provide their kinsmen ("Romance of the Sub-Vassals of Deogarh against their Chief, Rawat Gokul Das", Document submitted to Tod while he was agent at

having no son, adopted on March 20, 1921, as his heir and successor. Kanwar Mornmukt Singh, the younger son of the Thakur of Iarda, Sawai Madho Singh died in September, 1922. The confirmation of this adoption was delayed as a result of the challenge made to it by the Thakur of Jholar whose lineage had a more direct claim to the Jaipur throne. Eventually Lord Reading, the Viceroy, decided in favor of Iarda (K. A. Jain and J. Jain, 1935, Chapter I 26, 7, Chapter II, 1-4).

¹In 1956, we frequently encountered deeply felt and sometimes poetic defenses of the pleasures of submission.

Udaipur (Vol. I, 1960, 160) daily rations or a portion of grain at harvest time or lend them funds on an interest free basis (Chauhan, 1967, 73, 177). Heads of lineages in command of feudal estates were expected to have an elder's care for subordinate kinsmen. These in turn often took employment under the *thikana*, providing the administrative and police staffs for the superior government of the villages (Chauhan, 1967, 233; *Report on the Administration of Mewar, 1915-1916*, 114).

Relations among superiors and inferiors within the Rajput order and community were marked by stability and legitimacy. Objective economic and status differences were accompanied by a generalized sense of peership among caste members and, during the later period of British paramountcy particularly, by recognition of mutual obligations. What was common to the order and community had a greater hold on ideas and behavior than did the conflicting interests which arose from objective differentials in power, wealth, status and talent. Yet stable inferior superior relationships may harbor tensions beneath the surface of manners and ceremony. Inferior kin or younger sons may resent their subordination to a powerful lineage chief and feudal master. Morris Carstairs' psychological analysis of the relations within the ruling family of an Udaipur village brings some of these latent tensions to light.

The elder brother seemed to be impelled to keep on asserting his superiority, as if only the repeated display of his brother's subservience could keep in check his anxiety on this score. This process was nowhere more conspicuous than in the palace of Deoli. The rao Sahib constantly ordered his younger brother about, overruled his wishes, and emphasized his subordinate position (Carstairs, 1957, 114).

History too records ample demonstrations of the friction and conflict which could characterize the relations between Rajput superiors and inferiors. Rajput history is replete with the record of battles within families over succession and inheritance and between maharajas and major noblemen over the terms of their relationship and even over the *gaddi* itself. In more recent times such tensions as existed were of a more petty nature. Their resolution took the form of younger brothers or frustrated lesser kinsmen taking service at a distant court or, even more recently, by joining military service or taking up higher studies (Chauhan, 1967, 235-8).

These points of tension suggest that while objective economic and status differences among Rajputs were legitimized and integrated, altered historical circumstances could mobilize latent sentiments and interests arising out of implicit differences in rank, resources and power and that such differences, once mani-

fest, could give a conflictual turn to the internal structure of the Rajput order and caste community.

The "Republican" Revolution

Between 1947 and 1949, India witnessed the most rapid and peaceful "republican" revolution of modern history. In less than two years the five hundred odd princes and chiefs who ruled a quarter of India's people and two-fifths of her territory surrendered their political powers. The result was a revolution by diplomacy (Menon, 1956). In Rajasthan twenty-two princely states were merged to form a state in the Indian union. Its government was put in the hands of a "popular" ministry appointed in effect by the union States Ministry under Sardar Patel and more responsible to him than to the Rajasthan Pradesh Congress Committee, which also came into being at this time. With the princes disposed of, the first and most pressing concern of the new government was the *jagirdars*. They controlled approximately fifty percent of the productive land of the new state.⁹ Not only was the Congress government under an ideological commitment to place control of the land in the hands of those who cultivated it; it also faced a rival source of political power and leadership in the *jagirdars*, a feudal class in command not only of the incomes of their estates but also of the considerable staffs through which they administered revenue, police and judicial functions.

The Congress Party Versus the Jagirdars

Jagirs in origin were grants of land revenue.¹⁰ They were given by maharajas for services to them. Usually the services were military but some *jagirs* were granted as a form of religious patronage or for other forms of service.¹¹ The most important social and political functions of *jagirs* were to enable princes to pay for their armies and to maintain their kinsmen in dignity. *Jagirs* were not grants of land ownership. A small proportion of a *jagirdar's* land, his personal farm, might be cultivated by him

⁹ Sixty-six per cent of Rajasthan land was *jagir* and thirty-four per cent *Khalsa* or crown lands. Forty-eight per cent of the villages lay in *Khalsa* and fifty-two per cent in *Jagir* (D. Singh, 1964, 44).

¹⁰ Here and below we refer to *jagirdar* incomes as "revenue" rather than rent, for the latter carries a strong implication of ownership and in doing so tends to obscure the nature of rights in the land which *jagirdars* held, namely, rights to the share due government. The fact that *jagirdari* abolition involved the "resumption" of revenue rights by the state strengthens the case for this usage.

¹¹ The *jagir* system was used by the Moghuls to compensate and maintain chiefs of imperial levies. It is likely that the use of the word in Rajasthan derives from the influence of Moghul administration.

through managers and with the labor of personal dependents or, latterly, share-croppers and wage workers. Small *jagirdars* might cultivate the land themselves. Most of the production of *jagir* land, however, was organized and controlled by peasants who paid land revenue to the *jagirdar*. Peasants usually enjoyed customary if not legal security of tenure. *Jagir* lands provided only a small income to the maharaja.¹² His main source of income from the land was the revenue from the *khalsa* (crown land).

The Congress party attacked *jagirdari* on the grounds that *jagirdars* were a parasitic class whose possession of estates had long since ceased to serve the purpose for which they had been granted, i.e., military service; that the concentration of economic power which *jagirdars* represented, controlling as they did approximately fifty per cent of the land, the state's most important productive resource, was socially and politically undesirable; that their revenue income deprived the state of an important source of financial support; that the system was the cause or the occasion for injustice and exploitation. In 1950-51, the Congress government of Rajasthan, like Congress governments in the rest of the Indian states, prepared legislation designed to eliminate the intermediaries between the tiller of the soil and his government. In Rajasthan this meant legislation which would "resume" *jagir* lands leaving *jagirdars* with *khudkasht* (home farm) only. Together with the end of princely rule, *jagirdari* resumption would complete the dismantling of the political and economic institutions of monarchy and feudalism. These events destabilized internal relationships among Rajputs by lending a new and vital significance to economic, status and power differences. As the caste community's solidarity and the order's structural integration weakened, previously latent class differences became capable of engendering conflict.

The Marginality of Small Jagirdars

When the princes and great noblemen began to dismiss their military, police and administrative retinues, the "small" Rajputs or *bhumias*¹³ who had staffed them flooded the countryside seeking

¹² Jodhpur state after the turn of the 20th century collected Rs. 700,000 from the *khalsa*, Rs. 350,000 from the *jagirdars*, even though the *jagirdar* lands produced three times as much revenue as *khalsa*. (*A Brief Account of the Jodhpur State*, 15.)

¹³ Obviously the distinction between small and large Rajputs is not a clear one, but it was generally understood in Rajasthan. The small Rajputs were referred to as *bhumias*, but the use of the word *bhumia* in this general social sense should not be confused with its technical meaning referring to the holders of *bhom*, a special kind of inalienable tenure. Many *bhumias* were holders of *bhom* in the technical sense, but not all.

economic security with honor. They were the masters of small holdings whose uneconomic size had encouraged them to find service under a maharaja or nobleman. To these holdings they now returned. Fearing that land reform would deprive them of land let out to tenants, they began to eject tenants and merge tenant's lands with whatever *khudkasht* (home farm) they might possess. It seems likely, although there is no systematic and comprehensive evidence on this point, that *bhumias* ejected tenants in proportionately greater numbers than did big *jagirdars*.

The Congress government, shocked to find that the first fruit of land reform was wholesale ejection, enacted the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance (No. IX of 1949). It provided for the reinstatement of tenants who held land prior to April, 1948, and guaranteed them against ejection. Where administrative capabilities existed, and they were not, in these early days, widespread or well-developed, the ordinance prevented *bhumias* who had rented out all their lands and had kept no home farm from acquiring one. At the same time that *bhumias* were losing out to tenants in the control of the land they began to lose out to them in the distribution of the income from the land. Revised or new revenue settlements which shifted payment from kind to cash and legally fixed the amount of cash payment transferred the benefit of the price rise that characterized these years from the *bhumias* to the tenants.

These developments were felt much more intensely by the *bhumias* than the territorial magnates, whose resources, social eminence and influence often helped them to adapt more readily and with less trauma to the new circumstances. For *bhumias*, independence, the integration of the princely states, the end of princely rule and land reform threatened to destroy the foundations not only of their economic security but also the bases of their self and social esteem. By devaluing Rajput status, these events made overt their marginal and dependent economic and social position, reducing them in principle from the superiority and dominance of *kshatriyas* to the equality of *kisans* (peasant cultivators).

The Caste Association

To cope with the immediate prospect of land reform, the Rajputs new modelled their caste association, the Kshatriya Mahasabha, founded in 1888 to institute social reforms within the community. During the five years prior to independence in 1947, when responsible and even popular government seemed imminent, Rajput *sabhas* in the various princely states had learned

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to articulate Rajput interest in a more organized and systematic manner¹⁴ than was the case earlier when great noblemen acted alone or in concert as need or occasion demanded. In response to the creation in 1949 of the Venkatachar Committee, whose object it was to consider the pattern of land reform in Rajasthan and neighbouring Madhya Bharat (now part of Madhya Pradesh), Rajasthan *jagirdars* united in a Rajput association in order to join with the *jagirdars* of Madhya Bharat in a Special Organization (*Memorandum*. . . ., 1949). The actual tasks of representation and negotiation at this stage, as in the future, were carried on, however, by the Kshatriya Mahasabha.

The Leaders—The Major Jagirdars

The new modelled Kshatriya Mahasabha, at least formally, represented an important transformation in the structure and norms of the Rajput community and order. It had the formal characteristics of an interest group, a modern voluntary association catering to the needs of an identifiable economic group. Its offices were filled via established procedures by the members. Members in turn became such as a result of choice, not birth in a particular caste, lineage or princely state. Programs and policies like the appointment of office bearers, were in principle decided upon according to established procedures in which members' views were the ultimate validation. In practice, however, the Kshatriya Mahasabha remained the bailiwick of the great *jagirdars*. Decisions in fact were taken *in camera* by the ten to twenty major noblemen who recognized each other as class as well as caste equals.¹⁵ The membership was infrequently consulted and then too in a ceremonial rather than efficient manner. In this effort to provide the Rajput community and order with the form and capabilities of an interest group there were deep contradictions which future events were to expose and activate.

The Kshatriya Mahasabha defined its mission as the defense of Rajput interests. It did so by representing *jagirdars* before the Venkatachar Committee, by organizing and coordinating Rajput

¹⁴For example the Rajput *sabha* which represented *jagir* interests in Jodhpur before Justice Sudhalkar (*Report*, 1944, 12). The progenitor of this association, known as the Walterkrit Rajputra Kitkarni Sabha, was organized by Colonel C. K. M. Walter, Agent to the Governor General. See his speech of February 9, 1889 in *List of Documents* (pertaining to the Thikana of Chomu). Allahabad, no publisher, no date. Probable date of printing is 1889. The *List of Documents* was privately printed by the Chomu Thikana. The also Charles H. Heimsath. *Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964. For the activities of the Sabha see pages 281 and 287.

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participation in the first general election in 1952, by coordinating Rajput legislative activities in the legislature (there was considerable overlap between the Kshatriya Mahasabha and the Samyukta Dal, organized by opposition MLAs after the election) and by providing the teams to negotiate with government from 1953 onward to work out the final terms of land reform legislation. *Jagirdari* was abolished by ordinance just after the general election but before the newly returned legislature could meet. The results of that election, a one seat majority for Congress, left the government with an extraordinarily precarious hold on power; in the second session, the opposition Samyukta Dal, consisting mainly (eighty-four per cent) of Rajputs (Rudolph and Rudolph, forthcoming, Part IV), very nearly carried a no confidence motion. The fate of the land reform bill was subject not only to the constraints of the party position in the legislature but also to the judgments of the courts before which Rajasthan *jagirdars* had a variety of cases pending following court decisions striking down as unconstitutional land reform acts passed by other states.

The Congress government hoped to strengthen its legislative majority by inducing some *jagirdars* to cross the aisle and to free itself from immediate legal embarrassment by persuading those who had filed court cases to withdraw them. To further these ends it agreed to reopen the question of the terms of land reform, settled by the ordinance, and enter into negotiations with the Kshatriya Mahasabha concerning the final form which land reform legislation was to take.

Negotiations Between Congress Government and Kshatriya Mahasabha

The negotiations between the Congress government and the Kshatriya Mahasabha, like the dismissal of Rajputs from service under the princes and *jagirdars*, began to make more apparent the economic interests and class differences which divided Rajputs from each other. The Venkatachar Committee and the Home Ministry had taken the view that were substantial economic and social differences in the circumstances of the large and small Rajputs and that legislation ought to recognize them. As a result they had recommended, and the 1952 ordinance provided, that *jagirs* whose incomes fell below Rs. 5000 per year should not be abolished. This exemption gave small *jagirdars* a different interest in the regulations than the large ones had. For the small *jagirdars* the critical issue was whether the new bill, like the 1952 ordinance, would permit them to acquire home farms by ejecting tenants and if so how large a farm it could be. For them, a clause permitting the acquisition of *khudkasht* was vital. For the big

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jagirdars, whose estates would be resumed and who either had or could fairly easily acquire *khudkasht*, the critical issues were the amount of compensation they would receive and the conditions under which it would be paid.

Negotiations between the government of Rajasthan and the Kshatriya Mahasabha began in February, 1953. Negotiating on behalf of government were ministers, civil servants and extra parliamentary representatives of the Congress party. Those appointed to negotiate by the Kshatriya Mahasabha were major figures in the old order: the Thakur of Pokran, Jodhpur's ranking nobleman; Maharaj Himmat Singh, a brother of the late maharaja of Jodhpur; the Raja of Khetri, *Jagirdar* of the second largest estate in Jaipur; the Rawal of Nawalgarh, Vice President of the Kshatriya Mahasabha a large *jagirdar* in his own right and the senior member of a lineage which controlled several major estates in northern Jaipur; and Jaswant Singh, leader of the Sanyukta Dal in the Rajasthan legislature and a former *dewan* (prime minister) of Bikaner. Jaswant Singh and the Thakur of Serriari, a Jodhpur lawyer and General Secretary of the Kshatriya Mahasabha (*Times of India*, February 26, 1953; interviews with all of these men, Fall, 1956), supplied the more strictly professional talent on the *jagirdar*'s side. Negotiations were carried on between February and May, sometimes at Jaipur with the government of Rajasthan, sometimes when talks became stalled, outside of Rajasthan with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru or Home Minister G. B. Pant (*Times of India*, June 14, 22, and July 2, 1953; *Hindusthan Times*, June 29, 1953; *Hindusthan Standard*, June 29 and July 3, 1953).

The Small Jagirdars' Concern

The composition of the Kshatriya Mahasabha negotiation party gravely concerned the small *jagirdars* who felt themselves insufficiently and ineffectively represented. This feeling was greatly exacerbated when, shortly after the negotiations opened, the Congress party in Rajasthan declared itself in favour of the resumption of all *jagirs* regardless of size and urged the Congress government to drop its plan not to resume those with incomes below Rs. 5000 per year. The party argued that all intermediaries should be eliminated; only those who themselves cultivated the land should be in legal possession of it. At the same time, the government became aware that the *jagir* resumption act might fail in the courts on the ground that it was unjustifiably discriminatory in its treatment of one type of landed estate.

Small Rajputs began to fear that their interests would suffer rather than benefit from representation by the Kshatriya Maha-

sabha. Their concern was given expression at this time by several members of the Ram Rajya Parishad (God's Rule Party), one of the principle components of the Sanyukta Dal legislature party, when they protested the large *jagirdars'* monopoly position on the Kshatriya Mahasabha's negotiating committee (*Hindusthan Times*, February 27, 1953; *Hindusthan Standard*, February 28, 1953; *Hindusthan Times*, February 28, 1953). In March and April small Rajputs began to gather in Jaipur to publicize their special problems, distinguishing them from those of the large *jagirdars*. Some carried red flags. In Utipurwati, a troubled area of Jaipur state where small Rajputs were concentrated, attempts were made to obstruct the settlement work which determines land rights. Sixty-four persons were arrested. The demonstration embarrassed the Kshatriya Mahasabha negotiators by challenging their credibility and undermining their authority. Vijay Singh of Serriari, the Mahasabha's General Secretary, damned the unrest at Jaipur and suggested that it must be communist inspired (*Times of India*, March 11, April 13, 1953; *Hindusthan Times*, April 23, 24, May 15, 1953). Rajput integration was cracking as the small *jagirdars*, no longer in direct relations with particular feudal masters and lineage chiefs nor dependent on them, found that the defense of their interest and self-respect required separate political mobilization, organization, agitation and negotiation.

The Land Reform Bill

These trends were accelerated and deepened in May, 1953, when rumors spread, in anticipation of the impending announcement of the terms of the land reform bill, that the interests of the small *jagirdars* would be fundamentally compromised. Seizing the initiative, they called a meeting of the Kshatriya Mahasabha without consulting its officers. Convened in Jaipur where increasing numbers of them had gathered, the small Rajputs in effect seized the organization from below, converting it into a vehicle to express their opinions and interests. The meeting resolved that unless the terms of the bill had the unanimous consent of the entire *sabha* they would not be acceptable (*Hindusthan Standard*, July 7, 1953; *Hindusthan Times*, July 10, 1953). Relations within the Rajput community and order had entered a new phase. Consent, legitimization by deliberation and numbers rather than by birth and status, were being converted from formal to operative norms in the Rajputs' principal representative structure.

Split Between Small and Large Jagirdars

When the terms of the agreement were announced, it became evident that if the worst fears of the small Rajputs were not real-

ized their interests had in fact been compromised, while those of the large *jagirdars* had, if anything, been enhanced (Pant, 1953). The provision in the 1952 ordinance which enabled *jagirdars* without *khudkasht* to acquire some by ejecting tenants was dropped. "It is not", said Home Minister G. B. Pant, "a clean slate that we have to write upon. . . . The cultivators are naturally looking forward to further improvement in their condition. If on the contrary they are now faced with ejection, it will clearly be a retrograde step diametrically opposed to the spirit of land reforms" (Pant, 1953, 22). Still, there was some cause for satisfaction; *jagirs* whose income was Rs. 5000 and below were not to be resumed. The large *jagirdars* could take considerable satisfaction from the terms under which compensation was to be calculated; they had been revised in ways which would enhance the amount to be paid. If the restriction of *khudkasht* reflected the Congress party's ideological commitments it was not so clear that the enhancement of compensation did so. Both decisions were also related to calculations of political advantage. To increase the quantum of compensation might increase the gross indebtedness of the state government but the political effects were long term and unspecific. In the meantime the larger *jagirdars* were mollified, and no one in the short run was adversely affected. To have yielded on *khudkasht*, however, would have had very direct political consequences by damaging immediately the interests of those who were or who might be Congress supporters.

Between July, when the decision of Home Minister Pant became known, and November, when Prime Minister Nehru endorsed his decision, the Kshatriya Mahasabha, at the suggestion of its executive committee, made several attempts to win additional concessions (*Hindusthan Times*, July 11, 13, October 22, 1953; *Statesman*, July 12, 1953). Having failed to do so (*Hindusthan Standard*, October 31, 1953), the executive committee unanimously accepted the Nehru-Pant Award, as it was popularly known, and placed it before the general council in November, 1953, where it was unanimously approved by the fifty or sixty large *jagirdars* who were the mainstay of the official Kshatriya Mahasabha (*Hindusthan Standard*, November 28, 1953). Within a few months of their having done so, however, government re-opened the land reform issue in a most fundamental way by announcing that it planned to resume all *jagirs*. This decision to do away with *jagirdari* altogether enormously expanded the scope of the bill. The 1952 ordinance, which had exempted *jagirs* whose income fell below Rs. 5000 per year, affected no more than fifty per cent of *jagir* lands. The political effect of the decision was even more

sweeping, raising the proportion of Rajput landlords involved from ten to one hundred per cent.¹⁶

The Kshatriya Mahasabha responded by re-opening negotiations. A new team of negotiators including small Rajputs and the Mahasabha's general secretary began talks in May, 1954 (*Times of India*, May 26, 1954, and *Hindusthan Times*, May 26, 1954). The second Pant Award and the subsequent amendment of the Rajasthan Land Reform and Abolition of Jagir Act of 1954 in which it was incorporated conceded additional rehabilitation grants graduated according to the size of the *jagir* involved with the smallest entitled to the highest ratios.¹⁷

The New Association of the Small Jagirdars

The small Rajputs believed they had been betrayed not only by the Congress governments in Delhi and Jaipur but also by their fellow Rajputs. Despite the concessions won by the Kshatriya Mahasabha in the last round of negotiations, land reform as enacted not only blocked them from acquiring home farms but also deprived them of the income and dignity associated with their ancient standing as lords of the soil. Their response was to create a new political association, the Bhuswami Sangh. The Sangh was organized by a twenty-one member committee under the presidency of Thakur Madan Singh of Danta (*Hindusthan Standard*, July 13, 1954), a substantial but antiestablishment Jaipur *jagirdar* who had, as president of the Ram Rajya Parishad during the 1952 election campaign, attempted, with only marginal success, to mobilize Rajputs and other twice born castes behind that party's ideological appeal to Hindu fundamentalism. The leadership of the Bhuswami Sangh was drawn primarily from professional and middle class members of the Rajput community who lacked the income and status which large estates could bestow. Vice President Ayuwan Singh edited a local newspaper

¹⁶Singh, 1964. Table 15.5, on page 319, provides the basis for an estimate of approximate percentages of landholders of various size holdings. Statistics on the income of holdings are hard to come by but if we assume a high rate of assessment (Rs. 25-60 per bigha; *Settlement Report of Samod Thikana*, 4, year not given) an individual would have to hold from 80 to 200 acres of land to make an income of Rs. 5000, and even more if the assessment were lower. Yet not more than a little above 10% held more than 80 acres.

¹⁷Pant, 1954; *Rajasthan Land Reforms and Abolition of Jagir (Amendment) Act, 1954*, Second and Third Schedules. The act provided rehabilitation grants of between five and eleven times net income for *jagirdars* with gross income of Rs. 5000 and below; *jagirdars* with higher gross income received grants twice to four times net (D. Singh, 1964, 42).

in Jodhpur. Educated at Jodhpur college, he gained political experience as His Highness Jodhpur's publicity secretary in that prince's highly successful campaign effort during the 1952 general election. Raghbir Singh of Jaoli, president of the Rajasthan Ram Rajya Parishad and a leading figure in the Sangh, had been home minister in Alwar state during the trying partition period when that state witnessed bloody persecution of its substantial Muslim population. Educated at Allahabad University, one of the premier educational institutions of British India, he was trained as a collector in the Punjab but had spent most of his service career in the princely states. Pandit Rahunath Sahay, the general secretary, was an advocate. So too was Tan Singh, another leading figure. Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, who later became the dominant figure in Rajasthan's Jan Sangh party but who began his political career with the Bhuswami Sangh, had been a police inspector in Jaipur state. (Interviews with all of these men.)

The Bhuswami Sangh

The name of the association, Bhuswami Sangh, symbolized the social and religious revivalism of its ideological orientation. *Bhumia* referred in a general way to those attached to the soil but it also had a more specific reference to the *bhom*-holding, a feudal tenure whose leading characteristic was its inalienability. Granted for service to the state, *bhom* tenures did not ordinarily carry the obligation to provide future service which most other feudal tenures required. Swamis are men with a religious vocation and a religious mission. Madan Singh of Danta, the Bhuswami Sangh president, was an admirer and follower of Swami Karpatri, national president of the Hindu orthodox Ram Rajya Parishad and a leading advocate of Hindu revivalism.¹⁸ Danta's para-religious formulation of the movement's ideology and program, like his earlier efforts as Ram Rajya Parishad president in the 1952 general election, were guided by the swami's religious and

¹⁸The Ram Rajya Parishad showed its greatest strength in Rajasthan during the 1952 general elections when it captured 24 members in the state legislative assembly and 12.3 per cent of the popular vote. It continued, until the 1967 general election, when it captured no seats in Rajasthan and two in Madhya Pradesh to be a minor party in those states, where small Rajputs and some large ones apparently provided its electoral means of support. Karpatriji is particularly opposed to such reformist practices as admitting untouchables into Hindu temples and engaged in a prolonged fast to prevent them from doing so in certain Banares temples. It was as a leading advocate of cow protection that Karpatriji in late 1966 and early 1967 emerged from quiet oblivion. Cow "protection" had figured as one of the leading planks of the R.R.P. in 1952. Prior to the 1967 election he and his colleagues in the Goraksha Samiti managed to raise it to a national issue, gaining all-India and world wide notoriety in the process.

political ideas. This time his ideological efforts were more successful. To call for religious dedication in the defense of ancient rights to the soil and to do so in the name of the *kshatriya*'s religiously sanctioned claim to power and status in state and society fit the economic interests of the small *jagirdars* much better than did the call for Ram Rajya (God's rule) in the general election.

Mobilization and Demands . . .

The *bhuswami* Sangh mobilized and agitated throughout the spring and summer of 1954, holding meetings at the district and *tehsil* level at which the requirements of small Rajputs were forcefully stated and the treachery of the large Rajputs condemned. One meeting resolved to "expell" from the Kshatriya Mahasabha all *jagirdars* who, upon the completion of negotiations over land reform, joined the Congress party. Another disavowed the negotiations (*Hindusthan Times*, June 19, 1954). The agitation culminated in a massive *satyagraha* (non-violent resistance campaign) staged in Jaipur in June, 1955.

The *bhuswamis* came with high hopes. From all over the state mustachioed men in saffron or crimson turbans, their *lathis* (quarter staffs) slung over their shoulders, converged on the capital. Calling upon the chief minister to "roll up his bedding", they warned him that he had but three days to quit office.¹⁹ As merchants in Manak Chowk, the pink city's central bazaar, closed their shops and government waited with a certain nervousness, they squatted in the streets, blocking all traffic and passively resisting efforts to clear the area. In scenes recalling nationalist days under Gandhi's leadership in British India, hundreds took the place of those the police carried off to jail, hundreds went on hunger strikes while held there and other hundreds began sympathetic demonstrations in the district headquarters of outlying areas. The agitation continued steadily despite arrests until, one month after it began, 1500 had been imprisoned, 700 in Jaipur alone. Speakers demanded that government make it possible for *bhuswamis* to acquire *khudkasht*, that it pay lump sums in connection with rehabilitation grants and that small *jagirdars* be compensated for wells, small forts, and other major permanent structures. At the same time that these concrete economic demands were being advanced, speakers reminded the demonstrators that their ancestors had fought bravely and well in defense

¹⁹The following events are reconstructed from both newspaper sources and interviews. The sources include *Times of India*, June 6, 25, July 5, 1955, *The Statesman*, June 15, 1955; *Hindusthan Times*, June 15, 18, 22, 1955; *Hindusthan Standard*, June 17, 20, 25, 30, 1955, *Indian Express*, June 21, 1955.

of *dharma* (Hindu law and virtue) and that their wives had committed *johar* (self-immolation) rather than be taken by the enemy.

Government weathered the storm. Agitation continued. A scheduled conference of senior administrative officers could not be held in the early spring of 1956 for fear of leaving the districts unattended (*Hindusthan Standard*, March 8, 1956). In April another massive *satyagraha* was held in Jaipur city (*Times of India*, April 7, 1956; *Hindusthan Standard*, April 8-11, 1956). This was the last of the great mass agitations although the *bhuswamis* remained active until 1958 when yet another award by Prime Minister Nehru increasing levels of compensation²⁰ brought to a close the agitational period of *bhuswami* political activity.

The Breakdown of the Feudal Order

The recognition of class cleavage among Rajputs was accompanied by a sense that small *jagirdars* had been abandoned by their feudal and lineage superiors within the caste community. By this abandonment the superiors forfeited their right to deference and obedience. The suppressed resentments, anger at injustices done and hurts of inferiority remained latent prior to radical changes in the political environment. Now they burst into prominence. Coming into dynamic conjunction with the objective differences within the community, they provided the legitimization for conflict.

"We small Rajputs [in Jaipur] are of the family of Jaipur", one of them argued. "I separated from Amber [the maharajas former capital] fifteen generations ago, and His Highness' son is separating only in this generation, but he ought to respect me as much as his son, or his uncle, or his brother. But it is not so. The small Rajput, he feels so small in front of a big *thakur*, and the big *thakur*, he feels so small before the maharaja. So that thing has crept in. The small Rajput, he just feels like dirt, he feels so small, he has no self-confidence. The small Rajputs used to think that Nawalgarh Rawalsahib [leader of the large *jagirdars* in the Kshatriya Mahasabha] he is my father and my mother. Who am I to disagree with him? He has made these negotiations and I must accept whatever it is he says. But we have changed all that. It has encouraged the small Rajput . . . now he knows his strength and he says, 'My God, who does Nawalgarh think he is. It is my property, and he has no right to negotiate for me'". (Interview with a "small" Rajput, functionary of a minor maharaja.)

When the negotiations began the small Rajputs believed that the gains of each would be the gains of all. Whatever differences

²⁰This grant provided additional compensation of from two to four times net income (D. Singh, 1964, 43).

existed between great and small had been buried in the context of mutual obligation and mutual dependence that united Rajputs as a primary group and a feudal order. In the practical world of interest and power, small Rajputs served on the staffs and in the services of princes and great *jagirdars* or received some benefits from their hand as immediate kinsmen. They had derived status, protection and security from their place in the Rajput order and community. With the advent of radical political change, Rajput relations had been individualized and privatized and the practical links through which their interests had been united were broken and juxtaposed. Thakur Prem Chand Verma, Secretary of the All-India Kshatriya Mahasabha, captured an important dimension of this new relationship when he argued that "petty Bhoo-swamis should be paid the compensation which is being given to the big *jagirdars*". Compensation of large landowners should be postponed "as the amount which will be given to one big *jagirdar* will be sufficient to pay compensation to hundreds of petty Bhoo-swamis" (*Hindusthan Standard*, July 13, 1955).

Family Unity . . .

Family unity among older and younger brother also broke asunder in the face of economic differences unmediated by mutual obligation. Bhairon Singh Shekawat, the *bhumia* and Jan Sangh leader, offered an amendment on the floor of the assembly to abolish primogeniture, the critical factor in producing disparities in wealth and status within Rajput families. "The interest of sons other than the oldest must be properly protected", he argued. "*Jagirdars* themselves should be ashamed of giving bad treatment to younger brothers. *Jagir* does not belong to one son only" (*Proceedings of the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly*, V, No. 38, 3083). The proposal was immediately supported by H. K. Vyas, the only Communist member of the assembly, and by a series of Congress spokesmen but failed when the Chief Minister declined to support it (*Proceedings*, No. 38).

The Ideological Orientation of Large and Small Rajputs

The ideological orientations of the Kshatriya Mahasabha and the Bhuswami Sangh drew on different aspects of the Rajput normative inheritance, the large *jagirdars* generally following the practical norm of conduct represented by the historical legacy of Jaipur and Jodhpur, the small *jagirdars* the ethic bequeathed by Udaipur. In exchange for a relatively generous settlement for their resumed *jagirs* and the possibility of retaining much of their local influence and a few of their privileges a substantial section of the major noblemen agreed to lend their support to the

shaky Congress government. The lesser *jagirdars* embraced a contemporary version of valor without regard to consequences, reveling in the excitement of struggle but neglecting to seize its fruits for want of calculation and prudence. Rajasthan's territorial magnates generated and used the capabilities which an establishment can command by drawing on their own knowledge and experience of administration and finance or utilizing professionals to act in an expert capacity for them. The small Rajputs neglected negotiation and bargaining for political agitation, substituting their illusions for a concrete, practical assessment of their circumstances and possibilities and preferring the reckless style of the mounted warrior to whom a charge is more meaningful than its success. In their hands the Rajput ethic changed its nature, being transformed from the ideal of a warrior ruler class into the ideology of a movement.

The Large Jagirdars Join Congress . . .

In January, 1954, soon after the conclusion of negotiations over land reform, eighteen large *jagirdars* crossed the aisle to join the Congress legislature party, thereby immensely strengthening the Congress government (*Times of India*, January 30, 1954). The Kshatriya Mahasabha's Vice-President, the Rawal of Nawalgarh, expressed the sentiments of the Rajput establishment when he said:

In the present circumstances the most sensible course open before the landholders . . . was to strengthen the hands of the Nehru government by actively supporting Congress, which was the only political organization capable of ensuring unity and solidarity of the nation . . . the representatives of the landholders who met recently at Jaipur felt equally concerned over the new situation arising in the country as a result of Pakistan's reported armed (sic) deal with the United States of America and they were convinced that sectarian and communal considerations should be eschewed (Paraphrase in *Hindusthan Times*, February 4, 1954).

By March twenty-five MLA, one MP and "hundreds" of rank and file Rajputs had joined Congress. The chief minister expressed the view that he might reshuffle his cabinet thereby holding out the possibility of Rajput representation in it (*Indian Express*, Mar 3, 1954; *Times of India*, March 4, 1954). When forty-three leading *jagirdars* announced their decision to join Congress, they appealed to others to do the same by arguing that Congress' victories in the ten by-election held since the general election in 1952 proved that its popularity was now firmly established among the people of Rajasthan. *Jagirdar* compensation, they added, depended upon the preservation of the *status quo* and it could be best maintained by Congress. Finally, Congress had

made important concessions to the *jagirdars* and they deserved recognition (*Times of India*, March 4, 1954).

The Small Jagirdar Choose Struggle

The Bhuswami Sangh took a radically different position by identifying itself in the manner of Rana Pratap as the guarantor of Hindu religion and culture and the dignity of Rajput status:

"The aim of the present agitation", its representatives told government, "is mainly to protect our thousands of years old cultural traditions and ideals of which the social structure of Rajputs forms a main component part. We do not think it proper to end these traditions in the garb of certain reformative laws. . . . Land is our hereditary and traditional property whose protection meant the protection of Nation and Religion. It is therefore the firm belief of the Bhooswamis and Sangh that the principle of the protection of private ownership of property of the nation would be in the latter's interest. The present agitation of the Sangh is aimed at protecting the private property, the land . . . the *jagirdars* have acquired their *jagirs* not in the form of alms or dowries but by shedding their own blood and it is the result of their sacrifices that Religion and Culture are today existing here. Those who can not protect their land and have, out of pressure, accepted the principle of abolition of *jagirdari* system, may, forced by circumstances, hand over the nation also to the foes. . . . (Memo by the Bhooswami Sangh, 1956).

Speeches at the mass meetings and *satyagrahas* in Jaipur were heavily laced with references to Rajput heroism and calls for struggle unto death. Struggle itself was solace to the small Rajputs:

Those were great days. The agitation gave our people a sense of purpose. The British policy has made the Rajputs weak. This peace has made them soft. . . . Look at England and Germany, they are strong. The war. It is a trial to the small Rajputs, it challenges them and makes them strong. I have been telling the leaders, we ought to have one agitation every year. . . . We ought to follow Jinnah's policy, and have agitation every year. (Interview with a "small" Rajput.)

Small Rajputs gloried in struggle but it seemed to be an end in itself. They were no further along in the summer of 1956 in gaining any of their objectives than they were when their political agitations began. As negotiators they were unable to capitalize on any advantages they might have gained as agitators. Many of their demands were concrete and reasonable; for example that a *jagirdar* should be compensated for any wells or houses located on lands that passed out of his control. But Bhuswami Sangh negotiators had little sense for the realities of the political situation and what they might reasonably expect the Congress government to yield. When negotiations became particularly difficult, they resorted to romantic statements about the past or improbable threats. At one such juncture, for example, the Thakur of Danta

told the press that "If our demands are not met, the Rajputs may have to leave Rajasthan to become wandering gypsies" (*Hindusthan Standard*, April 25, 1956). Once when Sangh negotiators arrived at the secretariat at eleven o'clock, believing that to be the hour set for a meeting, and found no representatives of government there they stormed out, furious, without waiting to find out that government believed the meeting to be scheduled for twelve o'clock. (Interview, Lieutenant General Thakur Nathu Singh of Gumanpura, a mediator in 1957 between the Sangh and the Kshatriya Mahasabha.) A retired general of the army, Lt. General Thakur Nathu Singh of Gumanpura, a small Rajput himself, agreed to help the Bhuswami Sangh negotiate with government but soon lost patience with their squabbling and inattention to detail. The *bhuswamis'* appreciation for facts was weak; throughout the negotiations they referred to the thirty-five lakhs (3,500,000) small Rajputs who would suffer from abolition of *jagirdari*, a figure bearing little relation to the approximately 1,000,000 Rajputs living in Rajasthan at the time.

Nor was the Bhuswami Sangh interested in or capable of helping small *jagirdars* take advantage of the provisions of legislation already on the books. In April, 1956, some 5,000 *jagirs* had been resumed but compensation had been paid to only 1100 to 1300. When *bhuswami* representatives in the assembly picked up this figure to criticize government, Chief Minister Sukhadia explained that of the 5500 "notified" *jagirdars*, only 1900 had submitted the claim form they were required to file in order to receive compensation.

"The whole trouble arises", he admonished them, "because the concessions given under the act are not fully availed of. So many people do not know what to do and where to apply for compensation. The proper thing will be to explain things to these persons. To illustrate, the period for putting in applications for compensation has expired. Even after that, the government has written to individual *jagirdars* to apply so that their application may be considered" (*Proceedings*. . . ., April 10, 1956).

Some leaders of the sangh subsequently became skilled politicians, but at that time action for its own sake with little regard for its fruits, lack of craftsmanship in negotiations, and a desire to be heroic and to experience the apocalypses, were the attitudinal and behavioral expressions of the *bhuswamis'* ideological orientation.

The Two Leaders . . .

Nawalgarth

The outlook and character of the two men who led the Kshatriya Mahasabha and the Bhuswami Sangh, the Rawal of Nawal-

garh and the Thakur of Danta, illustrate how the dominant and deviant themes of the Rajput ethic helped shape the ideological orientation and personal style of each structure. The *thikana* of Nawalgarh lies in Shekhawati, an arid land lying in the northern half of former Jaipur State. The family of the Rawal belongs to the Panchpana Sardars, Jaipur noblemen who disputed over the centuries the claims of the maharaja to fealty, service and obedience and even today take a certain pride in their independence. The Panchpana Sardars did not observe primogeniture. As a result, their lands in Jhunjhunu and Jaipur districts were fragmented and their scions swelled the ranks of the Bhuswami Sangh. Shrewdness and good luck have spared the Nawalgarh house from the disastrous results of subdivision.

When the present Rawal looks from the top of his white-washed palace towards the city of Nawalgarh he can see meadows filled with grazing herds of bloodstock sheep and an expanse of fertile acres kept productive by careful use of fertilizers, modern farm machinery and an abundant supply of water pumped up from deep wells by his own locally generated electricity. His wealth, family connections, reputation for probity and knowledge of the world of finance and administration enabled him to command the respect of his fellow *jagirdars*. From his post as Vice-President of the Kshatriya Mahasabha he became the most important spokesman for the interests of the large *jagirdars*.

Ascetism . . .

Rajputs like *kshatriyas* generally do not practice the ascetic virtues so highly valued by the other two twice born *varna*, the brahmans and vaisyas, today's *banias*. Drinking, meat eating, blood sports and warfare are very much part of the Rajput heritage and shape their contemporary character. Yet the ascetic and non-violent tradition of the other two *varna* is sufficiently strong in Rajasthan that it stands in constant tension with Rajput norms and behavior. The reputed conversions of Rajputs in the sixteenth century to Jainism, a religion which stresses, even more than Brahmanism, self-control and non-violence, suggests that this tension is of long standing. The effect of Hindu reform and purification movements in the present century, particularly the Arya Samaj whose leader Dayanand spent a great deal of time in Rajasthan and died there, has been to strengthen the appeal of ascetism, often in the form of puritanism, and to denigrate or render suspect the more expressive behaviour characteristic of Rajputs. The fact that the Rawal of Nawalgarh decided to avoid some aspects of Rajput behaviour at the instance of a saintly reformer is not ideo-syncretic but part of a broader historical and

cultural pattern. Some Rajputs have responded to Hindu reform movements or chosen conversion to ascetic religions because they found that they were temperamentally unsuited to at least some Rajput norms and behavior.

The compulsions of temperament were often subtly blended with the needs and opportunities of the times. Ascetism and the calculation and prudence that usually accompany it among members of the non-marital twice born castes are more suitable for the successful practice of statesmanship and business than is the expressive and unreflective behaviour usually associated with Rajputs. The Rawal of Nawalgarh rarely affirmed the Rajput past, as did so many of his peers, through nostalgic renditions by bards or raconteurs of tales of their ancient glory and blind heroism. A quiet even reticent man, he prefers to listen more than to talk. The walls of his country palace lack the shields and weapons that make many Rajput houses minor armories. He prefers chess to hunting and is apt to nurse a lemonade and a vegetable platter at a carousing, meat-eating Rajput party. Though tall and robust in appearance, he has a delicate constitution.

Nawalgarh

The town of Nawalgarh is a hometown of Marwaris, India's most powerful business community, one of many such towns scattered throughout Shekhawati. Marwari business activities are spread all over India. In Calcutta and Bombay Marwaris control a substantial portion of the commercial and industrial firms concentrated there. The Rawal of Nawalgarh, like some others among the Panchpana Sardars of Shekhawati who live among the Marwaris, shares their capacity for business affairs and management. His prudence and judgment are valued by the boards of directors on which he sits and his extensive farm is a well managed business even while he assumes the part of the gentleman farmer. The Rawal understood before it became apparent to a good many other *jagirdars* that those whose wealth was tied up in land would have to invest some of it elsewhere if they were to survive in a modernizing economy. Punctual and orderly to a fault, his household is managed with Germanic-like punctiliousness by retainers trained to the Rawal's exacting standards. His sons have been educated in ways that enable them to prosper in a post-feudal world, one as an engineer (he can and does repair the electrical and mechanical machinery on the Rawal's home farm), the other as an art historian (he is the curator of the Palace Museum, Jaipur and a leading dealer in Rajput miniature paintings).

Many of the Rawal of Nawalgarh's fellow Rajputs were at once uneasy and awed by his interests and capacities. "Those

big Sardars in Shekhawati have lived too long with the Banias [Marwaris and other merchant castes]" a proud but penniless Udaipur Rajput observed in explaining to himself their un-Rajput behaviour. Yet he and many others believed that the future probably lay with Nawalgarh and those, like the maharaja of Jaipur, willing and able to adapt to the changing times. The accommodating and prudential behaviour of the maharaja of Jaipur expressed the practical norm of conduct associated with his house's name; he accepted the Congress government's offer to become the first *rajpramukh* (head of state) of the newly formed state of Rajasthan and had taken care to invest much of his considerable wealth in economic activities other than land. If Udaipur *jagirdars* believed that "nothing better can be expected" of a descendant of Sawai Jai Singh, the maharaja too served as a model for those who by character, interest and political outlook were willing to take statesmanship and business seriously. The Rawal of Nawalgarh's key role in the Kshatriya Mahasabha's negotiations with government over the terms of land reform helped to insure that the Jaipur rather than the Udaipur legacy guided the spirit with which they were conducted. Unlike many of his colleagues and peers, the Rawal did not join the Congress at the conclusion of negotiations. He chose instead to remain outside the partisan fray even while maintaining good relations with Congress leaders in Rajasthan and Delhi.

Danta . . .

The contrast which Thakur Madan Singh of Danta offers to the Rawal of Nawalgarh not only symbolizes the difference between the Bhuswami Sangh and Kshatriya Mahasabha but also the ways in which the Udaipur legacy found expression in the first, the Jaipur legacy in the second. At the time that Danta emerged as a leader of the *bhumias*, he was in his mid-thirties, tall and handsome, with a classically carved profile. His disconcerting greyish-brown eyes implied that he felt much that he could not express. Danta resided in a Jaipur town house whose compound suggested former splendors. His estate too had fallen on evil times. Certainly the prudence, order and punctiliousness of the Nawalgarh establishment was absent from his domestic arrangements. If Danta found inspiration and guidance in the glory and heroism of Rajput resistance to Moghul domination, his connection with Swami Karpatri brought him into contact with the militant, Hindu revivalist strain of Indian nationalism whose greatest hour came in the early twentieth century activities of Bengali terrorist organizations. Its literary roots were to be found in Bankim Chandra Chatterji's late nineteenth century novel, *Anandamath*. There dedicated disciplined nationalists living

in a forest *ashram* (religious retreat) found the courage in the face of desperate odds to fight the forces of alien domination. Prior to the 1952 election Danta responded to Karpatri's newly formed Ram Rajya Parishad's appeal to establish again a society and state based on Hindu religious doctrines, becoming its first president in Rajasthan.

"Some thought", he said "the Congress program would destroy the old Aryan culture. When they saw the princes and *sadhus* [holy men] were gone, they asked, who would take care of this great culture? Who would guide the people? With this object we formed a new party. Politics should be subordinated to religion. Without religion, anyone could participate, even communists. Any religion, not just Hindu religion. Religion would serve as the limiting factor" (Interview).

Danta was not always a political man. He had been one of the fashionable young noblemen who joined the British Indian army at the time of the second world war. Pictures show him in uniform, dashing, moustachioed, trim. He moved with assurance among the sophisticated set that surrounded the polo playing, club going maharaja of Jaipur. Politicized by his attraction to Swami Karpatri and leadership of the R.R.P. in the 1952 election, he was yet more deeply engaged by the *bhumia* agitation.

His style and appearance changed. Sprouting a formidable black beard and moustache of the kind common among *bhumias*, he vowed not to shave them until the *bhumia* cause triumphed. He abandoned his well tailored trousers for *dhoti* (cloth tied as an ankle length nether garment). Over it he donned a long khaki shirt and over the shirt a maroon sleeveless sweater beneath which his shiertails flapped freely. This apparel, variations of which were common among his followers, was topped by a maroon turban tied rope like, in the manner of the village Rajput. Strapped to his side was an immense well used sword sheathed in a worn leather scabbard. The *complet* had a wildly romantic, military yet egalitarian effect.

Danta's outlook and style were the product of mystical obscurantism and a romantic heart.

"What can we do", he asked. "Why should we be reasonable if they will not listen to us? They hate the Rajputs, they want to reduce us to nothing, to dirt; India has forgotten our defense of *dharma*! . . . Our motto: He who opposes us, We will crush to dust. . . .

You must be extreme, you never really experience anything until you have gone to the extreme, to the very end . . . I have studied these things . . . It is when you go to the very end that you really do something. . . .

I like little children, for their thinking is pure, unclouded, they know, they understand . . . There is a woman, she lives in a cave; whenever I am in doubt, I consult her . . . Even about the atomic bomb she knows . . . and she advises me" (Interview).

Danta's self-conception as a leader in the ascetic, religiously dedicated style of conservative Hinduism and militant nationalism was strengthened when Swami Karpatri declared him a Raj-Rishi, an epithet applied to saintly rulers in the epic tradition. Poor *bhumias* intent on holding on to their meager patrimony and precarious self-respect responded when Danta translated the charisma of mythical heroes into the qualities of some one like themselves, and the Rajput ethic into their political ideology. Danta's leadership and ideology by speaking to their needs and sentiments, helped politicize and mobilize the *bhumias*, turning them for a time into a powerful political movement.

In Conclusion . . .

The Bhuswami Sangh broke with the Kshatriya Mahasabha not only over questions of policy and interest but also over principles of organization, leadership and legitimization and the desirability and effectiveness of particular political strategies and methods. Despite its formal characteristics which were those of a modern voluntary association, the Kshatriya Mahasabha continued to be led and dominated by men of hereditary status and considerable wealth while the Bhuswami Sangh was led by men more socially representative of the caste as a whole. The authority of *bhuswami* leaders was based on their capacity to articulate and represent the interests of Sangh members, on their personal popularity and on the resonance of their ideological appeals, through which they were able to create and sustain a movement among Rajputs. "The greatest good of the greatest number", observed Thakur Prem Chand, "is a sacred principle of democracy, and it should be applied in this case too" (*Hindusthan Standard*, July 13, 1955). Closed meetings of the few and decisions taken there were explicitly denounced. So too were the political strategy and methods involved in the representation of caste interests through prudent negotiation with government. The Bhuswami Sangh instead pursued a strategy of maximum pressure on government through methods of political agitation and direct action such as demonstrations and *satyagrahas*. The effect of these differences on the Rajput community and order was to replace caste solidarity and normative and structural integration with conflict, class and organizational segmentation and ideological differentiation.

The disintegration and segmentation of the Rajput order and community resulted from the catalytic effects of new circumstances in the political environment. They made manifest latent differences among Rajputs with respect to economic interests, social status and ideological orientations. The formation of the

Bhuswami Sangh and its rivalry with the Kshatriya Mahasabha gave dynamic structural and normative expression to class cleavages. The social differentiations on which these classes were based was old; consciousness of them as a source of cleavage and conflict was new. These classes did not arise from the introduction of new factors of production or other long-term secular changes in the nature of the economy. The occasion for their formation within the former ruling caste was the consequence of a series of political decisions altering the distribution of existing resources.

The integration of the princely states by a republican and democratic government deprived the princes of their formal public authority and much of their control of existing resources, and land reform legislation deprived the Rajput feudal order of its public authority and control of the economy's leading resource, land. These changes broke the bonds which linked *jagirdars* generally to their princes and chiefs and undermined the economic, status and political bases of community, clan and feudal solidarity and mutual dependence. With these bonds broken, patrons and dependents began to act separately, treating each other antagonistically. Confrontation with other classes—peasants and middle classes organized in the Congress party—sharpened conflict as it became clear that the immediate nature of the threats to each section of the former Rajput feudal order differed. In falling asunder under the impact of radical changes in the political environment, a feudal order developed, from the potentialities of its own social, characterological and ideological resources, many of the characteristics and capabilities which modern political classes require to perform effectively in the context of democratic representation and political competition.

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The Flexibility of Traditional Culture*

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Conventional wisdom analyzes the great cultural ferment in Africa and Asia in terms of a stark confrontation between "traditional" and "Western" patterns. This commonplace model has been employed by generations of students of the institutions of "nonWestern" countries. The currency and tenacity of the model bespeak its utility. It has helped us cope with the diversity of world cultures, substituting an image of commonality for one of bewildering variety, and prodding us to ask again and yet again in what ways the modern Western world is different from all other worlds. But the model's utility is not boundless. As understanding of nonWestern societies has deepened and ideas have refined, the ideal type of polarity between traditionality and Westernism has degenerated into a stereotype, and social scientists have rightly been roused to battle against it.

I see three main lines of argument in this battle. One rejects use of "Westernization" as a generic term to denote the large scale cultural transformations engulfing the nonWestern world. It is rejected not only on grounds that modern institutions are being developed in many places through imitation of nonWestern models like Japan and Turkey, but also—and more important theoretically—because developments associated with modernization came about in nonWestern countries through internal secular

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changes for the most part and not primarily through a direct transfer of culture patterns. In many instances indigenous needs and cultural resources have demonstrably produced such phenomena as business mentalities, specialized occupational roles, centralized nation-states with standing armies, and rationalized culture. (Identifying "Modernization" with "Westernization" is objectionable for at least two additional reasons. It leads one to assume the age-old technical superiority of Western civilization, an assumption belied by the fact that as recently as the late 16th century the economy, political organization, science and technology of China and Islamdom were just as highly developed as those of Western Europe. And it associates technical updating with the diffusion of such Western inventions as two-piece suits, Bartok quartets, and cigarettes—traits which make no demonstrably greater contribution to efficiency and rational adaptation than do Chinese vases, Persian poetry, or saki.¹)

Replacing "Western" by "modern" in the formula, so goes the second line of argument, still leaves intact the questionable notion that traditional and modern patterns are inherently in conflict. Studies of India (Singer, 1960), Indonesia (Geertz, 1962), Japan (Scalapino, 1965), and Ethiopia (Levine, 1965) have revealed numerous cases and ways in which cultural traditions, rather than posing recalcitrant obstacles to modernity, have directly promoted various forms of modernization. The combined effect of these two arguments is to indicate that a model of modernization in terms of conflict between traditional and Western patterns represents but one possibility out of four: modernization may be endogenous as well as exogenous, and congruent with tradition as well as discontinuous.

To grasp those processes of modernization which are continuous or endogenous, moreover, we must come to terms with a third line of argument, namely, that which challenges the adequacy of the conventional conception of traditional culture itself. This strand of revisionism I take up in the present paper, in the context of a critical review of some of my own earlier assumptions about Ethiopian culture.

¹The complex "fact" referred to in the first of these points has been abundantly documented in the work of Marshall Hodgson. Hodgson stresses the second point as well and goes on to refine this terminology more radically, distinguishing use of the term traditional in its more literal sense as meaning customary from other, inconsiderate uses of the term to mean *custom-bound* (akin to Mannheim's "traditionalistic"), *pre-Modern-Age*, and *old-fashioned*; and by distinguishing the term Westernized from both modern (in the sense of up-to-date) and "technicalized" (Hodgson, forthcoming).

The Anatomy of Tradition

Just as the themes of innovation and diversity recur in virtually all discussions of the nature of modernity, so the idea of *sameness* informs most efforts to specify the most general characteristics of traditional culture. The content of a traditional culture is thought to be similar throughout a population, or uniform; it is held to be similar over time, or persistent. Internally, the parts of a traditional culture are thought to be similar, the culture as a whole integrated. Much evidence to the contrary, the images of uniformity, persistence and consistency dominate our perception of traditional cultures, in part perhaps because social scientists have tended to fixate on major themes from the writings of men like Durkheim, Weber and Redfield, adhering to simplistic versions of what are often much richer textures of thought.

Such images clearly dominated my own thinking when I set out, some ten years ago, to study tradition and innovation in Ethiopian culture. I felt delighted and relieved to have found among the highland-plateau Amhara, the politically and culturally dominant ethnic group of the country, what appeared to be a pure specimen of an intact traditional culture. While change and diversity were conspicuous in the capital city, rural Amhara preserved a culture that had been virtually the same for a millennium. I set out at once to locate Amhara culture in time and space, and to determine its core of contents as a base against which to consider the problems of modernization. In so doing, I did not remain blind to variable elements in Amhara culture; but such elements often were set aside in my mind, chiefly because the intellectual constructs I was using to fashion my body of facts oriented me in the opposite direction.

The Doctrine of Uniformity

Such constructs inclined me to think, for example, once I had identified the elements of Amhara culture they could be presumed to be shared by all the Amhara. A respectable source for this doctrine was Emile Durkheim, who held it a fundamental characteristic of pre-modern societies that their members possess the same ideas, sentiments and values (Durkheim, 1933). Durkheim's theorem that this common consciousness provides grounds of solidarity in such societies still contains a solid kernel of truth, and the assumption of uniformity had the practical value of assuring me that the lessons learned in one part of Amhara land could be applied in other parts; it was helpful to expect and convenient to find the same norms of deference, religious rituals, and poetic forms in briefer forays into Gondar and Gojjam that

I had become familiar with during more extended work in Manz.

Yet all told I was led to conclude that there is more disunity among the Amhara than solidarity, and it is clear that to the Amhara themselves their culture does not appear as a uniformly distributed set of patterns. They see their fellow Amhara as bearers of considerable cultural variety, a variety which now irritates them, now entertains them, now leaves them cold. They are extremely sensitive to nuances of cultural diversity among themselves: different attitudes toward fasting between the highlanders and lowlanders, differences in norms regarding theft among provinces, differences in ego ideals among families. And even to a dull outsider areas of considerable cultural variation become manifest once the stereotype of uniformity has been cracked.

Sources of Diversity

This variation flows from at least three sources: cultural specialization; competitive accentuation of differences; and differential enculturation.

In any society groups which perform different functions and inhabit different statuses tend to develop somewhat specialized cultural orientations. Nobility, clergy and peasantry are three such groups in Amhara society. These status groups merge imperceptibly into one another but nonetheless possess distinctive cultural elements. For example, cosmological beliefs of the learned clergy differ in many respects from those of the uneducated. Patterns of morality and etiquette are not the same for nobility and commoners. Linguistic patterns both express and constitute considerable variation of this sort. Amharic is understood from one end of Amhara land to the other, yet to speak of its use as uniform is greatly to exaggerate the case. Church literati known as *dabtara* make use of an ornate and literary style, sometimes referred to as "dabtara's Amharic". The nobleman's use of Amharic is quiet and reserved, the peasant's raucous and aggressive. Still other groups such as minstrels, merchants and shepherds have evolved their own respective special argots.

Cultural elements shared by members of a certain status group but not by the whole population are what Ralph Linton called Specialties (1936). Linton maintained that Specialties exist in the most primitive of cultures; they should be expected a fortiori in societies, like that of the Amhara, which have attained what has been called an "intermediate stage" of societal evolution—societies which possess a written tradition that is esoteric and limited to specialized groups (Parsons, 1966). For societies of this type, one must at the very least take into account the differences

between what Redfield called the "Great Traditions" and "Little Traditions" (1956) and move on to explore other dimensions of variation between elite and nonelite cultures. Failure to do so has led observers of Amhara culture to conclude, for example, that the typical Amhara food is a kind of pancake made from a grass called *teff*, and mead a frequent beverage; whereas these are typical only for well-to-do strata, and the peasant more frequently consumes pancakes made of barley, and drinks, no mead, but barley beer almost exclusively.

Apart from such rather visible and well established axes of variation, there are other more subtle and spontaneous kinds of cultural variety. There are not only Specialties, but also what Linton called Alternatives—traits shared by a number of individuals but not even by all members of a recognized status group. Among the Amhara alternatives are evident in such areas as poetry, religious doctrines, wedding customs and customs regarding land tenure.

One might predict that alternatives of this sort would emerge in any society on the grounds, established chiefly by psychoanalytic theory, of the universality of human aggressive and competitive strivings. In this context certain of my field observations, which at the time seemed only entertaining, now take on greater significance. As I went from one part of Amhara land to another, I often noted that inhabitants of one region sought to distinguish themselves from others by referring to their accentuated adherence to one or another aspect of Amhara culture. People in one area boasted of their scrupulous respect for the inalienability of land use rights, others boasted of their distinctively elegant use of Amharic, still others of unusually pious adherence to certain religious practices. In each case, the values in question were associated with a claim to superiority over other Amhara. In other cases, the competition revolved around the most suitable version of some generally accepted cultural form. Thus, canons for the esoteric type of religious poetry known as *qene* are often regarded as standard for all practitioners, yet the masters in different areas have developed quite distinct styles and approaches to the art. To the casual observer the beliefs and rites of the Orthodox Church seem highly conventionalized and uniformly accepted, yet there have been many bitter disputes among Ethiopians in different regions over subtle differences in theological doctrine.

A Third Source of Diversity

A third inexorable source of diversity in traditional cultures is that individuals learn the culture of their group in different

degrees and in different ways. This point was made dramatically during one of my trips within Manz, a region which prides itself on consistent observance of religious prescriptions for fasting, when I encountered a group of Amhara embroiled in a strenuous argument over whether a certain day was to be observed as a fasting day or not. Initially I was stunned—I had already learned what their tradition said on the question, and here they were disputing which alternative was to be preferred! This kind of observation, familiar to all careful anthropologists, reminds us that the transmission of culture is inherently precarious and never perfect. The very fact that the adult members of every society have different genetic constitutions and have grown up in markedly differing family environments guarantees that they will be disposed to make differential selections and interpretations of any body of culture. As recent work in the field of human development suggests, moreover, the members of a particular society do not all attain the same stage of development with respect to the internalization of its culture. In sum: cultural elements may be partially learned, incorrectly learned, or transformed in the learning, and the degree of confusion over what is proper tradition should never be underestimated.

The Doctrine of Persistence

Even if one admits a certain amount of cultural variation among the members of a traditional society, it is possible to perceive that differentiated culture as relatively persistent over time. The image of traditional culture as essentially changeless is immediately congruent with stereotypes about Ethiopian culture which have gained wide currency. These stereotypes were prefigured by Gibbon's famous line that, following the advent of Islam, "the Ethiopians slept near a thousand years, forgetful of the world, by whom they were forgotten" (Gibbon). Toynbee went on to categorize the strictly preserved culture of the Amhara as a "fossil in a fastness", remarking that

the survival of her Monophysite Christianity in the borderland between Islam and paganism, the survival of her Semitic language between the Hamitic and Nilotic language-areas, and the stagnation of her culture . . . are all peculiarities which derive from . . . the virtual impregnability of the highland-fastness in which this Monophysite fossil is ensconced (Toynbee, 1935).

Still more recent writers have been inclined to refer to Amhara culture as petrified.

Similar pictures have been drawn by other writers in dealing with other nonWestern cultures. Max Weber may be cited as one of the sources of such an image. Weber did much to promote

the concept of traditionality, and he defined it in terms of the long-term persistence of culture traits.² By traditional action he meant action that follows long familiar custom; by traditional authority, that grounded on the sanctity of ancient norms, norms that "have always existed". This idea of the changeless character of traditional culture coincided with much that I observed in studying the Amhara. I encountered much resistance among the rural Amhara to innovations proposed by modern-educated men. The customs and beliefs I recorded were remarkably similar to those reported by writers in earlier centuries; I was to find, for example, after noting down some legends in the region of Alo Bahr in Manz, that the exact same legends had been reported more than a century earlier by the British missionary Krapf.

Precisely because Amhara tradition lends itself so readily to being described as rigid and petrified, however, one needs to be doubly cautious in adopting the image uncritically. In fact, of course, there are numerous indications of culture change in any century for which we possess documentation, and Toynbee's allegation that Ethiopia is a country without a history can be respected only if it is altered to read: the writer's knowledge of Ethiopian history is inadequate. Of the many grounds for asserting that change is constantly underway in even so apparently changeless a culture as that of the Amhara, I shall discuss four briefly: the scope for authoritarian innovation; spontaneous rationalization; diffusion; and the shifting status of cultural complexes.

Sources of Change

One source of change is already implicit in the very notion of traditional authority as conceived by Weber: the scope for free arbitrary action accorded anyone holding authority on a traditional basis. A number of Ethiopian emperors have used this discretionary power to institute or promote changes of considerable significance. The official conversion of the Aksumite kingdom to Christianity in the 4th century was largely due, it seems, to the decision of Emperor Ezana. Zara Yaqob in the 15th century altered the face of Orthodox ritual by instituting new liturgies and religious holidays, and other emperors have intervened decisively in the reshaping of doctrine. Emperor Iyasu and others at Gondar created the conditions for a notable renascence of religioaesthetic culture, and Menelik in the early years decreed such innovations

²As Lloyd Fallers has recently emphasized, however, Weber did not imply that any empirical society could be entirely governed by traditional patterns (Fallers, unpublished).

as the adoption of smallpox vaccination and eucalyptus trees by his subjects. Innovation in such matters as official protocol have been decreed at various times and places by authorities at various local levels.

Another perspective for looking at ways in which the cake of custom was continually being broken is to regard the intermittent interest shown by many Amhara in rationalizing their technology and other cultural resources. For those who see Amhara technology exclusively as reflecting an unswerving commitment to the ways of the fathers, Lebna Dengel's urgent appeal to the King of Portugal for technical assistance in 1527 must seem bewildering:

I want you to send me men, artificers, to make images, and printed books, and swords and arms for all sorts for fighting; and also masons and carpenters, and men who make medicines, and physicians, and surgeons to cure illnesses; also artificers to beat out gold and set it, and goldsmiths and silversmiths, and men who know how to extract gold and silver and also copper from the veins, and men who can make sheet lead and earthenware; and craftsmen of any trades which are necessary in kingdoms, also gunsmiths (Beckingham, 1961, 505).

The sentimental attachment to traditional practitioners and folk medicine notwithstanding, European medical techniques were readily adopted whenever available from the 16th century on (Pankhurst, 1965)—by the royal families at least, and these always provided models for imitation by the nobility and then others.

In the area of technology of deepest interest to the Amhara spirit, firearms, a continuous interest in improving weaponry is evident through the centuries. The notion that Ethiopian painting was restricted to the highly conventionalized treatment of religious subjects overlooks the adaptation of graphic resources to depict secular subjects in a more naturalistic style during the Gondarine period (17th–18th centuries) and increasingly during the last century (Chojnacki, 1964). And the image of the unself-conscious transmission of religious beliefs in Amhara culture is contradicted by the occasional creation of rationalizing tracts, like the Confession of Faith which Emperor Galawdeos composed to combat the ideas of Jesuit missionaries, as well as the oral argumentation addressed to the defense of theological positions—apologia which not only reaffirmed but extended and modified existing beliefs.

Isolated though the Amhara have been, they have not been wholly out of contact with other peoples at any point nor impervious to the diffusion of culture traits. The normal but not exclusive path has been from the courts of the emperor and high-

est nobility downward. Arabic loanwords, Maria Theresa dollars, the use of coffee, and acceptance of photography represent a sample of cultural items which gradually made their way into Amhara culture, often after some lively initial resistance.

There is, finally, a kind of change in traditional culture which involves not the creation or adoption of new cultural elements, but a shifting in the relations among existing elements. Since it can be argued that what is distinctive about modernity generally is not a radically different core cultural pattern, but rather a shifting of the relative primacy of cultural complexes which have existed in all other cultures, this may not be an insignificant consideration. While a careful analysis of this phenomenon in Ethiopia in history has not been made one can at least give some indication of the potential fruitfulness of this type of analysis by referring to the shift toward greater importance of the court clergy over the monastic clergy in the 13th and 14th centuries; the fluctuating importance of the values associated with the emperor and the imperial court during the last three centuries; and the relative increase in importance of religious and literary values at Gondar during the Gondarine period.

The Doctrine of Consistency

Even if one's focus on traditional society is sharp enough to apprehend change as well as diversity, a fully realistic picture may still be impeded by the conviction that all this variability can be subsumed under certain basic culture patterns which are closely and harmoniously interwoven. Robert Redfield's conceptualization of the folk society, as one in which "patterns are interrelated in thought and in action with one another, so that one tends to evoke others and to be consistent with the others" (Redfield, 1947, 299), continues to inspire such a conviction. Although his ideal type of folk culture was based on analysis of the most primitive isolated tribal community, it tends unwittingly to guide our thinking about all pre-modern societies. Thus Riesman's "tradition-directed" people live in societies marked by a comparatively "tight web of values" (Riesman, 1950, 13).

It is tempting to portray the Amhara as living in such a beautifully integrated system. And the overwhelming impression that Amhara ecology, social structure, personality and culture are harmoniously adapted to one another would seem to justify an extravagant portrait of that sort. But the aesthetic gratification to be obtained thereby would be gained at the expense of some corner of the truth. It would also be misleading for purposes of analyzing Ethiopia's modernization. A tightly consistent culture

must seem both more resistant to change and more fragile when pushed toward modernity than one with many inconsistencies, for inconsistencies provide more bases for leverage toward change and ways of cushioning sudden lurches in the direction of cultural transformation.

Sources of Inconsistency

Even in the most primitive cases, however, there seem to be grounds for arguing that inconsistencies are inevitable. One stems from the concept of culture lag: since change is inexorable, new cultural items are likely to appear which do not fit perfectly with the rest of pre-existing culture. Such discrepancy may be illustrated among the Amhara, for example, by the introduction of money and a primitive market economy. Since the prevailing values continued to denigrate the role of the trader, commercial trading has for the most part had to be carried on by non-Amhara.

Apart from the assumption of change, moreover, the general theory of social systems indicates that the diverse functions needed in every society must be supported by values which are ultimately discrepant and not reducible to a single core pattern. Indeed, many social scientists have come to believe that the one-sided and exclusive elaboration of a single cultural theme would produce an unworkable system. Of the manifold value conflicts which may be identified in Amhara culture, I shall mention two: aggressiveness versus reconciliation, and piety versus intellectuality.

Aggressiveness Versus Reconciliation

Masculine aggressive prowess is highly valued among the Amhara. Martial ability, excellence in litigation, and political shrewdness are some of the main forms it takes, and these virtues have been important in maintaining the political and land tenure systems of the Amhara. The value of aggressive masculinity is inculcated during the socialization of boys and is celebrated in numerous folk verses and anecdotes. But other ideals and norms are upheld which serve to curb the effects of masculine aggressivity. Fasting, for example, is felt to be a particularly important part of the Amhara round of life, because it curbs the human inclination to be aggressive and provocative. The value of aggressivity is also counteracted by the values of justice and reconciliation, values associated with the teachings of the church and the activities of elders and judges. The call to be a judge or mediator is one that is hallowed in Amhara custom. These contrasting sets of values are held by the same individuals, who now praise one local ruler because of his toughness and capacity to exploit

others, now another because of his sense of justice and ability to neutralize conflicts; now idealize one emperor because of his military achievements, now another because of his Solomonic wisdom and diplomatic finesse.

Among the clergy, certain men are renowned for their mastery of the oral and written traditions of the Ethiopian Church. Through years of study, usually under conditions of considerable personal privation, they have become adepts in the composition of very complex and subtle poetry and interpreters of the great books of Amhara tradition. Amhara esteem for their attainments is shown by the use of a number of honorific titles—and such titles are highly prized—which indicate grades of attainment in the knowledge of this intellectual lore. The Amhara remain nonetheless highly ambivalent about such attainment, and a strong anti-intellectual strain is evident in Amhara tradition. This is manifest in such traditional traits as the association of learning with madness, disdain for the practice of writing, and the belief, often justified, that the literati who command this knowledge tend to be men of sensuous indulgence and immoral behavior. Against the literati are posed those truly religious men, the pious, who typically have little or no learning but are models of ritual observance and ascetic practice. It is an Amhara axiom that the truly religious person does not ask too many questions or probe too deeply into mysteries, which are the province of God and not to be trespassed.

Against the model of a highly consistent web of values, then, set the reality of a life where experience of conflicts of value is manifold, constant and endemic. That this experience is not so troubling for traditional Amhara as for moderns is probably true. The obsessive rationalism of modern culture makes value conflict at best problematic, at worst abhorrent. The Amhara, and members of other traditional societies, are less concerned, partly because of a lesser degree of self-consciousness, partly because of a great capacity for tolerating ambiguity. This latter trait, as I have argued elsewhere (Levine, 1963), is developed to an unusually high degree in Amhara culture but presumably pronounced in all traditional cultures, due to the extensive use of analogical reasoning, metaphorical thought and equivocal expressions. But the absence of cultural *Angit* should not be taken to indicate the presence of a totally consistent order of meanings, in which, like T. S. Eliot's perfect sentence,

. every word is at home,
Taking its place to support the others
The word neither diffident nor ostentatious,
An easy commerce of the old and the new.

The common word exact without vulgarity,
The formal word precise but not pedantic,
The complete consort dancing together.

In Conclusion . . .

Insofar as Amhara tradition is typical of traditionality in the general respects treated in this paper, the following propositions may prove to have a broad base of empirical support:

. . . The contents of pre-modern culture are not uniformly shared throughout any population. Specialization, competition, individuality, and differential enculturation produce diversity in any culture.

. . . The contents of pre-modern cultures do not persist unchanged. The innovative power of traditional authorities, impulses toward rationalization, diffusion and the shifting relative status of cultural complexes are constitutive of many kinds of change.

. . . The contents of pre-modern cultures do not form a tightly consistent whole.³ Culture lag and functional differentiation account for basic inconsistencies in all cultures.

These propositions, if valid, call for a reconstruction of the basic concepts available for thinking about traditional culture. When challenged, no scholar would defend a view of the tradition he knows as monolithic and static, but the ideas implanted in our minds about tradition have a life of their own. The tenacity of the old ideas may well reflect, not only imperfect understanding of traditional cultures, but a regressive need for projecting a simple, undifferentiated state of things onto some external object. Overcoming such a need is part of the maturational process which Westerners must undergo if they are to relate realistically to non-Western cultures. The diversification, change, and complexity of life brought on by modernization may not involve a revolutionary difference in the human condition, but rather an accentuation of characteristics with which members of pre-modern societies have always been familiar. Recognition of this may prove to be indispensable for understanding the cultural ferment in Africa and Asia, and that recognition will be aided by the development of new intellectual models for analyzing traditional cultures, models which make diversity and flexibility essential and not peripheral aspects of an analytic scheme.⁴

³The scope of this paper does not permit going into the analytical complexities involved in dealing with the concept of cultural integration, an exercise I have undertaken elsewhere (Levine, 1968).

⁴Such reconstruction would presumably not discard the inherited views all together; they should be admitted where legitimate. Certainly, a synoptic view

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of any culture may be entitled to present it as a highly unific for certain purposes. And if the dimensions of uniformity, persistence and consistency are treated more carefully as analytic variables, they may well be found to characterize certain pre-modern cultures far more than others, a finding which would suggest some interesting questions.



American-Educated Indians and Americans in India: A Comparison of Two Modernizing Roles*

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The perspective of this analysis stems from our concern with understanding the collective experiences, the modes of personal behavior, the group encounters, and the complex of social patterns which are evolving as growing numbers of persons move across cultures to engage in various types of enterprises related to the modernization of developing countries. Part of the enlarged scale of interdependency between the newly-developing and the more-developed countries, a predominant characteristic of our times, are the systems designed to facilitate the process of modernization: programs to advance educational exchange, institution building, technical and economic assistance, business and industrial innovations, expansion of the scientific community, application of technology, and the strengthening of development organizations. Indeed, it does not seem an overstatement to suggest that the transformation of an old and traditional into a modern type of society hinges in no small measure on the nature and content of the linkage systems and associations it has with other societies. Nonetheless, the great changes within a society

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called forth by its development depend upon the ways in which external and internal structures, resources, technicians and professionals are brought together to confront the realities of the everyday-world.

Our study explores the converging of these external and internal variables as they are incorporated in two roles within India: specifically, the roles of Indians who have secured their advanced education in America and the Americans who live and work in India. We shall briefly indicate their size and distribution, examine the different functions they perform, and consider the scope of each in the context of the total process of modernization.

Viewed from this perspective, both the meaning and indicators of modernity invite further specification. We would define a tradition-oriented society as one which attempts to perpetuate its future out of its past by acting according to values which are implicit in its customs, rituals and traditions. Conflicts in the decision-making elite are in the realm of the appropriateness of an inherited pattern or ritual or tradition for the specific realities of every-day living, but the implicit values are seldom questioned. For most members of the society, the conditions of life are considered precipitants of forces beyond the control of man's collective action. So long as the threats of the present can be met by inherited knowledge and wisdom, the society remains viable.

To Create the Future Not Live Off the Past . . .

A modernizing society is one which creates its future rather than lives off its past, which continuously generates its culture, both with respect to values and substantive content. A modern-oriented society is a complex society which states its values explicitly and does not so much reject its traditions as assesses them along with other alternatives for expressing its values. Conflict and decision-making occurs both over the values which are stated as goals for the future and over the appropriate translation of these values into substantive content, programs, plans, actions and behavior. The world view of the modern-oriented is that deprivations to life chances, as defined by the goals, and social problems to be solved by the actions of men.

In this sense of modernity and traditionalism, neither is correlated with a particular historical period—both have always existed and still exist. There have been modern-oriented societies in the past which have succeeded in creating their future and others which have failed; tradition-oriented societies which have persisted and others which have collapsed. What is peculiar about

the contemporary period is the complex and intricate intermixture of all shades of world outlook from the most traditional to the most modern within the world community, within every society, within most social systems, and often within the same individuals.

India has been committed to modernization in the sense of creating a future different from its past for over a century and a half. Three new orientations distinguish the contemporary modern from earlier modern and have relevance for the American-educated Indian and the Americans in India.

Three Domains of Modernity

The first domain of modernity pertains to the global modern third culture which sets the expectations for the bi-national and multi-national endeavors which take, as their primary goals, political, economic, scientific and technological development. In contrast to the norms of the colonial third culture which defined trans-societal relationships in terms of super-subordination, the norms of the global third culture posit coordinate relationships. Modernity in this world-encompassing setting refers to the capacity of a society to comprehensively participate in the mainstreams of the nascent world community. Trans-societal transactions may differ appreciably with respect to the priorities of goals and their implementation but whatever the nature of the plans, organization and programs, the norm for assessing the total relationship is that the participants are co-equals in conjoint efforts. Hence a newly-developing nation like India and a new world power like the United States approximate modernity, according to this definition, to the extent that they can so act. In previous articles we have detailed how norms of the world third culture carry through into the Indo-American community and its binational third culture (J. Useem, 1966; Useem, Useem, Donoghue, 1963; Useem, Useem, 1967). Our main hypothesis is that extensive participation of India and the United States in consociate endeavors differentially impinges on the Americans in India and the American-educated Indians.

The second domain of modernity concerns the complex organizational structures within which most modernizers function. These are a unique outgrowth of India's distinctive historical legacy and contemporary confrontations. During the colonial period, there were two diverse sectors committed to modernization. One was the British rulers, and the Indians trained and educated by them, who sponsored changes on a subcontinent-wide basis in markedly limited but crucial areas. Modernity in this context was measured by the degree to which the changes approximated western standards.

Also during the colonial period, there developed a number of disparate groupings, committed to modernization but not westernization. Although they selected forms, patterns, ideas and styles of life from the west, they rejected western standards for assessing the changes. As a result, the norms of what constituted modernity varied widely for they were uniquely fashioned along various communal, ethnic, linguistic, provincial, caste and feudal (princely state) lines.

With Independence . . .

With independence there was a need to develop a coherent national identity of these widely varying organizational arrangements for modernization and at the same time meet the needs for participating in the global third culture. "Indianization" is the common term applied to this norm of modernity whether it occurs in the large bureaucratic structures of the government, in the organizational structures of private and public business establishments, in the organizational arrangements of schools, hospitals, transportation facilities, colleges and universities, and communal groupings. Persistent issues prevail as to the degree to which development requires the adoption or adaptation of western models and the degree to retain or redefine unique historical local developments as national plans are implemented in the Centre and in the various sectors, regions, linguistic states and communal groupings.

The third dimension of modernity that needs to be considered is the traditional spheres of social life which were not the major object of modernization in the pre-independence period. New nation-wide and world-wide minimal standards of living have transformed traditional ways of living which were once accepted as fate to social problems calling for programmed solutions. Ignorance, illness, birth, death and the routines of daily life, once the concerns of extended kin and communal groups within India and religious missionaries from without have been redefined as high rates of illiteracy, morbidity, mortality and population increase, and low rates of productivity and consumption—in short, social conditions to be changed by organized action. Modernity in this context is the capacity of a nation-state and world community to meet the "rising tide of aspirations" of and for the masses. Since Indian Independence in 1947, the main thrust for modernization and the pervasive value of the of the life conditions of the total members of the society.

Other aspects of traditional cultures not connected with the "new poor" are also undergoing redefinition—e.g. kinship,

caste and communal loyalties, the status of women, and traditional religious practices—as these impinge upon and are affected by new norms of modernity.

Before comparing the ways in which American-educated Indians and Americans fit into this complicated context, let us get some idea of the extent of the binational flow of persons of the two countries.

The American-Educated Indian

Although India has had a long-established practice of sending some of its young people abroad for an advanced education, the number who came to the United States prior to Indian Independence was only a small proportion of those who pursued a higher education in the United Kingdom. Just before World War II, there were about 1500 in the academic institutions of Great Britain and something less than 200 in America. This disparity reflected the nature of the relationships between India and other societies. The policies of any colonial society are intended to assure close ties between the governing country and the governed populations. Those in India who felt dissatisfied with the traditional society and who looked beyond their own cultural boundaries for intellectual inspiration or practical examples of modernity could find them amply in England. And any realistic assessment of the opportunities open to the foreign-returned clearly revealed the comparative advantages of a British education over that from other countries. An American education, in contrast to a British education, ordinarily did not lead to appointments in the British-run administrative services, in the largely British-owned firms, or in the colleges and universities controlled by the government.

Since the onset of the post-colonial period, many Indians continue to study in the United Kingdom; still, having an American degree has become increasingly advantageous not only for competing for relatively scarce positions within India but also for entering the world market for the highly educated. At present, there are more students from India studying in the United States than from any country in the world and there are more Indian students and trainees in the United States than in any other foreign country. By 1951, around 600 students a year left India to study in America; by 1961 the number increased to two thousand and by 1966 to twenty-one hundred. The total number of Indian students in the United States grew from 1818 in 1956 to 6789 in 1966 (Institute of International Education, 1956, 1966). Three-fourths are enrolled in graduate or professional schools

and two-thirds are concentrated in the fields of science and technology. In contrast, the total number of American students in India has never been large—reaching a total of less than fifty by 1966. The majority, but not all, of the American-educated have returned to India upon completion of their studies. It is difficult to estimate the number but it is probably not larger than fifteen thousand.

Recent years also have witnessed a substantial rate of growth among senior Indian scholars, scientists, and other professional men (especially in the field of medicine) who have come to America for varying periods of stay. For instance, from 1956 to 1966 the number of Indian faculty and researchers in American universities increased from 47 to 1143. This twenty-four fold increase considerably exceeds the quadrupling of American university staff members who have gone to India during that same time span (Institute of International Education, 1956, 1966). To add one further item of relevant information, over half, and an ever-growing proportion of the Indian senior scholars who have come to America are in the physical sciences, whereas the largest group of senior American scholars who come to India are in the social sciences.

Americans in India

As one might expect in a developing nonWestern nation-state with a colonial heritage, western groups who temporarily live and work in the country correspond to the newer systems of inter-societal relationships. India contains governmental, business and developmental representatives from nearly every country of the western world. As a society with a colonial history which ended peacefully and by mutual agreement, many of the old ties with the United Kingdom have been preserved and rewoven into a new cross-cultural pattern. As a consequence, none among those who have come to India from the western world equal in size the British: three out of every four western foreigners are British. The high point of British numbers peaked in the first decade of this century, the low point was reached in the years immediately following Independence; thereafter the British community expanded and in recent years has become larger than in the years immediately before the transfer of power. However, indicative of the relative growth and size of the newer bi-national relations, no other foreign group, including the British, approximate the rate of increase of the American community. Currently there are six British for every American, and every other man from the west who is not British is an American.

For the decade-and-a-half from 1951 to 1966, the Americans in residence have grown from slightly less than 3700 to over 7500. This overall growth has been accompanied by changes in composition and distribution. While the number of American "heads of household" have increased, the numbers of American dependents have mounted at an even more rapid rate. The spectacular rise in dependents correlates with a number of factors: the lower age of marriage and higher birth rate in the United States; preference by organizations, both Indian and American, to have seasoned, older and married men rather than untried single young apprentices; and the Indianization of organizations which has cut down on the number of opportunities available to the young. Consonant with the general upward trend of American families with several dependents, there has appeared a new set of variables in the work-related activities of Americans and their general style of living in India (R. Useem, 1966).

A Trend Toward Fewer Missionaries

Another trend in this period has altered the balance among groups within the American community, which in turn influences the types of roles and the scope of contacts within different sectors of India. Missionaries, the American grouping longest in India, largest and most dispersed (being located primarily in small cities and towns), registers the lowest rate of growth and the most extensive shift in the emphasis of its total functions. The American missionary movement became active in India during the latter part of the Nineteenth Century and expanded the scope of its activities all through the first three decades of the Twentieth Century. The successive crises of depression, World War II, and the turbulence in the subcontinent when the country divided into Pakistan and India, curtailed the regular flow of newcomers and the return from furlough of old hands. The new Government of India, as it passed on applicants for visas and then by formally enacted policy, imposed selective limits concerning the foreigners permitted to come as missionaries or to return from their home leave. Consonant with the new era, the Government encouraged and the mission organizations supported the Indianization of missionary establishments. Concurrently, the central tasks of mission-sponsored work became exclusively the sustaining of already established education, health, and welfare enterprises.

A Trend Toward More Businessmen and Governmental Employees

The two major American groups located chiefly in the large urban centers, businessmen and governmental employees, are channeled into different sectors of India. Businessmen have

consistently held their relative size at about one-fifth of the American community. The history of American commercial and industrial firms spans nearly a century; however, only the last quarter of this period brought the American business, managerial and technical personnel to their current levels. Following several years of ambivalence towards foreign business, the Indian government shaped a policy of inviting American private investments and especially of encouraging joint Indian-American business ventures which fit into the country's national plans for economic development. As in the case of the old mission establishments, old foreign firms have increasingly "Indianized" their middle level managerial and technical staffs (Kapoor, 1966).

In a colonial society, relationships with foreign countries are, of course, carried on through the colonial power and hence the United States government had but a handful of representatives in the country when India became independent. By 1951, American governmental representatives constituted six per cent of the American community. With the expansion of foreign service officer staff and the building of the information service and technical aid programs, their proportion of the American community increased to twenty-eight per cent in 1966.

Americans under the aegis of private foundations, voluntary associations, international organizations and cultural exchange programs have grown from two to ten per cent of the American population; though each is a small group, altogether they are significant for they often find their way and perform roles in sectors of Indian society less touched by other American groupings.

An Expansion of Interchange . . .

Thus during the last fifteen years (1951-66) there has occurred a quickening in the pace and an expansion in the magnitude of interchange of persons between India and the United States. Over that span of time, the moving of Indians to America to secure an advanced education has tripled and the moving of Americans to work in India has doubled.

The combined population of the American-educated Indians and the Americans in India is but a small fraction of the men and women in the country who identify themselves and are identified by others as an integral part of the modernizing segment. They are relative newcomers to a century-old segment which, although numerically small, provides the society-wide leadership in the development of India. We shall attempt to delineate how they fit into this modernizing elite with respect to their work roles and style of life, and how they respond to modernity and tradition as they personally encounter it in their everyday world.

Shared Outlook of the Two Groupings

In our interviews with American-educated Indians and Americans in India we found they shared a commonality of outlook in their present work roles which transcends the simple biographical fact that both groupings have resided in the two societies. We probed in depth to learn the dynamics and contents of attitudes, expectations, values and world view and found these features common to both.

In the first place, through their professional and technical education and their occupational careers, they have been socialized to a cognitive style of life, a pragmatic reliance on rational procedures, bureaucratic structures and specialization for coping with societal problems. To guide decisions and actions, they indicate a preference for information, ideally acquired by the use of scientific methods and refined by practical application, rather than a dependence on inherited solutions and long-established practices. They feel that a man validates himself through accomplishments, through having something to show for his efforts. Therefore a good job is one that has built-in challenge, an opportunity to participate in making changes that will shape the future. Not all Americans and Indians equally exhibit this work ethic and most are thwarted at one time or another in fulfilling the norms. However, the commitment is sufficiently internalized that most will forego fulfillment of other life values rather than endure total deprivation in this area. Furthermore their relatively rare skills and education are sufficiently prized in the contemporary world that many can and do terminate intolerable employment and accept positions in other structures and nations.

In the second place, both groups exhibit a broader perspective, an enlarged world view growing out of having personally experienced contrasting cultural milieus. They look upon the world around them and themselves in a different way. The Indians who go to America often report that they secure an enlarged vision of social life, an increased capacity to see things on a larger scale, a broader view of their homeland, and many for the first time in their lives began to ask searching questions about the basic problems and future development of India. Americans taking a work assignment to India, especially the first-time outers, register a comparable change. Moving from the delimited environs of a middle-class neighborhood in an American community, in which their work and local social circle are fairly circumscribed, to a higher status in a foreign land in which they represent their whole society or a particular profession, engenders a new world view.

They begin to think about what development and a modern society entail, reflect as seldom before on the conditions which make for change and growth in America, and gain a sense of participating in an important historical process.

In the third place, correlative to their enlarged vision of social life and their personal involvement with it, both gain new social identities. The Indians are known to others as the "foreign-returned", "the American-educated", the holders of highly prized advanced degrees. The American in India is "the foreigner", "the foreign expert", "the representative" of a powerful nation, company, university. These new social identities affect the expectations others have of them and the modes of interaction which occur.

A Modernizing Status-Role . . .

We call the joining of a cognitive style work ethic, a new self identity and a new social identity, a modernizing status-role. The legitimacy of the status-role is generally accepted in India—but not without tensions. Indeed, the conflicts, discussions and compromises are the very crux of the modernizing process, for they precipitate a self-conscious awareness of alternatives in goals and means for developing a viable future. There are conflicts and changing policies as the holders of the modernizing status-roles confront others in the binational third culture, in the complex organizational structures and in the traditional sectors within India. Alternatives are weighed and sometimes hotly debated as to how best to structure the international flow of persons depending upon changes in the international climate and in the domestic situation. Intermittent and recurring controversies occur over many facets of this status-role; for instances, how many and what kinds of foreign-educated Indians are required, what are the advantages and disadvantages of sending Indians for higher studies overseas compared with bringing in foreign scholars and scientists to help educate Indians domestically; are the existing structures using effectively the foreign-trained manpower, would more effective utilization result in loss of control, what are the consequences of the "brain drain", which positions ascribed to foreigners in a foreign-controlled organization during the colonial and early post-colonial years can be "Indianized", and how fast can this be accomplished; to what extent do the American newcomers represent the best quality of men in their field of special competence in the United States. Orthodox and nativistic-minded segments evince varying degrees of hostility but do not have the power to impose their views on the total society. Some worry about how much American influence should occur in those areas

connected with establishing a unique national identity or which are considered "domestic" problems.

There is less talk and debate and more day-by-day accommodation to and acceptance of individual American-educated Indians and Americans by those with whom they work. Although we have no conclusive evidence to back them up, our impressions, from interviewing Indians who work with the American-educated and especially with the Americans, are that Indians and Indian organizations have adequate means to control their own activities. They are skilled in dealing with foreigners and sophisticated in creating situations which channel the actions of those overly-committed to American ways into harmless activities. In fact this skill is one of the major sources of frustration to the zealous fresh-returned and newly-out American. As the newcomer is socialized to the system and his bona fides established, his contributions are accepted and appreciated.

Intersections of the American-Educated and the Americans

Despite the fact that both groupings share a commitment to a cognitive work style, have a similar world perspective, and generally function in modernizing structures, the amount of interaction between them is only moderate. At first we were puzzled as to why during our field work with Americans in India we so seldom met American-educated Indians, the subject of our first field trip. Where we did, we found that it was neither the shared American experience nor the common outlook but the structuring of their work roles which brought them together. While there is some overlap, each group enters into India by different ecological pathways and are positioned differently in the work structures.

American-educated, although rarely residing in villages where the vast majority of Indians live, are more widely distributed over India and more dispersed in the metropolitan centers. Americans tend to live in more circumscribed areas inhabited by foreigners and upper-status Indians. Although American missionaries are widely dispersed, the communities with whom they interact have few foreign-educated.

Within Indian governmental organizations, the foreign-educated are usually in the middle to upper middle ranks with a fixed position in a regular line of authority whereas the American normally comes in at a higher status because he is an official representative and carries more rank and responsibility than he does Stateside, but has no direct authority in his advisory capac-

ity. Both groups frequently have work assignments in technical, scientific or managerial aspects of the newer departments or enterprises, but there are more Americans in foreign-owned and joint Indian-American private enterprises and more American educated in governmental and university posts. Within American governmental units (embassy, consulates, USIS), the Indian employees are of relatively low rank and seldom American-educated.

For the foreign-educated, it reflects on the individual to become known within their own Indian circles as a person who runs after the foreigners. Few deliberately avoid association with Americans, but they meet primarily only where there is a mutually shared particular interest. Some of the Americans reach out for the Indians in their organization who have been to America, but in a majority of the joint Indian-American government programs there is no policy to use the American-educated as counterparts to the American technical consultant. While there exists a bi-national social network of inter-personal relations around which form local and functional groups that we have referred to as the bi-national community, it is composed more of particular Americans and selective segments of modern-oriented Indians than of the former plus American-educated Indians. Another contributing factor is that although the work roles may overlap, there are usually wide divergencies in the non-work roles. The American-educated are often embedded in extensive kin, community and caste ties whereas the Americans tend to establish an American community for mutual aid.

Modernizing Functions

The modernizing functions Americans perform in their work roles can be summed up under three rough categories. One is symbolic. Altogether they represent modernity in what they are supposed to be doing and accomplishing. Whether or not these ends are achieved, they signify a class of men who, along with like-minded Indians, are deeply involved in strengthening the modernizing patterns. They help attain this general goal less through specific innovations or the tasks they perform than by reinforcing the convictions of Indians who also are firmly committed to modernity but encounter indifference to their aspirations in their immediate work situation or otherwise feel alone and isolated from the mainstreams of what they value most. For example, the American scholar may not be able to carry out a distinguished piece of research during his year in residence as a Fulbright scholar and the American technical assistant may have nothing tangible to point to as an outcome of two years as a consultant to an Indian

organization. Yet if one looks closely into what occurs, he may discern that the foreigner from America helped his fellow Indian scholars in a college or the junior technical staff in a department retain faith in the future of their endeavors by being a living reminder that they are part of a nascent global pattern. While this may on the surface appear evanescent, it is not to be entirely discounted in the evolving of new cultural patterns. Similarly, the American-educated functions to give greater credibility to aspirations and means already present in Indian segments.

A second function is that of mediating between disparate modernizing systems and between modernizing and traditional systems. Stated in its boldest conception, these are men whose roles are to actively bridge gaps between societies and between segments of societies. These two groups have no monopoly of this function with respect to India and America. They carry it out most effectively in those situations where they are parts of chains which link them with others of different personal experiences, and with those who are differentially participating in implementing a vision of the future. The American-educated and the Americans in India are trying to present different facets of the total fund of new knowledge, ideas, technology and plans which have been tried in one part of the developed world for consideration in India. As such, they open possibilities within India of exploring alternatives, putting them together in creative new ways, and searching for meaningful patterns. It has proved a far more complicated and difficult function to carry out than anyone had anticipated.

A third and substantive function pertains to the introduction of skills and knowledge. This is the manifest reason for the foreign education of Indians and the bringing of Americans to India. It has been presumed that the rate of change attempted demands the quick infusion of professional skills, especially in the technological and scientific fields. It is becoming evident that a developing society can sustain them and utilize their knowledge only if it is modernizing its institutions, its bureaucratic organizations and its people. Hence while decisions may continue to be made in terms of manpower needs for economic development within India, the most significant parts of the total endeavor will be the modernizing of men to live in an interdependent world and the ferment which is created out of the confrontations.

Creating the Future

Let us speculate about the final period of this century, the next three decades. It might seem more realistic to focus on a

narrower time range and certainly much safer to offer a neat summary of the main trends during the pre-independence and post-colonial periods: we would gain thereby that degree of confidence that comes from describing actual conditions and presenting hard social facts. Nonetheless, we deem it more illuminating to try to discern what modernity and tradition imply for the future.

We return to the opening theme to define further the process of modernization at the societal level for a developing, heterogeneous and self-governing country with a colonial heritage in the non-western world. It consists of a collective search for a coherent sense of identity and a position of dignity in an interdependent world; a continuing dialogue among the varied segments of an old society incorporated into a new nation-state as to its shared aspirations, common values, the priority of its goals and how all of these can be fulfilled; and the endeavors to aggregate the internal and external resources to improve the life chances of its total members.

The specific content of the problems, issues, ideas, plans and organizational arrangements change over time but the process itself is an enduring one. For more than a century a succession of generations in India (both Indians and foreigners) have been involved in this generic process. As India continues to move toward modernity, those who are actively engaged in one or another role, will become even more self-conscious of their functions. And the patterns, the relationships and the problems will become more complex—for one of the hallmarks of any modern society is inherent complexity.

This intricate enterprise will demand of the new generations, sophisticated leadership who possess the skills and charisma to put together into a unified whole the ancestral traditional, the colonial cultural legacy and the early modern third culture of the post-independence years. We doubt that the fit will be perfected for India is too complicated a society to expect more than working accommodations and the global society too protean to establish any certainty in cross-cultural relationships. Despite the recent crises—the food shortage, the population growth, war, the frustrations of delayed fulfillment—India clearly has the human talents and capacity to surmount over time its threats and to move to a higher level of development by the onset of the new century.

And There Will be a Greater Flow . . .

We expect a larger rather than a lesser flow of persons between India and the rest of the world, including an even greater

number of Indians and Americans participating in the exchange of persons. The scope of interdependency in both the public and private sectors of trans-societal associations will continue to expand, and consonant with this there will evolve even further culture patterns, which provide the norms for social interaction amongst the members of related societies who live and work together. As American life advances into a post-modern high civilization, Indians will come to the United States not so much for a higher education and a technical apprenticeship but rather to secure a surer grasp of the additional options that a post-modern society suggests for the next stage of its development. And as a correlative, Americans will go to India not to do what educated Indians can perform with equal competence and with clearer understanding of Indian conditions, but instead to get perspective and understanding of their own and the world society and to fulfill the mediating third cultural functions. In the global world that is coming into being, the emerging world community of scientists, social scientists, technicians, and others will gather as working groups where ever the facilities and opportunities make it possible to undertake constructive work. What is now often called the "brain-drain" will become redefined as a new division of functions in an interdependent world.

Creating the future, which implies exploring the alternatives which are available and feasible, requires increasing reliance on the oral mode of communication. There are no hard guidelines to follow, no corpus of knowledge to draw on, and no body of literature which contains an accumulated body of solid information that can be used. Hence the men who participate in the process of modernization depend less on the written word than on interpersonal discussions and group conferences to figure out what is happening together with considering what is possible in the future. We, therefore, can anticipate an increased amount of personalized communication among all those involved in the modernizing of India. This post-literate mode of interaction will take place within many international networks and among differentiated segments of each of the related societies.

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Biographical Sketches

JOHN W. BENNETT. B.A., Anthropology, Beloit College, 1937. Ph.D., Anthropology, University of Chicago, 1945. Chief, Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division, Japan Occupation, 1949-51. He is co-author, *In Search of Identity: The Japanese Scholar in America and Japan*, 1958; *Paternalism in the Japanese Economy*, 1964. Bennett has recently completed a four year study of agrarian and social development in Western North America, and has just returned from a nine month trip through Asian countries preparing for similar research in that part of the world. Visiting Professor at Waseda University, Tokyo, the fall semester of 1966. Presently he is Professor and Chairman, Department of Anthropology, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri.

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WILLIAM H. FRIEDLAND is Associate Professor in the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University. A sociologist, he holds the Ph.D. degree from the University of California, Berkeley. He edited (with Carl G. Rosberg, Jr.) *African Socialism*, has written *Unions and Industrial Relations in Underdeveloped Countries*, compiled *Unions, Labor and Industrial Relations in Africa: An Annotated Bibliography*, and is currently completing a book, *Institutional Transfer*. He is Chairman of the Committee on African Studies at Cornell. Friedland is now studying migrant labor in the United States, pursuing interests in unusual forms of social organization.

MARC GALANTER received his B.A. (1950), M.A. (Philosophy, 1954), J.D. (1956) all at the University of Chicago. He had a Fulbright to India in 1957-58 and was a Faculty Fellow of the American Institute of Indian Studies in 1965-66. He taught at Chicago and Stanford Law Schools and is presently Associate Professor in the Social Sciences in the College of the University of Chicago. His field is comparative law with special interest in development of modern legal systems and the relation of law to traditional or primordial groupings. Currently he is working on a study of the relation between law and caste in India.


JOSEPH GUSFIELD is Professor and Chairman, Department of Sociology, University of California, San Diego. He has a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Chicago. His publications include *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement*. In 1962-63 he was a Fulbright Lecturer in India and was a Visiting Exchange Professor at Keio University in Tokyo during Fall, 1967. His other work includes articles on political sociology, modernization and sociology of education.

BERNARD KARSH is Professor of Sociology in the Department of Sociology and the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, University of Illinois. He has a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Chicago where he co-authored with Joel Seidman and others the book *Why Workers Join Unions*. His work on American industrial relations includes *A Diary of a Strike*. In 1961-62 he was a Fulbright Lecturer in Japan and followed up his interest in Japanese industrial development by a year of language study at Stanford University. In 1965-66 he was a Visiting Exchange Professor at Keio University in Tokyo, where he continued his research on Japanese industrial development.

DONALD N. LEVINE received his three degrees at The University of Chicago. He has published *Wax and Gold: Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopian Culture*, and articles in the fields of social theory and Ethiopian Studies. He is currently Associate Professor of Sociology and Master of the Collegiate Division of the Social Sciences at The University of Chicago.

LLOYD I. RUDOLPH is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago and SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH is Associate Professor of Social Science and Political Science in The College, University of Chicago. They both received their Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University. Their research on Indian politics has resulted in a number of significant papers and in two books, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India* and *From Princes to Politicians in India*. They have been recipients of several research awards for Indian research. Their most recent field trip was in 1966-67 when they were Faculty Fellows of the American Institute of Indian Studies.

JOHN USEEM is Professor of Sociology and RUTH HILL USEEM, Professor of Sociology and Education, at Michigan State University. Both received their doctoral degrees from the University of Wisconsin in Sociology and Anthropology. Under the auspices of The Edward W. Hazen Foundation, they spent two field periods in India, 1952-53 studying the western-educated Indian and, in 1958, interviewing Americans in India. Their other publications include articles on American Dakota Indians, Micronesia, post-modern American society, middle-management men, and changing women's roles.



JOHN BENNETT, Tradition, Modernity and Communalism in Japan's Modernization. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 4, 0000.


The modernization of Japan resembles that of the Western European nations more closely than that of other Asian or African countries. Japanese institutions approached modern form slowly, over a period of three centuries. Consequently the concepts, "tradition", and "modernity" have no simple meaning in the case of Japan, and in fact possess the same manifold nuances found for the terms in any Western language and culture. Japanese "traditional" society was, for example, instrumental in Japanese "modernization"; or, much of what the Japanese today consider as elements of their "traditional" culture, are actually items of Western origin.

WILLIAM H. FRIEDLAND, Traditionalism and Modernization: Movements and Ideologies. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 4, 000.

Transition to modernism in movements and ideologies is examined inductively by considering a single case, that of Tanganyika, and developing a general model. Transition occurs in four stages. *Traditionalist* responses to external contact is oriented toward the maintenance of the status quo. Leadership consists of those holding traditional authority. In the *proto-nationalist* phase, goals of movements are oriented toward returning to the status quo but leadership devolves on new social groupings. A broader level of consciousness orients action against external control but organization is primitive and spontaneous. In the *prenationalist* stage, formal organizations operating within the rules established by externally dominating forces begin to develop. Organizations, while based on indigenous social structures, develop broader frames of reference. In the *nationalist* phase, movements are organized and ideologies of nationalism become articulate.

MARC GALANTAR, The Displacement of Traditional Law in Modern India. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 4, 000.

The modern legal system in India transformed and supplanted the indigenous legal structure. It substituted a unified and nation-wide set of laws for a system of local usages applied to specific cases; replaced local interpreters of law by a professional class of lawyers and court officials who form a national and uniform legal culture. In the course of its development the modern legal system supplanted customary and oral law with the content of Hindu scriptures and now replaces these sources with legal precedent and legislation. While modern legal forms often uphold traditional values, there is little possibility of the revival of indigenous legal forms.



BERNARD KARSH and ROBERT E. COLE, Industrialization and the Convergence Hypothesis: Some Aspects of Contemporary Japan. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 4, 0000.

This paper examines some aspects of changes in post war Japan associated with the way(s) men are managed in the modern sector of the Japanese economy. We focus on whether the relationships that define industrial work tend to take on the same characteristics regardless of the setting and regardless of the pace and structure of industrialization. Technology is viewed as the central part of the general process of differentiation and as the base from which industrialization approaches social change.

Though the evidence is by no means conclusive, it does suggest that convergence is occurring. But it suggests even more that theory construction may be better served by more careful examination of the complex relations between universal tendencies and national cultural differences, and the way in which change occurs.

DONALD N. LEVINE, The Flexibility of Traditional Culture. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 4, 0000.


The conception of traditional cultures as uniform, persistent, and consistent, while of some heuristic value, functions more as a stereotype than an ideal type. Specialization, competition, creativity and imperfect enculturation produce diversity among the bearers of any culture. The innovative power of traditional authorities, impulses toward rationalization, diffusion and the shifting relative status of cultural complexes constitute areas of change endemic in pre-modern societies; culture lag and functional differentiation produce notable inconsistencies. Such variability is patent in the culture of the highland-plateau Amhara of Ethiopia, a culture which was initially thought to conform to the conventional ideal type. While most scholars are presumably aware of the complexity and flexibility of traditions with which they are familiar, intellectual constructs which focus on these characteristics are under-developed.

LLOYD I. RUDOLPH and SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH, The Political Modernization of an Indian Feudal Order; An Analysis of Rajput Adaptation in Rajasthan. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 4, 0000.

The effort to understand the nature of modernization has, until recently, laid considerable stress on the discontinuities that separate and distinguish traditional from modern societies. The homogeneity of particular traditional societies has been exaggerated; the affinities that link traditional and modern societies have been neglected; and the role of social and cultural continuities in the processes of modernization has been underestimated.

Focussing on the persistent domination of particular characteristics of complex societies tends to obscure their latent, minority and deviant characteristics, the 'imperfections' and 'failures' in socialization and integrations that can be so important for social change. Given certain alterations or crises in the historical environment, such characteristics can provide the impetus and the means for new identities, structures and norms.

The adaptation of the Rajput feudal order in Rajasthan after Indian independence (1947) and the advent of democratic rule has contributed to the development of this theoretical perspective and helps to illustrate it.



JOHN USEEM and RUTH USEEM, American Educated Indians and Americans in India: A Comparison of Two Modernizing Roles. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1968, XXIV, No. 4, 0000.

Since Indian Independence, the increased bi-national flow of persons between India and the United States reflects the changed relationships between the two nations and the changes which have occurred within the two countries in an increasingly interdependent world. The two modernizing status-roles of American-educated Indians and Americans in India generally enter different segments and sectors of Indian life. The tensions and conflicts which arise as these groupings meet with traditional, pre-Independence colonial and pre-Independence Indian modern, are part of the modernization process which is defined as the attempt to create a future out of the realities of the present rather than trying to duplicate the past, whether that be traditional or earlier modern patterns.

The Activists' Corner

David Krech

University of California, Berkeley

Nevitt Sanford

Stanford University

In our Statement of Intent, when we opened *The Activists' Corner* for business some four issues ago, we made it clear that activity in this Corner was not a private affair but that we would welcome and print contributions from our readers. A number of our readers, having written to us, we turn over this number of *The Activists' Corner* to them. There is, of course, space here to print only a few excerpts—and even those, from only a few of the communications we have received. We are saying, in other words, that the response to our first few columns has been most gratifying. A goodly number of good people have written in to express their general enthusiasm and support, to indicate that they have been thinking along the same outrageous lines, and—best of all—to offer valuable statements (i.e., ones we can crib from for our later columns) of what social psychology should be about, or concrete examples of how inquiry and action can be joined, compounded and confounded.

Fully aware of the self-selective nature of these respondents, we then conducted a highly informal survey among our SPSSI acquaintances to validate the results of our mail. The conclusions from our poll were as follows: (a) Some SPSSI members don't

read *The Journal of Social Issues*—they merely receive and file. (b) Many SPSSI members read only those rare numbers of the *Journal* which happen to deal with topics of special interest to them. (These first two groups—accounting for over half of our sample—did not even know that the *Journal* was now graced by *The Activists' Corner*.) (c) A few SPSSI members had noticed our column but they “had not yet gotten around to reading it—but I intend to at the very first open moment”. (d) A very small number had read our columns and of these some approved (under intensive probing) of the line taken therein. From these interview results, it was clear that the letters we had received gave us as representative a reaction of the SPSSI membership as we would want to get. We terminated our interviewing.

Our reasons for printing the following excerpts from those letters, however, are not only that we had promised to do so or that they represent a consensus of SPSSI membership. We have a more compelling reason. Almost every letter we received raised—in a manner ascribable only to the operation of a Pre-Established Harmony among our diverse correspondents—two closely intertwined and recurring issues—issues, the solutions to which are propaedeutic to action. (Action—we hasten to reassure all—action will always remain the major concern of our column.) These action-related issues are: a) the nature of the beast which is social science and b) the education of the social psychologist for social action. The reader will clearly discern these two issues in the excerpts printed below. Please be advised that these excerpts state the themes with which we intend to deal at some length in forthcoming columns. Should they provoke you to other thoughts, or further thoughts, let us hear from you. We welcome grist for our mill—reserving the right, of course, to grind it as we please.

“The Activists' Corner: Prelude to a Science of Science”?

First, a rather long excerpt from a paper sent to us by Dr. Ian Mitroff of the University of Pittsburgh and entitled “The Activists' Corner: Prelude to a Science of Science”?

If the first column and statement of intent of *The Activists' Corner* are any indication of what is to follow, we are in for a very welcome and exciting addition to the *Journal*. I think that David Krech and Nevitt Sanford are really onto something, perhaps bigger than any of us can realize. As I read Krech and Sanford's initial statements, I was overjoyed, for they were touching on a theme that is dear to my own interests. For the past two

years, I have been working on the problem of trying to visualize the kinds of issues and methods that the Sciences of the Future might be interested in. Krech and Sanford's proposals show that I have not been working alone. More importantly, they indicate some of the means whereby welcome changes and developments in scientific method and the training of scientists are likely to come about.

I should like to say at the outset that Krech and Sanford's proposals are excellent and deserve the most serious consideration. Indeed we do need special committees designed to keep abreast of specific problem areas and charged with the responsibility of giving the best diagnosis they can in the face of "fast-breaking" problems where action is necessary "before all the data are in". This need *should* be obvious. That's why we must thank Krech for having pointed out the most difficult thing to see, the obvious.

"Scientists" and "Scientists"

Some of Krech's other points are not as easy to take, not because they are wrong or ill-expressed, but because they are all too true. While I fully agree that "the social psychologist must be a clinician to society", I do resent the implication (not necessarily Krech's) that the social psychologist who would fulfill such a role (i.e., advising "before all the data are in") would thereby become any less of a scientist. When Krech writes that "no number of pious statements can erase the differences—in attitude and in behavior and in activity-tempo—between the scientist and clinician", I think that he is pointing up a serious problem in the scientific community, namely that we have defined (stereotyped) the term "scientist" in such a way that it excludes the "clinician". But just because the clinician often has to act before all the data are in, does this really mean that he is any less the scientist? Isn't he just a different kind of scientist? After all, doesn't the "scientist" often act before all the data are in? (Aren't we all short-time maximizers in this "publish or perish" world?) Have we been so conditioned by the physical sciences that it is almost impossible for us to conceive of the possibility of having a science of the short-run? When Krech says that the "clinician" and "scientist" differ "in attitude and in behavior and in activity-tempo", I agree with him insofar as differences of style and method are characteristic of all scientists. But so what? Why not call them both scientists? Why the need to maintain the distinction? Isn't science big enough that it can tolerate a wide variety of styles and personality types? Or is the style and

personality of the "clinician" *threatening* to the "scientist's" traditional image of himself?

Recent developments and revelations in the psychology (Rosenthal, 1964) and sociology of science (Barber, 1961; Hagstrom, 1965) show how far the real-world scientist is from meeting the ideal image of the disinterested observer who waits patiently for all "the facts" to come in before he discovers his "eternal verities". . . .

Even more significant are recent works in the history and philosophy of science. Olaf Helmer and Nicholas Rescher's excellent paper, "On the Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences" (1959) makes the valid point that we have been too one-sided in our demands and criticisms of the "soft" social sciences. (Is not the clinician the softest of all?) In our zeal to preserve the image of the hard sciences we have often quite conveniently forgotten all the times when the physical sciences are "soft" while neglecting to mention all the times when the social sciences are "hard":

Writers on the methodology of the physical sciences often bear in mind a somewhat antiquated and much idealized image of physics as a very complete and thoroughly exact discipline in which it is never necessary to rely upon limited generalizations or expert opinion. But physical science today is very far from meeting this ideal. Indeed some branches of the social sciences are in better shape as regards the generality of their laws than various departments of physics such as the theory of turbulence phenomena, high-velocity aero-dynamics, or the physics of extreme temperatures. Throughout applied physics in particular when we move (say in engineering applications) from the realm of idealized abstraction ("perfect" gases, "homogeneous" media, etc.) to the complexities of the real world, reliance upon generalizations which are, in effect, quasi-laws becomes pronounced. (Engineering practice in general is based on "rules of thumb" to an extent undreamed of in current theories of scientific method.)

In the face of such analyses as Helmer and Rescher's why do we persist in maintaining the stereotype of the ideal scientist? Historians of science like Thomas Kuhn offer us clues. Kuhn (1962) has written how scientific training itself perpetuates the stereotyped image of science. Unlike the education of students in the arts and humanities, students in the sciences gain their education primarily through textbooks which present an almost completely ahistorical, controversy-free, and "up-to-date" development of their subject. In short, where students in the arts and humanities are educated to the norm of disagreement and controversy, students in the sciences are educated to the norm of agreement and the suppression of conflict. Little wonder that any field or notion which conflicts with the stereotype of dispassionate

inquiry is looked upon with suspicion if not outright hostility. Kuhn comments that as an historian of science, while science students are among the most rewarding to teach, they are also among the most frustrating: "Because science students 'know the right answers', it is particularly difficult to make them analyze an older science in its own terms". It is no less difficult to make them appreciate a new science or a science that is different from theirs.

A New Kind of Scientist . . .

This is why I find Krech and Sanford's proposals so interesting. Not only do they promise to provide a new kind of service that society so desperately needs, but, perhaps of even more importance in the long-run, they promise to train a new kind of scientist, or maybe I should say, provide an outlet for a scientist of a different personality bent. We have to realize that not all potential scientists are afraid to tackle the high-risk problems that are full of controversy. Until we realize this and until we provide an environment where those who are psychologically predisposed can develop their talent and expertise for making scientific predictions for the short-run, we'll never begin to develop a dynamic science of the short-run. We'll go on fulfilling our own prophecies that such a thing is not possible. And maybe it isn't. But we'll never know unless we try. Notice that if we are consistent in our passion for science, we couldn't afford *not* to try. For how else could we know what science could or could not do except by experimenting on science itself, i.e., by perturbing its methods and its manner of training its practitioners?

If by the word scientist we mean anyone who constantly tries to improve on his methods of prediction, explanation and control, then Krech's committees will be scientific and the members on them scientists if constant improvement is their goal. (Shall we say that they will be scientific if they constantly subject their methods of making short-run predictions to general long-term analysis?) It's not the nature of a problem that makes an activity scientific or not; it's the approach to the problem and the desire to constantly improve one's methods. The lesson of modern science is also that there are many scientific approaches to problems not one and that no single science has a monopoly on either methodology or content. Can we say that some personality types have a greater need to hold onto the traditional image of the scientist than others do?

In closing, there are two aspects of the feature that I feel deserve special mention. The first aspect has to do with the fact that the feature has stated that it is willing to court the elusive,

the vague but interesting problem. In the language of the editors, the feature will be amenable to "the posing of dilemmas". The second aspect has to do with the fact that the feature will not be afraid to assume positions of advocacy on controversial issues and unpopular causes, in short, to "lobby for the 'lobby-less'". Disparate as these two aspects may seem to be, they are really related in a very fundamental way. Both show a greater sense of freedom and maturity on the part of the profession to question the conventional wisdom. The first aspect shows that the profession to question the conventional wisdom. The first aspect shows that the profession is no longer afraid to entertain creative flights of fancy; the second shows that it is ready to get involved in the problems of the world. The second aspect shows that our profession has matured to the point of being interested in other than in-house problems. Shall we say that a profession, like a patient, is getting better when it is no longer so introverted and preoccupied with its own problems that it can begin to take a more active interest in the outside world? In fact, I should like to say that the profession is on the verge of discovering new aspects of its own personality, that it is on the verge of developing a psychology of psychology, one of the first steps in the development of a science of science. I would go even further and say that I see the incorporation of advocacy as the first step in the joint teaching of science and ethics which is itself the first step in the development of a science of ethics (*cf.*, Churchman, 1961).

Is this where Krech and Sanford are leading us? Well, who knows what they really have in mind. But I strongly suspect that they are testing our tolerance for ambiguity. We cannot afford to let their challenge go unanswered. I have a feeling that a science of ethics, if it is ever to come about, will have to start and end in ambiguity. The challenge is to understand what this means.

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Ivan Mitroff

The Problems of Ethics and Values . . .

Dr. William Eckhardt of the Canadian Peace Research Institute also ponders on the nature of social psychology. He takes off from where Mitroff stopped—the problems of ethics and values.

The main point to be made here is that science is a human enterprise. It was never intended to be value-free, although it often pretended to be, in order to get the culture and religion off its back, while it went about its scientific work. It was always intended to further human interests and values. Science was never merely a game. It has always been used to achieve human purposes, whether human purposes were the medical purposes of saving life most effectively or the military purposes of destroying life most effectively. Effectiveness as such is always an incomplete description of human behavior. A medical doctor and a bank robber can both be equally effective. A president and his assassin can both be equally effective. The problem of understanding human behavior is hardly solved by a value-free definition of effectiveness, no matter how operational our definition might be.

Psychologists should be deciding what psychology is for, and that means deciding what human beings are for. Now these may not be very "scientific" questions, but either we answer them, or try to, or sell our services to the highest bidder, and abrogate any responsibility we may have to ourselves, our profession, and our society. . . .

Given the dimension of compassion-compulsion, we have to decide which end of this dimension is more desirable, that is, we have to make a value-judgment. But this is really nothing new in science. Biologists have not hesitated to place a higher value on life rather than death. Medical doctors have no trouble deciding that health is better than disease. Clinical psychologists prefer the state of mental health to that of mental illness. Educational psychologists believe that superior intelligence is better than mental deficiency, other things being equal, etc. Consequently, social psychologists should have no trouble deciding that compassion is better than compulsion in human affairs, other things being equal, etc. . . .

Are Value-Judgments "Unscientific"?

If we care and dare to make such value-judgments as these, we can be sure of a value-backlash. We shall be accused by some colleagues of being "unscientific". Let us concentrate on this accusation that value-judgments are "unscientific", since this is the first barrier that has to be crashed in the scientific disciplines. It seems fairly obvious that the scientist (or anyone else, for that matter) who claims to be value-free is simply serving the status

quo of whatever values happen to prevail at the time. In other words, to prevent demonstrations, discussion, or research of opposing values is to cast a vote for the values that be. Instead of being value-free, such a scientist is being determined by values of which he is unconscious, or of which he may even want to be unconscious so that he can go about his scientific work believing it to be value-free. If this is true, then the only difference between those who claim to be value-determined and those who claim to be value-free is a difference in consciousness. And it would seem to be no less "scientific" to consciously determine the values one's scientific work is going to serve than for these values to be unconsciously determined either by one's culture or by one's personality. In fact, so far as science implies knowledge, it would seem to be more scientific to be conscious of the values guiding one's behavior and to make these values explicit, so that others may judge them for themselves.

In other words, those who want to preserve the status quo for whatever reason can afford to claim to be value-free and to insist that all others be equally value-free. This modus operandi assures the preservation of the status quo. But those who want to change the prevailing value-structure have to admit and express the fact that their behavior (even if it is scientific) is value-determined. They cannot afford the luxury of claiming to be value-free, not only because this is a false claim in any case, but it would be a self-defeating claim for those who want to focus attention on values and the need for change in the direction of higher value actualization.

The Problems for Teaching, Education and Research

Dr. Leon Rappoport of Kansas State University continues the concern with the nature of social psychology but looks at the problems for teaching, education and research.

Just a brief reaction from the ranks re. your and Sanford's statement in the recent *Journal of Social Issues*. Wonderful! I feel compelled to write because (forgive the immodesty) in the past year I have reached very similar conclusions all by myself. Allow me to explain.

As teacher, both in graduate and undergraduate social psychology courses, I find it more and more difficult to gear standard text materials to what is happening in the world. For example, all that we have on "mob psychology" or "crowd behavior" is generally irrelevant to ghetto riots and university rebellions. I find myself trying to stretch existing material to its limits and then simply letting go in order to address the present—not to mention the future.

As researcher, I have had some experiences recently that also bear on your statement. Until a year or two ago, I had not done any applied work for some time. Then I received a copy of an article by David Schoenbrun that gave an excellent brief critique of the war in Vietnam. I was also informed that some peace groups were planning mass distributions of the article. But there was no evidence that it would in fact persuade anyone to change their views. So we got into *that* problem, which led us finally to an interview study with Vietnam veterans, which has resulted in some very interesting and unexpected findings. (E.g., many of the combat veterans hate the South Vietnamese more than the North Vietnamese.) Most of our results were made available to a local peace group and have had some influence on their activities.

Partly because of the experience gained in connection with the Vietnam work, we have now begun working on a project aimed at defining the local race-poverty environment. This also began in part because someone suggested that I serve on a local human relations board, and I realized that I didn't really know enough about local situations to do anything more than display my good intentions. Of course, as social scientists we now have the Coleman Report, Pettigrew's work, Moynihan, and a few other sources, but these things only give us a sense of the parameters that must characterize any local condition; the values on the parameters must be determined locally. So I began trying to think through and test out efficient ways to acquire the needed information. It was at this point that I realized something of critical importance. Namely, that the time is past for us to see our work solely in terms of information collection. We simply cannot be content to gather material and make it available to society. We don't need, and it is almost pointless to have, more work in the tradition of Myrdal or Dollard. Instead, we need appropriate means (short of revolution, although some might disagree with this) for implementing or acting upon knowledge.

Altogether then, I hope you can see why I am delighted with your statement: it is perfectly relevant to my situation. Furthermore, what you have said serves as a nice outside justification for some of my plans to extend our social-personality graduate program in applied directions. But we need a better word than "applied". Perhaps "social action research". Among other things, your column might function to help many of us work toward a substantial definition of social action research—one that will fit the world of the 70's.

Leon Rappoport

The Amen Corner

If there can be circles within circles, we suppose there can also be corners within corners. We are tempted to found a subdepartment within The Activists' Corner called *The Amen Corner*, but we will not push our luck and establish an *Amen Corner* as a permanent feature just yet. However, if we were to have an *Amen Corner*, the following excerpts would belong there, not only because they approve our suggestions but also because they enrich, amplify, or propose ways and means to implement the suggestions. The first excerpt is from a letter written by Dr. Luther S. Distler of the Psychology Clinic at Berkeley to the officers and council members of SPSSI. Dr. Distler was kind enough to send us a copy. The second excerpt is from a letter by Professor Marcel L. Goldschmid of McGill University.

I would like to express my wholehearted endorsement of Prof. Krech's proposal in the April issue's Activist's Corner. I would urge that the council take positive action on his proposal, if not direct implementation, at least a poll of SPSSI membership directed to the question of implementation. As one of the many psychologists in the San Francisco Bay Area who worked with Paul Ekman in ABSSOP, I am convinced that there is a professionally respectable role for applied social psychology in the model of clinician-scientist. Our silence or predominately retrospective commentaries in professional journals constitutes a statement of sorts on the multitude of social issues that daily confront our conflicted society. Why shouldn't we speak out more directly and cogently.

Luther S. Distler

Your proposal to have special committees serve as advisors and consultants to the public proved that you were serious about being "activist". I am delighted to endorse such an enterprise and hope some committees will get started soon. . . .

As to the composition of these committees, I agree that eminent scientists should serve, but I would like to be sure that these psychologists are courageous men who state their opinion and advice frankly even though "the data will not all be in". It should be pointed out most emphatically that those professionals who presently advise Governments are in the same position as our committees would be. They too can not wait until exhaustive research has been conducted on a problem. They must act and state their opinion when the President, the Governor, or the Mayor asks them for it.

Finally, I feel that these committees should get started as soon as possible. After a reasonable amount of discussion and

planning, we should act as we typically do in psychology when we consider an idea; we do it empirically. Let's get some of these committees started and then, after we have some data, evaluate again whether Krech's proposal has merit.

In order to speed up communications among interested psychologists, all planning, discussion, the formation of committees, and their activities, could be reported in a newsletter (funded perhaps by voluntary contributions) to avoid publication lags.

Marcel L. Goldschmid



Comments and Rejoinders

Comment on: *The Primary Purpose of JSI*

Robert R. Rodgers
Cornell University

When I joined SPSSI five years ago I looked forward to receiving the Journal of Social Issues because that's what I thought it would be. Instead, it has consistently been just another research journal, even if the research has often been about social issues. In a research journal, by its very nature, scientists in a field address themselves to their colleagues. They do not address themselves to their "clients", nor do their "clients" address them.

Now I fear that, in the new department of the journal to be edited by David Krech and Nevitt Sanford, behavioral scientists will write for each other *informally*, whereas they previously wrote *formally*. In short, this part of the Journal of Social Issues will be a "trade journal" for socially-concerned psychologists. This will not cure the condition they describe in which "relatively few psychologists in areas other than social . . . are joining the Society". It will exacerbate it.

The primary purpose of the Journal of Social Issues should be as a kind of clearing house for the presentation of social issues to scientists (and definitely not just to behavioral scientists) by persons who face these issues in their lives, and who wish to involve scientists to help in resolving the issues by performing their functions of research and consultation. Many, many such articles can be suggested in illustration. Members of the United Nations Security Council should be invited to write about the

conditions of negotiation in the Council as they have experienced them; Cesare Chavez should be invited to describe the problems of unionizing farm laborers; Fred Friendly should be invited to report on the conflict of money and morality in news broadcasting; someone in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration should be invited to describe the problems of man-machine interaction resulting in the Apollo Program difficulties; etc., etc.

I cite only well-known issues and figures, but I hope that a tradition could be built of accepting unsolicited work from unknown persons who have experienced a social issue in the raw. The accounts would often be in the first person, but not necessarily so. They should contain facts, but may also be as deep or as inferential as the writer can manage. What they should all have in common is some kind of question and some form of invitation to scientists to contribute to the resolution of the issue. In many cases, men who are involved in social action either can not take the time to write such articles, or unable to write well enough of their own experiences. No stigma should be attached to either journalistic interviewing or collaborative writing.

This type of article would restore to the Journal of Social Issues the primary meaning of "journal"—"a record of happenings"—in contrast to the weakly derived meaning—"any periodical"—which presently applies. It would most certainly broaden the involvement with the issues beyond the narrow borders of professionally social psychologists.

The magnificent address by the late Martin Luther King, Jr. is a perfect example of the proper content of the Journal.

Rejoinder

Joshua A. Fishman
General Editor, *JSI*

The issues of our *Journal* are planned far in advance, so much so that as these words are being written I can see through to the end of my four year tenure of office as General Editor of the *JSI* (approximately a year and a half from now). With the assistance of the current Editorial Board I have by now authorized all of the issues destined to appear under my general responsibility. I, therefore, view Dr. Rodgers' comments and criticisms as providing me with an opportunity to indicate the guiding principles that have shaped my efforts on behalf of the *JSI* and that have (or will soon have) left their mark on nearly 20 of its issues. If Dr. Rodgers' comments and my rejoinder prove to be of general interest and if they elicit comments from other readers as well,

the space and time devoted to them will not only be of help to the newly incoming General Editor of the *JSI*, but they will be of help to SPSSI as an organization and to SPSSI Council in particular in planning the nature of the *JSI* for the years immediately ahead.

A Professional, Scientific Journal . . .

I have viewed the *JSI* as a *professional* social science journal devoted to the *scientific* study of social issues. I have purposely italicized "professional" and "scientific" in the foregoing sentence because I have viewed the *JSI* as primarily addressed to professional social scientists and as primarily containing the professional writings of social scientists. While I am well aware (and grateful) that many individuals who are prominent in the world of public affairs have much to say that is relevant to social issues I have particularly sought out those who could say something new and relevant to the scientific study of social issues. While I am well aware (and thankful) that some social scientists have much to say to practitioners and to intelligent laymen at large I have particularly sought those who could say something new and relevant to other social scientists professionally interested in the scientific study of social issues.

It has been my view that there are many other journals available for either men of affairs or for social scientists who wish to reach the intelligent lay readership in connection with the pressing social issues of our time. There are only a few journals that are seriously concerned with the scientific study of social issues and I have tried to make the *JSI* as justifiably well known as possible in that small company.

A scientific journal for the study of social issues seems to me to be needed for two reasons. First of all, social scientists often do make some important and novel professional contributions toward the quicker solution or the better understanding of social issues. I believe that social scientists have a professional responsibility to tackle social issues much the same as health scientists have a professional responsibility to tackle health problems. I have wanted to make the *JSI* a journal for social scientists from various disciplinary backgrounds who have accepted this responsibility and who seek to pursue it along conceptually integrated and empirically validated lines.

However, there is yet another reason why a scientific journal for the study of social issues has seemed to me to be highly desirable. "More than the Jews have guarded the Sabbath, the Sabbath has guarded the Jews (Akhad Haam)". As much as

social scientists may and do contribute to a richer understanding of social issues, the scientific study of social issues has contributed even more to the enrichment of the social sciences. The scientific study of social issues is the only way to build powerful social sciences and social sciences that are simultaneously realistically broad and productively deep. Without the scientific study of social issues as a constant corrective the social sciences cannot resist the tendency to become pedantically and aridly self-centered or method centered, seeking gratification in mere objectivity, quantification and theoretical coherence for their own sake.

In Implementation . . .

In seeking to implement the above convictions I have struggled to define "scientific" as broadly as possible. Neither experimentation nor quantification, alone or jointly, are the exhaustive hallmarks of science. Any systematic approach to explanation—be it case studies, participant observations, field surveys or careful theoretical inductions or deductions—has been considered an acceptable approach to scientific explanation, particularly where the subject matter is complex and novel.

I have also not tried to overemphasize the *psychological* contribution to the scientific study of social issues. I do not consider social psychology to be sufficiently broad to maximally enlighten us on social issues, nor do I consider it possible to appreciate either the contributions or the limitations of social psychology without the constant perspective provided by history, political science, anthropology, economics and, above all, sociology. Thus, whereas SPSSI members and other social psychologists could well have more than filled all of the *JSI* issues that have appeared under my general supervision, I have considered it to be highly undesirable that they do so. My first responsibility has been to further the scientific study of social issues rather than to further narrowly disciplinary perspective on anything as real and as pressing as social issues.

It is relatively easy to put together a provocative journal of social commentary and social concern. It is also relatively easy to put together a high quality social science journal. Well worn paths lead to both of these altars. However, the goal of putting out a provocative and high quality social science journal dedicated to the scientific study of social issues is constantly just beyond one's grasp. Social issues that are both new and urgent have inevitably received little empirical and less theoretical attention. Those social issues to which social research and social theory

have been successfully directed are inevitably somewhat passé as well as somewhat routinized and overprofessionalized in the treatment accorded to them. I have believed that the *JSI* must try to avoid both of these traps. At the same time it must be understandable to readers from a variety of social science disciplines (and even to readers from allied applied fields). It must try to further social science and to be social science without the overluxuriant terminology of social science. Obviously this too is a goal which must constantly elude one's grasp.

Reader Rodgers would have us pursue a goal which is simultaneously easier and equally worthwhile. I do not think it is the proper goal for *JSI* but it is up to *JSI* readers to make themselves heard in this connection.

As for Kretch and Sanford's "Activists' Corner": the first 3 installments speak for themselves. They seek to build a community of interest among social scientists interested in the scientific study of social issues. They seek to provide something provocative for each of us to read in *every* issue of *JSI*, whether or not the Issue Editor and the General Editor have succeeded in putting together an issue on a topic that is of direct interest to this or to that group of readers. The job of helping society as social scientists and the job of building the social sciences as specialists in the study of social issues must go on and must elicit our dedication regardless of whether a particular issue of *JSI* is devoted to a topic that interests us. The concern with the scientific study of social issues is greater than this or that particular social issue. That concern must be advanced in every issue of *JSI* and the "Activists' Corner" is a still fresh and already controversial attempt to do just that. If *JSI* readers are sympathetic toward it, it will certainly take root during the years ahead.

**Comment on: "A Theory of Organization and Change
Within Value-Attitude Systems" by Milton Rokeach
JSI, January, 1968.**

Lewis W. Brandt
University of Saskatchewan,
Regina Campus

"Beliefs" and the Whorf-Sapir Hypothesis

The problem of the organization of "beliefs" illustrates the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis according to which a person's thinking is contingent on the language in which he thinks. A number of the points which Rokeach makes in his various writings including

the address entitled "A Theory of Organization and Change Within Value-Attitude Systems" could not be made or would have to be made quite differently in either German or French. Both of these languages have nouns corresponding to "belief" which cannot form any plural (G. *Glaube*, *Vertrauen*; F. *croyance*, *foi*, *confiance*). Furthermore, just as the Eskimos have no word for "snow" but must discriminate between different consistencies and textures of the substance we call "snow", German and French and no words which cover all the different meanings in which the English word "belief" can be used. Even their words which form plurals (G. *Meinung*, *Ueberzeugung*; F. *conviction*) correspond only to certain meanings of "belief" and not to others. Similarly, the verb form "to believe in" cannot be translated into a single German or French verb form which remains identical for all meanings of "to believe in". Germans must decide between "*etwas glauben*", "*an etwas glauben*", and "*viel oder wenig von etwas halten*". In French similar distinctions are made between "*croire quelque chose*", "*croire à quelque chose*", "*croire en Dieu*" and "*considérer quelque chose bon ou mauvais*".

Three Categories . . .

These distinctions correspond to the belief in (a) the existence of something (e.g. God, dragons, flying saucers), (b) the truthfulness or correctness of a statement (e.g. "The beliefs of social psychologists are just as much mere beliefs as those of their experimental subjects"), and (c) the value or worthlessness of something (e.g. democracy, birth control, experimental psychology). While it is possible to confuse these three distinct categories of "beliefs" in English by using the same word for all three of them, the English language offers also possibilities for distinguishing between them. We can refer to the belief in the existence of something as "conviction", to the belief in the truthfulness or correctness of something as "trust", and to the belief in the value of something as "approval". These three terms were chosen in such a way that corresponding verbs ("to be convinced", "to trust" and "to approve") could be used.

Subjectively "convictions" are divided into "knowledge" which is not considered to be a belief and "beliefs" which contain the possibility of doubt. The latter introduce a number of concepts which are distinct from any kind of belief and with which Rokeach does not deal at all, namely doubt, hope and ignorance. Most instruments used in social psychology ignore doubt and lack of information as well as true indifference and thus lead to statistically significant artifacts.

Rokeach is aware of the existence of the distinctions pointed

out above. He refers to them in his definition of attitudes. However, he does not realize that different psychological states are lumped together by him merely on the basis of an English word which can be used to designate any one of them. His research findings which are based strictly on verbal communications in English do also not refer to psychological states but merely to linguistic entities.

The second confirmation which the Worf-Sapir hypothesis receives from Rokeach's theory cannot be illustrated by referring to other Indo-European languages. The issue involved is common to all Indo-European languages and could be illustrated only by comparing SAE (Standard Average European) to Hopi. The latter does not objectify or reify processes or events by using nouns. Our inability to truly think in processes (Brandt, 1966) is due to our use of nouns for non-things. Thus Rokeach can state "an attitude *is*" and "a value *is*" (italics added) instead of "when using the word attitude (or value) I refer to". Consequently attitudes and values can be quantified, measured and treated statistically.

The Treatment of Values as Structures not Processes

By treating values as structures instead of processes Rokeach distinguishes between "instrumental values" and "terminal values". If values are not considered to be things but aspects of actions, the distinction between instrumental and terminal values becomes one not of the values but of the context in which they appear. Thus, "freedom" becomes meaningful only in relation to the answer to questions "free from what"? and—as Nietzsche points out—"free for what"? It becomes thus an instrumental value while in certain instances it may represent a temporary goal in itself and thus a terminal value. Similarly, "equality" may represent a terminal value when I am fighting for it and an instrumental value when I insist upon it because my goal is free competition which cannot exist without equality. However, one may seriously question whether any value is ever "terminal" in the sense in which Rokeach seems to mean it. If he assumes that freedom is a goal in itself and not merely instrumental for reaching some other goal, why does he assume that cleanliness, forgiveness and responsibility cannot just as well be terminal? He seems again caught in a linguistic dilemma as he uses the adjectives "clean" and "responsible" and the verb "forgive" instead of the nouns. The conceptual distinction between instrumental and terminal values is thus based on the linguistic distinction between nouns and non-nouns.

Finally, Rokeach's concern with consistency, a concern which underlies his entire theory of belief, attitude and value systems and which he shares with Festinger, Osgood and many other social psychologists results perhaps from the structure of SAE which according to Korzybski, the founder of General Semantics, forms the basis of Aristotelian logic. According to the latter $p \neq \bar{p}$ and $x = p \vee \bar{p}$ and $x \neq p + \bar{p}$. This logic is the basis for the belief that contradictions cannot exist within an individual. It results in the ignoring by Rokeach of doubt and ignorance as well as ambivalence and indifference and leads to the consistent results which Osgood and his followers have obtained with the semantic differential which leaves no room for ignorance, indifference, ambivalence, inconsistency and the distinction between these four.

Rokeach knows that "in every person's value-attitude system there already exist inherent contradictions" and he assumes "of which he is unaware". This assumption is again based on Aristotelian logic according to which someone must be either aware or unaware of something. As psychoanalysts know a person can be both aware and unaware of something. The paradigm of being aware and unaware of something is the defense mechanism of denial where something must be noticed to be shut out from being noticed. Information leading to the awareness of inconsistencies of which a person was not formerly aware rarely leads to decreased inconsistency as practicing psychotherapists of various schools know.

Rokeach's theory is that beliefs, attitudes and values are organized in systems and can be changed in introducing or pointing out existing inconsistencies. While this may be true for obsessive-compulsive characters it does not apply to hysterical and genital characters. In the latter, inconsistencies can continue to exist not only with the help of defense mechanisms as Rokeach believes but because of tolerance for contradictions which ego-psychologists regard as a sign of mature adjustment. As the German humanist Ulrich von Hutten said:

Ich bin kein ausgeklügelt Buch.

Ich bin ein Mensch mit seinem Widerspruch.

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Rejoinder

Milton Rokeach

Michigan State University

All in all, I must confess that I was somewhat overwhelmed by Lewis Brandt's objections to my work on beliefs, attitudes, and, especially, values. Exactly what, I asked myself, is Brandt objecting to? I read and reread his brief paper, hoping to be able to summarize his criticisms, find a focus and attempt to formulate a reply. I could find no central issue, but I could see that Brandt is groping for a systematic formulation of his own of the nature of beliefs, attitudes and values. He finds himself extremely reluctant to accept my formulations and research findings; in stating the reasons for his reluctance, he gives all too many reasons, some of which seem contradictory to one another. Brandt objects to my lumping together different "psychological states" under the general rubric of "belief"; moreover, my research findings deal with "linguistic entities" and not with "psychological states"; and besides, my findings represent "statistically significant artifacts" because I ignore doubt, lack of information and true indifference; and besides, I treat values as "structures" and not as "processes"; and besides, I am guilty of "Aristotelian logic" in treating the problem of psychological consistency; and besides, practicing therapists know that you *cannot* change the values and attitudes of a person by raising to his level of awareness the contradictions existing within his value-attitude system; and besides, therapists also know that you *can* change values and attitudes, but only in obsessive-compulsives and not in hysterical and genital character types. It is this "and besides" quality of Brandt's remarks which makes it difficult for me to know how to answer him.

The Criticisms One by One . . .

Since I could find no central issue among Brandt's objections on which to focus, I can respond to him only by reacting to some of his specific criticisms one-by-one:

. . . "A number of the points which Rokeach makes in his various writings could not be made or would have to be made quite differently in either German or French". I am sure Brandt is right about this, but the observation will not be very helpful to me unless Brandt further specifies which points I could not have made, *which* points I would have to make quite differently and what difference the difference would make insofar as specific hypothesis-formulations and testing are concerned.

. . . "Most instruments used in social psychology ignore doubt and lack of information as well as true indifference and thus lead to statistically significant artifacts". I agree, and await Brandt's suggestions on how we should go about correcting this situation in order not to end up with "statistically significant artifacts".

. . . My "research findings which are based strictly on verbal communications in English do not also refer to psychological states but merely to linguistic entities". I do not know precisely to which research findings Brandt is referring. If he means those based on the Dogmatism Scale, there are confirmations of parts of my work in Swedish, German and Italian (not to speak of confirmations in many other languages which involve the F scale). If he means my work on the "principle of belief congruence" I see no reason why similar results would not be obtained in any language; and I would remind him that I have presented data on behavioral choice supporting the principle of belief congruence; these data are highly consistent with the linguistic choices reported by myself and co-workers, and by others as well. If he means my work on values I would draw his attention to the data on the values of Lenin and Hitler (see Table 4, page 26, in Rokeach, 1968a or Table 18, page 172, in Rokeach, 1968b), based on translations into English of works by Hitler and Lenin. I very much doubt that the values found for Hitler and Lenin would have been any different had we analyzed them in the original German and Russian.

The Distinction Between Instrumental and Terminal Values

. . . Brandt objects to my distinction between instrumental and terminal values because it treats values "as structures instead of processes". Freedom, according to Brandt, may be an instrumental value in certain contexts and a terminal value in another. I see no point in arguing over something as profoundly difficult as alternative definitions of the nature of values. I would prefer to shift the discussion to the issue of the fruitfulness of alternative conceptualizations for empirical research. In reviewing Brandt's view of the nature of values, I cannot help asking: In what specific ways will it be helpful or relevant in advancing theory and empirical research on value organization, value change or behavioral change?

. . . "If he assumes that freedom is a goal in itself and not merely instrumental for reaching some other goal, why does he assume cleanliness, forgiveness and responsibility cannot just as well be terminal"? Because "cleanliness, forgiveness, and respon-

sibility" refer to *ways of behaving* and not to *states of existence*. These values do not, therefore, qualify as terminal values, under my definition of terminal values. We say, for example, that a person strives for a "state of salvation" (a terminal value, in my conception), and we say that a person strives to *behave cleanly, forgivingly and responsibly* (instrumental values, in my conception). The definition of an instrumental value is not so much "Is it instrumental to something else"? but "Does it or does it not refer to a preferred mode of behavior which could be instrumental to some preferred end-state of existence"? If it does, it satisfies my definition of an instrumental value. Similarly, my way of defining a terminal value is to ask: "Does it or does it not refer to an end-state of existence"? If it does, it satisfies my definition of a terminal value. It may well be that one terminal value is instrumental to another terminal value, and that one instrumental value is instrumental to another instrumental value. But at this moment I do not see any great research payoff in pursuing such questions. I prefer to pursue the appealing idea that there is a set of instrumental values (modes of behavior) which is in the service of another set of values—terminal values (end-states of existence). And I intend for the moment to use the value concept in no other way (but I'm not promising not to change my mind). And, of course, others are not obliged to accept my way of defining values.

Goodness knows how many fruitful (that is, scientifically fruitful) ways there might be to define and measure values. Why quarrel about it? Let's just get to work to see where alternative conceptions lead us. If Brandt feels that he has some better way of defining and measuring values, let him demonstrate its fruitfulness, by whatever criteria of fruitfulness are meaningful to him. And if I like his criteria of fruitfulness, I will try to buy them.

... "The conceptual distinction between instrumental and terminal values is . . . based on the linguistic distinction between nouns and non-nouns". I would prefer to say "between a certain kind of noun (those nouns referring to preferred end-states of existence) and a certain kind of non-noun (those non-nouns referring to preferred modes of behavior)".

The Awareness of Inconsistencies

... "Information leading to the awareness of inconsistencies of which a person was not formerly aware rarely leads to decreased inconsistency as practicing psychotherapists of various schools know". Despite what practicing psychotherapists know, the data I have presented do nevertheless strongly suggest changes in values and attitudes which have endured for at least three to five months after a half-hour experiment. Brandt can choose

either to dismiss these results, on the ground that "psychotherapists know" such results are "rare", or to try to account for the obtained findings in some other way. The history of science is full of accounts of findings which practitioners or experts "know" cannot be or which they consider highly improbable. I am not impressed with such orthodox arguments. If Brandt cannot accept my interpretation of the data, he has no choice but to try to account for these data in some other way. If he cannot accept my interpretation of my data, he is still obliged to accept my data. He may choose to reinterpret them, but he cannot choose to dismiss them.

"Rokeach's theory is that beliefs, attitudes and values can be changed by . . . pointing out existing consistencies. While this may be true for obsessive-compulsive characters it does not apply to hysterical and genital characters". This idea seems to contradict Brandt's earlier remark cited above, but it is an idea worth pursuing. As soon as we find reasonable measures of obsessive-compulsive, hysterical and genital characters, we intend to use them in our ongoing research program on the organization and modification of values, attitudes and behavior.

In closing, I would like to wish the *Journal of Social Issues* well in its inauguration of a "Comments and Rejoinder" section. I hope that the exchange between Brandt and myself will stimulate others to submit their reactions to the complex issues we have raised.

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
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
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